Laws. It was appropriate to use the word "in" in order to embrace legislation by internal law-making bodies. Moreover, the language is not "in and for" but it is "in or for." The word "for" was an appropriate term to indicate legislation by a law-making body existing outside the municipality. There were only two methods by which legislation could be enacted outside the municipality: (1) The people of the state at large; and (2) the legislative assembly. The term "referendum" necessarily assumes the existence of a law-making body other than the voters themselves; and, hence when a municipal law is enacted in the municipality it can be referred, and when a municipal law is enacted by the legislative assembly for one municipality like a county or port, it can likewise be referred. Again noticing the wording of Section 1a, it will be seen that the language is "local, special and municipal legislation" and not "local, or special or municipal legislation." When a city council or other internal representative body of a municipality enacts a law or when the legal voters of a city pass a measure, it is necessarily local and special to itself and is municipal in quality, because such a law-making body could not enact any other character of legislation. So too, when the legislature enacts a law for only one municipality, that law is special and local because in direct terms it is applicable only to a specified municipality and is of course municipal in character because appertaining to a municipality. Granting the right to exercise the initiative and referendum as to "all local, special and municipal legislation" is equivalent to saying that those powers cannot be applied to legislation which is not "local, special and municipal." It is not enough that the legislation be municipal in character but it must also be local and special; and

therefore the very language of Section la contemplates not only that the legislature can enact municipal legislation but also that the legal voters of one municipality cannot invoke the referendum to determine whether they shall be governed by a general law which has been passed for all municipalities.

This result does not emasculate the power of cities and towns to enact or amend their own charters. Take for example the Bancroft bonding act and assume that it had been passed by the legislature to-day: It would apply to all the cities and towns in the state and would be available to all the people of the respective cities and towns. To-morrow, however, the city could legislate concurrently upon the same subject and make use of its legislation if the city legislation did not conflict with the state legislation. If the legislature passes a general municipal measure it can be referred to the voters of the entire state the same as any other general legislation, but it is safe to say that in the practical administration of affairs legislators will be extremely tender of the rights and the wishes of cities and towns. The legislature cannot pass a special law for a city or town; but it can enact local, special and municipal legislation for any other kind of a municipality or district subject, however, to the right of the legal voters of such municipality or district to refer the measure to themselves for their approval or disapproval. A painstaking investigation by every member of the court confirms our belief in the correctness of the conclusion that the legislature can enact general laws concerning cities and towns and other municipalities. A construction of the Constitution which enables the legislature to pass a general law relating to cities and towns harmonizes the different sections and makes the organic law consis

tent with itself. To hold that the legislature cannot pass a general law affecting municipalities will not only jeopardize all bonds that may have been issued pursuant to Chapter 128, Laws of 1907 (codified in Sections 3254 to 3263, inclusive), but improvement bonds issued by cities and towns since 1907 under the provisions of the Bancroft bonding act may be rendered doubtful to whatever extent they may be dependent for their legality upon the validity of the amendment enacted by the legislative assembly in 1907 (Chapter 201, Laws 1907); and let it be remembered that since 1907 the City of Portland alone has issued bonds under the Bancroft bonding act amounting to approximately $4,000,000.

Speaking for himself the writer says that: had any doubt remained after an extended examination of the subject it would be clarified and entirely removed by the declaration of Mr. Chief Justice MCBRIDE who says that the sponsors for the amendments neither intended nor thought nor even dreamed that the amendments would prohibit the legislature from enacting general laws relating to municipalities, cities and towns. He assisted in launching the movement to amend the Constitution; his guidance was sought and his counsel was followed by his coadjutors; he knew the object designed to be accomplished; and no living person more than he is in a position to speak understandingly of the intention sought to be expressed by the language employed, for the reason that he helped to frame both amendments. "He who made the law knows best how it ought to be interpreted" is not less true now than it was when Rousseau wrote.

Summarizing the foregoing discussion: The legislative assembly cannot create any corporation by a special law; but corporations of all kinds may be

formed under appropriate general laws passed by the legislative assembly. Charters or laws granting or enumerating the powers exercisable by a corporation are indispensable. Cities and towns can enact or amend their own charters, but no other corporate body can, without an enabling act, legislate power unto itself to legislate. The legislative assembly cannot enact a special measure which enacts, amends or repeals a specified city or town charter, but it can enact a special law which amends the charter or act of incorporation of a municipality, other than a city or town. The legislative assembly can enact a general law affecting the charters or acts of incorporation of all cities or towns, or municipalities or districts. If a municipality has within itself a representative lawmaking body then the legal voters of such municipality can apply the referendum to any measure passed by that representative body; if the legislative assembly passes a special measure for a specified municipality or district, other than a city or town, then the legal voters of that municipality can apply the referendum to that special measure for the reason that this gives practical application to Article IV, Section 1a, which reserves the referendum "as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their respective municipalities," and also carries into execution the purpose expressed in the argument submitted by the framers of the amendment to the Constitution. The people of the state at large can apply the referendum to all general municipal legislation but the legal voters of an individual municipality cannot refer to themselves, as distinguished from the voters of the state at large, any general municipal measure passed by the legislative assembly.

The construction adopted here removes friction between the two amendments, promotes harmony between them, makes them consistent with each other and with themselves and with the Constitution as a whole, and above all carries out and preserves the idea of home rule without at the same time creating an imperium in imperio or denying the power of legislation to the sovereign people of the state at large or their agent and representative, the legislative assembly where, in the words of the Constitution itself, "the legislative authority of the state shall be vested." The amendments were innovations at the time of their adoption and their newness made it difficult to understand their full scope and meaning; what was then theory has since become practice, and what to some may once have appeared apocryphal has now become familiar and accepted usage, so that now the language of the amendments is shown in the clearer light of practical experience, rendering it less difficult to interpret the amendments and enabling all readers to see plainly what was then clear to the writers of these changes in the Constitution.

6, 7. The doctrine taught by Farrell v. Port of Portland, 52 Or. 582 (98 Pac. 145), was overruled by State ex rel. v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or. 1 (154 Pac. 399), and counsel have expressed some apprehension lest the Port of Portland is now prohibited from continuing in the pilotage and towage business. We merely call attention first to 23 Cyc. 1269 where it is stated that:

"A judgment for or against a municipal corporation, in a suit concerning a matter which is of general interest to all the citizens or taxpayers thereof, as the levy and collection of taxes, or public contracts or other obligations, or public property, its title, character or boundaries, is binding, not only on the municipality and its officers, but also upon such citizens or