ment of duty or propriety; and am perfuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my fervices, that in the prefent circumftances of our country, you will not difapprove my determination to retire.

The impreffions with which I first undertook the arduous truft, were explained on the proper occafion. In the difcharge of this truft, I will only fay, that I have with good intentions, contributed towards the organization and administration of the government, the bett exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious in the outfet of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps itill more in the eyes of others, has ftrengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of years admonithes me more and more, that the fhade of retirement is as necellary to me, as it will be welcome. Satisfied, that if any circumftances have given peculiar value to my fervices, they were temporary; I have the confolation to believe, that while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political fcene, patriotism does not forbid it.

In looking forward to the moment, which is intended to terminate the career of my public life, my feelings do not permit me to fufpend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude, which I owe to my beloved country, for the many honours it has conferred upon me: frill more for the fted fat confidence with which it has fupported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifeding my inv olable attachment, by fervices faithful and perfevering, though in ufefulnes unequal to my zeal. If benefits have refulted to our country f om thefe fervices, let it always be remembered to your pra fe, and as an inftructive example in our anals, that under circumitances in which the paffions, agitated in every direction, were liable to milead, amidit appearances fometimes dubious, viciffitudes of fortune often difcouraging, in fituations in which not unfrequently want of fuccefs has countenanced the spirit of criticifm, the constancy of your fupport was the effential prop of the efforts, and a guarrantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I fhall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to uncealing vows, tha heaven may continue to you the choiceft tokens of its beneficence, that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual; that the free Conftitution, which is the work of your hands, may be facredly maintained; that its adminiftration in every department may be ftamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of thefe ftates, under the aufpices of liberty, may be made c mplete, by fo careful a prefer. vation, and fo prudent a ufe of this bleffing, as will acquire to them he glory of recommending to the applaufe, the affection and adoption of every nation which is yet a ftranger to it.

Here, perhaps, I ought to trop. But folicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehenfion of danger, natural to that folicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the prefent, to offer to your folemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, fome fentiments, which are the refult of much reflection, of no inconfiderable obfervation, and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. There will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only fee in them the difinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can podibly have no perfonal motive to bias his counfel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my fentiments on a former and not diflimilar occafion.

Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is neceffary to fortify or confirm the attachment.

The

The unity of government, which conftitutes you one people, is alfo now dear to you. It is juitly fo; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the fupport of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad; of your fafety; of your profperity; of that very liber y which you fo highly prize. But as it is eafy to forefee, that from different caufes and from different quarters, much pains will be tak n, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortrefs against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be moit conftantly and actively (though covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment, that you should properly eltimate the immenfe value of your na ional union, to your collective and individual happinefs; that you thould cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it, accuftoming yourfelves to think and fpeak of it as of the palladium of your political fatety and profperity; watching for its prefervation with jealous anxiety; difcountenancing whatever may fugget even a fufpicion that it can in any event be abandoned: and indignantly frowning upon the firft dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the reit, or to enfeeble the facred ties which now link together its various parts.

For this you have every inducement of fympathy and intereit. Citizens by birth or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to you, in your national capacity, mult always exalt the just pride of patriotiin, more than any appellation derived from local di criminations. With fight fhades of difference, you have the fame re igion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have a common cause tought and triumphed toe her; the independence an: liberty you poffets are the work of joint councils and joint efforts, of common dangers, fufferings, and fuccefs.

But thefe confiderations, however powerfully they addrefs themselves to your fenfibility, are greatly outweighed b thole which apply more immediately to your intereft.-Here every por ion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and prelerving the union of the whole.

The north, in an unreftrained intercourfe with the fouth, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter, great additional refources of maritime and comn.ercial enterprize, and precious materiais of manu afturing industry. The fouth, in the fame intercourfe, benefiting by the agency of the north, fees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand, turning partly into its own channels the feamen of the north, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and while it contributes, in different ways, to nourih and increase the general mafs of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime ftrength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The east, in a like intercourfe with the weft, already finds, and in the progreflive improvement of interior communication by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent for the commoditis which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The weft derives from the eat fupplies, requisite to its growth and comfort; and what is perhaps of itill greater confequence, it must of neceflity owe the fecure enjoyment of indifpenfable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime ftrength of the Atlantic de of the union, directed by an indiffoluble community of intereft as one nation. Any other tenure by which the weft can hold this effential advantage, whether derived from its own feparate ftrength, or from an apoftate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, muft be intrinsically precatious.

While

While then every part of our country thus feels an inmediate and particular intereft in union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mafs of means and efforts, greater ftrength, greater refource, proportionably greater fecurity from external danger, a lefs frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations, and, what is of ineftimable value they muft derive from union an exemption from tho'e broils and wars between themf. Ives, which fo frequently afflist neighbouring countries not tied together by the fame government; which their own rivalfhips alone would be fufficient to produce, but which, opposite foreign alliances, attachments and intrigues would ftimulate and mbitter, Hence, likewife, they will avoid the neceffity of thote over-grown ettablifhments, which under any form of government are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as par icularly hoftile to Republican liberty; in this fenfe it is, that your union ought to be contidered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one, ought to endear to you the prefervation of the other.

Thefe confiderations fpeak a perfuafive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the union as a primary object of patriotic defire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace fo large a fphere? Let experience folve it. To listen to mere fpeculations in fuch a cafe were criminal. We are au thorifed to hope that a proper organ zation of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the refpective fubdivifions, will afford a happy iffue to the experiment. 'Tis well worth a fair and full experiment. With fuch powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience fhall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reafon to diftruft the patriotifm of thofe, who in any quarter may endeavour to weaken its bands.

In contemplating the caufes which may disturb our union, it occurs as matter of ferious concern, that any ground fhould have been furnished for characterifing parties by geographical difcriminations, northern and fouthern, atlantic and weftern; whence defigning men may endeavour to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interefts and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular diftricts, is to mifreprefent the opinions and aims of other diftricts. You cannot fhield yourfelves too much against the jealoules and heartburnings which ipring from thefe mifreprefentations: they tend to render alien to each other, thofe, who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had an uieful leffon on this head; they have feen, in the negotiation by the Executive Government, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, with Spain, and in the univerfal fatisfaction at the event, throughout of the treaty the United States, a decifive proof how unfounded were the fufpicions propagated among them of a policy in the general government, and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their inte reits in regard to the Mililippi: they have been witneffes to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain, and that with Spain, which fecure to them every thing they could defire, in refpect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their profperity. Will it not be their witdom to rely for the preservation of thefe advantages on the Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to thofe advifers, if fuch there are, who would fever them from their brethren, and connect them with aliens ?

To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a Government for the whole is indifpenible. No alliances, however frist, between the parties can be an adequate fubftitute; they muft inevitably experience

f

the

the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Senfible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first effay, by the adoption of a Conftitution of Government be ter calculated than your former for an intimate Un'on, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the diftribution of its powers, uniting fecurity with energy, and containing within itfelf a provifion for its own amendment, has jut claim to our confidence and your fupport. Refpect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiefcence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true Liberty. The bafis of our political fyftem is the right of the people to make and to alter their Conftitutions of Government; but, the Conftitution which at any time exifts, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is facredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish Government, prefuppofes the duty of every individual to obey the established Government.

All obstructions to the executions of the Laws, all combinations and affociations, under whatever plaufible character, with the real defign, to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the Conftituted Authorities, are deftructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They ferve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force-to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the will of a party, often a fmall but artful and enterprizing minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public adminiftration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of confiftent and wholefome plans, digefted by common councils, and modified by mutual interefts.

However combinations or affociations of the above defcription may, now and then, anfwer popular ends, they are likely in the courfe of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to fubvert the power of the people, and to ufurp for themfelves the reins of Government; deftroying after wards the very enemies which have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Towards the prefervation of your Government, and the permanency of your prefent happy State, it is requifite, not only that you steadily difcountenance irregular oppofitions to its acknowledged authority, but alfo, that you refilt with care the fpirit of innovation upon its principles, however fpecious the pretexts. One method of affault may be to effect, in the forms of the Conftitution, al erations, which will impair the energy of the fyftem, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of Governments, as of other human inflitutions-that experience is the fureft tandard, by which to teft the real tendency of the exifting Con ftitution of a Country-that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothefis and opinion, expofes to perpetual change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interefts, in a country fo extenfive as ours, a Government of as much vigour as is confiftent with the perfect fecurity of liberty, is indifpenfable. Liberty itfelf will find in fuch a Government, with powers properly diftributed and adjusted, its fureft guardian. It is, indeed, little elfe than a name, where the Government is too feeble to withstand the enterprizes of Faction, to

confine

confine each Member of the Society within the limits prefcribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the fecure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of perfons and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of Parties in the State, with the particular reference to the founding of them on geographical difcriminations. Let me now take a more comprehenfive view, and warn you in the most folemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of Party generally.

This fpirit, unfortunately, is infeparable from our nature, having its roots in the strongest pallions of the human mind. It exifts under different fhapes in all Governments, more or lefs ftifled, controlled, or oppreffed; but in thofe of the popular form, it is feen in its greatest rankness, and it is truly their work enemy.

The alternate domination of one Faction over another, fharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to Party diffention, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a moft horrid defpotifm. The diforders and miferies which refult, gradually incline the minds of men to feek fecurity and repofe in the abfolute power of an individual; and, fooner or later, the Chief of fome prevailing Faction, more able or more fortunate than his Competitors, turns this difpofition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of Public Liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of fight) the common and continged mifchiefs of the spirit of party are fufficient to make it the intereft and duty of a wife people to difcourage and reftrain it.

It ferves always to diftract the Public Councils and enfeeble the Public Administration. It agitates the Community with ill founded jealousies and falfe alarms; kindles the animofity of one part againt another, fo ments occafionally riot and infurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated accefs to the Govern ment itself through the channels of party paflions. Thus the policy and the will of the country are fubjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the fpirit of Liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical caft, Patriotifm may look with indulgence, if not with favour, upon the fpirit of party. But in thofe of the popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a fpirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every falutary purpose. And there being conftant danger of excefs, the effect ought to be, by force of pub. lic opinion, to mitigate and affuage it. A fire not to be quenched; it demands an uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, left, inftead of warming, it fhould confume.

It is important likewife, that the habits of thinking in a free countrý fhould infpire caution, in thofe entrusted with its administration, to confine themfelves within their refpective conftitutional fpheres, avoiding in the exercife of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The fpirit of encroachment tends to confolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of Government, a real Defpotifin. A juft eftinate of that love of power, and pronenefs to abufe it, which predominates in the human heart, is fufficient to fatisfy us of the truth of this pofition. The neceffity of reciprocal checks in the exercife of political power, by dividing f 2

and