reached by the sense of touch; but emerging of itself from the mind, like a star from the depths of the firmament, it reveals itself distinctly and brightly to the intellectual vision.

§. 190. Origin of the idea of the first or primitive.

The mind, satisfied with nothing short of the elements and foundations of knowledge, seeks, in its inquiry, into the origin and causation of things, not only for the element of Power, but also for the FIRST cause, the antecedent which has no other antecedent, the PRIMITIVE. Whenever we see

a thing, we are naturally led to think of, and to inquire for the beginning of that thing. There is a sort of natural consanguinity of events, an unalterable tie, which binds the present with the past; and the past with that which is still further back in the depths of time. The thing, the event, the fact, (whatever exists or takes place,) calls for that to which it is related, the antecedent and basis of its own existence, in the language of Scripture, as "deep calls to deep." Hence the idea of the Primitive. This important notion, (which we variously express by the words FIRST, Original, BEGINNING, and the like,) originates in the Intellect, rather than in Sense; and in that particular form of intellectual activity, which we denominate Suggestion. It is obvious, while we can see or hear or touch any thing which is an object of the outward senses, we cannot, with strict propriety and truth of speech, be said to touch or see its antecedence, or primitiveness. In fact, there is only one object, and that no other than the Supreme Being himself, to whom this idea, with absolute truth or strictness, will apply at all. We look at the works of man, and the works of nature; every thing which has form or activity; the sun, the moon, the stars, the ocean, the forests. But the mind, not satisfied with the perception of the thing, looks still further for its cause, its effective antecedent, the foundation of its existence. It inquires, who reared the forest, who rolls the ocean, who made the sun. The mind itself, therefore, suggests the notion of something which goes before, of PRIORITY; and, advancing under the impulses of its own nature, it proceeds from step to step, from star to star, from existence to existence, till it finds the absolute Primitive in that great Being, who involves in the

fact of his Supremacy, not only the subordination, but the subsequence of all things else. And it is to be kept in mind, that it is found there, not as a matter of outward, but of inward perception; revealed, not to the understanding, perceiving through the restricted instrumentality of the senses, but to the understanding, perceiving in the intuitive light of its own spontaneous action.

§. 191. Of the ideas of right and wrong.

Right and Wrong also are conceptions of the pure Understanding; that is, of the Understanding operating in virtue of its own interior nature, and not as dependent on the senses. We are constituted intellectually in such a manner, that, whenever occasions of actual right or wrong occur, whenever objects fitted to excite a moral approval or disapproval are presented to our notice, the ideas of RIGHT and WRONG naturally and necessarily arise within us. In respect to these ideas or intellections, (if we choose to employ an expressive term partially fallen into disuse,) Cudworth, Stewart, Cousin, and other writers of acknowledged discernment and weight, appear to agree in placing the origin of them here. And this arrangement of them is understood to be important, in connection with the theory of Morals. If these ideas originate in the pure intellect, and are simple, as they obviously are, then each of them necessarily has its distinctive nature; each of them is an entity by itself; and it is impossible to conceive of them as identical or interchangeable with each other. They are as truly unlike as our conceptions of unity and time, or of space and power. And if this is true of our ideas of right and wrong, it is not less so of right and wrong themselves. In other words, right can never become wrong, nor wrong, right; they are placed forever apart, each occupying its own sphere; and thus we have a foundation laid for the important doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions."The distinction between right and wrong, (says Cousin, Psychology, Chap. 5,) may be incorrectly applied, may vary in regard to particular objects, and may become clearer and more correct in time, without ceasing to be with all men the same thing at the bottom. It is an universal conception of Reason, and hence it is found in all

languages, those products and faithful images of the mind.Not only is this distinction universal, but it is a necessary conception. In vain does the reason, after having once received, attempt to deny it, or call in question its truth. It cannot. One cannot at will regard the same action as just and unjust. These two ideas baffle every attempt to commute them, the one for the other. Their objects may change, but never their nature."

§. 192. Origin of the ideas of moral merit and demerit.

Closely connected with the ideas of right and wrong are the ideas of moral MERIT and DEMERIT. In the order of nature which is sometimes called the logical order,) the ideas of right and wrong come first. Without possessing the antecedent notions of right and wrong, it would be impossible for us to frame the ideas of moral merit and demerit. For what merit can we possibly attach to him, in whom we discover no rectitude; or what demerit in him, in whom we discover no want of it! Merit always implies virtue as its antecedent and necessary condition, while demerit as certainly implies the want of it or vice. Although the ideas of merit and demerit, in consequence of being simple, are undefinable, there can be no doubt of their existence, and of their being entirely clear to our mental perception; and that they furnish a well-founded and satisfactory basis for many of our judgments in respect to the moral character and conduct of mankind.

§ 193. Of other elements of knowledge developed in Suggestion. In giving an account of the ideas from this source, we have preferred as designative of their origin the term SUGGESTION, proposed and employed by Reid and Stewart, to the word REASON, proposed by Kant and adopted by Cousin and some other writers, as, on the whole more conformable to the prevalent usage of the English Language. In common parlance and by the established usage of the language, the word REASON is expressive of the deductive, rather than of the suggestive faculty; and if we annul or perplex the present use of that word by a novel application of it, we must introduce a new word to express the process of deduction. Wheth

er we are correct in this or not, we shall probably find

no disagreement or opposition in asserting, not only the existence, but the great importance of the intellectual capability, which we have been considering. The thing, and the nature of the thing, is undoubtedly of more consequence than the mere name.

In leaving this interesting topic, we would not be understood to intimate, that the notions of existence, mind, personal identity, unity, succession, motion, duration, power, and the others which have been mentioned, are all, which Suggestion furnishes. It might not be easy to make a complete enumeration; but in giving an account of the genesis of human knowledge, may. we not ascribe the ideas of truth, freedom, design or intelligence, necessity, fitness or congruity, reality, order, plurality, totality, immensity, possibility, infinity, happiness, reward, punishment, and perhaps many others to this source? In particular may we not assign here, (such is the doctrine and one of the excellencies of the system of Kant,) the abstract conceptions of Beauty and Deformity? It is true, that we feel the Beautiful and its opposite by the inward Sensibilities, as we shall have occasion to notice and explain, when we come to that interesting view of the mind. But is it not true also, that we conceive or have an idea of it by the intellect? We may not be able to tell what the BEAUTIFUL is, but does not the intellect, by a spontaneous and effective intimation, assure us of the fact of its existence? And if there is a Beautiful, is there not also a Deformed, and of course a fixed and immutable distinction between them? Could we have a distinct idea of the Beautiful without an idea of the Deformed, any more than we could have an idea of Right without an idea of Wrong? Our opinions as to what is in fact beautiful may vary in a given case; but that does not prove the absence of the reality, nor alter the essentials of its nature. It is a common remark, that religion is practically no religion to those who have no faith in it; so the Beautiful is practically annihilated to those who have not the power of perceiving it; but independent of the circumstance of its being perceived or not, it is the Beautiful still; like the sweet song of the bird in the desert, the same in itself, though there is no one to hear it, and rejoice So that we cannot but assent to those who assert,

in it.

that the foundations of Esthetics, (that is, the science of the Beautiful as applied to nature and the arts,) are firm; not depending upon variable circumstances, but substantiated by the permanency of nature. And hence it has happened, that what was beautiful and pleasing to mankind four thousand years ago, is beautiful and pleasing still, simply because Beauty in nature, like Rectitude in morals, is, in the element and substance of its constitution, indestructible and invariable. The idea of the Beautiful, as thus explained, is made known by Suggestion.

§. 194. Suggestion a source of principles as well as ideas.

One remark more remains to be made. Original Suggestion is not only the source of ideas, (and particularly of ideas fundamental and unalterable,) but also of principles. The reasoning faculty, which in its nature is essentially comparative and deductive, must have something to rest upon back of itself, and of still higher authority than itself, with which, as a first link in the chain, the process of deduction begins. It is the suggestive intellect, which is the basis of the action of the comparing and deductive intellect. Of those elementary or transcendental propositions, which are generally acknowledged to be prerequisites and conditions of the exercise of the deductive faculty, there are four particularly worthy of notice. (1) There is no beginning or change of existence without a cause. (2) Matter and mind have uniform and permanent laws.(3) Every quality supposes a subject, a real existence, of which it is a quality.—(4) Means, conspiring together to produce a certain end, imply intelligence. The first of these propositions is the basis of all those reasonings, which are employed to prove the existence of God from the light of nature, besides having other important applications in regard to any thing and every thing that is past. The second is essential to the continuance of our existence and our activity, inasmuch as it lays the foundation of all foresight into the future, and of the important consequences dependent upon such foresight. The third gives us a knowledge of mind and matter, the mental and material world, in distinction from their mere attributes and operations; assuring us of a substance or actuality of exist