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land, after the district work was done he laid a line of 12-inch tile, beginning at the old road ditch near the northeast corner of the land and extending westerly and southerly for about 1,400 feet. At present, under ordinary conditions, the water from this tile flows into the same old road ditch and thence east therein to lateral C, but in high-water stages it goes over the road north. No work of any consequence has been done on the road ditch by Schrader except the removal of a few shovels full of sand at the mouth of his 12-inch tile, and some cleaning out of the ditch was done by the road overseer. Nothing has been done by Schrader to change the ultimate disposition of the water coming from his quarter section of land and flowing into the old ditch on the south side of the highway.

quarter and ends in a pond located near the north boundary of the quarter section. This ditch carries water from lands located across the hard road in section 35. The water from this pond overflows at times and goes upon the land immediately north thereof belonging to Elliott. A shallow ditch extends a short distance northwesterly and thence north from this pond. Some work was also done upon these two ditches. The complaint filed charges this ditch or water course to have been connected with lateral C, but the court made no such finding and the proof did not warrant such finding.

The evidence produced on the hearing tends to show that at the time of filing the complaint a continuous ditch existed from the south end of lateral C across the south 40 rods of the land of Kitty Elliott to her Elliott bought the south half of the north-south fence, where the ditch extends west east quarter of section 35 about 1919. This alongside the fence for some three or four land lies immediately south of the property into which lateral C extends, and the north line of this 80 acres is about 40 rods from where lateral C ended as constructed by the district. The land has always been low and marshy, and still is since the construction of lateral C. The west three-fourths of the 80 is comparatively level from east to west and has a fall from north to south of about 42 feet. The major portion of the surface water enters this land from the south, a few rods east of the southwest corner. Water also flows upon the land about 100 rods farther east, and most of it comes from a pond located on the land of Nation. During October, 1920, Elliott and Nation deepened the north and south channel some 12 or 14 inches on the westerly side of this 80 acres and extending from two rods north of the south line to within three rods of the north line, the purpose being to confine the water coming upon Elliott's land as much as possible. This channel was made along a swale or pression referred to as a water course. Nation owns the west half of the south-introduced showing that at times water west quarter and the southeast quarter of section 35, the latter of which lies immediately south of Frank Elliott's 80 acres. An open ditch or water course extends from the south line of the southeast quarter in a northerly direction and thence northwesterly through the west half of the quarter section to the north line thereof, where it reaches the Frank Elliott lands and water channel. The fall of the land from the south end of the ditch to the north end is about 12 feet. During August, 1922, this ditch was scraped out and cleaned and the north 40 rods of it was straightened. The general course of the water was not changed but continued under the fence on the north line the same as before. This new ditch, however, was not connected by a distance of two rods with the water channel on Elliott's land. Another ditch enters the land of Nation on the easterly side

rods, thence south across the westerly side of the 80 acres belonging to Frank Elliott, and thence south and southeasterly across the 160 acres of Nation. Elliott and Nation denied that either of them, or any one for them, had made any actual connection with lateral C. No work was done by them, or by any one else to their knowledge, upon the Kitty Elliott lands from the south end of lateral C to the north line of Frank Elliott's lands.

It was also shown by appellants that a water course some 10 or 12 inches deep had existed from lateral C south to the Frank Elliott lands ever since the latter had owned his property, and also that one or more depressions extended northerly across the south half of the Kitty Elliott lands toward lateral C, in which some water flowed at times. It further appears that at times the water does not go into lateral C, but flows west thereof across the northwest corner of the Kitty Elde-liott lands and north toward the highway between sections 26 and 35. Evidence also was

flowed out of the south end of lateral C into another ditch extending easterly upon the Kitty Elliott lands, and that the natural water course is not where lateral C is now located but is west thereof, and that at times at least some water goes that way. From the testimony it appears that the fall across the westerly portion of the Frank Elliott lands from south to north is about 4% feet. the fall across the Nation lands from south to north is about 12 feet, making a total fall from south to north across the 200 acres of 16 feet or more. The water from the lands of all of the appellants has always flowed northerly toward or upon the lands lying north of the south boundary line of the district, which lands are necessarily servient to the lands of appellants.

[1, 2] The proof, as we understand it, shows there were low places on the Elliott

(146 N.E.)

north, called swales, through which the sur- and west on his land had its outlet in face water flowed, and it was along the this ditch a few rods west of where lateral course of these low places or swales that the C crossed the public highway through a culditches were constructed, which consisted of vert, and it is that tile ditch which it is cleaning out and slightly deepening them claimed was the connection he made with the along the course of the natural flow. The district ditch. According to the preponderentire territory was wet land, and in times ance of the testimony, the surface water in of heavy rains the water was not confined to times of rains flows off Schrader's land the swales but flowed over pretty much all north in the road ditch and when the rainof the land. Except in times of overflow the fall is heavy it flows over the road. The dewater followed the water course or swale. cided preponderance of the evidence is that It was held in Lambert v. Alcorn, 144 Ill. none of appellants' lands are benefited by 313, 33 N. E, 53, 21 L. R. A. 611, that where the district ditch. Prior to 1919, when it was water flowed from a higher tract of land up- sought to annex lands because the owners on a lower one in a fixed and determinate had connected an artificial ditch with the course, so as to discharge at a fixed point, it ditches of the district, it was necessary to constitutes a water course; that there must show the connection or that the lands are or be a "ravine, swale or depression" extending will be benefited by the work of the district. from one tract to the other, and it is not Under the statute then in force, it was held important that the water has not worn a that where landowners had by artificial ditchchannel having definite and well-marked es connected their lands with the district banks or sides. It was further held in that ditches it was to be deemed a voluntary apcase that a natural water course may be plication for annexation and the question of improved by deepening or widening it, for benefits was immaterial. Gar Creek Drainthe purpose of more effectively conveying the age District v. Wagner, 256 Ill. 338, 100 N. surface water off the land, without creating E. 100. Under the statute as amended in a new water course. We held in St. Louis 1919 it was provided that lands lying outMerchants' Bridge Terminal Railway Ass'n side the district, the owner of which "shall v. Schultz, 226 Ill. 409, 80 N. E. 879, that a thereafter make connection with the main slough or depression which carries water in ditch or drain or with any ditch or drain rainy seasons, only, is a water course within within the district as organized and whose the meaning of our drainage laws. The own- lands are or will be benefited by the work of er of the dominant estate may rightfully col- | such district, shall be deemed to have made lect the surface water upon his land and by voluntary application to be included in such means of ditches conduct them into natural drainage district." Laws of 1919, p. 442. water courses which empty into the ditches The material change by the amendment of of the district, without subjecting his land to 1919 was the substitution of "and" for "or," be annexed to the district. People v. Barber, so that under the 1919 amendment, to au265 Ill. 316, 106 N. E. 798; Inlet Swamp thorize the annexation of land outside the Drainage District v. Mehlhausen, 291 Ill. 459, district because the owner had connected it 126 N. E. 113. In order to establish that a with the district ditch, it must be benefited tract of land lying outside a drainage dis- by the work of the district. In 1923 (Laws trict has been connected by the owner with 1923, p. 335) the same section of the statute the district ditch, it is not sufficient to show was again amended by substituting "or" for the waters from the land ultimately flow "and," so that as amended in 1923 the statthrough district ditches, but it must be ute was restored as it existed before 1919. shown that an artificial ditch has been con- If we are to attribute any meaning to the structed leading into the district ditch, or in- change made in 1919, it could only be that it to some artificial ditch previously construct- was intended the proof of connection of land ed connecting with the district ditch. Peo- lying outside the district with the district ple v. Barber, supra; Inlet Swamp Drainage ditches was not, alone, sufficient to authorize District v. Gleim, 272 Ill. 551, 112 N. E. 291; annexation, but it must appear also that the People v. Drainage Com'rs, 282 Ill. 514, 118 lands will be benefited by the work of the N. E. 742. district. The amendment of 1919 was made after the decision in Gar Creek Drainage District v. Wagner, supra. The amendment of 1923 seems to conclusively show the purpose of the Legislature was to return to the statute as it existed prior to 1919. What work was done by the appellants on their lands by virtue of which appellee seeks to annex their lands was done between 1919 and 1923, and unless the 1923 amendment is construed to be retroactive in its effect it could not be held to apply in this case.

[3] What Elliott and Nation did was to improve the natural water course on their own lands by deepening it so as to collect the surface waters and carry them off their lands in the same course they had previously followed. Schrader's land was higher than the land north of it. Along his north line was the public highway, which had been graded higher than the natural surface. On the south side of the road next to his land a ditch had been constructed before the drainage district was organized. Schrader's string of tile extending south 146 N.E.-36

[4, 5] It may well be doubted whether, if the Legislature had intended to give the 1923

amendment a retroactive effect, it had the power to do so; but it seems clear it had no intention to do so. The intention to give a statute a retroactive effect must clearly appear from the act. People v. Lower, 236 Ill. 608, 86 N. E. 577; People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N. E. 162. The burden was on appellee to prove benefits as well as connection, and we cannot hold this has been done. We do not overlook that appellee proved some years ago, and after the district was organized, the appellants, or some of them, or their predecessors in title, signed a petition to have their lands included in the drainage district. Nor have we overlooked the fact that the judge presiding at the trial personally viewed the premises.

The record does not justify the judgment, and it is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

(315 Ill. 548)

HOIT v. SNODGRASS. (No. 16285.) (Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 17, 1925.)

1. Courts 36 County court adjudicating questions of which it has general jurisdiction entitled to as favorable intendments as courts of general jurisdiction.

County court adjudicating questions of which it has general jurisdiction is entitled to as liberal intendments in favor thereof as are courts of general jurisdiction.

2. Insane persons 36-Regularity or validity of conservator's appointment cannot be questioned collaterally.

Regularity or validity of appointment of conservator cannot be questioned collaterally. 3. Insane persons

32-County courts have jurisdiction to appoint conservators and jurisdiction over wards' persons and estates after appointment.

County courts have jurisdiction to appoint conservators of insane and distracted persons and jurisdiction over their persons and estates after appointment.

4. Insane persons 36-County court's decree in conservatorship proceedings not subject to collateral attack.

Judgments and decrees of county court, having general jurisdiction of subject-matter and parties in conservatorship proceedings, are not subject to collateral attack, however erroneous they may be.

5. Insane persons 71-Good faith purchaser under county court judgment ordering sale of insane person's realty protected.

Purchaser in good faith under county court's judgment ordering sale of insane person's realty is protected, though court proceeded irregularly.

6. Judgment 474-Errors and irregularities of county court corrected therein or by appellate court.

Errors and irregularities of county court, rendering judgment in conservatorship proceeding, must be corrected in such court by proper proceedings, or by court of review regularly exercising appellate jurisdiction. 7. Judgment 474 Stranger to county court's unimpeached judgment in conservatorship proceedings cannot challenge its validity collaterally.

Where parties to conservatorship proceedings in county court make no effort to set aside judgment for error in proceedings, stranger cannot challenge its validity in collateral proceeding.

8. Judgment 503-No collateral attack on judgment within court's general jurisdiction, though pleadings are defective.

When subject-matter of judgment is within court's general jurisdiction, collateral attack cannot be made thereon, though pleadings are defective and subject to demurrer.

9. Insane persons

36-Defective petition for、 appointment of conservator not ground for collateral attack on judgment.

County court's action in treating petition for appointment of conservator as sufficient, though it contained no formal prayer to declare ward insane, rendering judgment appointing conservator, and entering nunc pro tunc order at subsequent term, can be no more than error, not depriving court of jurisdiction, so as to render judgment subject to collateral attack. 10. Insane persons 71-County court may direct sale of insane ward's realty.

County court, in exercise of general jurisdiction of insane ward's estate, may direct sale of ward's realty.

11. Insane persons 71-County court's error in ordering sale of insane ward's realty free from mortgage and judgment liens held no defense to suit for specific performance of purchaser's contract.

County court having jurisdiction of subjectmatter and of all persons having claims against insane ward's estate, error in ordering conservator's sale of realty free from mortgage and judgment liens is no defense in suit to compel specific performance of purchaser's contract.

12. Insane persons 36, 71-Orders of county court in proceeding for appointment of conservator and sale of ward's realty binding on all.

Proceedings in county court for appointment of conservator and sale of insane ward's

realty are in rem, and orders entered by it, until set aside, reversed, or modified in regular and direct proceeding, are binding on all the world.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; William T. Church, Judge.

Suit by Otis W. Hoit, as conservator of the estate of John F. Smith, an insane person, against Frank A. Snodgrass. From a de

cree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. firmed.

(146 N.E.)
Af- to enter an order nunc pro tunc after the ex-
piration of the term at which the verdict was
entered finding Smith to be insane; (d) that
the court had no authority to order the con-
servator to sell the lands of his ward free

George W. Wood and Dan H. McNeal, both of Moline, for appellant.

Henry Waterman and Joseph L. Shaw, both of Geneseo, for appellee.

All of these objections amount to the same thing, and so may be treated under one head. They all challenge the regularity of the proceedings with respect to the appointment of the conservator and the administration of the ward's estate, and the attempt in this proceeding in the circuit court is to review the proceedings in the county court.

from existing liens and incumbrances without the consent of the lienholders; (e) that the entering of the nunc pro tunc order after the THOMPSON, J. This appeal is prosecuted entering of the order confirming the sale did to review the decree of the circuit court of not validate the proceedings intervening beHenry county, directing the specific perform-tween the verdict of the jury and the enterance of a contract for the sale of real estate. ing of such nunc pro tunc order; and (f) that, John F. Smith, who was the owner of lands if section 29 of chapter 86 of the statutes of in Henry county valued at $275,000, became this state be construed to give power to the financially involved. December 8, 1920, a county court to order the sale of lands of a petition was filed in the county court of Hen- ward by the conservator free and clear of all ry county, alleging that petitioners "are rep- liens and incumbrances, it is to that extent utable citizens of the county of Henry and unconstitutional, for the reason that it austate of Illinois, that John F. Smith, who thorizes an order that impairs the obligation resides in the city of Geneseo, in the county of contracts. aforesaid, is an insane person, who by reason of such unsoundness of mind is incapable of managing and caring for his own estate." The prayer is "to appoint some fit and proper person conservator of the estate of the said John F. Smith." Smith was duly summoned, and a guardian ad litem appointed for him. There was a trial by jury, and the jury returned a verdict, finding "that [1-4] The law is well settled in this state said John F. Smith is insane, and in conse- that the county court, when adjudicating upquence of such disability is incapable of on questions of which it has general jurismanaging and caring for his property and diction, is entitled to as liberal intendments -effects," and that a conservator should be ap- in favor of its jurisdiction as are extended pointed. The court received the verdict and to the acts of courts of general jurisdiction. entered it of record, and thereupon entered Bostwick v. Skinner, 80 Ill. 147; Wight v. its order, appointing Otis W. Hoit conserva- Wallbaum, 39 Ill. 554. It is the settled doctor. Hoit filed his report, estimating the to- trine of this court that the regularity or vatal assets of the estate to be about $290,000, lidity of the appointment of a conservator and listed claims showing that the total lia- cannot be questioned collaterally. Fecht v. bilities amounted to more than $310,000. He Freeman, 251 Ill. 84, 95 N. E. 1043; Dodge v. filed his petition for leave to sell real estate Cole, 97 Ill. 338, 37 Am. Rep. 111. The counof his ward to pay debts, and due notice ty courts of this state have jurisdiction to was given to all parties concerned. The appoint conservators of insane and distractcourt found that it was for the best interests ed persons, and jurisdiction over their persons of the ward and the creditors to sell the and estates after a conservator has been aplands free and clear of all liens and incum- pointed. Where the court has jurisdiction brances, and that the conservator assure of the subject-matter and the parties, its purchasers at the sale that a merchantable judgment or decree cannot be questioned coltitle to the lands would be shown by ab- laterally, no matter how erroneous it may be. stract. Pursuant to said order the lands This rule applies in all its force to the counhere involved, amounting to 368.5 acres, were ty court, which has general jurisdiction of sold for the sum of $55,275 to appellant, conservatorship proceedings, and its judg Frank A. Snodgrass. The conservator furnished an abstract of title in accordance with the terms of a formal contract of sale entered into between the parties to this suit, and appellant refused to perform the contract, for the reason that the title shown by the abstract is not merchantable.

The errors assigned and argued by appellant are (a) that the petition filed for the appointment of a conservator contains no prayer for ar adjudication of insanity; (b) that no order was entered at the term the verdict was rendered finding John F. Smith to be insane; (c) that the court had no power

ments and decrees are not subject to review by the circuit court collaterally for error. Sheahan v. Madigan, 275 Ill. 372, 114 N. E. 135.

[5-8] While the court may have proceeded irregularly in ordering the sale of the real estate.in question, a purchaser in good faith under its judgment is protected. Spring v. Kane, 86 Ill. 580. Having a right to decide every question that occurred in the proceedings, the errors and irregularities of the court rendering judgment, if any exist, must be corrected in that court by proper proceedings or by a court of review regularly exer

(316 III. 60)

CITY OF ROCKFORD V. NOLAN.
(No. 16360.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 17, 1925.) 57-Powers de

cising its appellate jurisdiction. Where the parties to the proceedings make no effort to set aside the judgment of the court for error in its proceedings, and the judgment stands unimpeached, a stranger in a collateral proceeding cannot challenge its validity. Swiggart v. Harber, 4 Scam. 364, 39 Am. Dec. 418. When the general character of a judgment is such that its subject-matter falls within the general jurisdiction of the court that enters it, a collateral attack cannot be made thereon, even though the pleadings may be defec- 2. Municipal corporations 58-Statute granttive and subject to demurrer. Christianson Ing powers strictly construed.

v. King County, 239 U. S. 356, 36 S. Ct. 114,

1. Municipal corporations
rived from General Assembly.

Municipal corporation derives existence and powers from General Assembly, and has no in

herent power.

Statute granting powers to municipal corpo

60 L. Ed. 327; Jarrell v. Laurel Coal & Landration is strictly construed, and any fair or Co., 75 W. Va. 752, 84 S. E. 933, L. R. A. reasonable doubt of existence of such powers is 1916E, 312; Tube City Mining & Milling Co. resolved against it. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203, L. R. A. 1916E, 303; Altman v. School District, 35 Or. 85, 56 P. 291, 76 Am. St. Rep. 468; In re James' Estate, 99 Cal. 374, 33 P. 1122, 37 Am. St. Rep. 60; Trumble v. Williams, 18 Neb. 144, 24 N. W. 716.

[9-12] The questions raised with respect to the proceedings in the county court are not before us for decision, but, assuming that all the errors urged are well taken, none of them are of a character to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Grant that the petition should have contained a formal prayer to declare Smith insane, the action of the county court in treating the petition as sufficient and rendering its judgment appointing the conservator can be nothing more than error. And the same may be said of the action of the court in entering its nunc pro tunc order at a subsequent term. There is no bill of exceptions in this record, nor could there be, showing that the court did not have before it proper memoranda justifying the entry of the order. All of the authorities in this state are to the effect that the county court has general jurisdiction of an insane ward's estate, and that in the exercise of that jurisdiction it has power to direct the sale of real estate belonging to the ward. In the proceeding here questioned the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and had jurisdiction of all the persons having claims against the estate. Whether it erred in ordering the real estate sold free from the liens of those whose claims are secured by mortgages on the real estate involved, and whose claims have been reduced to judgment, is a question not open for consideration in the proceeding in the circuit court to compel the specific performance of a contract for the sale of the real estate. The proceeding in the county court was one in rem, and the orders entered by it are, until set aside, reversed, or modified in a regular and direct proceeding, binding on all the world.

The decree of the circuit court is affirmed. Decree affirmed.

3. Municipal corporations ~59 "Implied powers" necessarily incident to express pow

ers.

"Implied powers" of municipal corporations are those necessarily incident to powers granted.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Implied Powers.]

4. Licenses 6(2)-Power to license occupation must be expressly granted or necessarily incident to power expressly delegated.

Power to license or require payment of tax to engage in occupation, must be expressly granted in city's charter, or necessarily implied in or incident to power expressly delegated. 5. Licenses 6(2)-No power to legislate concerning occupations not enumerated in statute, but power may be derived from several items of enumeration.

Express enumeration in Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, of occupations or businesses, not nuisances per se, over which city is given control, excludes all others, but power to legislate on given subject may be derived from several items of enumeration.

6. Licenses 6(12)-Act authorizing city to open, improve, and regulate use of streets does not authorize licensing of occupation or business such as renting vehicles without drivers.

Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, subds. 7, 9, conferring general authority to open, improve, and regulate use of streets, does not authorize licensing of occupation or business, such as that of renting motor vehicles without driv

ers.

7. Licenses 6(12) Licensing business of renting motor vehicles without drivers not authorized by act permitting licensing of hack men, etc.; "all others pursuing like occupations."

Cities and Villages Act, art. 5, § 1, subd. 42, authorizing city to license hackmen, draymen, etc., and "all others pursuing like occupations," does not authorize licensing of business of renting motor vehicles without drivers for use wherever bailees desire; quoted words being limited to pursuit of same class or nature as those specified.

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