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own name for an undisclosed principal has export. He gave orders for the purchase of no power to destroy the contract without the corn in question to Williams & Monroe, the principal's consent (Samuels v. Northrup members of the Chicago Board of Trade oper. Nat. Bank, 234 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 721), and a ating in Louisville, and the orders were transbroker making a contract for the sale of mitted to defendants. Contracts were made property for another has no right to rescind by defendants accordingly and reported to the contract without the knowledge or con Williams & Monroe with the following state sent of his principal unless the commercial ment: usage was such at the place where the sale

“We have the pleasure of confirming the folwas made (Saladin v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 79). lowing transactions made for your account and If the words of the contract are plain and risk this day. All purchases and sales made unambiguous, the contract must be so con- by us for you are made in accordance with and strued as to give effect to the plain and subject to the rules, regulations and customs obvious import of the language used. Bearss of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Ford, 108 Ill. 16; Kansas City v. Public and the rules, regulations and requirements of Service Com., 276 Mo. 539, 210 s. w. 381. its board of directors and all amendments that

are made thereto.” When the parties are competent to contract, with the wisdom or folly of their contracts, Each contract for purchase was confirmed made for a consideration and without fraud, by Williams & Monroe with this statement: courts of law have no concern. Florida Ass'n

“All orders for the purchase and sale of any V. Stevens, 61 Fla. 598, 55 So. 981; Mizell article are received and executed with the Live Stock Co. v. McCaskill Co., 59 Fla. 322, distinct understanding that actual delivery is 51 So. 547. One who contracts cannot be contemplated and in accordance with and subrelieved from the obligation of his contract ject to the rules, regulations and customs of the which binds him to perform his agreement, exchange upon which the order is to be exe. and he cannot be deprived of the benefit of cuted and the requirement of its board of di

rectors and all amendments that are made his lawful contract, and the rights which it thereto, and that the party giving the order so confers upon him, without his consent, and understands and agrees." in every case the question is what the contract was and what obligation it created. A After the country had entered into the party to a contract has no right to impose a World War there was a great increase in the condition not provided for in the contract price of grain and the future market was itself. Illinois Conference Female College v. oversold, so that more grain had been sold Cooper, 25 Ill. 148. Neither would it be any on the Board of Trade for future delivery defense in such case that by reason of tbe than was possible to obtain or deliver. The declaration of war against Germany on April sales of corn exceeded the entire product 6, 1917, and the unusual conditions result- available for delivery, so that purchasers ing, and sure to result in the future, in compelled sellers to settle their contracts abnormally high prices, which would have at extortionate prices. On July 5, 1917, enabled purchasers to compel sellers to settle corn for delivery in July had reached a price their contracts at extortionate prices, the of approximately $1.63 per bushel, and the Board of Trade, by resolution of the board unusual and abnormal conditions, were sure of directors, provided that after July 5, to cause, and did cause, great future ad1917, settlements of the contract in ques- vances, as shown by the fact that on July tion should be made in the manner in which 31, 1917, the price of cash corn was $2.40 a they were made. Neither would it be any bushel. For the purpose of stopping the defense to a suit for damages resulting from speculative trading in corn, which it was a breach of such contract that a compliance certain would have disastrous results, the with such contract would entail great hard board of directors adopted a resolution that ship upon defendants or that by reason of the after July 5, 1917, all trading by members exigencies of the World War the fulfillment of the board in corn for future delivery, by of the contract would be rendered extremely grade alone, in July, either for immediate difficult, or even impossible, where defendant or future delivery, should cease, and a comhas failed to limit in the contract his lia- mittee of three was appointed to fix a price bility in respect to such contingencies. Illi- which should be a basis of settlement of all nois Central Railroad Co. v. McClellan, 54 contracts for July open at the close of busi. Ill. 58, 5 Am. Rep. 83; Illinois Central Rail-ness that day, except such open contracts road Co. v. Cobb, Christy & Co., 64 Ill. 128; as should be performed by delivery or settled Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Co. v. by agreement of the parties. On July 9, Lockhart, 71 Ill. 627; Phelps v. Illinois Cen- 1917, Clement-Curtis & Co. notified defendtral Railroad Co., 94 Ill. 548.

ants of their purpose to settle their conThe facts in the case were not disputed. (tracts at $1.65 per bushel, and upon notify. Plaintiff, during the time of the transactions ing Williams & Monroe, defendants were in question, was buying and selling grain at first informed that the purchases were for Louisville, Ky. He bought corn in different the account of plaintiff. states and furnished it to parties in various [3, 4] While plaintiff's orders for the purparts of the country and also bought it for chase of corn to Williams & Monroe were or.

(146 N.E.) ders for an absolute and unconditional con- , was “authorized to establish such rules, regtract for the purchase and delivery of the ulations and by-laws for the management of corn, yet when Williams & Monroe employed their business and the mode in which it shall defendants, who were members of the Board be transacted as they may think proper." of Trade, to contract, as agents for the plain. The by-laws of the Board of Trade providtiff, for the purchase of such corn, their em-ed that all orders received by any member ployment as such agents was to purchase to buy or sell for future delivery any of the such corn in accordance with the rules, regu- articles or commodities dealt with upon the lations, and by-laws of the Chicago Board floor of the exchange (except in exchange for of Trade, and the contracts which defendants cash property) must be executed in the open entered into for the purchase of such corn market in the exchange or during the hours were not in accordance with plaintiff's orig- of regular trading. The'Board of Trade rules inal orders but were entered into “in accord also provide that in case any member acting ance with and subject to the rules, regula. as a commercial merchant shall have made tions and customs of the Board of Trade of purchases or sales by order and for account the City of Chicago and the rules, regula- of another, whether the party for whom such tions and requirements of its board of di- purchase or sale was made be a member of rectors and all amendments that are made tho association or not, such order shall be thereto." These contracts being reported to deemed to have been made with reference to Williams & Monroe and by them reported to and to be executed and carried out in all replaintiff, together with the statement that spects under the rules, regulations, and cus"all orders for the purchase and sale of any toms of the association, the same as though article are received and executed with the they were terms incorporated into such ordistinct understanding that actual delivery is der. The rules of the Board of Trade also contemplated and in accordance with and provide for the manner in which settlesubject to the rules, regulations and customs ments of contracts shall be made, and among of the exchange upon which the order is to be other things in this respect provide : executed and the requirement of its board of

"In case any property contracted for future directors and all amendments that are made delivery is not delivered at maturity, of conthereto, and that the party giving the order tract, the president shall appoint a committee 80 understands and agrees,” and plaintiff of three from the membership at large, to be not having repudiated such contracts as hav. approved by the board of directors, which coming been made without authority, but hav-mittee shall determine the true commercial val. ing ratified them by demanding their ful- ue, as nearly as possible, of the commodity in fillment and bringing this suit, is bound by and the price so established shall be the basis

question on the day of maturity of contract, the terms and conditions of such contracts upon which settlement is made." so made by defendants with the parties from whom defendants purchased such corn. The [5] It is contended by plaintiff that the contracts in question, therefore, were not court erred in the admission in evidence of contracts which were absolute and uncondi- | the resolution of the Board of Trade fixing tional and to be fufilled at all events, but $1.65 as the settlement price of the conwere subject to rules, regulations, and cus- tracts in question. The laws, rules, and toms of the Board of Trade of the City of regulations of the Board of Trade being an Chicago and the rules, regulations, and re- integral part of the contracts, it was not quirements of its board of directors and all only proper but necessary to ascertain what amendments that were made thereto during those rules and regulations were in order to the continuance of such contracts. This con- arrive at the true terms of the contracts, dition, therefore, became and was an integral and the admission in evidence of the resolupart of the contract.

tion, which was one of the requirements of Members of the Chicago Board of Trade the directors of the Board of Trade, was are bound by its lawful rules, regulations, therefore not error. and by-laws, since they bind themselves in

[6] It is claimed by plaintiff that he had no writing to obedience thereto as a condition notice or knowledge of the laws, rules, and precedent to membership. The Board of regulations of the Board of Trade, and that Trade does not buy or sell grain or other therefore he could not be bound by the resoproducts, but only furnishes a place where lution. Having been notified by Williams & its members meet and between certain hours Monroe that the contracts in question were of the day deal with each other in grain and made in accordance therewith, it was his other products under the rules, regulations, duty to ascertain what such rules, regulaand by-laws passed by the Board of Trade tions, by-laws, and requirements were, and, for the government of its members and the if he did not then desire to be bound there regulation and control of the business trans- by, to repudiate the contracts. Not having acted by its members upon said board. Pa. done so, he is as fully bound thereby as if caud v. Waite, 218 II. 138, 75 N. E. 779, 2 he had full knowledge thereof. L. R. A. (N. S.) 672.

Plaintiff's contention that defendants, who By the legislative act incorporating the made the contracts in their own names, were Board of Trade of Chicago the corporation bound by the resolutions but that plaintife

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was not, is without foundation. He was not criminating in their nature or tending to prove à stranger to the contracts but was one of guilt. the contracting parties himself.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words [7] The only contract of agency existing and Phrases, First ana Second Series, Confesbetween plaintiff and defendants with refer. sion.] ence to the purchase of the corn in question 4. Criminal law Om528-Admission of defendbeing for the purchase of corn “in accord ants' confessions against each other hold er. ance with and subject to the rules, regulations and customs of the Board of Trade of In murder prosecution, court erred in adthe city of Chicago and the rules, regula- mitting alleged confession of each defendant tions and requirements of its board of di- against each other, where it did not even limit, rectors and all amendments that are made either in its rulings or instructions, declarathereto," and defendants having purchas- tions of either defendant to one making them. ed the corn in accordance with such rules 5. Criminal law Om 899–Defendants held not to and regulations, and having settled with the have waived error in admission of confes. persons from whom such corn was purchased

sions against each other by testifying. in accordance with such rules, regulations In murder prosecution, defendants did not and customs of the Board of Trade and the waive court's error in admitting alleged conrules, regulations, and requirements of its fession of each defendant against the other by board of directors, they were not guilty of sented by different counsel and antagonistic to

testifying to samé facts, where they were repre. any breach of their contract of agency and each other, and counsel for neither of them was therefore were not liable to plaintiff in this able to protect his client against statement of suit. The court should have directed a ver- other, dict for defendants.

6. Criminal law Om 528Admission of witness. The judgments of the Appellate Court and

es' testimony held erroneous as admission of municipal court are reversed and the cause

one defendant's statement against the other, remanded to the municipal court.

In murder prosecution, admission of wit. Reversed and remanded.

ness' testimony that one of defendants in re

turning witness' pistol, which defendant had DUNN, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ., borrowed, stated that he had given it to his dissenting..

codefendant who had admitted to him that he shot decedent, was erroneous as admission of

one defendant's statement against the other. (316 Ill. 38)

Error to Circuit Court, St. Clair County; PEOPLE V. RUPERT et al. (No. 16203.)

William F. Borders, Judge.

Arnold Rupert and another were convicted (Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 17, 1925.)

of murder, and they bring error. Reversed 1. Criminal law Om622(1)-Court must exer- and remanded. cise sound discretion in overruling motion for

John C. Roberts, of East St. Louis, for separate trial of defendant jointly indicted

plaintiffs in error. with another. While granting of a separate trial of de Lindauer, of Belleville, State's Atty., George

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., H. C. fendants jointly indicted rests in discretion of trial court, court must exercise a sound dis-C. Dixon, of Dixon, and W. R. Weber, of cretion in overruling such a motion.

Belleville, for the People.

Ru

2. Criminal law m622(2)-Failure to grant PER CURIAM. Arnold Rupert and Jim

separate trial to defendants jointly indicted mie Dean, negroes, of the ages of 21 and 20 held reversible error, where only incriminat. years, respectively, were convicted in the ing evidence was statement of one against circuit court of St. Clair county of the mur. the other,

der of William Owens, a white man. In murder prosecution, denial of defend-pert was sentenced to death and Dean to imants' motion for separate trial was reversible error, where only incriminating evidence against prisonment for life. They have sued out a defendants was in statement of one against the writ of error to reverse the judgment. other, and statement of each of defendants as

On the night of September 22, 1923, in to himself simply amounted to a declaration or East St. Louis, William Owens stopped at admission of some facts tending to incriminate the soft drink parlor of William Singleton, him.

which is called in the testimony a saloon, and 3. Criminal law 516_"Confession," defined. got a lunch, in paying for which he exhibit

ed a roll of bills amounting to $20 or $30. A confession is a voluntary acknowledgment He left Singleton's shortly before midnight of guilt, or a voluntary acknowledgment by a person charged with commission of a crime for his home, which was two blocks away, that he is guilty of offense, or that he par- ) and in a few moments came to the back door ticipated in committing crime, term being lim- of his brother's house, where he was living, ited to criminal act, and not including state- and called to his brother that he was shot ments, or declarations, or admissions of fact in- His brother had heard the shot fired, and

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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(146 N.E.) jumped up and let him in. Owens told him to bed. He did not see Rupert until the next that two colored men had attacked him and day. He met Rupert on Third street, near tried to hold him up; that one held him and Exchange avenue, and asked him who did the little short fellow shot him. He was the shooting. Rupert said he did. He asked shot in the abdomen. He was taken to the Rupert if he hit the man, Rupert said he hospital and died the next day from the did not know; that the man had a pistol in wound. The plaintiffs in error were in the his hand, and that he had to shoot to get saloon when Owens was there. Dean left away. On Monday, September 24, Dean met after Owens did. Rupert claims not to have Rupert at Singleton's saloon, reading a paleft the saloon, but to have been there when per. Rupert called him and showed him the the shot was fired.

statement in the paper about the shooting. The day after Owens' death the plaintiffs Dean asked Rupert what he was going to do, in error were arrested and taken to the po- and Rupert replied that he was not going to lice station, where they made separate state- do anything, as they did not know who shot ments in the presence of the officers and oth-Owens. He further stated that the revolver ers which were taken down by an officer | the police had was the same one that he saw and signed by the plaintiffs in error, respec- Rupert have. It was a 38-caliber Smith & tively. At the January term of the circuit Wesson nicket-plated revolver, No. 81,826. court they were indicted, separate counsel

Rupert's statement was, that at Singlewas appointed by the court for each, they ton's saloon Dean came to him and asked were tried, found guilty, and Rupert was him to loan Dean his revolver, and to the sentenced to be hanged on April 18, and question, “What for?" answered that a neDean was sentenced to imprisonment for life. gro named Charles Yates was trying to kill

Before the trial Rupert made a motion for him. Rupert loaned him the revolver. Dean a separate trial on the ground that all the left the saloon, and Rupert did not see him evidence which would be produced by the any more that night. About an hour after people would not be applicable to him and Dean left a shot was heard outside, and Jimmie Dean; that Dean had made a state- everybody ran to the door, but the proprietor ment to the police, and so far as the state- told them all not to go down there, and every ment implicated Rupert, he would be unable body went back into the saloon. Rupert then to have a fair trial if jointly tried with went with some others in a machine to Dean; that Rupert had also made a state- Brooklyn and stayed there all night, getting ment in regard to the crime to the police of- back about 5:30 the next morning, when he ficers incriminating Dean. Rupert further went home and went to bed.

He got up stated to the court in his motion that if about 9 o'clock and went to Singleton's sathese statements were introduced in evidence loon, where he met Dean and asked him for neither of the defendants would be able to the revolver, and also asked him if he did procure a fair trial. The bill of exceptions that shooting last night, and he said “no." does not show that the statements were be- Then Dean said he was going to tell Rupert fore the court on the hearing of the motion, something, but did not want him to tell anyor that any other statement of their contents one about it. Rupert asked Dean again was made other than was contained in the if he did the shooting, and he said “yes”; affidavit. The motion was denied, and Ru- that he was trying to make something last pert excepted.

night, and the guy made a gun play, and The statements of the plaintiffs in error Dean had to get him. Rupert asked him if were offered in evidence, and each was ob- he killed the man, and he said he did not jected to by the defendant not making it, but know, but he did know he hit him. Dean the objections were overruled and both state- told him that he shot at the man one time ments were received in evidence. Dean's and the man ran, and Dean turned and ran statement was, in substance, that Ru- away. He gave Rupert the revolver. Rupert asked him to walk down the street. pert talked with Dean again about the shootThey left the saloon about 12 o'clock or a ing after he had read a paper and saw that little before, and walked west on Winstanley the man was in the hospital. He asked avenue, and to the question where he was

Dean if he was going to leave town. Dean going, Rupert replied to come on-there was said “no”; that he was going to stay around something down there. Dean Saw

and see how the man was getting along. walking west on Winstanley avenue about The next day, Monday, they read in the pa20 feet ahead of them, and then he knew that per that the man had died. Dean then told Rupert meant to stick this man up. They him that all he had to do was to keep his

Dean stopped, but Rupert | mouth closed, and to tell Singleton to do went toward the man, and the next thing away with the revolver. The police had the Dean heard a shot. Rupert and the man

revolver. He (Rupert) took it from Singlewere about 20 feet from Dean. Rupert fell ton's saloon. It was a 38-caliber Smith & to the ground, then got up and ran, and Dean Wesson nickel-plated revolver, No. 81,826. It ran east to an alley, then by a roundabout was the property of Singleton. Singleton way back to Singleton's saloon, at Third street did not know that Rupert had taken the gun, and Winstanley avenue, went inside and sat but later he told Singleton about it. around for a while, and then went home and

After the foregoing statements were made,

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Rupert and Dean were placed in jail, and did not have separate' trials. The only inthere they made two other statements, each criminating evidence in the case against the of them being, in substance, the same as the defendants is to be found in the statement two already set out in this opinion. All four of the one against the other. Their volunof the statements were introduced in evi- tary statements have been referred to by the dence over the objection of each of the de- people as confessions. There was not really fendants.

a confession made by either of the defendWilliam Singleton, proprietor of the saloon, ants, and it is clear that the people used the testified for the people that he heard the statement of one of the defendants mainly shot fired and told the crowd not to go out for the purpose of convicting the other. A Rupert and Dean were both in the saloon confession has been defined by this court to be before the shooting, but were not there when a voluntary acknowledgment of guilt, or a vol. the shooting occurred. They were there all | untary acknowledgment by a person charged of the time before the shooting, and it could with the commission of a crime that he is 'be possible for them to have been there aft- guilty of the offense, or that he participated in er that without his seeing them. There were committing the crime. 1 Pope's Legal Def. about 40 or 50 people in his place that night. 258; Johnson v. People, 197 Ill. 48, 64 N. E. After the shooting Rupert came into the sa- 286; Michaels v. People, 208 Ill. 603, 70 N. loon first, and Dean came in afterwards. He E. 747. The term “confession" is limited to identified the gun as his, and said Rupert the criminal act, and does not include state and Dean knew where he kept it, Rupert ments, declarations or admissions of fact inhaving worked for him at the saloon before criminating in their nature or tending to that time. Rupert told him that he had tak- prove guilt. Michaels v. People, supra. The en the gun, and that he had shot at some statement of each of the defendants as to telephone posts on the railroad. He stated, himself, simply amounts to a declaration or over the objections of the defendants, that admission of some facts tending to incrimRupert said he got the pistol and gave it to inate him. “No man can confess for any one Dean to protect himself against Yates, and but himself.” People v. Anderson, 239 Ill. that Dean told Rupert that he shot Owens. 168, 87 N. E. 917. We believe that, if the When Rupert gave him back the pistol he no- people had been trying one of these defendticed it was freshly shot, and Rupert said ants separately, and he had offered his own that he did not do it, but that Dean did. statement, the people would have objected to There were two empty shells in the gun and the main part of it on the ground that it was two other cartridges were gone, which he a self-serving declaration, made for the purfound in front of his place the next morning. pose of exonerating him from participation

The foregoing was all the evidence in the in the crime charged, and that is really just case, except the testimony of several witness- what the statement amounts to. es who witnessed or heard the statements of These alleged confessions were in the the defendants that were offered in evidence, hands of the people, who well knew their all of whom testified that the statements contents and yet resisted the motion, necessawere voluntarily made, without any promise rily knowing that they would rest almost of reward or of favor of any kind, and with their entire case as to each defendant upon out compulsion or threats. The record does the declaration of the other. They thereby show that on rebuttal the people offered a deliberately led the court into error in overrecord showing the conviction of Rupert for ruling this motion. In the case of People v. a criminal offense, but the record does not | Buckminster, 274 Ill. 435, 113 N. E. 713, this show the character of the offense, and fails court laid down the rule that where one of to show any part of that record. Both de- several defendants jointly indicted has made fendants took the witness stand and testi- admissions or confessions implicating others, fied in their own behalf to the same facts, in a severance should be ordered, unless the atsubstance, as appear in their four state- torney for the state declares that such adments. Each defendant objected to the oth- missions or confessions will not be offered in er defendant testifying, and specifically ob- evidence on the trial. It would have been jected to the other defendant's testimony | better, as a matter of precaution, if Rupert that incriminated him, but their objections had set forth in his motion the character or were overruled.

nature of the admission and confession of [1-3] It is argued by defendants' counsel his codefendant, Dean, but the information that it was error to deny Rupert's motion was in the hands of the people, and the court for a separate trial. It is argued by the peo- should have taken the precaution to ascerple that the granting of a separate trial of tain the nature of the incriminating evidefendants jointly indicted rests in the dis-dence, or have taken the statement of Rupert cretion of the trial court. It is true that as true that the alleged confession of Dean this is a general rule often stated, but it has incriminated Rupert. This error been as often stated that the court must ex- serious that we must hold it was reversible ercise a sound discretion in overruling such error to overrule the motion for a sever. a motion. It cannot be a matter of serious ance. doubt that both defendants in this case were [4-6] The court also committed very serivery much prejudiced by the fact that they | ous error in admitting the alleged confession

was SO

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