thing else. But this makes us no wiser. Is it any thing more than to say, that the unity of an object is its indivisibility? Or in other words that its unity is its unity?

As the idea of unity is one of the simplest, so it is one of the earliest notions which men have. It originates in the same way, and very nearly at the same time, with the notions of existence, self-existence, personal identity, and the like. When a man has a notion of himself, he evidently does not think of himself as two, three, or a dozen men, but as one. As soon as he is able to think of himself as distinct from his neighbor, as soon as he is in no danger of mingling and confounding his own identity with that of the multitude around him, so soon does he form the notion of unity. It exists as distinct in his mind, as the idea of his own existence does; and arises there immediately successive to that idea, because it is impossible, in the nature of things, that he should have a notion of himself as a twofold or divided person.

Unity is the fundamental element of all enumeration. By the repetition or adding of this element, we are able to form numbers to any extent. These numbers may be combined among themselves, and employed merely as expressive of mutual relations, or we may apply them, if we choose, to all external objects whatever, to which we are able to give a common name.-(See §. 144.)

§. 182. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession.

Another of those conceptions, which naturally offer themselves to our notice here, is that of SUCCESSION. This term, (when we inquire what succession is in itself,) is one of general application, expressive of a mode of existence, rather than of existence itself; and in its application to mind in particular, expressive of a condition of the mind's action, but not of the action itself, which that condition regulates. It is certainly a fact too well known to require comment, that our minds exist, at different periods, in successive states; that our thoughts and feelings, in obedience to a permanent law, follow each other in a train. This is the simple fact. And the fact of such succession, whenever it takes place, forms the occasion, on which the notion or idea of succession is

SUGGESTED to the mind. Being a simple mental state, it is not susceptible of definition; yet every man possesses it, and every one is rightly supposed to understand its nature.

Accordingly it is not necessary to refer the origin of this idea to any thing external. It is certain, that the sense of sinell cannot directly give us the idea of succession, nor the sense of taste, nor of touch. And we well know, that the deaf and dumb possess it, not less than others. The blind also, who have never seen the face of heaven, nor beheld that sun and moon, which measure out for us days and months and years, have the notion of succession. They feel, they think, they reason, at least in some small degree, like other men; and it is impossible, that they should be without it. The origin, therefore, of this notion is within; it is the unfailing result of the inward operation to call it forth, howeyer true it may be, that it is subsequently applied to outward objects and events.

§. 183. Origin of the notion of duration.

There is usually understood to be a distinction between the idea of succession, and that of duration, though neither can be defined. The idea of succession is supposed to be antecedent in point of time to that of duration; (we speak now of succession and duration relatively to our conception of them, and not in themselves considered.) Duration must be supposed to exist antecedently to succession in the order of nature; but succession is the form, in which it is made to apply to men; and is, therefore, naturally the occasion, on which the idea of it arises in men's minds. Having the notion of succession, and that of personal or self-existence, a foundation is laid for the additional conception of permanency or duration; in other words, it naturally arises in the mind, or is suggested, under these circumstances.

As we cannot, according to this view of its origin, have the notion of duration without succession, hence it happens, that we know nothing of duration when we are perfectly asleep, because we are not then conscious of those intellectual changes which are involved in succession. If a person could sleep with a perfect suspension of all his mental operations from this time until the resurrection, the whole of that period would appear to him as nothing. Ten thousand years

passed under such circumstances would be less than a few days or even hours.

That the notion of succession, (we do not say succession itself, but only our notion or idea of it,) is antecedent to, and is essential to that of duration, is in some measure proved by various facts. There are on record a number of cases of remarkable somnolency, in which persons have slept for weeks and even months. One of the most striking is that of Samuel Chilton, a laborer of Tinsbury near Bath in England. On one occasion, in the year 1696, he slept from the ninth of April to the seventh of August, about seventeen weeks, being kept alive by small quantities of wine poured down his throat. He then awoke, dressed himself, and walked about the room, "being perfectly unconscious, that he had slept more than one night. Nothing, indeed, could make him believe, that he had slept so long, till, upon going to the fields, he saw crops of barley and oats ready for the sickle, which he remembered were only sown when he last visited them."*

In the Proceedings of the French Royal Academy of Sciences in 1719, there is also a statement illustrative of the subject under consideration, to the following effect.- -There was in Lausanne a nobleman, who, as he was giving orders to a servant, suddenly lost his speech and all his senses. Different remedies were tried, but, for a very considerable time, without effect. For six months he appeared to be in a deep sleep, unconscious of every thing. At the end of that period, however, resort having been had to certain surgical operations, he was suddenly restored to his speech, and the exercise of his understanding. When he recovered, the servant, to whom he had been giving orders, happening to be in the room, he asked him if he had done what he had ordered him to, not being sensible, that any interval, except perhaps a very short one, had elapsed during his illness.†

-Per

The publication, from which this statement is taken, and which contains others of similar import, refers to Frazer's Magazine as its authority. †The Academy received this statement from Crousaz, Mathematical Professor at Lausanne, and author of a Treatise on Logic, &c.sons, suddenly attacked by delirium and afterwards restored, exhibit the same unconsciousness and ignorance of the intermediate lapse of time.See Abercrombie's Intellectual Philosophy, Section on Insanity.

§. 184. Of time and its measurements, and of eternity. When duration is estimated or measured, we then call it Time. Such measurements, as every one is aware, are made by means of certain natural, or artificial motions. The annual revolution of the sun, (using language in accordance with the common apprehensions on the subject,) marks off the portion of duration, which we call a YEAR; the revolution of the moon marks off another portion, which we call a MONTH; the diurnal revolution of the sun gives us the period of a DAY; the movements of the hands over the face of a clock or watch give the diminished durations of hours and minutes. This is TIME, which differs from duration, only in the circumstance of its being measured.

What we call Eternity is only a modified or imperfect time; or rather time not completed. We look back over the months and days and years of our former existence; we look forward and onward, and behold ages crowding on ages, and time springing from time. And in this way we are forcibly led to think of time unfinished, of time progressive but never completed; and to this complex notion we give the name of Eternity.

§. 185. Marks or characteristics of time.

To this notice of the origin of the notion of time, it will not be improper to add, as it is one of great importance, some of its marks or characteristics.(1) Time, (meaning by the term duration as existing in succession, and as susceptible of being measured,) is strictly and properly predicable only of finite beings, and not of the Supreme Being. It is evident, that, in its application to the human mind, time becomes a law or fixed condition of the mental action, a restriction placed upon it, a sort of veil, which would hide knowledge from us, were it not that it is drawn up gradually, and lets it in by degrees. But it is equally evident that there can be no law of this nature restricting the Divine Mind. Those multiplied facts and events, which are brought one after another before the minds of men, in consequence of their limited mental constitution, are spread out at once before the Divine Mind, as on a map. Whether past, present, or future, they are embraced and comprehended in a single glance. In this respect there is not the slightest analogy be

tween the Supreme Mind, and the minds of men.-(2) Time is not susceptible of any visible or outward representation, as might be expected, if its origin had been external instead of internal. It is true, we apply language to time, which would imply, if strictly interpreted, that it has extension or length. We speak of a long, or short time, as if it were actually susceptible of material measurement. But this is owing partly to certain casual associations, and partly to the imperfection of language, and not to any thing in the nature of time itself. (See the chapter on Casual Associations.)

(3) Time, as it exists in our mental apprehension and in its relation to the intellect, is inseparable from events. Whatever event has taken place, whether it be some act of men or some occurrence in nature, although we are ignorant of the hour of the day, or the month, we cannot possibly conceive of it, independently of time. This is a fixed immutable, and ultimate condition of all our perceptions, so far as they regard events. That is to say; we cannot think of them; we cannot conceive of them as existing or taking place out of time.(4) Time, in its specific and appropriate nature, is indestructible, while the human soul remains the same it now does. It is not within the limits of human capability to contemplate events as the Supreme Being does, at once and simultaneously; but it can be done in succession alone; nor have we reason to suppose that it will ever be otherwise. It is true, the Angel shall at last appear, standing on the land and the sea, and shall swear, that time shall be no longer; yet the time, which the angel of the Apocalypse is destined thus to abolish, is only that, which is measured by these stars, this moon, and the revolutions of this earth. As long as the human soul exists, in whatever part of the universe, there must at least be, not only duration, but duration as existing in succession, unless the nature of the soul be fundamentally changed.

§. 186. The idea of space not of external origin.

Another of those notions, the origin of which we propose to consider under the head of Suggestion, is the idea of SPACE Perhaps it will be asked, why we have disregarded in this instance the authority and example of Mr. Locke,