who has ranked it with the notions of External origin, or in his own phraseology, with those which come into the mind by the way of sensation. And certainly it might be expected, that we should assent to that arrangement, if it could be definitely shown to us, which of the senses it is to be ascribed to. But it is obvious, that this cannot easily be done.

If it were of external origin, if it could properly be said to come into the mind by the way of sensation, we should be able to make such a reference of it. But let us inquire. It will evidently not be pretended, that the notion of space is to be ascribed to the senses of taste, of smell, or of hearing. And can it be ascribed to the sense of touch? Is it a matter of feeling? A single consideration will suggest a satisfactory answer. It will certainly be acknowledged, that we can have no knowledge, by the sense of touch, (with the single exception perhaps of the ideas of heat and cold, which are sometimes ascribed to it;) of any thing which does not present some resistance. The degree of resistance may greatly vary, but there will be always some. But no one will undertake to say, that resistance is a quality of space, or enters in any way into his notion of it.

Nor are there less obvious objections to regarding it as a direct object of sight. The sense of sight gives us no direct knowledge of any thing but of colors; all other visual perceptions are original in the sense of touch, and are made the property of the sight by transference. No one certainly ever speaks of space as red, or white, or of any other color, or conceives of it as such.

There is another consideration, adverse to ascribing the idea of space to the senses, applicable equally to the sight and the touch. Every thing, coming within the cognizance of those two senses, (with the exception already alluded to,) has form, limits, bounds, place, &c. But the idea, to which we are now attending, is utterly exclusive of every thing of this nature; it is not susceptible of circumscription and figure. So far from it, when we escape beyond the succession of circumscribed and insulated objects, we have but just entered within its empire. If we let the mind range forth beyond the forms immediately surrounding us, beyond the world itself, beyond all the systems of worlds in the universe; if we stand

in our conception on the verge of the remotest star, and look downward and upward; it is then the idea of space rushes upon the mind with a power before unknown. These considerations clearly lead to the conclusion, that the notion of space is not susceptible of being ascribed directly to sensation in any of its forms, and is not, in the proper sense of the terms, of external origin. It may perhaps be maintained, that we shall find an adequate account of its origin, if we combine the aid of abstraction with sensation. It is admitted, that by the sense of touch we have a knowledge of the extension of bodies, which includes, when it is contemplated under different views, length, breadth, height, &c. But still it does not appear, how abstraction, applied to extension, or any thing included in extension, can give us space. It is evident, that the abstract notion which we form of the length of a body, is different from the one in question. And if we abstract height or breadth, these also come short of giving us space. If we could abstract height, length, and breadth at once, and then combine them together, we should not even then have space, but on the contrary a solid body.

§. 187. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion.

What then shall we say of the origin of the notion of space? When pressed on this point, we have but one answer to give; it is the natural offspring of the mind; it is a creation of the soul, wholly inseparable from its elementary constitution and action; an intimation, coming from an interior and original impulse. The opinion of Cousin, (not to mention that of others of a like import,) closely approximates to this statement. After criticising upon Locke, as Mr. Stewart had done before him, and asserting the futility of pretending to derive this notion directly from the senses, he adds as follows; "Au contraire l'ideé d'espace nous est donneé, à l'occasion de l' ideé de corps, par la penseé, l'entendement, l'esprit, la raison, enfin par une puissance autre que la sensation."*

It remains to be added, that, while we cannot directly refer the notion in question to the senses, we cannot even state with certainty any particular occasion on which it arises, for we have the notion at a period further back than we can * L'Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome II, Dix-septieme Leçon.

remember. On this point, however, it is undoubtedly true, that we may advance opinions more or less probable.-It is, for instance a supposition not altogether worthless, that motion may have been the original occasion of the rise of this idea. At an early period we moved the hand, either to grasp something removed at a little distance, or in the mere playful exercise of the muscles, or perhaps we transferred the whole body from one position to another; and it is at least no impossibility, that on such an occasion the idea of space may have been called forth in the soul.

But there is another supposition, still more entitled to notice, the one referred to in the above quotation from Cousin. Our acquaintance with external bodies, by means of the senses, may have been the occasion of its rise, although the senses themselves are not its direct source. It is certain, that we cannot contemplate any body whatever, an apple, a rose, a tree, a house, without always finding the idea of space a ready and necessary concomitant. We cannot conceive of a body which is no-where. So that we may at least date the origin of the idea of space, as early as our acquaintance with any external body whatever. In other words, it is a gift of the mind, made simultaneously with its earliest external perceptions.

§. 188. Characteristic marks of the notion of space.

What has been said has prepared the way for the better understanding of the characteristic marks of space, as it exists in the mind's view of it. Of these marks there are four, which will help to distinguish it.(1) Like duration or time, space is not capable of being visibly represented. The remarks, which have already been made, clearly evince this. Nothing can be visibly represented, which does not come within the direct range and cognizance of the senses, as space does not. (2) It has no form nor limits. This might perhaps be considered as naturally resulting from the characteristic first mentioned. And besides we may safely appeal here to general experience, and assert without hesitation, that no man limits space in his conception of it, nor is it even in his power so to do.

(3) It is absolute and necessary. We speak of a thing as absolute which is not dependent on another, and is unaltera

ble. This is not the case with any thing whatever, which we become acquainted with by means of the direct agency of the senses. All such bodies are constantly changing, and there is no difficulty in the supposition, that they may all be struck out of existence. But it is impossible for us to associate the idea of non-existence with space. It is unalterably the same. But there is evidently nothing unalterable, which is not naturally and necessarily so. It is on this ground, therefore, that we assign to space the characteristic of being absolute and necessary.(4) A fourth characteristic is, that it is the condition of the existence of all bodies; that is to say, it is impossible for us to conceive of a body without associating the notion of space with it. We are so constituted that what we understand by space is utterly inseparable, from every thing outward, which has outlines and form. So that we may truly say of space, that it is the condition of the existence of all bodies, at least relatively to ourselves. And hence, as it is internally conceived of, it becomes a great law of the mind, modifying and limiting all its outward perceptions. We cannot conceive of objects out of space, any more than we can conceive of events out of time. It is true, the poet Gray represents Milton, as having, in his Paradise Lost, scaled the limits, which time and space impose on human conceptions; the flaming bounds, as he calls them. But this is only the license and fiction of a poet. If that should ever happen, which he has so sublimely imagined, and men should ever break through those great and unalterable barriers, which God has erected between himself and inferior intelligences, we might well anticipate the result, which the same glowing fancy has indicated;

"They saw, but blasted with excess of light,
"Closed their eyes in endless night."

§. 189. Of the origin of the idea of power.

Under the head of Suggestion the idea of POWER properly belongs. Every man has this notion; every one feels too, that there is a corresponding reality; in other words, power is not only a mere subject of thought, but has, in some important sense, a real existence. And we may add, that every one knows, although there is somewhere a great original

son.

fountain of power, independent of all created beings, that he has a portion, (small indeed it may be, but yet a portion,) of the element of power in his own mind, and in his own perThere is indeed a Power, unexplored and invisible, which has reared the mountains, which rolls the ocean, and which propels the sun in his course; but it is nevertheless true, that man, humble as he is in the scale of rational and accountable beings, possesses, as an attribute of his own nature, an amount of real efficiency, suited to the limited sphere, which Providence has allotted him. This is a simple statement of the fact. Power goes hand in hand with existence, intelligence, and accountability. There is no existence, either intelligent or unintelligent, without power, either in the thing itself, or in something else which sustains it. There is no accountable existence without power, existing in and participating in such existence, and constituting the basis of its accountability.

But the principal question here is, not what power is in itself, nor whether man possesses power in fact, but under what circumstances the notion or idea of power arises in the human mind. The occasions of the origin of this idea, so far as we are able to judge, appear to be threefold. (1) All cases of antecedence and sequence in the natural world. We are so constituted, that in connection with such cases of antecedence and sequence, we are led at a very early period of life, to frame the proposition and to receive it as an undeniable truth, that there can be no beginning or change of existence without a cause. This proposition involves the idea of efficiency or power. (2) The control of the will over the muscular action. We are so constituted, that whenever we will to put part of the body in motion, and the motion follows the volition, we have the idea of power. (3) The control of the will over the other mental powers. Within certain limits and to a certain extent there seems to be ground for supposing, that the will is capable of exercising a directing control over the mental, as well as over the bodily powers. And whenever we are conscious of such control being exercised, whether it be greater or less, occasion is furnished for the origin of this idea. It is then called forth or SUGGESTED. It is not seen by the material eye; nor