often the case than not that the one who has risen carries with him a fellow-feeling which is of no mean service as a factor in bargaining on a wage scale.

But from outside of the ranks in financial circles the hope and belief were widely accepted that the trust movement had large emancipating possibilities in it for labor. The arrest of pricedemoralizing competition was expected to prevent not only depression in prices but to put an end to unemployment. Much was hoped for through the development of foreign markets to keep the mills going at capacity or all the year round. Greater stability of prices was also one of the most fortunate developments to which labor could look forward under the selfcontrol to which industry was gradually coming. But entirely apart from these considerations, such leaders in the financial world as the late J. Pierpont Morgan made one of the first things to be considered in the organization and development of these combinations, "some plan of bringing about better conditions of labor, some plan of cooperation and participation in the benefits and profits of the company, which was considered the only way practically of helping to solve the relations of capital and labor."*

To the question whether the trusts have made good in their relation with their employees, the


Testimony of Robert Bacon, Dissolution Suit, U. S. Steel Corp., June 13, 1913.

representatives of organized labor are inclined to give the negative reply. John Williams, of the iron, steel, and tin workers, Pittsburgh, asserts that the smaller establishment, which the trust régime has absorbed or superseded, had many advantages which made for the better position of labor as a whole. He says:

"Before the organization of modern industrial combinations, the hours of labor were shorter, which in turn gave the workers some time for mind culture, some time to devote to the home and some time for social enjoyment. The physical requirements were not so great. Today, in the iron and steel industries, outside of those plants engaged in the manufacture of sheet and tin plates, the twelve-hour work-day is almost universal. This means practically fourteen hours per day, which gives the worker practically ten hours to devote to his family and public duties, with practically no time for recreation. The workingman loses his individuality as soon as he enters one of our modern industrial plants. He becomes but an atom in the great aggregate of this industrial system, and his only hope of regaining his social and economic individuality is by uniting with his fellow workmen in a movement through which he will be able to secure a joint bargain with his employer for the labor he has to sell."*

* Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Effects of Industrial Combinations on Labor Conditions, Vol. XLII, p. 9.

Probably the account on this score may best be put in the form of the following comparative summary of claims, pro and con, as to effects of combinations on labor:

Combinations claim they

1. Increase kinds of employment;
2. Improve labor conditions;
3. Promote steadier work;
4. Enlarge chances of promotion;
5. Make investing easier and safer;
6. Enhance value to community.

Labor claims combinations

1. Favor unskilled labor
2. Level down wages;
3. Restrict personal liberty;
4. Intensify competition;
5. Exalt machine over man;
6. Do not develop citizenship.



IFFERENT countries entertained entirely different views on such fundamental questions as the relation of business to government. Germany, for instance, favors trusts, not only by admitting combinations to complete legality, but even by promoting them and cooperating with them. England, on the other hand, under the civil or common law, allows them wide latitude with a minimum of regulation. In Canada and in the United States combinations are prohibited under both civil and criminal statutes. In Australia their validity is the more directly dependent upon the question whether a combination is primarily contributory to the public welfare. An examination of each country's position separately is necessary, however, to grasp the essential purport of their individual policies.

1. Cartels and Syndicates in Germany

Germany, where formerly extreme liberality in industrial policies prevailed, later came to be among the strictest in restraining industrial combinations. This status prevailed up to about the middle of the last century. At the present time, however, the widest freedom of contract

in private business activity goes side by side with strict laws relating to unfair competition and forbidden practices in the distributive branches of trade. To understand Germany's position one must keep in mind the historic tendency toward unification which ended in the formation of the Empire and the enlargement of the Zollverein. Her economists who stand highest in the imperial councils have always been exponents of the idea that the most economical unit of production is the nation with the least interference with freedom of movement of labor, capital, and commerce among its component states. Germany, furthermore, has recognized in the commercial, industrial, and engineering organizations effective instruments of self-control and correction in business practices to a much greater extent than is the case among English speaking peoples.

Probably the main reason why syndicates of industrial capitalists have found favor in Germany is because of their undisputed service in the equipment of home industry for participation in foreign commerce.. Germany's national prosperity depends much on the capacity to keep her export and import trade on sound economic and technical grounds. Hence the trusts in that country are conducted with much more regard to export efficiency than to domestic markets. A second reason is found in the service of the syndicates in protecting smaller enter

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