« ForrigeFortsett »
(146 N.E.) of such check that he has not sufficient funds much money on deposit to his credit in the in or credit with such bank for the payment bank. The release dated November 4, 1922, of such check in full upon its presentation, the day on which the transaction was conshall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The summated, recited the payment of that sum. amended information follows the language We are satisfied that the automobile was deof the statute in every particular except that livered in reliance upon the check and not it omits the words "in full upon its presen- upon the personal credit of the plaintiff in tation.” It charges that Westerdahl "did error. not have sufficient funds in or credit with It is also contended that the evidence does said bank for the payment of said check," not sustain the finding and judgment of the Payment of a check involves its full, and not trial court, The plaintiff in error denies partial, payment when presented. The that he refused to pay the check, but the words "in full upon its presentation,” are fact is that he did not pay it. He argues superfluous, for they neither add to nor de- that the delay in presenting the check for tract from the material allegations in the in- payment shows that there was an underformation. Barton v. People, 135 Ill. 405, 25 standing that it should be held for a few N. E. 776, 10 L. R. A. 302, 25 Am. St. Rep. days and negatives an intention to defraud. 375.
Undoubtedly there was much communication  If an indictment or information is so between Knutson and the plaintiff in error specific that the defendant is notified of the with reference to the nonpayment of the charge which he is to meet, and is able to check. If Knutson, after the telephone conprepare his defense, and the nature of the versation with plaintiff in error on Monday, charge may be easily understood by the court November 6, became convinced that it would or jury, the indictment or information is suf-serve no purpose promptly to deposit the ficient. Glover v. People, 204 111. 170, 68 N. check, his failure to do so would not alter E. 464; People v. McBride, 234 ni. 146, 84 the fact that the check had been drawn and N. E. 865: People v. Weil, 244 111. 176, 91 N. accepted upon the representation that it E. 112; People v.
Krause, 291 Ill. 64, 125 N. would be honored when presented. The D. 726; People, v. Love, 310 Ill. 558, 142 N. plaintiff in error on November 4 executed a E. 204. The offense charged is statutory. release by which the controversy over the The information was drawn in the language old automobile was settled, and there would of the statute, and it set forth specific facts scarcely be any occasion thereafter for a from which the plaintiff in error was ap prolonged discussion of that matter, but the prised of the charge against him. It was company obviously would make every effort sufficient in every respect.
to obtain payment of the check, and to that [3, 4] It is next objected that the transac-end discussions with the plaintiff in error tion for which the check was given occurred naturally would follow. We are unable to on November 4, 1922; that the check, al- say that the finding and judgment were not thougn delivered on that day, was hot dated warranted by the evidence. until the 6th; and that therefore no person- (5-7] The final contention of the plaintiff al property of value was obtained on the day in error is that the judgment does not conof the transaction in reliance upon the check, form to the offense charged in the amended but solely on the personal credit of the plain- information. The trial was by the court
The information charged the without a jury. The court found the plaindrawing and delivery of the check with in- tiff in error “guilty in manner and form as tent to defraud; the plaintiff in error know- charged in the information," and the judging at the time that he did not have suffi- ment was entered "on said finding of guilty." cient funds in or credit with the bank for No particular form of finding is required by the payment of the check. The fact that the the statute in cases of this character. If, check was postdated does not take the case from the whole record, it is apparent that out of the statute. By drawing and tender- the court found the plaintiff in error guilty ing the check, the purpose was presumed to of the offense charged and sentenced him in be to induce the belief that it would be paid accordance with the statute, it is sufficient. upon presentation. 2 Bishop's New Crim. Hoch v. People, 219 Ill. 265, 76 N. E. 356, 109 Law (9th Ed.) § 421 ; Lesser v. People, 73 N. Am. St. Rep. 327. Even if there were a Y. 78; Barton v. People, supra. Only upon technical error in the form of the judgment, the assumption that the check was good did it would not be reversed for that reason the plaintiff in error obtain delivery of the alone. People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill. 348, 94 N. new automobile. The agreement required E. 525. him to pay the balance of $932.62 in money. The judgment of the Appellate Court will His delivery of the check as such payment be affirmed. necessarily assumed the ownership of that Judgment affirmed.
tiff in error.
(316 111. 67)
block and a half. As they turned the corner PĘOPLE v. TYLER. (No. 16233.) one of their brakes stuck, and Campbell got
out and went to the rear of the machine and (Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 17, 1925.) noticed the other machine coming up. He 1. Robbery Ew24(3)-Evidence held to sus. waved to the fellows in it to go to one side,
tain conviction of robbery with dangerous as his machine was in the middle of the road. weapon.
Instead of continuing on, the other machine Evidence of identification held sufficient to stopped behind them. The two fellows jumpwarrant conviction of accused for the crime ed out, one on each side of their machine, of robbery while armed with a dangerous came up to him and asked what was the weapon.
matter, and at the same time one of them, 2. Criminal law e652-Accused held not en- | Tyler, leveled a gun at him. They then
titled to test witnesses to his identity by walked him around to the right and in the placing him among group of other men. shadow of his machine, and there Tyler
As respects sufficiency of evidence identi- pointed the gun at him and told him to give fying accused as the one committing a crime, Tyler his money or anything he had. He accused is not entitled to be placed among a told Tyler to take the gun out of his neck group or number of men to test ability of and then gave him $15 in United States curstate's witnesses to point him out as the guilty rency and Tyler put it in his pocket. Tyler party.
then pointed the gun at Howard, who was Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; in the machine, and asked him how much Frederic R. De Young, Judge.
money he had. He heard Howard, say, "I
have some currency," and Howard opened Richard Tyler was convicted of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon, and up his bill fold and gave him some money.
Tyler asked him if he had any more, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Howard replied that he had some currency W. G. Anderson, of Chicago, for plaintiff in his pocket and gave Tyler that. Tyler in error.
then said, “What else have you got?" HowEdward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert ard said, “I have got some change." Tyler E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and said he did not want that and asked Howard James B. Searcy, of Springfield (Edward E what else he had. Howard replied that that Wilson and Clyde C. Fisher, both of Chica- was all. Tyler then said, “I will look for go, of counsel), for the People.
mysell," and with that he stepped onto the
running board of the car and threw back DUNCAN, C. J. Plaintiff in error, Richard Howard's coat and said, "What is this?" Tyler, was jointly indicted with Harold Howard tried to talk him out of taking the Swart in the criminal court of Cook county star Howard had on his vest. Tyler then for the crime of robbery while armed with said, “You dirty son of a bitch, you get that a dangerous weapon, a revolver. On a sepa- off, or I will blow your brains out." After rate trial he was found guilty on March 10, that, while Howard was sitting in the ma1924, and sentenced to the penitentiary for chine, Tyler walked Campbell to the other an indefinite term. He has sued out this side and put him into the front seat and writ of error to review the record.
told him to drive like hell, and that if he Only two witnesses testified for the peo- looked around he would blow his brains out. ple, Francis J. Campbell, general agent for The place where they were robbed was in the Internal Revenue Department, and Sam- Chicago, Cook county, Illinois. uel Howard, chief deputy United States mar Howard testified substantially to the same shal for the Northern district of Illinois, both facts related by Campbell. He further tesof Chicago. Campbell testified in substance tified that he was wearing an officer's star as follows: On August 9, 1923, about 3 o'clock with a diamond set in it, of the value of $2,in the morning, he and Howard were in an 000, that had been presented to him by the automobile on their way home, traveling employees in his office and his friends, which north on Sheridan road. While driving up Tyler took after uttering some oath, saying Sheridan road he noticed a machine in their that if he did not take the star off quickly rear driving very quietly. They were driv- he would put a hole through his head. Ty. ing slowly and this machine continued to ler also took from him his bill fold and took remain behind them. They slowed down to out of it a 50-dollar and a 20-dollar bill of let it pass them, and as it passed he noticed lawful currency of the United States and that it was an Oldsmobile maroon car, with returned to him the bill fold. Tyler also took two young fellows sitting in the front seat. from him 4 single dollars, lawful money of They drove alongside of the other machine the United States, which he had in his pockfor a short ways, and did not pay any more et, but did not take the change in his pocket attention to it. When they got to Bryn Mawr which he told Tyler he had. avenue they speeded up a bit and passed it. On cross-examination both Campbell and They turned off from Sheridan road into Howard testified that they had never seen Rosemont avenue and proceeded about a either Tyler or Swart prior to the robbery,
cm For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
(146 N.E.) and had only seen Tyler once or twice since hat, but his attention was called more di. the robbery and before the trial. Neither of rectly to his clothing, while Howard's atthem had ever seen Tyler in a group of men, tention appears to have been directed particor was ever asked to pick Tyler out from ularly to the cap without giving any parsuch a group. Howard described Tyler as ticular attention to his clothing. being about 5 feet 6 or 8 inches tall and [1, 2] This evidence clearly warranted the weighing about 170 pounds, and said that he verdict and judgment. It was the special might be taller than he had testified. He province of the jury to settle all questions also said that he wore a cap and had dark of fact in the case, and there is no good hair at the time of the robbery, and that he reason for disturbing the verdict and judgprobably did not get a good look at his hair ment. There is no requirement of the law that night. Campbell described Tyler as be- that the state must have a defendant placed ing about 5 feet 6 or 8 inches tall and wore among a group of any number of men for a checkered suit, and that he did not have a the purpose of testing whether or not its cap on when he walked around to the rear witnesses and victims of the crime are able of the machine, and before that he did not to point him out as the guilty party. know whether he had a cap on. He did not The judgment of the criminal court is afsee him change from a hat to a cap, and his firmed. best recollection is that Tyler did not wear Judgment affirmed. a cap that night. He did not notice what kind of a hat Tyler had on, He did not
DE YOUNG, J., took no part in this deciknow whether it was a straw hat or slouch
Tyler testified that he is 23 years old, is 5 feet 1042 inches tall, and was about the same size August 9, 1923. He further tes
(316 Ill. 104) tified that he did not have a revolver on CITY OF CHICAGO V. COLLIN et al. that date on Rosemont avenue, and denied
(No. 15248.) categorically all the testimony of the state's
(Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 17, 1925.) witnesses as to his having taken any part in the robbery; that he never saw the star al-1. Appeal and error m1097(1)-Decision on leged to have been taken from Howard; that former appeal is law of case on subsequent he had lived in Chicago previous to the al
appeal, where evidence on two trials was leged holdup, and was in the cigar business
substantially the same. with his father at Forty-Seventh street and
Decision on former appeal is law of ca se on Ingleside avenue; that Swart is his cousin, subsequent appeal, where the evidence on the but that he had not seen him since Christ- two trials was substantially the same. mas, 1922, previous to his arrest; that he 2. Eminent domain Omw 153Grantee to whom left Chicago for New Orleans with a man land was conveyed pending condemnation pronamed Murphy, and was there arrested, and ceedings against grantor succeeded to granreturned to Chicago voluntarily and without
tor's vested rights, extradition papers. He admitted that in Ju- Grantee, to whom land was conveyed after ly, 1919, he pleaded guilty to a charge of petition for condemnation of land had been burglary before Judge Kavanagh in the crim-filed against grantor, succeeded to grantor'3 inal court of Cook county, and was sentenced vested rights. to the penitentiary on that plea.
3. Taxation 810(1)-Burden of proving valThe sole reason assigned by plaintiff in idity of tax deeds on persons claiming thereerror for a reversal of the judgment is that under. he was not sufficiently identified by the wit- Where grantee, to whom land was convey. nesses as one of the robbers. He therefore ed pending condemnation proceedings against argues that his guilt was not established by grantor, filed petition in condemnation procompetent legal evidence beyond all reason- ceedings claiming right to the compensation, able doubt and that the verdict and judg. answered by persons who claimed title by virtue ment were not justified. Both Campbell and of tax deeds, grantee did not have burden of Howard positively identified him and on the proving tax deeds void, but burden of establish
ing validity thereof wa3 on persons claiming trial pointed him out in the courtroom as thereunder, in view of Revenue Act, $ 224 one of the robbers. The only substantial (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1923, c. 120, § 210), difference between their testimony as to iden- making such deeds only prima facie evidence of tification was on the question whether or not certain facts. he on that night wore a hat or a cap. It
4, Taxation 810(3)-Judgment declaring was the judgment of Howard, positively ex
tax deeds yoid held warranted. pressed, that he wore a cap. Campbell ex
Where there was no evidence of compliance pressed it as his opinion that he wore a with Revenue Act, § 216 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. hat, but was not sure of the character of 1923, c. 120, 8 202), as to notice of tax salé, and the hat, and his testimony clearly shows
no evidence that purchaser made affidavit for that he did not pay strict attention to his tax deed as required by section 217 (section 203),
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
and no precept or judgment was shown, court, of Chicago. The petition for condemnation was warranted in declaring tax deeds void. was filed October 19, 1918. The petitioner 5. Appeal and error on 1195(3)—Questions was ordered to pay to the county treasurer, which could have been presented are res
as full compensation to the owners and parjudicata whether presented or not.
ties interested in the first three lots above When litigation is prosecuted to an ap- named and for all private interests in the pellate tribunal and questions of law are de- alleys abutting said premises, the sum of cided, all such questions relating to the subject- $1,800, together with $3 as costs of suit, and matter which were open to consideration, and for the benefit of the owners and parties incould have been presented, are res judicata terested in the other eight lots the sum of whether they were presented or not and wheth- $4,800, together with $3 as costs of suit. er the judgment was affirmed or reversed.
The taking over of the property by the city 6. Appeal and error on 1195(3)–Judgment of Chicago for the use of the schools oc
held res judicata as to right of holders of curred some time after the judgments of void tax deeds to reimbursement.
condemnation and previous to April 8, 1920. In action involving right of holders of void On the latter date J. Kent Greene filed his tax titles to reimbursement, in which there was petition in the circuit court of Cook county evidence of application to register title under in the condemnation proceedings claiming to Torrens Act, with offer to reimburse holders of void tax titles, judgment on appeal denying be the owner of lots 4, 45, and 46, together remuneration under tax deeds held res judicata with the improvements thereon, and praying as to right of reimbursement, though effect of for an order on the county treasurer to pay such application was not expressly passed on. to him the amount of $1,803, less any sums 7. Abatement and revival m58(2)-On death of money that may be due to any of the
of owner, Torrens proceeding abates as to other defendants in the condemnation prohim,
ceedings for liens upon the premises. Anna On death of owner, proceeding for registra- M. Cann (now Anna M. Condon) filed a simtion of lands under the Torrens Act abates as ilar petition with the court, claiming to be to him.
the owner of the other eight lots by virtue 8. Eminent domain am 158-Defendant's gran
of a deed of conveyance from Oscar E. Leintee not required to join as parties to her en, one of the defendants in the condemnapetition claiming compensation holders of tion proceedings, executed and delivered to void tax deeds.
her December 16, 1919. She was not made Grantee, to whom land was conveyed pend- a party to the condemnation proceedings, ing condemnation proceedings against grantor, but Greene was made a party thereto and was not required to make persons claiming un-claimed title by virtue of a warranty deed der void tax deeds parties to her petition from Leinen and wife to him to the three claiming right to compensation, since such per: lots, executed and delivered to him Sepsons had the same right to file petition as such
tember 16, 1910. The petitions were grantee.
swered by Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos, Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; claiming ownership of both funds by virtue Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.
of tax deeds. The petitions and answers Condemnation proceedings by the City of were referred to a master in chancery, who Chicago against Guillaum Collin and others, took the evidence and reported that Greene in which Anna M. Condon and another filed and Anna M. Condon were the owners, repetitions answered by Jacob Glos and an- spectively, of the lots claimed; that the other. From judgment rendered, Jacob Glos tax deeds of Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos and another appeal. Affirmed.
were void; that there was due to Greene See, also, 302 Ill, 270, 134 N. E. 751.
$1,631.22 after allowing $171.78 to the city John R. O'Connor and Alben F. Bates, don $4,215.30 after allowing $587.70 to the
of Chicago; that there was due to Mrs. Conboth of Chicago, for appellants.
city of Chicago; that Jacob Glos was enJ. Kent Greene, of Chicago, for appellees. titled to $1,008.18 for reimbursement on his
tax claims and Lucy M. Glos was entitled DUNCAN, C. J. On March 15, 1920, judg- to $579.48 on account of her tax claims. On ments in condemnation proceedings were ob- a hearing on exceptions to the report the tained in favor of the city of Chicago, in findings were approved, but one-balf of the trust for the use of the schools, against cer- master's fees of $357.50 was taxed to Jacob tain lands, including the lands involved in Glos and Lucy M. Glos, to be paid out of the this proceeding, to wit, lots 4, 45, and 46, in fund, leaving the net amount payable to block 1, in John Nelson's subdivision of the Jacob Glos $894.68 and to Lucy M. Glos southwest quarter of the northwest quarter $514.23. It was stipulated that the charges of the northeast quarter of section 4, town for the tax claim were to be made against ship 39 north, range 13 east of the third prin- Mrs. Condon, and she appealed from the orcipal meridian, and lots 27 to 34, inclusive, der. Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos assigned in the same block, all situated in the city | cross-errors. They also appealed, and all
em For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
(146 N.E.) the appeals were consolidated and all errors, lots were subsequently reconveyed to the and cross-errors were disposed of, "with- same grantor of Mrs. Condon. At the time out particular reference to them," by this the lower court ordered this cause resubmitcourt at the February term, 1922, in which ted for further evidence, the petitioner obdecision the decree of the circuit court was jected to such reference or to the further reversed and the cause remanded, as will be taking of evidence upon the ground that the found by reference to City of Chicago v. Supreme Court had completely and finally Collin, 302 Ill. 270, 134 N. E, 751. This court disposed of all matters in issue by its dedenied a rehearing at the April term, 1922. cision aforesaid. The appellants objected We refer to that decision for a more com- to the court limiting further inquiry and eviplete statement of the facts and the issues dence to the question of title to the premtherein decided.
ises, only, contending that there should be After remandment of the cause the man- an inquiry also as to the question whether date of this court was filed in the lower court or not appellants were entitled to renumeraMay 1, 1922. The circuit court then ordered tion for the amount of taxes, etc., paid in that the petition of Mrs. Condon, and the securing their tax deeds. The master found issues formed thereon, be submitted to a from the evidence before him that Mrs. Conmaster in chancery of the court for the sole don was the sole owner of the real estate and only purpose of determining whether described in her petition at the date of the she was the owner of the real estate de- taking over of the real estate by the city of scribed in her petition and for determining Chicago. Objections to the report by appelwhether or not Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos lants were overruled by the master and were the owners of portions thereof. The stood as exceptions before the court. The master, Samuel A. Andalman, was directed court approved the report and entered a to consider the evidence taken before him decree finding Mrs. Condon was the.pwner at the former hearing of this petition, the of the lots described in her petition and takanswers, and such other evidence as any of en over by the city of Chicago for the use the parties might produce as to ownership, of the schools; that the tax deeds of appeland that the evidence be confined exclusive-lants are null and void, and that neither ly to the question of ownership. The at- of them is entitled to any portion of the fund torney for Mrs. Condon presented to the mas- deposited with the county treasurer; that ter in chancery the master's report made by the city of Chicago is entitled to the sum of him on the former submission and the evi- $619.90 out of the fund in addition to the dence attached to that report. He also of- $587.70 heretofore paid to it, for taxes, forfered in evidence a certified copy of the feitures, etc., and that Mrs. Condon or her opinion of the Supreme Court above cited. attorney, J, Kent Greene, is entitled to the 302 Ill. 270, 134 N. E. 751. Jacob Glos then remainder of the fund, amounting to $3,595.offered in evidence a quitclaim deed execut- 40, and the county treasurer is ordered to ed by himself and wife, Emma J. Glos, con- disburse the fund accordingly, and to tax all veying to Emma J. Glos, Clara G. Bates, cost of the second reference to the master, Albert Glos, Walter A. Glos, and Mabelle amounting to $216.05, to Jacob and Lucy M. Glos, as joint tenants, "all that particular Glos, who have prosecuted this appeal. interest and estate in land situated in the The first question arising on this appeal county of Cook and state of Illinois which is as to what questions were decided by this the said grantors have acquired by virtue court on the former appeal and as to whethof and by mesne conveyances under taxes er or not that decision finally disposed of heretofore recorded in Cook county, Ill., ex- all matters before the court, and, if so, cepting, however, such of said interests and whether or not the parties were entitled to estate as they have already conveyed by deed any further trial before the lower court, of record at the date hereof, situated in the etc. On examination of the decision it is county of Cook and state of Illinois," which clear that this court decided that the owner deed bears date December 31, 1919. The of these lots on the day the petition for attorney for Jacob Glos also introduced in condemnation was filed had a vested right evidence on behalf of Emma J. Glos a quit- in them which could not be impaired by any claim deed by Jacob Glos to Walter A. Glos subsequent legislation passed while that suit to all interest in the undivided three-quar- was pending, and that as against such ownters of lots 4, 45, and 46 and also to the er, Oscar E. Leinen, no then owner of void other lots, dated October 18, 1918, and re-tax deeds for such lots would be entitled to corded October 21, 1918. This was all the any remuneration for the taxes, etc., paid evidence allowed on behalf of Jacob Glos, in securing the same. In accordance with Emma J. Glos, or Lucy M. Glos, except that such holding it was further held that appelthey introduced a deed of one of the grantors lants, Jacob Glos and Lucy M. Glos, were in the chain of title of Mrs. Condon to part not entitled to any of the fund paid into the of the lots condemned, and that evidence county treasury for such lots as remunerawas immediately rebutted by the introduction for taxes, etc., paid by them in securing tion of two other deeds showing that the their tax deeds. This is clear from a read