tained letters of administration on the estate of Winburn. After the purchase Boatwell died and she married Reynell, who in her right detained the articles so purchased by Boatwell, alledg ing that an aministrator could no otherwise acquire a property in any articles belonging to the estate of his intestate than by paying the value to a creditor, which here he had not done... The defendant's counsel cited office of executor, 89. Boatwell in right of his wife was the vender by means of the sheriff according to the act of 1762, ch. 5, sec. 10. And it is absurd that the seller shall become the purchaser: to whom shall he give bond and sureties as required by the act?-Surely not to himself; much less to to the sheriff who is only an instrument and has no interest. The goods yet remain part of the intestates' estate, and an execution issued against his assets in the hands of his administrators would attach upon them. An administrator or executor as such can no otherwise become entitled to the goods of his testator than by paying their value to creditors, as stated in the book cited. Verdict and Judgment for defendant. Collins vs. Dickerson. THE clerk and master Mr. Iredell, had issued his execution for about the sum of four hundred pounds as due for the costs of this suit, which Dickerson complained of. And the court in the beginning of this Term referred it to Mr. Blair to state to the Court the services which had been performed by Mr. Iredell. He accordingly made his report; whereupon several questions arose and were debated at the bar. One was, whether for sums expressed in figures in recording the proceedings he should charge for as many words as would be necessary to express the sum in words at length, or whether he should charge for each sum expressed in figures as for one word. Per curiam, WILLIAMS and HAYWOOD. He shall charge as for one word for each sum expressed in figures in pounds, shillings and pence, as for instance, f. 1 10 11, expressed in figures shall be charged for as for one word. Another question was, what should be deemed a copy sheet; that not being expressed in the act of 1787, ch. 22, sec. 3. Per curiam, it is mentioned in the act of 1782, ch. 11, sec. 4, to be ninety words: the legislature meant the same thing in the act of 1787. Halifax, October, 1797. GR ENERAL DAVIE moved to prove the will of Major Ge rard, lately deceased; saying the estate was under such cir cumstances as required immediate attention before the time of the sitting of the county court of Edgecombe where the testator resided at the time of his death. Per Guriam. WILLIAMS and HAYWOOD. The act of 1789, ch. 23, sec. 1, directs the probate of wills to be in the court of the county where the deceased resided, to the end that those concerned to contest it, might know where to go to make opposition to the probate. The parties cannot know it will be offered here so cannot be prepared to oppose it here, et per HAYWOOD Judge. This court, independent of the other reason has but an appellate jurisdiction in cases of probates, by 1777, ch. 2, sec. 62 63, and for that reason cannot take probate in the first instance. Motion denied. Bryant vs. Vinson, Ejectment.. A TRACT of 640 acres had been granted, then 320 acres sold off by an uncertain description, then the remaining 300, "running along a path to a branch, then down the branch to its "junction with another branch, then up the latter branch to the "path, and along the path to a corner on the opposite extremity "of the tract, and so around to the beginning." The bargainee. of this latter tract bargained and sold to another; beginning as in the former deed and running to the branch, thence to the corner (before described) on the opposite extremity. WILLIAMS Judge. The plaintiff's counsel contend, that by the description in the latter deed, the line was intended to run as described in the former-down the first branch, then up the se eond, and thence along the path to the corner. But the word thence is not a term of relation; it does not refer to the boundaries in the former deed. Thence to a corner can mean nothing but a direct line from the former to the latter point. To deviate from the former point immediately and return by another line to the direct one from that to the latter, and then along the direct line is not warranted by the term thence to the beginning. HAYWOOD Judge assented; but the Jury found otherwise. Whitehead (Widow) vs. Clinch. PLAINTIFF exhibited her petition for dower under the act of 1784, ch. 22, sec. 9, and defendant pleaded. Baker, for plaintiff, insisted that the proper way for the defendant to make his defence was by way of answer on oath to the petition, where upon the court will determine in a summary way, and the issue shall be tried by the court. Davie, for the defendant, argued strenuously that pleading the defence was the only proper way. Per Curiam. Williams and Haywood Judges.--It is true some of the practices since the act of 1784, have made their defences by way of auswer, it is equally true that others have made defence by pleading, and it is at the practice should be settled. The act of 1784 did not intend this to be an equity proceeding; it did not mean to require that the defendant should answer on oath; it alters the common law no farther than it has directly expressed by substituting the petition in place of the intricate proceedings by writ and declaration; the defence must be made and tried as before it is absurd to say the court shall try in a summary way whether the plaintiff received satisfaction or not, or was lawfully married or not: the rules of the common law are never to be departed from but where the legislature have expressly directed it, or where it necessarily follows from what they have directed: they have not done this in the present instance; they have not required any answer on oath, and the court will not. So the jury was sworn on the pleas, and after much argument on both sides the court permitted oral evidence to be given of cohabitation in proof of the marriage notwithstanding the English authorities require a certificate of the Bishop, because there is no record kept here of marriages as in England there is, consequently no certificate of any officer can be had, and unless parol evidence be received we shall invalidate all the marriages in the country. THIS Williamson, by Guardian vs. Cox. HIS was an action of trespass, and on not guilty pleaded upon trial, the case appeared to be, that Williamson was seized of the lands in which, &c. and died seized in the year 1780, and afterwards his widow married, and her son the heir of Williamson assigned dower by metes and bounds which were specified in a deed signed by the son and his mother. Some time afterwards, Cox the second husband died, and the widow cleared the lands and cultivated them beyond those bounds. Per Curiam, The deed ascertaining the boundaries is not binding, being signed by the defendant during her coverture with the second husband; neither is her acceptance of dower during coverture an estopal to her to claim more as it might have been, had the acceptance been during her widowhood, but she ought to have had a new assignment of dower if she was dissatisfied with the former; she cannot enter upon and occupy what part she pleases without assignment, and therefore her entering upon the land beyond those bounds, and clearing and cultivating them, was a trespass. Verdict for the plaintiff. State vs. Ingles. INDICTMENT for a riot with others, and for beating and imprisoning Edward D. Barry. The defendant pleaded that he had been heretofore indicted in the county court of Edgcombo for an assault and battery on the said Barry, and thereon had been convicted and fined, which indictment and conviction had been grounded on the same facts that this indictment was preferred for. Per Curiam. After argument, by Baker, for the state, and White for the defendant, the truth of this plea is admitted by the demurrer; the state cannot divide an offence consisting of several trespasses into as many indictments as there are acts of trespass that would separately support an indictment and afterwards indict for the offence compounded of them all; as for instance, just to indict for an assault, then for a battery, then for imprisonment, then for a riot, then for a mayhem, &c. but upon an indictment for any of these offences the court will enquire into the concomitant facts, and receive information thereof, by way of aggravating the fine or punishment, and will proportion the same to the nature of the offence as enhanced by all these circumstances, and no indictment will afterwards lie for any of these separate facts done at the same time. This plea is a good one and must be allowed. The plea was allowed and the defendant discharged. Wilmington, November, 1797. Anonymous. DEBT upon a bond executed here, and payable to a person of South-Carolina. Per Curiam. Haywood, Justice only in court.-This bond is not made payable in South-Carolina-if it were, yet as it was executed here, it shall only carry North Carolina interest. A contract is to be interpreted according to the law of the country where made, and draws to it such legal consequences as the law of that country attaches to it. Had the bond been executed in South-Carolina, and there payable, it would undergo a different consideration. Cobham, assignee of Creedon vs. the executors of Neill. ASE upon a note of hand, and the act of limitation pleaded. This action had been instituted against the testator in his life time; and after his death, was continued against his executors by scire facias, under the act of 1786, ch. 14, sec. 1. On the trial, the plaintiff proved an acknowledgment of the debt about a month after the assignment, the assignee then being in the country, and having gone off about a month after the acknowledgment, to Europe. Per Curiam. Haywood, Justice only in court.-The plaintiff's cause of action accrued by the assignment (the original promisee being beyond sea,) the act began to run upon his demand, and continued to do so all the time he stayed here; and his withdrawing to parts beyond the sea afterwards, will not sus pend its operation. The saving in the act only extends to such persons as were beyond the sea at the time when the action accrued; not to such who were here when it accrues: and as he did not sue within three years after the accruing of the action, he is barred. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendant. Same vs. Mosely. CASE upon a note of hand and the act of limitation pleaded. The note was dated and made payable in the year 1775.-This action was commenced in the year 1792, but the plaintiff proved the note was presented to Mosely not longer than a month or two before the beginning of the action-who said, "It was at the desire of my mother I gave it; I will not pay it;, Kosser ought to pay it; I will speak to him about it. Per Curiam. Williams and Haywood.-After the point hadi been reserved and argued, the latter words of this conversation. admit the debt has never been paid; the former admit the defendant's signature. An admission of the signature, it is true, is no admission of the debt; for still it may be usurious, a gaming debt, or the meney may have been paid, or it may be under some other circumstances which render it not a just debt but when he says Rosser ought to pay it, I will speak to him about it this shews the debt is not paid; and though he says at the same time, I will not pay it-yet being legally due from him, the law will compel him to pay it. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Cobham, assignee of Creedon vs. Administrators. CASE upon a note of hand, and the act of limitation pleaded amongst other pleas. The note was executed and made payable before the war, and suit had not been commenced till long after three years of computable time had elapsed from the day of payment. Evidence was offered by the plaintiff's counsel of an admission of the debt within three years next before the action commenced, which was objected to by the defendant's counsel, on the ground that any exception to take the case out. of the act should have been replied and notice thereby given of. the particular fact relied upon to take the case out of the act, and he was about to produce authorities to that point. Per curiam. You need not produce cases to that effect, the law is so, and if you insist upon it, on that ground the court will reject the evidence; but the practice of the bar has been not to draw out the pleadings at length, nor to reply but when the act of limitation is pleaded; to proceed to give evidence of facts that will avoid the act, as if such facts had been replied; it is for you to consider whether insisting upon the strict rule of law at this |