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1851.]

Translations from Anselm.

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place from the actual scenes of the gospel history, and written after men had begun to withdraw into deserts and caves and convents, to spend their lives in solitude and mortification, hoping thereby to gain the favor of God; instead of going about doing good, as Christ did, and as he taught all the early preachers of Christianity to do. These apocryphal gospels will next engage our attention. [To be concluded.]

ARTICLE IV.

TRANSLATIONS FROM ANSELM.

By J. 8. Maginnis, D. D., Professor in the University of Rochester, N. Y.

PROSLOGION OF ANSELM.

[THE author of the following Article was one of the founders of the scholastic Philosophy, and was regarded as the Metaphysician par excellence of the eleventh century. Piety and good sense everywhere characterize his writings. Such were his reputation and influence that he was denominated the Second Augustine. His philosophical labors constituted an epoch in the history of the human mind. In theology, he did more than any other author from the days of the apostles up to his own times, to vindicate the object of the death of Christ as a vicarious sacrifice for sin. He was the first who effectively broke the spell of that absurd theory which had prevailed for so many centuries, both with the Greek and the Latin Fathers, and had been advocated even by such men as Ambrose and Augustine, and which represented the death of Christ as a ransom paid to Satan to redeem men from his power. His views on this subject are expressed in his tract, Cur Deus Homo; i. e. as he himself explains the title, Qua ratione vel necessitate Deus homo factus sit.

The Proslogion, a translation of which is here presented to the reader, is one of the most celebrated of his productions on account of the ontological argument it contains in proof of the existence of a

1 Rixner Geschichte der Philosophie, Band II. S. 18.

God. It has obtained an honorable notice from every history of philosophy which has appeared since the age in which it was written. The argument it contains has been analyzed by Tennemann, Rixner, Reinhold and Ritter, and has commanded the respect of such thinkers as Descartes, Leibnitz, and Stillingfleet. In the progress of the discussion there may occur what may seem to us quaint expressions, absurd paradoxes, puerile illustrations; objections may be raised where none are needed, and difficulties started which may arise only from the form of expression in which they are stated. All this may be offensive to modern taste, and to a superficial judgment may create the necessity of some apology for introducing the Article into the pages of a literary or religious Review. No such apology, however, will be required by those who feel any interest in tracing the various steps by which the human mind has been advanced to its present strength and attainments. Such will recognize here and in the Monologion the movements of a great and vigorous intellect, the first awakenings of human thought after a slumber of ages- the first ripe fruit borne by the tree of knowledge after the desolating scourge of barbarism had swept away all that was fair and beautiful in the literature of the old world. The Proslogion is here inserted for the purpose of convenient reference for theological students and others, who may wish to investigate the history of the proofs of the existence of a God, and who have not the opportunity or leisure to consult the original.

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The Translator is not aware that there exists any version of this singular document in the English language. The only translation he has seen, is one into the French, undertaken by the advice of Cousin and published, in connection with the Monologion, under the title of CHRISTIAN RATIONALISM. If Anselm deserves to be called a Rationalist, his was truly a Christian rationalism; and we could heartily wish that rationalism had remained just where he left it. He left it the humble pupil, but it has since become the critic and judge of divine revelation. In his view, we are not to make reason the sole judge of everything, and are not at liberty to reject a doctrine of revelation because we cannot comprehend it. He rose so far above the slavish dogmatism of his times as to admit that we ought, in all cases, so to exercise our intelligence as to seek for the rational grounds of our belief; and if we are so happy as to succeed, and

1 Le Rationalisme chrétien a la fin du XIe Siecle traduit et précédé d'une in troduction, par H. Bouchitté, Professeur d'Histoire au Collége Royal de Ver sailles.

1851.]

Anselm's Argument.

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should thus advance from faith to knowledge or understanding (intellectum) we ought to render thanks to Him who has endowed us with faculties capable of such attainments; but the doctrines of faith which we cannot comprehend, we are still bound to venerate and admire.1 Even in his attempt to prove the existence of a God, Anselm piously disclaims seeking for any rational demonstration of this as a condition of adopting it as an article of his faith; but having once received it into his belief, this becomes a high and imperative reason why he should seek for its scientific proof. Indeed he intimates and very justly, that the mind which is not previously possessed with this belief; or a mind in a state of unbelief, is in the worst possible condition to perceive and appreciate the highest evidence that presents itself in favor of the divine existence. He says Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam: sed credo, ut intelligam. Nam hoc credo, quia nisi credidero, non intelligam.

His argument is, strictly speaking, included within the second, third and fourth chapters. He seems to adopt as his text, "The fool (insipiens) hath said in his heart there is no God." The validity of this argument was called in question by Gaunilon, a monk of his own times, who puts into the mouth of the fool a reply which he may properly make to the reasoning here employed against him; his tract was, therefore, entitled Liber pro Insipienti, i. e. a book in behalf of the fool. Gaunilon's tract and Anselm's apology will both be presented to the reader.

It is not our design to pronounce upon the validity of this argument; in reference to this the reader must form his own judgment. But in explanation of the reasoning here employed, let it be observed that the author does not begin by attempting to prove the exist ence of God directly, but he attempts to prove the existence of some supreme thing, object or being conceived in the most absolute and unconditioned sense; after he supposes his object accomplished, he then identifies this supreme and highest conceivable being with our conception of God. Compare Chap. 3d of the Proslogion with Chap. 10 of Anselm's Apology. Postponing the question, therefore, whether this being is God or not, the first inquiry with Anselm is, does such a being exist? The whole force of his demonstration depends upon the peculiar nature of this being. Gaunilon has unques

1 De Fide Trinitatis. Nam christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum profi cere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere. Sed cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur, cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest, veneratur.

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tionably constructed a close, powerful and unanswerable argument against the reasoning of Anselm, if we concede that he has the right conception of the being whose existence is to be proved. But the circumstance which evidently vitiates his whole reasoning, and which renders his beautiful illustration drawn from the lost island inapplicable, is, that he starts out with an entirely different conception from that which Anselm has in his mind. Gaunilon proceeds from the conception of a being greater than all things else that exist. This conception and form of expression do not necessarily forbid the supposition that a greater being than this may, at least be conceived. But Anselm starts with the conception of a being the greatest conceivable—that is, a being which must necessarily envelop and contain within itself every possible perfection, which, consequently, in its very conception implies not only possible and actual existence, but eternal and necessary existence. Apol. Chap. 5. Anselm freely admits that his reasoning can have no application to any different being from this. Apol. Chap. 3. His reasoning is designed to show that having once conceived of a being to whom necessary existence belongs, then to deny actual existence to such a being is a simple absurdity. It is easy to be seen that if we could be once assured of the actual existence of a necessary being, then, to ascribe to such a being the possibility of not existing, would be a contradiction in terms. But does the conception of this being prove his actual existence? Few, perhaps, are prepared to concede this. Whatever may be the reader's views on this subject, the author's reasons for the affirmative will be found expanded in his Apol., Chap. 1. See also Cudworth, Vol. II. p. 141. Clark: Being and Attributes of God, Prop. III. Also, Preface to his Discourse on Natural Religion. Stillingfleet's Origines Sacræ, B. III. Chap. 1.

Leibnitz thinks that Descartes borrowed his argument from Anselm, of whose writings he could not have been ignorant― having studied the Scholastic Philosophy so long at the College des Jésuites de la Fléche. He says, the Scholastics all misunderstood Anselm's argument, not even excepting their Doctor Angelic; he says, they represent it as a paralogism, but that it is not a paralogism, but only a defective demonstration; that all it wants for its completion is, first to show that the being in question is possible. He thinks it would follow that, if this being is possible, it exists -an argument, however, which will hold good only of the Deity. If this be all that is necessary to the completion of Anselm's argument, we see not but

1 Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entandement Humain, Liv. IV. § 7.

1851.]

Existence of God from our Primary Ideas.

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the defect is easily supplied. Everything is possible that is conceivable, and that implies no contradiction; but a perfect being is conceivable, and implies no contradiction; therefore, it is possible. Again, a perfect being is possible, otherwise it belongs to the very nature of being to be imperfect; in other words, the perfection of being would consist in its imperfection, which is absurd. The same reasoning is applicable to a self-existing being; this is possible, otherwise all being is dependent; on what, then, must it depend? On something that is not being? This would be absurd. If the impossibility of a perfect self-existing being is proved, atheism is of course established. If the possibility of such a being is proved, then its actual existence follows as a matter of necessity: for, if it does not now exist, its existence is plainly impossible since any being that can hereafter be brought into existence, would not be perfect or selfexistent. However untenable, therefore, the argument of Anselm may be, in the form in which he has left it, we conceive that an argument for the existence of a God may be constructed not merely from our conception of a perfect being, but from our conception of right and wrong, and from all our primary and necessary ideas. The untutored child may gaze long upon the starry heavens, and be delighted with the number and beauty of the objects it beholds, without ever making the reflection that the existence of these objects requires and presupposes the existence of space which surrounds and envelops them. So, those who are wiser than children, are too apt to speculate long and learnedly on our necessary mental conceptions, without reflecting that every one of these implies and proves the existence of God, just as certainly as the stars of heaven imply the existence of space. It is scarcely possible to start wrong, if we go in search of God. There is no point from which if we go out, we may not find Him. If it be true, as Inspiration teaches, that in Him we live and move and have our being, it is only necessary to have our eyes open in order to behold within us and around us the most direct and unequivocal proofs of the Divine existence, and we could no more doubt that there is a God, than the mariner could doubt the existence of the ocean, while his noble bark is gliding beautifully upon its bosom.-TR.]

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