intellect, has something peculiar and characteristic of it, which shuts it out from the domain of the sensibilities; and whatever has the nature of a volition has a position apart both from the intellectual and the sentient. This is a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried out and applied, includes the whole soul. To the one or the other of these general heads, every thing, involved in our mental existence, may be referred. In fully exhausting, therefore, these topics, we may justly count upon having completed the exploration of the mental constitution.

§. 31. Evidence of the general arrangement from consciousness. The general arrangement, which has been spoken of, viz, into the INTELLECTUAL, SENTIENT, and VOLUNTARY states of the mind, appears to be susceptible of abundant illustration and proof. It is not our intention, however, to enter into the discussion of its correctness, at much length; but merely to indicate as briefly as possible, some of the grounds, on which it has been made; premising at the same time, that the whole of this work, while it is based in a good degree on this fundamental division, will be found to furnish incidental evidence throughout of its truth.

In proof of the propriety of the general arrangement in question, we may refer in the first place, to Consciousness. In doing this we are of course obliged to presume, that the reader understands what is meant by the term consciousness; and that he assents to the truth, so readily and generally acknowledged, that we have much of our knowledge of the mind by its aid. Mental philosophers assure us, that we are enabled, by means of consciousness, to ascertain what thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish them from each other. And if we are not willing to depend upon the information thus given us, if we reject its authority in the hopes of finding something more certain, we shall only be involved in greater difficulty; in the language of Condillac on this very subject, "we stray from a point, which we apprehend so clearly, that it can never lead us into error.”* But if it be true, that the existence and distinctive character of the mental acts is made known, in a good degree at least,

* Origin of Knowledge, Pt. I, CH. I.

by consciousness, and that we may justly and confidently rely on its testimony, we naturally inquire, what does it teach in the present case? And in answering this question, we may safely appeal to any person's recollections, and ask, whether he has ever been in danger of confounding a mere perception, a mere thought, either with desires and emotions on the one hand, or with volitions on the other? Does not his consciousness assure him, that the mental states, which we thus distinguish by these different terms, are not identical, that the one class is not the other, that they as actually differ from each other, as association does from belief, or imagination from memory ?-It may be objected, however, that we find ourselves perplexed and at a loss to explain, by any statement in words, the precise difference in this case, whatever that difference may actually be. We readily admit the fact, implied in this objection, but without admitting that it has any weight as proof against the distinction in question. No simple notion or feeling whatever is susceptible of a definition, of an explanation by mere words alone. And it cannot be expected of anything, whose own nature we cannot explain by words, that we can fully explain by a mere verbal statement, its difference from other things.

It would seem, therefore, that we may rest in this inquiry upon men's consciousness; not of one merely, but of any and all men. The understanding stands apart from the rest. The will also has its separate and appropriate position. We may at least assert with full confidence, that no one is in danger of confounding volitions with intellections; that is to say, with the mere notions of the understanding. On this point there is certainly a general agreement. And yet our consciousness, if we will but attend to its intimations with proper care, will probably teach us, that the nature of a volition more nearly approaches that of a purely intellectual act, than it does the distinctive nature of emotions and desires. It is undoubtedly true, that volitions may have aroused and excited antecedents, and may thus be very closely connected with the various affections; but in themselves they are cold and unimpassioned; they are purely executive or mandatory, and are as obviously free from any actual impregnation

of appetite, sentiment, or desire, as the most abstract and callous exercises of the intellect.

32. Evidence of the same from terms found in different languages.

We are enabled further to throw some light on this subject from a consideration of the terms, which are found in various languages. Every language is, in some important sense, a mirror of the mind. Something may be learnt of the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the form or structure of language in general, but even from the import of particular terms. There can be no hesitation in saying, that every language has its distinct terms, expressive of the threefold view of the mind under consideration, and which are constantly used with a distinct and appropriate meaning, and without being interchanged with each other as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are terms in all languages, (meaning those of course which are spoken by nations somewhat advanced in mental culture,) which correspond to the English terms, INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, WILL. If such terms are generally found in languages, differing from each other in form and in meaning, it is certainly a strong circumstance in proof, that the distinction, which we propose to establish, actually exists. On the supposition of its having no existence, it seems impossible to explain the fact, that men should so universally agree in making it. If on the other hand it does exist, it is reasonable to suppose, that it exists for some purpose; and existing for some purpose, it must of course become known; and being known it is naturally expressed in language, the same as any other object of knowledge. And this is what we find to be the case. So that we may consider the expression to be an evidence of the fact; the sign, an intimation and evidence of the reality of the thing signified.

§. 33. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers.

We now pass to other sources of evidence on this subject. No small amount of knowledge, bearing upon the capabilities and the character of the human mind, may be gathered from the incidental remarks of writers of careful observation and good sense. And accordingly if we find remarks expressive

of mental distinctions, repeatedly made by such men, when they are not formally and professedly treating of the mind, it furnishes a strong presumption, that such distinctions actually exist. Their testimony is given under circumstances the most favorable to an unbiassed opinion; and ought to be received into the vast amount of evidence, drawn from a great variety of sources, which goes to illustrate the true nature of the soul. The popular author of Literary Hours has given in one of his Works an interesting biographical sketch of Sir Richard Steele. After remarking upon the inconsistencies of his life, his excellent resolutions and his feeble performances, his successive seasons of riot and repentance, he refers the cause of these inconsistencies to the feebleness of the will; and in doing it, he incidentally, but very clearly, makes the distinction under consideration. "His misfortune, the cause of all his errors, was, not to have clearly seen, where his deficiencies lay; they were neither of the head, nor of the heart, but of the volition. He possessed the wish, but not the power of volition to carry his purposes into execution."* As we are not at liberty to suppose, that so respectable a writer employs words without meaning, he must be regarded as intending to make the distinction, which has been asserted to exist.

In Dr. Currie's well written Life of Burns, it is asserted, that the force of that remarkable poet lay in the powers of his understanding and the sensibilities of his heart. And the writer not only thus clearly indicates the distinction between the understanding or intellect and the heart; but in another passage, which undoubtedly discloses the key to the poet's character and conduct, he distinguishes both of them from the voluntary powers. The passage referred to is this. "He knew his own failings; he predicted their consequences; the melancholy foreboding was not long absent from his mind; yet his passions carried him down the stream of error, and swept him over the precipice he saw directly in his course. The fatal defect in his character lay in the comparative weakness of his volition, which, governing the conduct according to the dictates of the understanding, alone entitles it to be denominated rational." †

*Drake's Essays illustrative of the Tatler, Spectator, and Guardian, Vol. I. p. 50. + Currie's Life of Burns, Philadelphia Ed. p. 62.

A recently published Inquiry, concerning the Indications of Insanity, in which are various sketches of personal history and character that illustrate certain traits of the mind, has the following statement.-" Delinquents of this description are, perhaps, not unable to distinguish between what is right and what is wrong, but their will is not governed by their understanding, and they want the power of restraining themselves from that which, when committed, they are afraid to reflect upon. Their will remains; but it springs from depraved sensations and emotions, or from passions inordinate and unrestrained.”*

A celebrated writer, in giving directions to his son as to the manner of conducting negociations with foreign ministers, makes use of the following language. "If you engage his heart, you have a fair chance for imposing upon his understanding, and determining his will." This writer, as well as many others, employs the more common term heart to express the sensibilities; and he evidently uses language, as if there were a known and admitted distinction between the intellectual, sentient, and voluntary parts of our nature, since he speaks of the control or regulation of the understanding, as being, in the case under consideration, subsequent to the possession of the heart, and the determination of the will as subsequent to both, or at least as not identical with them.

We might multiply passages of this kind to almost any extent, if our limits would permit it. And these passages, if the distinction for which we contend, does not exist, must obviously convey erroneous ideas. This we cannot well suppose. On the contrary, we have not the least doubt, that they express a great and important fact in our mental constitution; a fact, which is at the basis of all true philosophy of the mind. A single extract more from Shakspeare, (Hamlet, Act. I, Sc. 2d,) will close this topic.

"It shows a will most incorrect to heaven,

"A heart unfortified,

"An understanding simple and unschool'd.

§. 34. Further proof from various writers on the mind.

The distinction in question has also been fully recognized *Conolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &c. Lond. Ed. p. 454. +Chesterfield, Lond. Ed. Vol. III, p. 137.