ARTICLE V.

AFFINITY OF ROMANISM AND RATIONALISM.

FROM THE GERMAN.

By Professor Joseph Packard, Theol. Seminary near Alexandria, D. C.

[The substance of the following article is taken from the Beiträge of Dr. Ernst Sartorius, of Königsberg, Prussia, formerly of the University of Dorpat. He may be known to some of our readers as the author of "Lectures on the Person and Work of Christ." It is found in the First and Second Parts of his Beiträge, or Contributions to the Defence of Evangelical Orthodoxy, and in his Reply to Kant. I intended at first to translate the whole, but as the original occupies about 150 pages, and the arrangement and division were peculiarly German, I concluded to give the substance of it digested, and more adapted, I trust, to the taste of the English reader. Occasionally I have translated closely, and at other times I have condensed the argument, omitting the more obvious refutation of erroneous doctrines. I have retained everything of importance in this valuable essay. It is enriched with quotations from the Decrees of the Council of Trent, the works of the principal Rationalists and of the Reformers, many of which will be found here. The discussion of this subject is peculiarly seasonable at this time, and may be of service in the controversy between truth and error.]

Ir is the design of the present essay to prove the affinity of the systems of Romanism and Catholicism in their fundamental principles. Such an attempt cannot be deemed unreasonable at a time when true Protestantism is assailed in different quarters by both.

The striking difference between the two systems in form, might appear to many, at first sight, as highly unfavorable to our object. While, on the side of the Rationalists we find the most unbounded license of private speculation, and no apparent external or internal unity, we perceive on the side of the Romanists a compact and connected system, which pleases the eye of the spectator by its symmetry, and which he would look upon with complacency, if founded upon pure truth. So striking is this apparent difference, that my attempt to prove their fundamental agreement has been considered as paradoxical, nay, a ridiculous fancy. But, every one acquainted with the subject knows, that this argument is nothing new, that it is to be found in Schubert De Naturalismo Ecclesiæ Romanæ, 1750, and in Chemnitz' Examination of the Council of Trent, and that hints of this accordance are to be met with in the writings of Melanchthon, Luther and Calvin.

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Source and Rule of Faith.

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The erroneous opinion that there is a wide and essential difference between the two systems, has been designedly kept up by those, who, to divert attention from themselves, and to repel any suspicion of such agreement, have always expressed the utmost horror of Rationalism; and who have been always ready to charge those with it, who are, in truth, the farthest removed from it, and the least in danger of it. If our limits allowed, and if it fell within the scope of this essay, we might show from history, that the relation of the Reformation to the scholastic philosophy was the same as that of modern orthodoxy to the Kantian philosophy. The Reformation began in the attacking by the reformers, of the scholasticism of the Church of Rome. The most superficial historical research, and the slightest acquaintance with the writings of the reformers, will convince any one of this.

But, we proceed to consider some of the principal points of agreement between the two parties, dwelling upon some at greater length than upon others.

Both, then, we should first remark, agree in setting up a different source and rule of faith than the written divine word. They place the subjective word above the objective, and make the former the judge of the latter. They differ indeed widely in manner as to the nature of this human authority: the one holding to a Pope, governed by tradition and the decisions of councils, the other making of every man himself such a Pope, and maintaining, as Wegscheider expresses it, that everything is to be determined "by the precepts of sound reason, tanquam verbum vere divinum internum." This difference in form is accidental, and in no way inconsistent with their identity in principle. In both, there is human authority; in the one case, that of the intuition of reason, in the other, that of Papal supremacy. Both alike leave the sure canon of the external word, and derive their true origin from the subjective. Both are natural religions, and we might also term them with propriety, fanatical religions; for as soon as we leave the written word, we have no security against falling into mysticism, or any other form of fanaticism. We might show, pari passu, that the system of mysticism remarkably coincides with those of Romanism and Rationalism.1

But we proceed to show their remarkable agreement in the doctrines of sin and the justification of the sinner, of which Melanchthon said, that error could be more safely admitted in any other than

1 Beiträge 2. 4–13. The enthusiasm of Romanism in maintaining a successive inspiration for individuals.

these; and that he, who did not understand these, could not be called a Christian. It has been admitted by Kant, that outward differences in manner constitute no objection to inward affinity in principle in different systems; and that all systems which expect to merit the grace of God in any way, are accordant. But we would first remark generally, before going into detail, that the Romish and Rationalistic systems may be characterized as Pelagian, while the true Protestant system is anti-Pelagian. Nor do the Rationalists themselves, though wont to deal so arbitrarily with church history, venture to deny that their system is Pelagian, or call in question this assertion. They evade the charge of apostasy from the faith of the church, by alleging, that these distinctions are of little consequence, and that a man may hold what opinion he pleases about them, and yet retain the faith of the church.

The orthodox doctrine of the sinfulness of man, so clearly taught by the most explicit and decisive language of Scripture, especially in the 5th and 7th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, is refuted by a Decree of the Council of Trent, that concupiscence has not the true and proper nature of sin.1 Bellarmin, the great defender of the Church of Rome, has devoted a long series of chapters to the defence of this Decree against the Protestants. The Rationalist, Wegscheider, in his Manual of Theology, and Paulus, have no hesitation in adopting this decision of the Council of Trent, as the correct one. "The Romish Catechism has correctly decided that concupiscence, if not wilful, is far removed from the nature of sin."

Both parties thus, in defiance of the most explicit language of scripture, coincide in opinion, that original sin is only so far to be considered sinful, as the man consents to it, and acts it out in what is forbidden. They both reason in the same way, that it is impossible that our natural desires should be sinful. This is true, as they were originally implanted in our frame; they were then pure and pleasing to God. They are not even now to be extirpated from human nature. And far be from us that iron system of philosophers and monks, which would require this of men, as Calvin says, "Nihil nobiscum ferrea ista Philosophia!" and Melanchthon, "It is not to be supposed that all affections are to be expelled from nature, as the fanatics vainly talk of their stoical apathy." But while this it true, it is cer

1 Concupiscentiam, quam aliquando apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat. Ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit.

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Error in Justification.

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tain that none of our passions now exist in their original purity and order, as the ornament of our nature. Their equilibrium has been disturbed; they now overstep their proper bounds, or lag far behind; they glow with heat, or are frozen with cold; they are selfish, and love the creature more than the Creator. This disorder within, which cleaves to us from our earliest childhood, since it is opposed to the standard of the divine law is sin, whether the will consents or not; nay, so far from being subject to the will, it brings the will unconsciously into subjection to it, as Melanchthon says: Tanta est vis concupiscentiæ ut malis affectibus saepius obtemperent homines, quam recto judicio; and as Pascal has strikingly remarked in his well known passage on this subject: "It is concupiscence which gives to the will itself a perverse tendency, infuses a selfishness into its volitions, robs the best services of man of their true value, and destroys the peace of the soul in the conflict within."

So emphatically is the orthodox doctrine taught in Scripture, that both parties have no other resort than to wrest such passages, by a common exegesis, from their plain and obvious meaning. The Rationalists, when the literal sense would oppose their system, have recourse to forced interpretations, accommodated, as they term it, to a "rational exegesis," and thus make Scripture suit their purpose. The Romanists not only do this, but appeal against Scripture to the Decree of the 5th Session of the Council of Trent. While the Rationalists avoid the term "merit" and instead of it use "make worthy," the Romanists likewise make a subtle distinction between meriting de condigno and de congruo.

What we have said is sufficient to prove the undeniable affinity of the two parties in the doctrine of sin; we proceed now to consider their agreement in principle as to the sinner's justification, and we shall be able to show that both have departed in equal degree from the truth.

From the false view of the natural condition of man, the common nouzov weūdos of the two systems, we should expect to find them equally in error as to the sinner's justification. Let us examine for a moment, more particularly, their view of man as a sinner, and of his ability to prepare himself for justification. According, then, to their systems, every man is a sinner, in so far as he now and then transgresses the divine law. With these occasional slips, he is in the main good and blameless, with sufficient natural strength of reason to teach him his duty, and of will to influence him to do good works, acceptable to God, and worthy of justification. While there is some

thing sinful in every man, there is much that is good, and if the balance is struck, it would be in his favor. We quote here the whole of an important passage from Wegscheider, which shows fully the rationalistic view of justification: Quicumque e vita turpi ad virtutem emerserit is eadem proportione, qua jam in virtutis studio progressus fuerit, in gratiam cum Deo reversus, ab eodem præmiis dignus judicabitur. Deus ex universo vitæ tenore dignitatem hominis cujusque aestimans, peccatori resipiscenti sortem æternam justa lance ponderatam tribuet, atque prout vera virtus in animo peccatoris crescet, ita fiducia ei restituitur. Venia igitur peccatorum recte ponitur in conversione gratiæ divinae ad peccatorem, et pænæ imminutione, pro ratione dignitatis prae moralis justissime definita.

What now is the Romish view of justification? The Romanist may say that he is justified by faith, using evangelical terms, but he means by faith something far different from the true Protestant. He does not regard it as confidence in the divine promise, appropriated to himself, so that faith and the word of God are correlative;1 but as he terms it a fides formata. He considers it as put by synecdoche for love, and all the good works which flow from it. He looks upon it as a meritorious quality in usa good disposition, which we are to manifest, before we receive justification. He introduces into the idea of faith as much as possible of obedience to the law, and declares that by this active faith men are justified. In the same manner the Rationalist speaks of obedience to the principle of natural religion and inward culture, as making us worthy of the grace of God. If the sinner now works in himself this acceptable state of heart, and gives the preponderance to his virtuous disposition, by this faith coöperating with good works, as the Council of Trent expresses it, coöperante fide cum bonis operibus, he cannot fail of obtaining a justificatio prima, of which we see his good works are the efficient causes and grounds. This justification, instead of being as Melanchthon expresses it, similis et aequalis est omnium, varies in every man

1 Beiträge 1. 131. Justificatio fit per verbum. Mel. How strikingly similar is the language of Hooker on this subject! “We cannot be justified by any inherent quality; Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in him. God accepteth them in Christ, as perfectly righteous, as if they had fulfilled all that was commanded them in, the law. Shall I say more perfectly righteous than if themselves had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith, “God made him," etc. Such are we in the sight of God, as is the very Son of God himself. Man hath sinned; God hath suffered; God hath made himself the Son of Man, and men are made the righteousness of God."