This list includes only those cases commented upon editorially or in our Notes of Important mented upon in our Notes of Important Decisions, and ann. case, annotated case. Adams v. Bullock (N. Y.), Liability of Electric Albright v. Stockhill (Mich.), Effect of Failure to Comply With the Bulk Sales Law as Between Vendor and Vendee, R. D. 186. Anderson v. Chicago (Mich.), Action for Dis- crimination by Railroad for Not Furnish- ing Sufficient Cars, R. D. 186. Baender v. United States (U. S. D. C.), Neces- Bank of California v. Starrett (Wash.), Bills Banner Coffee Co. V. Industrial Commission (Wis.), Failure to Take Proper Care of an Barrett v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (Iowa), Liability for Collision Between Train and Belvin's Executors V. French (Va.), Suits Against Executors for Their Negligence Crowe Coal & Mining Co. (Kan.), Awards in Workmen's Compensation Cases of Sums Payable in Monthly Installments, Bristow Cotton Oil Co. (Okla.), Does Loss of Hand Result from Loss of Fingers Under Workmen's Compensation Law, R. D. 387. Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen (U. S. S. C.), Are Non-Residents Entitled to Ex- actly the Same Access to Courts as Are Chicago, R. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cole (U. S. S. C.), Making the Jury Judge of the Law and Foulke v. New York Consolidated Railway Co. Granger v. Luther (S. D.), Constitutionality of Griffin v. Hustis (Mass.), Negligence-Imput- Hammerschlag Mfg. Co. v. Importers and Trad- Hancock v. Davis, et al. (N. C.), Husband and Hoefeld v. Ozello (Ill.), Is a Lease to Saloon Holland v. Tjosevig (Wash.), Bills and Notes Howell v. Howell et al. (Tenn.), Fraudulent Conveyances-Bulk Sales Act, ann. case, 27. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co. (N. J.), Pro- tecting Trade Name and Good Will in Pre- Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co. (N. J.), Re- In re Dressler Producing Corporation (U. S. C. Jackson v. City of Columbia et al. (Kan.), Re- 252. Va.), Right of Administrator to Recover Insurance for Death of Decedent Death was Procured by One Who is the Decedent's Sole Distributee, R. D. 58. Josevig-Kennecott Copper Co. v. Howarth Co. (U. S. C. C. A.), Is Losing Party in a Case King v. City of Owensboro (Ky.), Criminal Law-Coercion of Husband, ann. case, 287. Kornegay v. Price (N. C.), Right of Husband Kuhn v. Ohio Loan & Trust Co. (Ohio), Mort- Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers (Mass.), Accident Accelerating Death Not Sole Proximate Cause Thereof, R. D. 133. Lemmon v. McElroy (S. C.), Does the Term Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary et ux. (Cal.), Deeds Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Tally (Ala.), Is the Judgment of a Federal Court a Do- Maguire v. Trefry (U. S. S. C.), Constitutionality Maxwell v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co. (Ind.), Mak- ing a Contract for Insurance Companies in the Interest of the Insured, R. D. 225. McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bonding Company (N. Y.), Insurance-Failure to Take Appeal, McCarton V. Belfast Harbour Commissioners (English), The Use of Precedent and the Need for Codification, Ed. 386. Mogle v. A. W. Scott et al. (Minn.), Master and Muller v. Weiss (N. J.), Specific Performance National Surety Co. v. City of Atlanta (Ga.), Pacific Mutual Inc. Co. v. Meldrim (Ga.), Ac- State Public U. Com. v. City of Quincy (Ill.), cident Accelerating Death Not Sole Proxi- People v. Shwartz (Cal.), Appropriating Money Potorik v. State (N. Y.), Negligence-Proximate Prentiss v. Eisner (U. S. D. C.), Transfer Tax Not a Tax Which May be Deducted in Com- puting Federal Income Tax, R. D. 39. Reed v. Hollister (Cal.), Is One Who Drew Up a Will Estopped to Receive the Benefits of Rex v. Vilma Isaacs (English), The Mens Rea Roy v. Kern (Mich.), Duty Owed to Invited Rubinson v. Rubinson (N. Y.), Annulling a Mar- St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. Co. v. Wil- Schall v. Connors (U. S. S. C.), Unliquidated Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Oliver (U. S. C. Shaffer v. Carter (U. S. S. C.), Limitations on Power of a State to Tax Incomes of Non- Shea v. United States (U. S. C. C. A.), Additional Instructions to Juries After Disagreement, Urging Them to Reach a Result, R. D. 95. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (U. (Cal.), Liability of Directors of Corpora- tion for Voting Dividends in Excess of Profits, R. D. 388. State V. Babineaux (La.), A. Confession Not Affected by the Fact that Accused Was Suf- Right of Public Service Company to be Re- Make Them and Lack of Mutuality, Ed. 149. Stores v. Abrams (Conn.), Validity of Restric- tions in Restraint of Employment Unneces- sary to Protect the Promisee, R. D. 262. Stuart v. Clements (Ky.), Landlord and Ten- ant-Property in Manure, ann. case, 177. Sullivan v. City of Shreveport (U. S. S. C.), Validity of Ordinance Requiring Conductor and Motorman to Operate Cars, R. D. 169. Sutleff v. Sweetwater Co. (Cal.), Liability of the Owner of a Reservoir for Breaking Out Thomson Machine Co. v. Brown (N. J.), Injunc- Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (U. S. S. C.), Tullock et al. v. Connecticut Co. (Conn.), Neg- United States v. Rockefeller (U. S. D. C.), Valid- V. Couchman (English), Construction of Phrase "Arising Out of the Employment" in Compensation Cases, Where the Action is Washtenaw Mutual Fire Ins. Co. V. Budd (Mich.), Right of Insurance Company to Subrogation Where Insured's Loss Exceeds His Recovery, R. D. 187. Wine v. United States (U. S. C. C. A.), Element Central Law Journal. ST. LOUIS, MO., JANUARY 2, 1920. THE CHIEF ISSUE FOR 1920-THE SUPREMACY OF LAW. When Judge Anderson of Indiana recently sentenced the president of the Kansas Coal Miners' Union for contempt for not calling off a strike as he had been commanded to do, he declared that it had become important in these days to determine whether any organization or any class of citizens are above the law. We have no intention to discuss the merits of the particular case; we wish merely to use it, and the remark of Judge Anderson, to call attention to what we regard as the most serious phase of the present unrest.. No forward-looking citizen is alarmed at the multitude of proposals to change the law, no matter how radical or fantastical such proposals may be, for so long as citizens are content to achieve the realization of their dreams through the normal processes of legislation, there can be no serious harm to the state, even from experiments in legislation which may later have to be discarded as impractical or unworkable. But when men with dreams are not content to wait upon the consent of the majority to put their dreams into effect but talk about putting down all opposition to their will by force or intimidation, there is reason for every free American to set his jaw and square his shoulders and be prepared and vigilant to defend his dearly bought liberties. We do not wish to defend the so-called principle of "government by injunction." The writ of injunction is an ancient writ intended originally to grant relief where the common law was unable to do justice. Its issuance has always been carefully guarded by the courts and it has issued only where there was no other effective remedy. The demand of the labor unions that they shall be exempt from the compulsion of such a writ while all other persons shall remain subject to it is presumptuous in the extreme. A labor union can easily become as dangerous as a monopoly ever was, and the law cannot afford to dispense with its only effective remedy to deal with a situation which may threaten not only the rights of individual citizens but the very life of the nation itself. But whether there should or should not be restrictions placed upon the power of the court to issue the writ of injunction, the duty of every citizen is to respect the law and the order of the court enforcing the law until the law is changed. Any citizen who declares there are some laws that he will not respect, or that there are some officers of the law whose authority he will not recognize, is not a good citizen and should be promptly put in the category of enemies to society. Let us be careful to put our finger on the real danger spot. It is not in Socialism nor any other platform for the reforms of society or government. It is not in attacks upon capital or upon officials or upon social organizations, or upon customs, or even upon the law itself. Everyone has the right to criticize existing institutions, customs and laws; everyone has the right to turn the spotlight of condemnation on public officials, and even judges are not exempt from such criticism. But the real danger is when men, members of a free society like the United States, refuse to accept the will of the majority and threaten to defy the law that they are unable to change through legal processes. The man who would destroy a society. in which he has equality of right with everyone else, because, forsooth, the majority of his fellow citizens will not accept his legislative proposals is either very ignorant of the essentials of a free government or he does not believe in a free government at all. Free societies have not discovered any better way to settle strife and differences of opinion in the state except by invoking the will of the majority. That will becomes for them the voice of the people, which is also, for the purpose of that government, the voice of God. Respect for law as representing the collective will is essential to the stability of every nation. No matter how citizens may differ on matters of policy and government, all must agree to abide by the result of the ballot; all must bow to the will of the majority until this will is changed by an appeal to the reason and conscience of the people. To attack the ballot box with a club is to strike down the most sacred right of a free manthe right to be his own sovereign. Men who attempt such a course are fit only to be ruled by an autocrat, since they are unfit to rule themselves. Respect for the courts is just as important as respect for the law, because the two are inseparable. The courts enforce the law in defense of the state and of the rights of the individual citizen, and no man would be safe or secure in his life, his liberty or his property, if the judgment of a court be not respected as the will of the nation to which every other will must submit. To resist the process of the court is therefore to defy society itself and set at naught the most important sanctions that guard the most cherished rights of free men. For 1920 the chief issue is the supremacy of law. We do not mean political issue because political parties could never divide on such an issue. We mean that it is an issue raised by foreign intermeddlers. in our affairs. A few men have thrown a lot of dust in the air and many people have become confused and cannot see clearly where their best interest lies. It is therefore the duty of the bar, not particularly to attack this or that reform as a political heresy, but to hold up to public scorn and condemnation the most terrible of all heresies the idea that a man can drive a dagger at the very heart of his government and then expect it to be able and willing to furnish him with that protection to his rights which he so vigorously demands. NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WAR TIME PROHIBITION.-There are many important implications in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., sustaining the War Time Prohibition Act against constitutional objection. The chief implication is that important events which are the criteria of a change in legal conditions or obligations are not established by hearsay, or even the unoffi cial speeches of a President. The really important contention of the defendants in the Hamilton case was that the war was over, that peace had come de facto if not de jure, and that demobilization had been practically completed according to newspapers and even according to the admission of the President in vetoing the Volstead act. The term used to limit the operation of war time prohibition in point of time was the "conclusion of the war." A war is terminated by treaty and a treaty is effective only after it is ratified and until then we are technically if not actually at war. The "conclusion of the war" does not mean an armistice; it does not mean the date when a treaty of peace is signed; it means an absolute ending of the war by the ratification of a treaty of peace and the official proclamation of peace and of demobilization by the President. Only by such an official declaration, says the Court, can uncertainty be avoided. On this point the Court said: "Conclusion of the war' clearly did not mean cessation of hostilities, because the act was approved ten days after hostilities had ceased upon the signing of the armistice. Nor may we assume that Congress intended by the phrase to designate the date when the treaty of peace should be signed at Versailles or elsewhere by German and American representatives, since, by the Constitution, a treaty is only a proposal until approved by the Senate. ** * ** "It was expected that the 'conclusion of the war' would precede the termination of demobilization. Congress, therefore, provided that the time when the act ceased to be operative should be fixed by the President's ascertaining and proclaiming the date when demobilization had terminated. |