erly municipal and germane to the purposes for which municipal corporations are formed. (Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, 114.) Municipal Corporations-Regulation of Rates. 5. The right to regulate rates is a matter of general concern, and does not pertain solely to municipal affairs. (Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, 114.) Municipal Corporations Streets-Injuries to Persons upon-Speed of Motor Vehicles. 6. Under Motor Vehicle Law (Laws 1911, pp. 266, 267), Section 2, subdivisions 11 and 17, declaring that in passing railroad or street-cars motor vehicles shall be operated upon that side of the street or railroad car with due care and caution for the safety of passengers alighting or descending, but should there be on the left side of the street or railroad car a clear space, motor vehicles shall be permitted to so increase their speed for the necessary distance to negotiate a safe clearance between the street or railroad car and the vehicle desiring to pass, which such speed shall not be deemed excessive, having due regard to the speed of the railroad or street-car, and that the speed on all streets and highways shall be a reasonable speed up to and not exceeding 25 miles an hour, but any speed beyond that shall be unreasonable, it is not negligent for a motorist in passing a street-car where there is a clearance to drive his car at any necessary speed up to 25 miles an hour. (Sorsby v. Benninghoven, 345.) Municipal Corporations-Injuries to Persons on Streets-Negligence. 7. A motorist for the purpose of passing a street-car increased the speed of his vehicle so that he was proceeding at a speed estimated as high as 18 miles an hour. The street was clear, and he could not see a young child standing behind a telegraph pole. Just as he was abreast the child it ran out and was struck by the rear fender, the motorist turning his vehicle into the car to escape an accident. Held, that the motorist was not liable for the resultant death of the child; for he was not driving at an excessive speed, but was lawfully proceeding in accordance with the express permission given by statute. (Sorsby v. Benninghoven, 345.) Municipal Corporations County Roads-Control-Statute. 8. The control of county roads is primarily in the legislative power of the state, and until in plain terms the state has given control thereof to any municipality, the latter cannot assume or exercise authority over them; and, under its act of incorporation, Laws of 1891, page 505, Section 39, by subdivision 14 defining the authority of the board of trustees as to obstructions in streets, by subdivision 28 authorizing it to construct streets, by subdivision 32 authorizing county road supervisors to collect taxes and keep the county roads in repair, etc., by Section 68 authorizing the board of trustees to change the grade and improve any street, and by Section 101 authorizing the laying out of streets, etc., the City of Bandon had no authority to exercise control over a county road. (Christie v. Bandon, 481.) Municipal Corporations-Public Improvements-Remonstrance-Sufficiency. 9. A tract of land owned by an individual, but divided in the center by a fence parallel to the street to be paved, which separated the cultivated portion from the pasture land, which tract has been all assessed for the pavement, is to be counted as one entire tract in estimating the area of land owned by those remonstrating against the improvement under a charter providing that, if the owner or owners of two thirds of the property adjacent to a street filed a written remonstrance against the proposed improvement, it shall not be proceeded with. (Lais v. Silverton, 503.) Municipal Corporations-Powers Construction, 10. To the extent that attributes of sovereignty are granted to local subdivisions, the language carrying the grant should be strictly construed, as such grant is a limitation upon the power of legislation. (Rose v. Port of Portland, 541.) Municipal Corporations - Port - Initiative Amendment of CharterConstitutional and Statutory Provisions. 11. Laws of 1901, page 417 (Sections 6076-6105, L. O. L.), revising all previous legislation as to the creation of the Port of l'ortland as a municipal corporation by Section 6078, empowers the port to improve the harbor in the Willamette River "at the City of Portland," and by Section 6079 empowers it to control the river in the harbor "at the City of Portland," and further grants the right to make regulations for the navigation "of said harbor in said City of Portland"; and in 1912 the legal voters of the port, acting on an initiative petition, attempted to amend their charter by including the power to dredge a slough in the Columbia River within the port, but outside the city limits. Article XI, Section 2, of the Constitution as amended and adopted in 1906, provides that corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special laws, and that the legislative assembly shall not enact or amend any charter for any municipality, city or town, and grants the legal voters of every city and town power to amend their municipal charter, and Article IV, Section la, of the Constitution as amended and adopted at the same time, provides that the initiative and referendum powers reserved by the Constitution shall be reserved to the legal voters of every municipality and district as to all the special and municipal legislation, and that the manner of exercising such powers shall be prescribed by general laws, except that cities and towns may provide the manner of exercising such powers as to their municipal legislation, and Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution as amended and adopted in 1902, declares that the legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a legislative assembly, and reserves to the people power to propose laws and constitutional amendments and to enact them at the polls, and reserves power to approve or reject legislative acts. Held that charters or laws, granting or enumerating the powers exercisable by a corporation, are indispensable, and that while cities and towns can enact or amend their own charters, no other corporation, such as a port, can, without an enabling act, legislate power unto itself to legislate, so as to amend its charter or act of incorporation. (Rose v. Port of Portland, 541.) Municipal Corporations-Statutes - Port - Amendment of CharterLegislative Power-"Referendum"-"Any." 12. Article IV, Section la, of the Constitution as amended and adopted in 1906, provides that the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by the Constitution shall be further reserved to the legal voters of any municipality and district as to all special and municipal legislation; that the manner of exercising such powers shall be prescribed by general laws, except that cities and towns may provide for the manner of exercising the initiative and referendum powers as to their municipal legislation, and Article XI, Section 2, of the Constitution as amended and adopted in 1906, provides that corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by the legislative assembly by special laws, and that the assembly shall not enact or amend any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town, and that the legal voters of every city and town may enact or amend their municipal charter subject to the Constitution. Held, that the word "referendum" of itself implies the existence of a law-making body other than the legal voters; that the word "any" may sometimes signify "every" or "all," but primarily means one individually out of a number, and is a derivative of one signifying an indeterminate unit, or number of units out of many or all; and that, in view of the history and purpose of the amendment, the legislative assembly, while it cannot enact a special measure, amending a city or town charter, may enact a special law, amending the charter or act of incorporation of a municipality other than a city or town, such as a port, and that if the assembly passes a special measure for a municipality other than a city or town, its legal voters can apply the referendum to that measure. (Rose v. Port of Portland, 541.) Municipal Corporations-Port-Powers-Coaling Ships-Statutes. 13. Laws of 1901, page 417, reproduced in Sections 6076-6105, L. O. L., Revised Laws of 1891, page 791, establishing and incorporat ing the Port of Portland, and declared the object of the port to be "to promote the maritime shipping and commercial interests of the Port of Portland," provided for the improvement of certain rivers in the port, and between it and the sea, by a ship canal to the sea, and conferred the right of eminent domain, taxation and the right to make regulations, and to own and operate a dry-dock. In 1908 the legal voters initiated and adopted a measure, attempting to confer the additional power of coaling or bunkering ships, under which the port proposed to purchase a site, erect coal-bunkers, and maintain a supply of coal, the expenses of which were to be raised by taxes, to meet the competition of Puget Sound ports, where coal could be obtained for less than in Portland, and thereby overcome such disadvantage and retain and increase its ocean commerce. Held, in view of the object of such legislation, that the coaling or bunkering of ships would be incidental to the public purpose for which the port was created, and would be itself a public purpose, which might be conferred by the legislature. (Stevenson v. Port of Portland, 576.) Municipal Corporations - Port - Powers — Amendment to CharterCoaling Ships. 14. Under Laws of 1901, page 417, reproduced in Sections 60766105, L. O. L., revising Laws of 1891, page 791, incorporating the municipality of the Port of Portland without the right to coal ships, the voters thereof could not, without legislative aid, constitutionally initiate and adopt a measure authorizing the port to coal ships. (Stevenson v. Port of Portland, 576.) See Judgment, 5. See Telegraphs and Telephones, 1. New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence-Effect. 1. In a suit to quiet title, where the weight of the evidence supported plaintiff's contention that he and another agreed upon the line and that a fence was constructed on such line, except where on account of a steep hillside it was necessary to depart from the line, newly discovered evidence that the then wife of such other had heard him say that some day he would have to move the fence out to the line, would not necessarily disprove the existence of the agreement, and hence permission would not be granted to take her testimony. (McCully v. Heaverne, 650.) Applied, Approved, Cited, Distinguished, Followed and Overruled in this Volume. See Table in Front of this Volume, OREGON CONSTITUTION. Cited and Construed in this Volume. OREGON STATUTES. Cited and Construed in this Volume. See Tables (Code and Session Laws) in Front of this Volume. 1. In suit between cotenants to partition real property, plaintiff, who made improvements on the land, building an addition to the house, which was burned, could derive no benefit therefrom. (St. Martin v. Hendershott, 58.) Partition-Improvements. 2. In suit between cotenants to partition the land, no allowance will be made plaintiff for trivial improvements. (St. Martin v. Hendershott, 58.) PARTNERSHIP. Partnership Joint and Several Note-Payment-Fund. 1. The individuals constituting a partnership signing joint and several notes were jointly and severally liable, and the payee might look to their individual assets for payment, or to the partnership estate for payment, where the notes arose out of a partnership indebtedness. (Anderson v. Stayton State Bank, 357.) Partnership-Indebtedness-Payment. 2. A partnership debt is primarily the obligation of the partnership, and secondarily the obligation of the individuals composing it, |