(146 N.E.) enjoined Froelich and his agents and serv-| because it fails to fix the beginning and terants from manufacturing, selling, bartering | mination of his imprisonment. or storing upon the premises any liquor containing one-half of 1 per cent. or more of alcohol by volume, and ordered that the premises should not be occupied or used for one year unless permitted by subsequent modification of the decree, and that the sheriff close and lock the premises forthwith. On August 11, 1924, a petition in the name of the people of the state of Illinois, by Ashbel V. Smith, state's attorney, was filed, which charged that since the issuance of the permanent injunction Froelich had sold intoxicating liquors on the premises to different persons. The prayer of the petition was for a citation against Froelich and certain of his agents and employees, commanding them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court for violating the injunction. Such a rule was entered. Froelich filed his answer thereto, in which he admitted the filing of the bill and the issuance of the permanent injunction, but denied the other allegations of the petition, and prayed that the citation be quashed. On the hearing testimony was offered in support of the petition. The court found that Froelich had violated the permanent injunction and adjudged him guilty of contempt, and fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the county jail of Lake county for 90 days. He seeks a review by this writ of error. The proceedings in the circuit court were conducted by authority of the Prohibition Act (Laws of 1921, p. 681), and to determine their character a consideration of the applicable provisions of that act is necessary. Section 21, among other things, declares that any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure or place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation of the act, or where property designed for the illegal manufacture of liquor is kept, and all intoxicating liquor or other property so kept and used, are a common nuisance, and that a single unlawful sale, barter or act of manufacturing liquor shall constitute such a nuisance. The twenty-second section provides that an action to enjoin a nuisance defined in the act may be brought in the name of the state of Illinois by the Attorney General, or any state's attorney or other designated public officer, or by any citizen of the county where such a nuisance exists; that such action shall be brought and tried in equity by the court without a jury; that a temporary injunction prohibiting the ' continuance of the nuisance, and an order restraining the removal of or interference with the liquor, fixtures or other things used in violating the act may be issued pending the suit, and that upon the trial of the cause, if the material allegations of the petition are The contentions of plaintiff in error, in sub- found to be true, the court shall enjoin the stance, are: (1) That the proceedings under manufacture, sale, barter or storage of liqthe Prohibition Act in which he was adjudged uor in such room, house, building, boat, veguilty of contempt of court constitute a crim-hicle, structure or place, or any part thereinal prosecution; (2) that as a criminal pros- of, and may, upon ordering the abatement ecution the proceedings are governed by sec- of such nuisance, direct that any such place tion 33 of article 6 of the Constitution, and shall not be occupied or used for one year, from their inception should have been carried or, in its discretion, may permit it to be ocon in the name and by the authority of the cupied or used if the owner, lessee, tenant or people of the state of Illinois, and concluded occupant shall give bond, with sufficient sureagainst their peace and dignity; (3) that sec- ty, conditioned that intoxicating liquor will tion 25 of the Prohibition Act, which pro- not thereafter be manufactured, sold, bartervides that the court may summarily try and ed, kept or otherwise disposed of therein, and punish the defendant for the violation of any that he will pay all fines, costs and daminjunction granted pursuant to the provisions ages that may be assessed for any violation of the act, violates the fifth and ninth sec- of the act upon the property. The twentytions of the second article of the state Con- fifth section provides that in case of the vistitution, and the fifth and sixth amendments olation of any injunction, temporary or perto the federal Constitution, which guarantee manent, granted pursuant to the act, the the right of trial by jury; (4) that he did court, or, in vacation, a judge thereof, may not have 5 days' written notice of the grant- summarily try and punish the defendant. ing of the temporary injunction, as provided by section 22 of the Prohibition Act, and for that reason could not be adjudged guilty of contempt; (5) that his sworn answer denied all the material allegations of the petition which charged violations of the permanent injunction, and upon that answer he was entitled to his discharge; (6) that the violations charged should have been shown by proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (7) that the venue was not established; and (8) that the order adjudging him in contempt of court is void [1, 2] The sole object of the bill of complaint was to restrain the maintenance of a nuisance. It did not seek to enforce any criminal liability or to impose any punishment. Section 22 of the Prohibition Act (Laws of 1921, p. 690), expressly provides that the suit "shall be brought and tried as an action in equity by the court, without a jury." By the form and substance of the bill and the relief sought, as well as the express provision of the act under which the suit was brought, the remedy is civil. Like wise the proceeding to punish for contempt [ the people, and that petition was sufficient of court in violating its injunction is for the for the purpose. Laws of 1921, § 25, p. 692. purpose of advancing the remedy of the [11] The power of courts to punish for concomplainant. It is from its inception to its tempt does not depend on constitutional or conclusion essentially a civil chancery pro- legislative grant, but is inherent in all courts ceeding, conforming itself, in its pleadings, as necessary for self-protection, and as an character, and quantity of proof required, essential auxiliary to the administration of to the rules and practice applicable to other the law. People v. Panchire, 311 Ill. 622, chancery proceedings. People v. Buconich, 143 N. E. 476; People v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 277 Ill. 290, 115 N. E. 185; Rothschild & Co. 137 N. E. 118, 26 A. L. R. 16; Schmidt v. v. Steger Piano Co., 256 Ill. 196, 99 N. E. Cooper, 274 Ill. 243, 113 N. E. 641; People 920, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 793, Ann. Cas. 1913E, v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528; Stu276; Hake v. People, 230 Ill. 174, 82 N. E. art v. People, 3 Scam. 395. It is one of the 561; O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. attributes of a court of justice that it should 108, 108 Am. St. Rep. 219, 3 Ann. Cas. 966. have the power of enforcing its orders withHence plaintiff in error was adjudged in con- out the necessity of calling upon a jury to tempt of court in a civil proceeding and not assist it in the exercise of that power. The by a criminal prosecution. fine and imprisonment which the court is authorized to impose for a contempt are not intended as a punishment for a violation of the criminal law, and punishment for contempt is not a bar to a prosecution for the same act if it also constitutes a criminal offense. The constitutional guaranties of the right of trial by jury do not apply to proceedings to punish for contempt, and those guaranties are not violated by the imposition of punishment by the court, without a jury, in a contempt proceeding. People v. Rushworth, 294 Ill. 455, 128 N. E. 555; People v. Seymour, 272 Ill. 295, 111 N. E. 1008; O'Brien v. People, supra; Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 821; People v. Kipley, 171 Ill. 44, 49 N. E. 229, 41 L. R. A. 775. [3-10] Section 33 of article 6 of the Constitution provides that all prosecutions shall be carried on "in the name and by the authority of the people of the state of Illinois," and conclude, "against the peace and dignity of the same." The word "prosecutions," in its broadest sense, would embrace all proceedings in the courts of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or the punishment of a wrong. Obviously, the word as used in the constitutional provision invoked has no such comprehensive meaning, but signifies only prosecutions of a public or criminal character and concerns the formal accusation of offenders by presentment or indictment by a grand jury or by information. People v. Gartenstein, 248 Ill. 546, 94 N. E. 128; Moutray v. People, 162 Ill. 194, 44 N. E. 496; Donnelly v. People, 11 Ill. 552, 52 Am. Dec. 459. The provision is mandatory in all prosecutions to which it is applicable, and the omission of the constitutional requirement in such cases may be urged on motion in arrest of judgment or on writ of error. People v. Gartenstein, supra; Hay v. People, 59 Ill. 94. But the constitutional provision has no application to a civil proceeding to punish for contempt in violating an injunction. Hake v. People, supra; O'Brien v. People, supra. Whether such a proceeding should be entitled and prosecuted as an independent proceeding in the name of the people, or carried on as a part of the civil suit to which it is incident, is of comparatively little importance, and the prac-permanent injunction without the issuance tice is not uniform. The mere entitling of the proceeding cannot change its nature or character. Manning v. Securities Co., 242 Ill. 584, 90 N. E. 238, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725; Hake v. People, supra; Lester v. People, 150 Ill. 408, 23 N. E. 387, 37 N. E. 1004, 41 Am. St. Rep. 375. The bill of complaint in the instant case was filed in the name of the state of Illinois, as required by section 22 of the Prohibition Act. Laws of 1921, p. 690. The contempt proceedings were insti [12] No written notice of the granting of the temporary injunction was given to the plaintiff in error. Such notice is necessary, if such an injunction is to remain in force pending the final hearing of the cause. Prohibition Act, § 22. But the plaintiff in error was not punished for a violation of the temporary injunction, and it was not the basis of the petition to have him adjudged guilty of contempt. Section 22 of the Prohibition Act requires the suit to be brought and tried as an action in equity without a jury, and nothing in that act or in equity practice compels the complainant, in a case of this character, to make application for or requires the court to grant a temporary injunction. Relief may be granted on the final hearing by a of a preliminary writ. Peters v. Harris, 245 Ill. 419, 92 N. E. 281; Holden v. City of Alton, 179 Ill. 318, 53 N. E. 556; Brown v. Luehrs, 79 Ill. 575; New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Ill. 383, 51 N. E. 629. The plaintiff in error was personally served with the original summons more than ten days prior to its return day. Hence the court had jurisdiction of his person as well as of the subject-matter of the suit. He made no defense, and by the court's order the (146 N.E.) The order was sufficient quently, upon the hearing, the permanent in- | plaintiff in error. We find no reversible error in the record, [13] The twenty-fifth section of the Prohibition Act (Laws of 1921, p. 692), provides that in proceedings to punish for contempt for the violation of any injunction granted pursuant to the provisions of the act, the "trial may be had upon affidavits, or either party may demand the production and oral examination of the witnesses." The prac tice authorized by the statute conforms to the practice in chancery to punish for civil contempt. People v. Buconich, supra; Hake v. People, supra; Loven v. People, 158 Ill. 159, 42 N. E. 82. The testimony of witnesses was properly heard by the circuit court, and the plaintiff in error could not, merely by his sworn answer, purge himself of the contempt and be discharged. [14, 15] No rule of law requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil case. Civil rights, only, were involved in the proceeding to punish the plaintiff in error for contempt, and it was only necessary to establish the violation charged against him by a preponderance of the evidence. We have, however, reviewed the evidence in the record, and we are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the plaintiff in error violated the permanent injunction as charged in the pe tition. [16] The bill, confessed by plaintiff in er ror, particularly described the property known as Willis Inn, and stated that it was situated in the town of Grant, Lake county, Ill. On the hearing in the contempt proceedings an abstracter testified to the same effect. Other witnesses at the same hearing testified that plaintiff in error sold intoxicating liquor to different persons on the same premises after the permanent injunction had been granted. The evidence is clear that plaintiff in error violated the injunction within the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Lake county. HEARD, J. I agree with the conclusion reached in this opinion, but not in all that is said therein. PEOPLE v. WESTERDAHL. (316 Ill. 86) (No. 16418.) Feb. 17, 1925.) I. Indictment and information 110(2)-Information following statute, omitting certain words, held sufficient; "payment." Information, under Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 38, § 255, for obtaining property in re- turn for check which drawer had not sufficient If indictment or information is so specific that accused is notified of charge, and is able to prepare defense, and nature of charge may be easily understood by court or jury, it is sufficient. [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Payment.] 3. False pretenses 6-Fact that check, which drawer had not sufficient funds to meet, was postdated, held no defense. That check was postdated, held no defense, in prosecution, under Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 38, § 255, for obtaining property in return for check, which accused had not sufficient funds to pay. 4. False pretenses 49 (5)-Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction for obtaining property for check, to pay which accused did not have sufficient funds. In prosecution for obtaining property without having sufficient funds to pay check given for it, evidence that property was delivered in reliance on check rather than on personal credit of accused held sufficient to sustain conviction. 5. Criminal law 258(2)—Judgment, entered on finding that accused was guilty in matter and form as charged in information, held sufficient. [17] Section 25 of the Prohibition Act authorizes the court summarily to punish for contempt. The circuit court, after making specific findings that plaintiff in error had violated the permanent injunction, adjudged him guilty of contempt, and sentenced him In prosecution under Smith-Hurd Rev. St. to imprisonment in the county jail of Lake 1923, c. 38, § 255, for obtaining property in county for the period of 90 days. The term return for check, to pay which accused had not sufficient funds, where trial was by court withof imprisonment was definitely fixed. It would begin immediately unless some appro- form as charged in the information," and judgout jury, finding of guilty "in manner and priate action to stay or review the court's ment thereon, held proper as conforming to of order of commitment was invoked by thefense charged in information. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 146 N.E.-47 cient. No particular form of finding is required, and, if from whole record it is apparent that court finds accused guilty of offense charged and sentences him in accordance with statute, it is sufficient. 7. Criminal law 1165(2)-Judgment not reversed for mere error of form. 6. Criminal law 258(2)-Record, showing release of all claims arising out of its sale; that court found accused guilty and sentenced and that he should pay the balance of $932.him in accordance with statute, held suffi- 62 in money. The old car was returned and the release was given. For the balance of $932.62 Westerdahl drew a check on the Pioneer State Savings Bank and made it payable to the order of and delivered it to the company. The new Hudson car was delivered to him at the same time. The release recited that he had paid the sum of $932.62. The transaction was consummated about 5:30 o'clock p. m. on Saturday, November 4, 1922, but the check, although delivered at that time, was dated two days later. It was not deposited until the 12th or 13th of November, and was returned unpaid by the bank upon which it was drawn for lack of. sufficient funds. Westerdahl mortgaged the new automobile within a few days after obtaining possession of it. A judgment of conviction will not be reversed for mere technical error of form. Error to First Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Howard Hayes, Judge. Hugo Westerdahl was convicted in the municipal court of obtaining property for a check without having sufficient funds to pay it, and brings error to review the judg-fied that, when the check was given to him, Knutson, the agent for the company, testiment of the Appellate Court, affirming the Westerdahl informed him that he had $4.000 judgment of conviction. Affirmed. to his credit in the bank, and that the check Robert W. Daniels, of Chicago (John B. was good; that on Monday, the 6th of NoFruchtl, of Chicago, of counsel), for plain-vember, Westerdahl called him on the teletiff in error. Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and Virgil L. Blanding, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson and Clyde C. Fisher, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. phone and requested him to hold the check, but that he told Westerdahl he could not do so, and that, after the check was returned unpaid, he often interviewed Westerdahl, who repeatedly promised to pay it, but never did so. Westerdahl testified that he was a general contractor; that on November 4, 1922, he DE YOUNG, J. An amended information was engaged in building a church; that he filed in the municipal court of Chicago informed Knutson that, because of his buildcharged that Hugo Westerdahl on November ing operations, he was short of funds; that 4, 1922, with intent to defraud, drew a cer- Knutson agreed, if he would give him a tain check for $932.62 on the Pioneer State check for the balance due on the new autoSavings Bank, Chicago, and delivered it to mobile, he (Knutson) would hold it for one the Parkway Motor Sales Company, and or two weeks; that, with this understandthereby obtained from that company an au- ing, the check was delivered to Knutson; tomobile of a specified value, without hav- that Knutson had called him several times ing, and knowing at the time that he did on the telephone, but that the calls were not have, sufficient funds in or credit with with reference to the controversy which the bank upon which the check was drawn arose out of the sale of the first automobile; to pay it. A jury was waived and upon that he had mortgaged the new automobile, trial by the court Westerdahl was found but that it was done with Knutson's knowlguilty and sentenced to the house of correc-edge and consent; that the release which he tion for six months, and to pay a fine of $500 and costs. On review by the Appellate Court the judgment of the municipal court was affirmed. He seeks a further review by this writ of error. Prior to the transaction in question Westerdahl had purchased from the Parkway Motor Sales Company an automobile, which proved unsatisfactory, and he had sued the company for damages for an alleged breach of warranty arising out of the sale. To settle the controversy, the parties agreed on November 4, 1922, that Westerdahl should buy from the company a new Hudson automobile for $1,932.62; that the company would allow him a credit of $1,000 on his purchase for the return of the old automobile and a signed had been drawn by the attorney for the company; and that he had never stated to Knutson that he had $4,000 in the bank. He admitted that he did not have sufficient money in the bank to pay the check and that he had never paid it. [1] In the trial court the plaintiff in error made a motion to quash the amended information, asserting that it failed to state an offense. The motion was denied. He renews the contention here that the amended information is insufficient. The statute (Smith's Stat. 1923, c. 38, par. 255, p. 685) provides that any person who with intent to defraud shall draw any check upon any bank and thereby obtain from any person any personal property, knowing at the time of the making (146 N.E.) of such check that he has not sufficient funds [2] If an indictment or information is so [3, 4] It is next objected that the transaction for which the check was given occurred on November 4, 1922; that the check, although delivered on that day, was not dated until the 6th; and that therefore no personal property of value was obtained on the day of the transaction in reliance upon the check, but solely on the personal credit of the plaintiff in error. The information charged the drawing and delivery of the check with intent to defraud; the plaintiff in error knowing at the time that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the payment of the check. The fact that the check was postdated does not take the case out of the statute. By drawing and tendering the check, the purpose was presumed to be to induce the belief that it would be paid 2 Bishop's New Crim. upon presentation. Law (9th Ed.) § 421; Lesser v. People, 73 N. Y. 78; Barton v. People, supra. Only upon the assumption that the check was good did the plaintiff in error obtain delivery of the new automobile. The agreement required him to pay the balance of $932.62 in money. His delivery of the check as such payment necessarily assumed the ownership of that much money on deposit to his credit in the bank. The release dated November 4, 1922, the day on which the transaction was consummated, recited the payment of that sum. We are satisfied that the automobile was delivered in reliance upon the check and not upon the personal credit of the plaintiff in error. It is also contended that the evidence does not sustain the finding and judgment of the The plaintiff in error denies trial court. that he refused to pay the check, but the fact is that he did not pay it. He argues that the delay in presenting the check for payment shows that there was an understanding that it should be held for a few days and negatives an intention to defraud. Undoubtedly there was much communication between Knutson and the plaintiff in error with reference to the nonpayment of the check. If Knutson, after the telephone conversation with plaintiff in error on Monday, November 6, became convinced that it would serve no purpose promptly to deposit the check, his failure to do so would not alter the fact that the check had been drawn and accepted upon the representation that it would be honored when presented. plaintiff in error on November 4 executed a release by which the controversy over the old automobile was settled, and there would scarcely be any occasion thereafter for a prolonged discussion of that matter, but the company obviously would make every effort to obtain payment of the check, and to that end discussions with the plaintiff in error naturally would follow. We are unable to say that the finding and judgment were not warranted by the evidence. The [5-7] The final contention of the plaintiff in error is that the judgment does not conform to the offense charged in the amended The trial was by the court information. The court found the plainwithout a jury. tiff in error "guilty in manner and form as charged in the information," and the judgment was entered "on said finding of guilty." No particular form of finding is required by the statute in cases of this character. If, from the whole record, it is apparent that the court found the plaintiff in error guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him in accordance with the statute, it is sufficient. Hoch v. People, 219 Ill. 265, 76 N. E. 356, 109 Even if there were a Am. St. Rep. 327. technical error in the form of the judgment, it would not be reversed for that reason alone. People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill, 348, 94 N. E. 525. The judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. |