of which we are conscious,, on the other, except so far as they are the occasions, on which the mind brings them out, or SUGGESTS them from its own inherent energy. Of the notion of DURATION for instance, he would say, I do not see it, nor hear it, nor feel it, nor become acquainted with it by means of any other of the senses; nor am I conscious of it, as I am of believing, reasoning, imagining, &c. but it is suGGESTED by the mind itself; it is an intimation absolutely essential to the mind's nature and action.

It will be noticed that Dr. Reid has not limited the use of the word Suggestion, exclusively to those ideas, the occasions of which are purely internal. Nor was this necessary. Those cases, however, where suggestion is brought into exercise by occasions chiefly external, (as, for instance, in forming the notions of externality, space, and motion,) are comparatively few in number. As a general statement, the occasions of its exercise are either wholly of an interior nature, or with only a slight mixture of outward circumstances.

§. 177. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity.

We shall now mention a few ideas which have this origin, without undertaking to give a complete enumeration of them. EXISTENCE. Among the various notions, the origin of which naturally requires to be considered under the head of Suggestion, is that of Existence. What existence is in itself, (that is to say, independenly of any existent being,) it would be useless to inquire. Using the word as expressive of a mental state, it is the name of a purely simple idea, and cannot be defined. The history of its rise is briefly this. Such is our nature, that we cannot exist, without having the notion of existence. So that the origin of the idea of existence is inseparable from the mere fact, that we have a percipient and sentient nature. An insentient being may exist, without having any such idea. But man, being constituted with powers of perception, cannot help perceiving that he is what he is. If we think, then there is something, which has this capability of thought; if we feel, then there is not only the mere act of feeling, but something also which puts forth the act.

II,-MIND. The origin of the notion of Mind is similar to

that of existence. Neither of them can be strictly and properly referred to the senses. We do not see the mind, nor is it an object of touch, or of taste, or of any other sense. Nor, on the other hand, is the notion of mind a direct object of the memory, or of reasoning, or of imagination. The notion arises naturally, or is SUGGESTED from the mere fact, that the mind actually exists, and is susceptible of various feelings and operations.The same may be said of all the distinct powers of the mind, such as the power of perception, of memory, of association, of imagination, of the will; not of the acts or exercises of these powers, it will be noticed, but of the powers themselves. That is to say, they are made known to us, considered abstractly and as distinct subjects of thought, not by direct perception, either inward or outward, but by spontaneity or suggestion. We say, not by direct perception, because there is something intermediate between the power and the knowledge of it, viz, the act or exercise of the power, which is the occasion of the knowledge of the power itself. The principle of Original Suggestion, availing itself of this occasion, gives us a knowledge of the distinct susceptibilities of the mind, just as it does of the mind as a whole.

III, Similar remarks, as far as spontaneity is concerned, will apply to the notions, (whether we consider them as simple or complex,) of SELF-EXISTENCE and PERSONAL IDENTITY. At the very earliest period they flow out, as it were from the mind itself; not resulting from any prolonged and laborious process, but freely and spontaneously suggested by it. This is so true that no one is able to designate either the precise time or the precise circumstances, under which they originate; for they spring into being under all circumstances. We cannot look, or touch, or breathe, or move, or think without them. These are products of our mental nature too essential and important to be withheld, or to be given only on rare and doubtful occasions; but are brought into existence in all times and places, and under all the varieties of action and feeling.—(See, in connection with this section, §.§. 4.5.6.)

§. 178. Origin of the idea of externality.

In giving an account of the origin of ideas, it is proper, in this connection, to refer to the notion of outwardness or exter

nality. Outwardness, although it is involved in every thing which the senses have a connection with, is, nevertheless, not a direct subject of the senses. As in other cases of ideas of internal origin, we do not, in strictness of speech, smell it, or taste it, or see it, or hear it, or touch it; and yet there is nothing, which we see, taste, hear, or touch, of which externality is not predicable. The simple fact is, that the senses, (or rather in this case one of them, that of roUCH,) furnish the occasion, (not the thing itself, but simply the occasion,) on which the Intellect, in virtue of its own spontaneity of action, gives us a knowledge of it. We have already had opportunity, (§. 70,) to speak of this idea as a most important one; as the connecting thought which introduces to us a new manifestation of existence, different from that interior existence, which we variously call by the names, spirit, mind, or soul. It is evident, if we could not form the idea of externality, every thing which is the subject of mental experience, would seem to be wholly internal, mere modifications of the inward or mental being. It is this idea, taken in connection with the circumstances of its origin, which solves what has sometimes been considered a great mystery. The question is often asked, how is it possible that the mind should pass over from the circle of its own existence, the limits of its own actual personality, into the region and the knowledge of things, wholly different from itself. If we will interrogate nature, and rest satisfied with her responses, the matter is simple. It is the power, that gives us a knowledge of Mind, and uniting mind with its operations gives us the idea of Personality, and combining the present with, the past originates the idea and the conviction of Personal Identity, which assures us also of outwardness, of an externality inconsistent with the assumption of all things into our own nature; the power, overlooked too often and still more frequently estimated too lightly, of Original Suggestion. Nature has implanted within us this spontaneity of thought, this intuitive directness of perception; and thus taken care to furnish important elements of knowledge, which could be possessed in no other way.

§. 179. Idea of matter or material existence.

It is here also that we find the basis of our conception of MATTER or material existence, when considered in distinction

from the mere outward presentations or attributes of matter. The connection, which we have with the material world by means of the senses, makes us acquainted with whatever is strictly appropriate to those senses, such as color, taste, hardness or softness, extension, &c. When, for instance, we look on a piece of wood or any other of those material bodies, by which we are surrounded, an impression is made on the organ of vision, and we have the sensation, or, as we sometimes express it, the idea of color. By applying the hand to the wood, we learn the penetrability or impenetrability, the softness or hardness of the mass which we hold. By moving the hand from one point to another in the mass, we are informed of the continuity or extension of its parts. But it does not appear, that we are able by means of the senses alone, to carry our inquiries beneath the surface of the body in such a way or to such a degree as to become directly acquainted with that inferior something, whatever it is, which is the basis or support of these qualities. The external or sensible Intellect, (that is the intellect operating by means of the senses,) furnishes simply the occasion of the idea of matter or material existence; while the internal or pure Intellect, (that is, the intellect independent of the senses,) acting upon that occasion, and availing itself of its power of Original Suggestion, brings into existence and realizes the idea itself. -This is the simple statement of the fact; but it appears to be abundantly authenticated by the common experience of men. That, which is outward and operates upon the senses, that which we taste and see and handle, is presented to us, (in other words we regard it,) in the light of an attribute or quality, rather than of substance. But the very idea of a quality or attribute implies, as the antecedent condition of its own existence, an object or subject, to which it belongs. The idea of such a subject or object, is, under these circum; stances, (that is to say, when any thing presents itself to our notice in the aspect of an attribute or quality,) not only naturally and necessarily suggested to us, but it obviously compels our belief. As we have already had occasion to remark, (§. 131,) we believe, and we cannot help believing, that there is some basis, some foundation, which is the support of the various attributes and qualities, which are presented to our

senses; just as we have the idea and believe in the existence of a God, although we know nothing of his interior essence or nature, but only of his manifestations, attributes, or operations; or as we have the idea of Mind suggested to us and fully believe in the existence of mind, although mind is entirely inaccessible in itself, and is made known wholly by those various acts of which we are conscious, such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning, willing, and the like.

§. 180. Origin of the idea of motion.

The idea of Motion, one of those with which we are most early and familiarly acquainted, is of internal and suggestive origin. Motion does not appear to be addressed directly to the senses. We can see things in motion; but not motion itself; we can touch things in motion; but motion itself is not accessible and knowable by that sense, nor by any other. When bodies move from each other, this new state of things is always indicated by a change in the appearance of the respective bodies, such as increased dimness of color, diminished size, obscurity in the outline, &c. The relation of things, considered in regard to mere position, is disturbed and altered also. Under these circumstances the idea of motion is naturally and necessarily suggested. And it exists with all that degree of definiteness and distinctness, which is necessary for our present purposes.

§. 181. Of the nature of unity and the origin of that notion.

Another important notion, properly entitled to a consideration here, is that of UNITY. We shall decline attempting to explain the nature of unity, for the simple reason that nothing is more easy to be understood; every child knows what is meant by One. And how can we explain it, if we would? We can explain a hundred by resolving it into parts; we can explain fifty or a score by making a like separation of the whole number into the subordinate portions, of which it is made up; but when we arrive at unity, we must stop, and can go no further,

It is true, attempts have been made to define it, but like many other such attempts, they have proved futile. Unity has been called a thing indivisible in itself, and divided from every