83. The phrase "State-banking associations" used in the sixth section of the internalrevenue act of March 3, 1865, chap. 78, as amended by the act of July 13, 1866, chap. 184, comprehends not only associations organized under State-banking laws, but associations or partnerships formed by private agreement for the purpose of carrying on the business of banking. And it may also be taken to include a railroad company issuing scrip in the form of currency, where the issue by the company possesses the essential characteristics of a banking operation. Opinion of Feb. 23, 1874, 14 Op. 373.

84. The limitation imposed by the twentysecond section of the act of July 14, 1870, chap. 255, as to the value of "household effects" which are exempted from duty thereunder, ceased to be of force when the provision in the fifth section of the act of June 6, 1872, chap. 315, also exempting such articles from duty, took effect; the provision in the latter act wholly superseding that contained in the former act, relative to the exemption of household effects. 386.

Opinion of April 15, 1874, 14 Op.

thereto being, that where a general intention is expressed in a statute, and the statute also expresses a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception. Opinion of May 5, 1875, 14 Op. 573.

88. The second proviso in section 3 of the act of March 3, 1875, chap. 127, is amendatory of section 3019 of the Revised Statutes, and must be construed in connection with the latter section, not in connection with the enactment in which it is found; the two (i. e., the proviso and section 3019), in effect, declaring that 10 per cent. on the amount of all drawbacks allowed by the statute shall be retained for the use of the United States, provided that of the drawback on refined sugars only 1 per cent. of the amount so allowed shall be retained. Opinion of May 8, 1875, 14 Op. 578.

89. By act of March 2, 1861, section 20, a duty of 20 per cent. ad valorem was laid on "sawed timber;" and by act of June 6, 1872, section 1, a certain duty per thousand feet was imposed on "sawed lumber." The Treasury Department construed the latter provision to supersede the former. Both provisions were, however, subsequently re-enacted in section 2504 Rev. Stat.: Held, that the construction of the Treasury Department was correct, and that the mere bringing forward into the Revised Statutes of the two provisions has not changed the previous state of the law. Opinion of June 19, 1875, 15 Op. 493.

Opin

86. The phrase "from and after the date of the passage of this act" used in section 1 of the act of February 8, 1865, chap. 36, and the phrases from and after the passage," and "on and after the date of the passage," used in the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth sections of the same act, were employed simply as equivalents of each other, and are to be understood as identical in meaning and force. Opinion of March 10, 1875, 14 Op. 542.

87. In construing sections 1222 and 2062 of the Revised Statutes together, the latter must be understood as constituting an exception to the former; the rule of interpretation applicable

90. Semble that the original dates of the provisions of the Revised Statutes must be con

other, and that a previous decision of a court or a Department based upon the circumstance that one such provision is an earlier, and the other a later, expression of the will of Congress, binds as much as ever. Ibid.

91. Sections 3679 and 3732 Rev. Stat. should be construed together. The latter section authorizes the heads of the War and Navy Departments, in the absence of appropriations, to purchase or contract for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, not exceeding the necessities of the current year. Such contracts are not within the prohibition of the former section. Opinion of March 21, 1877, 15 Op. 209.

92. The act of February 27, 1877, entitled "An act to perfect the revision of the statutes

of the United States," &c., must be deemed to take effect only from its date; there being nothing in its language which expressly, or by necessary implication, gives to it a retrospective operation. Opinion of April 7, 1877, 15 Op. 222.

dividuals," does not apply to a contractor with the United States. Opinion of May 3, 1877, 15 Op. 254.

98. The amendments of sections 2659 and 2660 Rev. Stat., made by the act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69, are not retroactive. That act takes effect, not from the date of the Re

94. The provisions of the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 119, by which the Secretary of War is "authorized to reopen the settlement made by the United States Government with the Western and Atlantic Railroad of the State of Georgia," &c., are mandatory. The word "authorized," as there used, confers a power, the exercise of which is not meant to be dependent upon the discretion of the Secretary, but to be imperative upon him when he is applied to by the party interested. Opinion of April 13, 1877, 15 Op. 621.

95. Under the amendment of section 3140 Rev. Stat., made by the act of February 27, 1877, chap. 69, the word " 'person," as used in chapter 4, of title 35, Rev. Stat., is to be understood as so including a corporation engaged in distilling spirits that it may give the bond and perform other acts required by the internal-revenue law of distillers, in its corporate capacity. The existence of a penalty in certain sections of that title, prescribing imprisonment as a part of the punishment, is not incompatible with an intent to include under the word person, as therein employed, a corporation. Opinion of April 23, 1877, 15 Op. 230.

96. The proceedings in Congress on the bill concerning the settlement made with the Western and Atlantic Railroad of Georgia are not admissible to control the words finally adopted by that body to convey its meaning in the act relating to the same matter (act of March 3, 1877, chap. 119). Opinion of April 24, 1877, 15 Op. 625.

97. The "public exigency" contemplated by section 3709 Rev. Stat. is one of time only. The provision in same section requiring articles or services to be obtained by “open purchase or contract at the place and in the manner in which such articles are usually bought and sold, or such services engaged between in

date of its own enactment, except in a case where (as in the amendment of section 1375) the purpose to make it retrospective is distinctly indicated. (Opinion of April 7, 1877, 15 Op. 222, referred to and reaffirmed). Opinion of May 4, 1877, 15 Op. 259.

99. Statutes imposing disabilities are not to be extended by construction. Opinion of Sept. 6, 1877, 15 Op. 652.

100. Agreeably to the intent of Congress, the clause in the second section of the act of March 3, 1875, referring to the provisions of section 2 of the act of March 30, 1868, must be deemed to limit the operation of section 1223 Rev. Stat. Opinion of Dec. 11, 1877, 15 Op. 407.

101. The prohibition contained in the joint resolution of March 2, 1867 (the provisions of which are embodied in section 3480 Rev. Stat.), is applicable to claims for bounty land; the intent of Congress being to include therein all manner of claims and demands-not only pecuniary, but other claims as well. Opinion of Feb. 20, 1878, 15 Op. 451.

102. The words "restored to market," in section 3 of the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 125, entitled "An act to secure the rights of settlers upon certain railroad lands," &c., are controlled by the last clause in the same section, viz, "and opened to settlement and purchase under the homestead laws of the United States only." Those words, taken in connection with this clause, signify nothing more than a withdrawal of the lands from the condition of reservation in which they have been held by reason of the railroad grant referred to in the first section of the act. Opinion of Oct. 19, 1878, 16 Op. 181.

103. The provision in the act of December 15, 1877, chap. 3-viz, that " said bureau shall be closed"—is to be understood as allowing a reasonable time therefor after January 1, 1879. The expenses incident to such work may be defrayed from the appropriation in the act of June 20, 1878, chap. 359. Opinion of Dec. 30, 1878, 16 Op. 239.

104. Legislation is to be deemed to be prospective only, unless language be used leading, either directly or by fair inference, to the conclusion that it is to have a retrospective operation. Opinion of Aug. 23, 1879, 16 Op. 378.

IV. Repeal.

105. Implied repeals are not to be favored. Opinion of June 10, 1857, 9 Op. 46.

106. An earlier law is never to be taken as repealed by a later without words to that effect, unless they be so inconsistent that both cannot stand together. Ibid.

107. Where one statute is repealed by another statute, acts done in the mean time, while it was in force, endure and stand, and are good and effectual. Opinion of Sept. 30, 1867, 12 Op. 251.

108. On every act professing to repeal or interfere with the provisions of a former law, it is a question of construction whether it operates as a total or partial repeal. Ibid.

109. The act of July 27, 1866, chap. 284, repealed the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1851, chap. 32, so far as that section relates to the appraisers and assistant appraisers for the port of New York, but no further. Opinion of Aug. 17, 1870, 13 Op. 312.

was stolen and transferred when past due, is entitled to payment, as against the party from whom it was stolen. Opinion of Sept. 4, 1865, 11 Op. 332.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

1. H. D. Bacon, a member of the firm of Page & Bacon, of Saint Louis, and also of that of Page, Bacon & Co., of San Francisco, applied to the Postmaster-General for an order to the deputy postmaster of the city of New York that all the correspondence of the firm in San Francisco addressed to their several agents in the Atlantic and Western States, and daily expected in New York by the steamer bringing the mails from San Francisco, should be delivered to him, H. D. Bacon: Held, that the writer of a letter has no such general property in it as to entitle him in every case to reclaim it while in transitu. Opinion of March 28, 1855, 7 Op. 76.

2. Exceptional cases may exist of right to reclaim a letter in the analogy of the cases of stoppage in transitu by the law merchant; but all such cases are exceptional, each depending on its own special merits, and there is no authority in law for the issue of the order asked in this case of the Postmaster-General.

Ibid.

SUBSIDIARY SILVER COIN.

See SILVER COIN.

1. It is lawful to serve either a civil or criminal process upon a person on board a British man-of-war lying within our territory. Opinion of March 11, 1799, 1 Op. 87.

2. The late collector at Savannah being in

debted to the Government, an action at law should be brought against him for the apparent balance due. Opinion of March 31, 1824, 1 Op. 639.

3. The judiciary cannot enjoin the executive branch of the Government from performing any duty specially devolved on it by the legislature or by the Constitution of the United States. Yet there are cases in which the courts will be found a useful auxiliary to the Executive, and promotive of the purposes of justice. Opinion of July 27, 1824, 1 Op. 681.

4. The proceedings to be had on an injunction granted by the district judge of Georgia against further proceedings upon a warrant of distress issued from the Treasury Department, under the act of Congress of the 15th of May, 1820, chap. 107, should be the same as in other cases, except that no answer is necessary on the part of the United States. Opinion of Aug. 23, 124, 1 Op. 694.

5. In every action brought upon a purser's bond for violation of his duties, his duties must be specified in the declaration. Opinion of Jan. 31, 1827, 2 Op. 50.

6. Judgments upon duty bonds against a surety are valid, although the suits were protracted until the principal obligor and cosurety became insolvent. Laches cannot be imputed to the Government. Opinion of March 29, 1827, 2 Op. 51.

7. The power of the President to order the discontinuance of a suit commenced in the name of the United States should be exercised only with the greatest circumspection and care, and never in a case in which a court of the United States has, by a positive act on its part, taken cognizance thereof, and thereby given countenance to the claim. Opinion of July 27, 1827, 2 Op. 53.

8. Private or extrajudicial caveats lodged with the commissioner of loans, when founded on some specific claim or lien on the stock created by the proprietor himself, ought to be respected. So, also, the process of the courts should be respected. Opinion of Oct. 20, 1828, 2 Op. 173.

9. An original bill, in the nature of a bill of review, is the proper proceeding to set aside a decree obtained by the production of forged documents. Opinion of March 25, 1830, 2 Op. 331.

10. Indictment is the proper proceeding to

punish the cutting, &c., of live-oak reserved for naval purposes, under the first section of the act of March 2, 1831, chap. 66; and under the second section of that act, indictment and information. Opinion of Dec. 30, 1831, 2 Op. 494.

11. Punishment by the House of Representatives for an assault and battery on the person of one of its members is no bar to an indictment and conviction in the district court for the same act. Opinion of June 25, 1834, 2 Op. 655.

12. The punishment of General Houston by the House was for a breach of privilege and for contempt of the House; but the indictment and conviction were for a violation of the public law. Ibid.

13. In the States where the garnishment or trustee process is in general use, it may be resorted to to compel the appearance of officers of the Army and other agents of the Government before the civil tribunals to account for money due from them where they have become personally liable, and where they hold funds for the particular purpose. Opinion of Aug. 5, 1834, 2 Op. 661.

14. The Executive should not consent to place the Government of the United States, which is not liable without its special consent to be questioned in its own courts, to be made compulsorily accountable as stakeholder.or garnishee to its debtors, their assignees, or creditors-at least without a judicial decision to that effect by the highest tribunal known to the laws. Opinion of Nov. 29, 1841, 3 Op. 718.

15. Payment of the mariners in Norfolk by the purser of the United States ship Constitution should be made, notwithstanding the attachment issued for their wages. I bid.

16. No preliminary demand of payment is necessary to put in default a postmaster who omits to pay over the public funds in his hands at the expiration of each successive quarter of his service, and no proof of such demand having been made is requisite to the sustaining of an action against him. Opinion of Jan. 22, 1844,

4 Op 304.

17. As the title of M to land on which the United States have erected a fort at the mouth of Bayou Desprez and Lake Borgne and lands adjoining is invalid, the Solicitor of the Treasury should commence an action in behalf of

the Government to try the title, as M, being in possession, cannot, if he would, institute a suit against the United States to quiet his claim. Opinion of Oct. 22, 1851, 5 Op. 402. 18. During the war between the United States and the Mexican republic, while General Taylor occupied the line of the Rio Grande, one Lund undertook to set up a ferry across the river, in which he was interrupted by Major Ogden, of the United States, in obedience to the command of General Taylor: Held, that no action lay against Major Ogden for this act; held, also, that on a suit brought by Lund against him in the State of Texas, he not residing there, and having never held a domicile there, and no personal service in Texas having been made on him, and he not having property in the State; so also no valid judgment can be rendered, at least none which can be made effective out of the State of Texas. Opinion of July 27, 1853, 6 Op. 75.

19. Where an officer of the Army or Navy is sued on account of acts alleged to have been performed in the line of his duty, the Executive is to judge, in his discretion, whether the case is one of which the defense is to be assumed by the Government. Ibid.

20. In general it is not the duty of the United States to assume the legal defense by counsel of marshals and other ministerial officers of the law where these are sued for official acts. But the President of the United States, in the discharge of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, may, in his discretion, well assume, in certain cases, the defense of such ministerial officers. Opinion of Nov. 14, 1853, 6 Op. 220.

21. The right to do this cannot be limited to cases in which the property of the United States is concerned, but extends to other cases, more especially those affecting the constitutional security of the Government, whether in the relation of the United States to foreign governments or that of the States among themselves, or that of the States to the United States. Ibid.

22. In case of vexatious suits against marshals of the United States for lawful acts done by them in the extradition of fugitives from service, the President may authorize the employment of counsel in their behalf by the United States. Opinion of June 3, 1854, 6 Op. 500.

23. No remedy exists for the case of a civilian absconding with maps and collections which came into his possession in the State of Massachusetts, but which belong to the Government, except by ordinary action at law. Opinion of Nov. 7, 1854, 7 Op. 9.

24. Generally actions in behalf of the Government are brought in the name of the United States, not of any public officer. Opinion of Feb. 6, 1855, 7 Op. 50.

25. The form of procedure in the district courts of the United States is that of the respective States, subject to discretional change on the part of the courts of the United States. Ibid.

26. Rafael and Manuel Armijo sued out, in the Territorial court of New Mexico, process of injunction and mandamus against the governor as superintendent of Indian affairs, to compel him, out of the general moneys of the Government in his hands, as such, to pay to the petitioners indemnity for losses suffered by them through the depredations of the Apaches: Held, that the courts have no jurisdiction or authority over such moneys of the Government in the hands of the superintendent, either by injunction, mandamus, or any other process of law. Opinion of March 29, 1855, 7 Op. 80.

27. Quære whether parties have a right to file a bill in the name of the United States for the purpose of vacating a patent alleged to have been illegally issued. Opinion of Feb. 21, 1857, 8 Op. 400.

28. Where Congress made a grant to a railroad company of certain lands in Minnesota and repealed the act at the same session, the Secretary of the Interior was advised, in tue absence of any possession on the part of the company of the lands or trespasses committed thereupon, that there was no reason that the United States should consent to bring an amicable action to try the title. Opinion of March 28, 1859, 9 Op. 317.

29. The right of removal given by the third and fourth sections of the act of May 11, 1866, chap. 80, attaches upon the filing of the petition, verified by affidavit, according to the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1863, chap. 81, without giving security for filing copies of the papers in the circuit court, and without giving security for the appearance of the defendant in that court. Opinion of Jan. 17, 1867, 12 Op. 109.