parts, and as susceptible in some respects, of different degrees. We look, for instance, at two men; they are both tall; but we at once perceive and assert, that one is taller than the other. We taste two apples; they are both sweet; but we say that one is sweeter than another. That is to say, we discover, in addition to the mere perception of the man and the apple, a relation, a difference in the objects in certain respects.

But

There are terms, in all languages, employed in the expression of such relations. In English a reference to the particular relation is often combined in the same term, which expresses the quality. All the words of the comparative and superlative degrees, formed by merely altering the termination of the positive, are of this description, as whiter, sweeter, wiser, larger, smaller, nobler, kinder, truest, falsest, holiest, and a multitude of others. In other cases, (and probably the greater number,) the epithet, expressive of the quality, is combined with the adverbs more and most, less and least. certainly we should not use such terms, if we were not possessed of the power of relative suggestion. We should ever be unable to say of one apple, that it is sweeter than another, or of one man that he is taller than another, without considering them in certain definite respects, and without perceiving certain relations. So that, if we had no knowledge of any other than relations of Degree, we should abundantly see the importance of the mental susceptibility under review considered as a source of words, and of grammatical forms in language.

§. 206. Relations of degree in adjectives of the positive form.

Although relations of degree are discoverable more frequently in comparative and superlative adjectives than any where else, they may sometimes be detected also in abstract nouns, which have the appearance of being entirely positive, and not unfrequently in adjectives of the positive form.-Let it be considered, as one instance among many others, what we mean, when we say of a person, He is an AGED man. Although the epithet has the positive form, we always tacitly compare the age of the subject of it with that of others, of people in general, and place the particular number of years, to which he may have attained, by the side of that period,

which we are in the habit of regarding as the ordinary term of man's pilgrimage. It is the same, when we say of any person, that he is YOUNG. He is then, by a tacit mental reference, considered as falling far short of an assumed period, an approximation to which gives to another person the reputation of age.

Buffier, whose remarks are generally entitled to great weight, happily illustrates this subject as follows." If we should, for example, never have seen or heard of any hill or mountain of greater height than a quarter of a mile, as might happen to some of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, a mountain a mile high would appear a considerable one to such people; but this mountain would be looked upon as inconsiderable and trifling to the people of the Alps, who are accustomed to see mountains of much greater height. This example is so striking, that there is no necessity for any other to make us sensible of the nature of relations that are founded on an arbitrary idea, formed either by accident and occasion, or by our own fancy; as, if I should take it into my head, without any foundation, that pearls are generally an inch in diameter, I must in that case, look upon all the pearls we have in France as very small.

"What has been here said of greatness is manifestly applicable to all the other qualities of long, broad, happy, unhappy, convenient, inconvenient, easy, difficult, rich, poor, good, bad, excellent, and many others of a similar nature, that have no determinate sense, but by a relation founded on an arbitrary and accidental idea formed within our own minds. A man thought himself miserable in having a slight head-ache: being afterwards seized with a giddiness and violent swimming in the head, the first reflection that occurred to him was, how happy he was when he had only his first head-ache. We here see that the arbitrary idea, on which the comparison and relation are founded, changes the signification, and in a manner the nature, of the qualities of happy and miserable.”

§. 207. (III.) Of relations of proportion.

Among other relations, which are discovered to us by the power of judgment or relative suggestion, are those of PRO* First Truths of Pere Buffier, Part 11, Chap. XXVIII.

PORTION; a class of relations, which are peculiar in this, that they are felt only on the presence of three or more objects of thought. They are discoverable particularly in the comparison of numbers, as no one proceeds far in numerical combinations without a knowledge of them. On examining the numbers two, three, four, twenty, twenty-seven, thirty-two, nine, five, eight, and sixteen, we feel certain relations existing among them; they assume a new aspect, a new power in the mental view. We perceive, (and we can assert, in reference to that perception,) that three is to nine as nine to twenty seven; that two is to eight as eight to thirty two; that four is to five as sixteen to twenty, &c.

And when we have once felt or perceived such relation actually existing between any one number and others, we ever afterwards regard it as a property inseparable from that number, although the property had remained unknown to us, until we had compared it with others. We attach to numbers, under such circumstances, a new attribute, a new power, the same as we do, under similar circumstances, to all the other subjects of our knowledge. There are many properties, for instance, of external bodies, which were not known to us at first, but as soon as they are discovered, they are of course embraced in the general notion which we form of such bodies, and are considered as making a part of it. And pursuing the same course in respect to numbers, if, on comparing them with each other, we perceive certain relations never discovered before, the circumstance of their sustaining those relations ever afterwards enters into our conception of them.

§. 208. (IV.) Of relations of place or position.

Other feelings or perceptions of relation arise, when we contemplate the place or position of objects. Our minds are so constituted, that such perceptions are the necessary results of our contemplations of the outward objects, by which we are surrounded. Perhaps we are asked, What we mean by position or place? Without professing to give a confident answer, since it is undoubtedly difficult by any mere form of words fully to explain it, we have good grounds for saying that we cannot conceive of any body as having place, without comparing it with some other bodies. If, therefore, hav

ing two bodies fixed, or which maintain the same relative position, we can compare a third body with them, the third body can then be said to have place or position.

This may be illustrated by the chess-men placed on the chess-board. We say, the men are in the same place, although the board may have been removed from one room to another. We use this language, because we consider the men only in relation to each other and the parts of the board, and not in relation to the room or parts of the room. Again, a portrait is suspended in the cabin of a ship; the captain points to it, and says to a bystander, that it has been precisely in the same place this seven years. Whereas in point of fact it has passed from Europe to Africa, from Africa to America, and perhaps round the whole world. Still the speaker uttered no falsehood, because he spoke of the portrait, (and was so understood to speak of it,) in relation to the ship and particularly the cabin; and not in relation to the parts of the world, which the ship had visited. instances show that place is relative.

Such

Hence we may clearly have an idea of the place or position of all the different parts of the universe, considered separately, because they may be compared with other parts; although we are unable to form any idea of the place or position of the universe considered as a whole, because we have then no other body with which we can compare it. If it were possible for us to know all worlds and things at once, to comprehend the universe with a glance, we could not assert, with all our knowledge of it, that it is here, or there, or yonder, or tell where it would be.

But if place express a relative notion, then it follows, that all words, which involve or imply the place or position of an object, are of a similar character. Such are the words, high and low, superior and inferior, (when used in respect to the position of objects,) near and distant, above and beneath, further, nearer, hither, yonder, here, there, where, beyond, within, around, without, and the like.

§. 209. (V.) Of relations of time.

Another source of relative perceptions or judgments is Time holds nearly the same relation to duration, as

TIME.

position does to space. The position or place of objects is but space marked out and limited; time, in like manner, is duration set off into distinct periods; and as our notions of the place of bodies are relative, so also are our conceptions of events considered as happening in time. It is true, that the notions of duration and space are in themselves original and absolute; they are made known to us by Original, rather than by Relative Suggestion; but when they are in any way limited, and events are thereby contemplated in reference to them under the new forms of place and time, certain new conceptions arise, which are relative.

All time is contemplated under the aspect of past, present, or future. We are able chiefly in consequence of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, to form a distinct notion of portions of time, a day, a month, a year, &c. ; we can contemplate events, not only as existing at present, but as future or past. But always when we think or speak of events in time, (in other words when we speak of the date of events,) there is a comparison, and a perception of relation.

What, therefore, is the import of our language, when we say, the independence of the North American colonies was declared, July fourth, 1776.-The meaning of these expressions may be thus illustrated. We assume the present year, 1836, as a given period and reckon back to the year, one, which coincides with the birth of our Savior; then the year, 1776, expresses the distance between these two extremes, viz. one, and eighteen hundred, thirty six. This seems to be all we learn, when we say the Independence of the United States was declared at the period above mentioned. Again, we obviously mean the same thing, and convey the same idea, whether we say that the Savior was born in the year one, of the Christian era, or, in the year, 4004, from the creation of the world. But, in the last case, the year, 4004, expresses the distance between these two extremes, viz, the beginning of the world and the present time; while, in the first instance, the event itself forms the beginning of the series. So that all dates appear to be properly classed under the head of ideas of relation; and also all names whatever, which are in any way expressive of the time of events, as a second, a minute, day, week, hour, month, year, cycle, yesterday, to-morrow, to day, &c.