the case may be opened, though a change in the mean time has taken place in the head of the Department. Opinion of Aug. 25, 1859, 9 Op. 387. no power, in such a case, to order the reopening of the claim. Ibid. 319. The Secretary of War (in execution of the act of March 3, 1877, chap. 119, which authorized him "to open and readjust the settle 311. Such indications of opinion from the legislature are not binding on the Department made by the United States Government ment, but are to be regarded merely as ground for the reconsideration of the case. Ibid. 312. Where a contract was declared to be forfeited by a Secretary of War, and the action of that officer was subsequently declared to have been illegal by the Court of Claims, a succeeding Secretary was held to have the right to open the case for another hearing, to be decided in the way which on such hearing should seem to him to be right and proper. Opinion of April 9, 1860, 9 Op. 422. 313. It is within the power of the head of an Executive Department to allow a claim which has been rejected by one of his predecessors, without new evidence. But the decisions of the head of a Department ought only to be reversed on clear evidence of mistake or wrong. Opinion of June 12, 1861, 10 Op. 56. 314. Where Congress (by joint resolution of May 2, 1866) referred the claim of certain parties for an increase of prices, under a contract with the Government, to the AttorneyGeneral for his opinion as to the construction of the contract, and the Attorney-General gave his opinion against the construction contended for by the claimants, it was held that this was a decision of the case, and not merely of the question, and that his successor in office had no right to reconsider the matter. Opinion of June 25, 1867, 12 Op. 169. 315. The cases defined in which the head of a Department is authorized to reopen the final decision of a predecessor. Opinion of Jan. 27, 1868, 12 Op. 356. · 316. Where the Postmaster-General was authorized and required by act of Congress (that of March 3, 1857, chap. 176) to adjust a particular claim, nothing but a new authority, emanating from Congress, will enable one of his successors to open his adjustment upon the ground that he adopted an erroneous basis of settlement. Ibid. 317. The fact that, since the settlement, the committees of the two Houses recommended by reports a different basis of settlement will not authorize a reopening of the case. Ibid. 318. Semble that the President would have with the Western and Atlantic Railroad of Georgia") made an award, upon which a settlement was effected with the State of Georgia. Subsequently it was claimed that an important item of credit, which should have been allowed the State in the settlement, had been ignored, and application was made in behalf of the State for a revision of the award and settlement. The Secretary declined to reopen the award and settlement for the purpose of revising the same in connection with such claim; but he decided to revise the award for the purpose of making an additional allowance of a certain sum found to be due after correcting an accountant's error against the United States, and also a mistake against the State in the computation of interest. A renewed application for revision of the award and settlement was afterwards made by the governor of Georgia, but, without taking any action thereon, the Secretary resigned and went out of office. Held that the succeeding Secretary of War has not power to reopen the award and settlement made by his predecessor in office with a view to the rectification thereof in any respect other than that which had already been directed by his predecessor, the act having been fully executed by the latter. Opinion of Jan. 29, 1880, 16 Op. 452. XXIII. Payment. 320. Payment under the act of 24th May, 1824, chap. 144, "for relief of the assignees and legal representatives of John H. Piatt," may be made to the assignees to the amount of their assignment; and as the amount for which the claim was assigned was not fixed in the assignment, it having been given for advances "made and to be made," the accounting officers must examine into and ascertain the amount actually due the assignees thereon. Opinion of Aug. 13, 1824, 1 Op. 692. 321. Notes of the assignor exhibited by the assignees are prima facie evidence of the debt; yet the administrators have the right to controvert it. Ibid. 322. A payment to a person acting under a power of attorney from one of several executors is valid, coexecutors being regarded in law as an individual person, and the act of any one of them, in respect to the administration of the effects, as the act of all. Opinion of Dec. 8, 1827, 2 Op. 66. 323. Lapse of time, whilst it furnishes strong presumptive evidence against the justice of claims, is no bar to payment. The delay may be accounted for. Opinion of Sept. 10, 1831, 2 Op. 463. 324. Payment of the claims of the citizens of Georgia, under the Creek treaty of 1821, and the law concerning them, viz, act of June 30, 1834, chap. 145, may be made by the President to the State of Georgia for the use of the claimants. Opinion of Dec. 20, 1834, 2 Op. 691. 325. Where there is a conflict of claims between an executor and his assignees for an award of moneys by the Third Auditor to the decedent, the Treasury officers should pay the same to the executor, who is the legal representative. Opinion of Dec. 7, 1835, 3 Op. 29. 326. Where assignments in due form are presented, and no objection is made to the right of the assignee, it may be paid to him. Ibid. 327. The resolution of the legislature of the State of Missouri authorizing the governor of that State to receive her distributive share of the funds arising under the provisions of the act of Congress of September 4, 1841, chap. 16, not having been signed by the president of the senate, is not a sufficient authority to sanction the payment. Opinion of March 16, 1848, 4 Op. 716. 328. Where a claimant executed a power of attorney to another, authorizing him to prosecute a claim before Congress and to appoint a third person to assist him, and therein assigned to each of them one-fourth of what might be recovered, authorizing them to receive the same; and the claim being subsequently allowed by Congress (by act of March 3, 1849, chap. 164), and demand of payment of one-half thereof, pursuant to said assignment, being made at the Treasury by the two attorneys, it was objected to by the administrators of the claimant, and refused on account of non-compliance with the act of July 29, 1846, chap. 66. Held that the latter act clearly prohibits payment to the attorneys, except they produce a warrant of attorney executed subsequent to the passage of the act allowing the claim, reciting the amount, properly executed, attested, and acknowledged. Opinion of April 13, 1849, 5 Op. 85. 329. As the act of July 29, 1846, was passed prior to the execution of the power of attorney and assignment produced, this construction impairs no previous contract obligations, nor infringes any vested right. Ibid. 330. Where an act of Congress was passed, approved, and enrolled, requiring payment of money out of the Treasury to a citizen, such payment cannot be refused on the ground that the law as it passed was coupled with a condition which by accident or design was left out of the enrolled bill. Opinion of March 24, 1857, 9 Op. 1. 331. Where the Secretary of the Treasury suspended the execution of a law for that reason, and the party entitled to the money made an abortive attempt to comply with the alleged condition, he was not thereby prevented from afterward demanding his rights according to the law as it stood enrolled. Ibid. 332. Where the expressed object of suspending the law was to give Congress an opportunity to correct the supposed error or fraud, and three sessions of Congress passed without such correction after the facts were communicated to both Houses, the law ought to be executed without further delay. Ibid. 333. Where an act of Congress required the Second Auditor to adjust a claim, and directed its payment out of the Treasury, and subsequent acts authorized further examination and readjustment of the claim, but contained no authority for the payment of the further amount found due on such readjustment: Held that the direction for payment in the first act applied only to the amount ascertained to be due on the first adjustment, and that the officers of the Treasury had no power to pay the additional amount so found due without specific legislative authority for that purpose. Opinion of April 29, 1862, 10 Op. 238. 334. The joint resolution of February 21, 1861, repealing the joint resolution of June 15, 1860, for the relief of William H. De Groot, is valid, and his claim cannot be paid in the face of that resolution. Opinion of June 6, 1862, 10 Op. 270. 335. In May, 1861, Simeon Hart, then a resident of New Mexico, delivered commissary stores to the Government at certain military posts in that Territory, for which he received a voucher from the proper officer, but payment thereof was withheld in consequence of an order issued from the War Department during the same month. Hart subsequently took an active part in the rebellion, but was pardoned by the President in November, 1865. He afterward assigned said voucher to two creditors, loyal persons, by whom payment of the same is now demanded. On a question whether payment is prohibited by the joint resolution of March 2, 1867 (No. 46): Held that the case presented is not within the prohibition of that resolution, the claim having accrued after April 13, 1861. Opinion of Dec. 5, 1872, 14 Op. 145. 336. The proviso in that resolution was intended only to make an exception in favor of claims existing prior to April 13, 1861, which had been assigned or agreed to be assigned to loyal citizens of loyal States prior to April 1, 1861, in payment of debts incurred prior to March 1, 1861. It does not relate to claims additional to those mentioned in the preceding words of the resolution. Ibid. 337. Where the payment of a claim against the Government would otherwise come within the prohibition of the joint resolution of March 2, 1867 (No. 46), the fact that the political disabilities of the claimant imposed by the third section of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution have since been removed by Congress does not free the claim from the operation of that resolution; the prohibition of payment still continues. Opinion of Nov. 15, 1873, 14 Op. 329. & C. and transmit it to them directly. Opinion of Oct. 23, 1878, 16 Op. 191. 339. A claim was presented to the Southern Claims Commissioners, under the act of March 3, 1871, chap. 116, the claimant describing himself in his application as “Alexander Anderson, of Augusta County, Virginia." The commissioners made favorable report thereon, finding the amount due claimant to be $175. Their report was adopted by Congress, and by act of March 3, 1873, chap. 339, the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to pay $175, "out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated," to "Alexander Anderson, of Virginia." In the mean time a claim had also been presented to the Commissioners in the name of Alexander Anderson, of Amelia County, Virginia, which was not allowed. The latter claimant, in March, 1873, gave F. a power of attorney to receive for him the $175 allowed by said act to "Alexander Anderson, of Virginia," describing himself as "Alexander Anderson, of Amelia CourtHouse, of the county of Amelia, in the State of Virginia." The money was paid to F. on filing said power, who had acted in good faith, and was not informed of the mistake until after he turned over the money to his principal. Held (1) that F. is under no legal liability for the money; (2) that his principal is liable, either at the suit of the rightful claimant or of the United States; (3) that the officer of the Treasury through whose negligence the mistake was made is legally chargeable with the amount, to be passed to his credit on the recovery of the money; (4) the rightful claimant does not, in consequence of the mistake, lose his right to be paid out of any money remaining in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated; (5) a second appropriation warrant may legally issue to again place the amount due the rightful claimant to the credit of the Secretary of War, that he may draw a new requisition on which a new warrant can issue in payment of the claim. Opinion of Oct. 23, 1878, 16 Op. 193. 338. An approved account or voucher for transportation performed for the Navy Department by F. & C., contractors, was issued by the chief of the Bureau of Steam-Engineering in favor of and delivered to H. & Son, who were brokers for F.& C. The latter claim that the amount appropriated by the act of June 14, 1878, chap. 191, to pay for the transportation, should be paid to them, and not to H. & Son. Held that the account or voucher issued as aforesaid is not a negotiable paper; that a transfer or assignment thereof would be void 340. By act of March 3, 1879, chap. 182, an under section 3477 Rev. Stat.; that the ap- appropriation of a certain amount was made propriation was made for the purpose of paying "to pay George H. Giddings, late contractor, F. & C., and not any alleged claim of H. & for one month's extra pay on discontinuance Son; and that the Navy Department may treat of a portion of route No. 8076, Texas, which such approved account or voucher as a nullity, went into effect July 1, 1861, in accordance and issue an approved account in favor of F. | with the opinion of the Attorney-General." receive for the United States whatever may be paid by the debtor, or his assignee, in discharge of the debt. Opinion of Dec. 15, 1879, 16 Op. 407. CLERKS OF COURTS. See also COMPENSATION, II; DISTRICT OF Co- Subsequently one D., claiming a right to a portion of the fund thus appropriated, filed a bill in the supreme court of the District of Columbia against the said Giddings, upon which an order was issued by the court forbidding him to meddle with the fund, and appointing a receiver to obtain and hold the same subject to the order of the court. A warrant having been issued for the payment of the amount to Giddings, pursuant to the terms of the statute, the receiver made application to the Postmaster-General for the delivery of the warrant to him. Advised that the payment cannot properly be made to any other than the person designated by Congress to receive it; that after such action by Congress the Executive Departments ought not to submit to the 2. The clerks of the district courts of the courts, upon any ground of comity, the quesUnited States in California are bound to rention as to who should receive the fund; and that the application should be denied. Opin- equally with clerks of other districts. der to the Treasury an emolument account ion of July 11, 1879, 16 Op. 367. Opin XXIV. Claims of the United States. 341. The Government has a valid claim against the vendors of the bark Florida under their bond of indemnity and the covenant of warranty in the bill of sale. Opinion of Sept. 10, 1862, 10 Op. 340. 342. The Government has a legal claim for damages against N. Kingsbury & Co. on account of their failure to fulfill their contract with the Navy Department for the delivery of blankets and blue flannel. Opinion of June 30, 1865, 11 Op. 263. 1. The clerk of the circuit court of the Discriminal court of the District, is bound to actrict of Columbia, who is also clerk of the receives in the latter capacity. Opinion of count to the Treasury for the fees which he March 22, 1854, 6 Op. 388. ion of May 1, 1854, 6 Op. 433. 3. The Secretary of the Interior is empowered by law to judge of the necessity of expenses of clerk-hire and other expenses in the offices of clerks of circuit and district courts where there is a surplus of fees above the statute allowance for salary, and to regulate the same in advance, subject to such modifications of amount, either by enlargement or diminution, and either periodical or occasional, as the satisfactory administration of justice in the several circuits or districts may require. Opinion of Oct. 13, 1855, 7 Op. 543. 4. The clerk of the courts of the United States in the District of Columbia is a collect 343. The Secretary of the Navy is not bound to compel the payment of damages if he is of ing agent of the Government, and is held to opinion that their default was the result of the failure of the Government to pay their accounts, and it could not have been avoided by the proper efforts of the parties. Ibid. 344. By act of June 22, 1874, chap. 388, an appropriation was made to reimburse the Soldiers' and Sailors' Orphans' Home for certain moneys (the balance of a deposit of moneys theretofore appropriated for the Home by Congress) involved in the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke & Co. An offer having been made to the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase the claim against that firm for the amount due on account of said deposit: Held that this claim must now be treated as a claim belonging to the United States, and that the Secretary has no power to sell the same or to do more than account for all the fees of his office received or receivable, deducting therefrom the maximum allowed him by law. Opinion of Dec. 19, 1855, 7 Op. 610. 5. The clerks of the courts of the United States in the Territories of Minnesota, New Mexico, and Utah are not embraced by the provisions of the act of February 26, 1853, chap. 80, giving augmented fees to those officers in the Territory of Oregon. Opinion of March 8, 1856, 7 Op. 648. COASTING TRADE. See COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION, IV. COAST SURVEY. 1. The costs of repairs and supplies furnished to certain vessels employed by the President in prosecuting the coast survey must fall upon the appropriation made by Congress for the survey of the coast. Opinion of Oct. 12, 1839, 3 Op. 479. 2. Yet if vessels are detailed from the Navy or from the revenue service for temporary service in the coast survey, they may be repaired from funds provided by Congress for the branch of the public service to which such vessels properly belong. Ibid. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS. See CUSTOMS LAWS, II. COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. See also RIVERS AND HARBORS; SHIPPING; SHORES AND BEDS OF NAVIGABLE WATERS; SOUTH PASS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER. I. Registry of Vessels. II. Enrollment and License of Vessels. III. Tonnage Duties. IV. Foreign and Coasting Trade. V. Fees Collected from Vessels. VI. Officers of Steam Vessels. VII. Inspection of Steam-Vessels. VIII. Obstruction to Navigation. IX. Improvement of Navigable Waters. I. Registry of Vessels. 1. The benefit of the registry of an American vessel is lost to the owner during his residence in a foreign country; but upon his return to this country the disability ceases. Opinion of Nov. 24. 1821, 1 Op. 523. 2. The fact that during the foreign residence of the American owner the vessel carried a foreign flag does not work any divestiture of title, nor render the disability perpetual. Ibid. 3. The Spanish schooner Amistad having been condemned (not for any breach of the laws of the United States) and sold by order of the district court of the United States, and the purchaser having applied for a register: Held that he is not entitled to a register, but that documents showing the order of sale, its execution by the proper officer of the United States, and the purchase and title of the present owner, ought to be issued to him. Opinion of Dec. 14, 1840, 3 Op. 606. eign ports where there shall be an American 4. Masters of American vessels entering forconsul, and remaining so long as that, by the local regulations, they are required to enter and afterwards to clear in regular form, are required to deposit their registers. &c., with such consul, irrespective of the purpose for which the port shall have been entered. Opinion of Sept. 26. 1849, 5 Op. 161. 5. A registered or enrolled American vessel voluntarily sold by her owner to a foreigner, and thus denationalized, is, equally with a foreign-built ship, incapable of receiving a new register or enrollment, although afterwards purchased and wholly owned by a citizen of the United States. Opinion of March 16, 1854, 6 Op. 383. 6. Under the act of December 23, 1852, chap. 4, a vessel built in the United States, but transferred to a foreign owner, and afterwards wrecked in the waters of the United States, may be allowed an American register by the Secretary of the Treasury. Opinion of April 16, 1860, 9 Op. 424. 7. Under the provisions of the first and fourth sections of the act of December 31, 1792, chap. 1, no vessel in which a foreigner is directly or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United States, nor can it be deemed a vessel of the United States or entitled to the benefits or privileges appertaining to a vessel of that description. Opinion of Dec. 17, 1873, 14 Op. 340. 8. So where a vessel has been registered, but the registry was obtained by a false oath as to its ownership, the vessel being at the time owned in whole or in part by foreigners, it cannot be deemed a vessel of the United States. Ibid. 9. Semble that the Virginius, though registered as an American vessel, was in fact owned by foreigners, and that the registry thereof was fraudulently obtained; and hence, at the time of her capture by the Spanish man-of-war Tornado, she had no right, by virtue of that |