tion as having length and breadth; as being, for instance, an inch in length, and a half an inch in breadth? There is nothing of the kind. Consciousness never gave, and it is not too much to say, that it never will give any such information. The properties or attributes of matter and mind, therefore, are entirely different. And as all persons hold it to be unphilosophical to ascribe attributes so different to the same subject, we conclude the subjects of them are not the And accordingly we call the subject of one class of

same.

phenomena Mind, and that of the other Matter.

§. 17. The soul's immateriality indicated by the feeling of identity. There is another somewhat striking consideration, which may aid in evincing the immateriality of the soul. It is well known, that the materials, of which the human body is composed, are constantly changing. The whole bodily system repeatedly undergoes, in the course of the ordinary term of man's life, a complete renovation, and yet we possess, during the whole of this period, and amid these utter changes of the bodily part, a consciousness of the permanency, as well as of the unity of the mind. "This fact (remarks Mr. Stewart,) is surely not a little favorable to the supposition of mind being a principle essentially distinct from matter, and capable of existing when its connection with the body is dissolved.”

Truly if the soul, like the body, were made up of particles of matter, and the particles were in this case as in the other, always changing, we should be continually roving, as an old writer expresses it, and sliding away from ourselves, and should soon forget what we once were. The new soul, that entered into the same place, would not necessarily enter into the possession of the feelings, consciousness, and knowledge of that, which had gone. And hence we rightly infer, from an identity in these respects, the identity or continued existence of the subject, to which such feelings, consciousness, and knowledge belong. And as there is not a like identity or continued existence of the material part, we may infer again, that the soul is distinct from matter.

§. 18. The material doctrine makes man a machine.

The doctrine, that thought is the result of material or

ganization, and that the soul is not distinct from the body, is liable also to this no small objection; that it makes the soul truly and literally a machine. If what we term mind be in truth matter, it is of course under the same influences, as matter. But matter, in all its movements and combinations, is known to be subject to a strict and inflexible direction, the origin of which direction is exterior to itself. The material universe is truly an automaton, experiencing through all time the same series of motions, in obedience to some high and authoritative intelligence; and is so entirely subject to fixed laws, that we can express in mathematical formulas not only the state of large bodies, but of a drop of water or of a ray of light; estimating minutely extension and quantity, force, velocity, and resistance.

It is not thus with the human mind. That the mind has its laws is true; but it knows what those laws are; whereas matter does not. This makes a great difference. Matter yields a blind and unconscious obedience; but the mind is able to exercise a foresight; to place itself in new situations; to subject itself to new influences; to surround itself with new motives, and thus control in a measure its own laws. In a word, mind is free; we have the best evidence of it, that of our own consciousness. But matter, as we learn from all our observations of it, may justly be characterized as a slave. It does not turn to the right or left; it does not do this or that, as it chooses; it possesses no self-determining and self-moving element; but the subject of an overpowering allotment, it is borne onward to the appointed mark by an inflexible destiny.-If these views be correct, we see here a new reason for not confounding and identifying these two existences.

§. 19. No exact correspondence between the mental and bodily state. The train of thought in the last section naturally leads us to remark further, that there is an absence of that precise correspondence between the mental and bodily state, which would evidently follow from the admission of materialism. Those, who make thought and feeling the result of material organization, commonly locate that organization in the brain. It is there the great mental exercises, in the phraseology of materialists, are secreted, or are developed, or are

brought out in some other mysterious way, by means of a purely physical combination and action. Hence, such is the fixed and unalterable nature of matter and its results, if the brain be destroyed, the soul must be destroyed also; if the brain be injured, the soul is proportionally injured; if the material action be disturbed, there must be an exactly corresponding disturbance of the mental action. The state of the mind, on a fair interpretation of this doctrine, is not less dependent on that of the body, than the complicated motions of the planetary system are on the law of gravitation. But this view, whether we assign the residence of the soul to the brain or to any other part of the bodily system, does not appear to be accordant with fact. It is not only far from being approved and borne out, but it is directly contradicted by well attested experience in a multitude of cases.

§. 20. Evidence of this want of exact correspondence. We are desirous not to be misapprehended here. We readily grant, that the mind, in our present state of existence, has a connection with the physical system, and particularly with the brain. It is, moreover, obviously a natural consequence of this, that when the body is injured, th mental power and action are in some degree affected; and this we find to be agreeable to the facts, that come within our observation. But it is to be particularly noticed, that the results are just such as might be expected from a mere connection of being; and are evidently not such as might be anticipated from an identity of being.

In the latter case the material part could never be affected, whether for good or evil, without a result precisely corresponding in the mind. But in point of fact, this is not the case. The body is not unfrequently injured, when the mind is not so; and on the other hand the soul sometimes appears to be almost entirely prostrated, when the body is in a sound and active state. How many persons have been mutilated in battle in every possible way, short of an utter destruction of animal life, and yet have discovered at such times a more than common greatness of mental power! How often, when the body is not only partially weakened, but is resolving, at the hour of death, into its original elements, and possesses

not a single capability entire, the mind, remaining in undiminished strength, puts forth the energy and beauty of past days!

We are now speaking of injuries to our corporeal part and of bodily debility in general, but if we look to the brain in particular, which is more intimately connected with the mental action than any other part of the bodily system, we shall find ourselves fully warranted in an extension of these views there. According to the system of the materialists, the soul does not merely exist and act in connection with the body, but is identical with it. And not only this, they go further and locate this identity in the brain, making the soul and the brain not merely connected together, but identically the same thing. But the objection to their views, which in its general form has already been made, exists here in full strength. If that organization, which they hold to result in thought and feeling, be identical with the brain, it must be diffused through the whole of that organ, or limited to some particular part. But it appears from an extensive collection of well authenticated facts, that every part of the brain has been injured, and almost every part absolutely reaoved, but without permanently affecting the mental powers, which is absolutely impossible, if there be an identity of the two things. "Every part of that structure, (says Dr. Ferriar in a learned Memoir, the statements of which have not, as far as we know, been disproved,) has been deeply injured or totally destroyed, without impeding or changing any part of the process of thought." He remarks again, after bringing forward a multitude of undoubted facts, as follows. "On reviewing the whole of this evidence, I am disposed to conclude, that as no part of the brain appears essentially necessary to the existence of the intellectual faculties, and as the whole of its visible structure has been materially changed, without affecting the exercise of those faculties, something more than the discernable organization must be requisite to produce the phenomena of thinking."*

§. 21. Comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming. The views of the two preceding sections receive some *Memoirs of the Manchester Philos. Society, Vol. IV.

confirmation from the comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming. In sound sleep the senses sink into a state of utter and unconscious sluggishness; the inlet to every thing external, as far as we can judge, is shut up; the muscles become powerless; and every thing in the body has the appearance of death. It is true, the soul appears for the most part to be fallen into a like state of imbecility; but this is not the case in its dreams, which are known to take up no small portion of the hours of sleep. At such times it does not appear to stand in need of the same repose with the body; otherwise it would seek and possess it. On the contrary, when the powers of the body are utterly suspended, the soul is often exceedingly on the alert; it rapidly passes from subject to subject, attended sometimes with sad, and sometimes with raised and joyful affections.

But this is not all; often in the hours of sleep the intellect exhibits an increased invention, a quickened and more exalted energy in all its powers. Many writers have remarked, that the conclusions of abstruse investigations have been suggested to them at such times. Not a few would conclude themselves persons of genius, if they could pronounce the arguments and the harangues in the awakened soberness of the morning, which they had framed in the visions of the night. Does not this state of things seem to indicate, that there is a natural and fundamental distinction between the mental and the material part of man?

§. 22. The great works of genius an evidence of immateriality.

Now let us look at what mind in man's awakened moments is able to accomplish; and see if the results of its action, in its higher and nobler exercises, are such as we commonly expect from or ascribe to matter. Look first at the kindred powers of memory and imagination. I am at this moment sitting in my chair with a book and paper before me, and a pen in my hand. But my memory is aroused; my imagination takes wing; and my soul suddenly finds itself, (at least considered in reference to its operations,) in a far distant place. I see distinctly before me the trees which shaded me, and the hills where I wandered in my childhood. The same waters flow before me ; the same bright sun shines