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agreements American Anti-Trust Act Association average Big Business bination capital cent CHAPTER commerce common law common stock company's compete competitors consolidation consumer contract cooperation cost decision declared earnings economic effect efficiency elimination fair Federal Trade Commission field foreign freedom holding company illegal increase Industrial Combinations Industrial Commission interest International Harvester Company investment investors J. A. Hobson jobber JOHN FRANKLIN CROWELL labor less limits manufacturing ment methods monopoly ness organization output over-capitalization ownership patent petition pipe lines pooling practices principle production profits promote public utility Pujo Committee purpose question railroads rates reason regulation relations Report restraint of trade result retail rivalry securities sell Sherman Act Sherman Anti-Trust Act social Standard Oil Standard Oil Company Steel Corporation stockholders sugar supply syndicate tion Trust Act trust policy trust problem unfair competition United States Industrial wages York
Side 96 - Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint...
Side 44 - That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships or corporations, except banks, and common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce.
Side 77 - No more than the patent statute was the copyright act intended to authorize agreements in unlawful restraint of trade and tending to monopoly, in violation of the specific terms of the Sherman Law, which is broadly designed to reach all combinations in unlawful restraint of trade and tending because of the agreements or combinations entered into to build up and perpetuate monopolies.
Side 92 - ... for the purpose of ascertaining and determining upon some plan or method of dissolving the combination and of recreating, out of the elements now composing it, a new condition which shall be honestly in harmony with and not repugnant to the law.
Side 49 - Monopoly means that substantial unity of action on the part of one or more persons engaged in some kind of business •which gives exclusive control, more particularly, although not solely, with respect to price.
Side 26 - It is said that Congress had very different matters in view and very different objects to accomplish in the passage of the act in question ; that a number of combinations in the form of trusts and conspiracies in restraint of trade were to be found throughout the country, and that it was impossible for the state governments to successfully cope with them because of their commercial character and of their business extension through the different States of the Union. Among these trusts it was said...
Side 2 - embraces every act, agreement, or combination of persons or capital believed to be done, made, or formed with the intent, effect, power, or tendency to monopolize business, restrain or interfere with competitive trade, or to fix, influence, or increase the price of commodities.
Side 75 - It is, as we have seen, a system of interlocking restrictions by which the complainant seeks to control not merely the prices at which its agents may sell its products, but the prices for all sales by all dealers at wholesale or retail, whether purchasers or subpurchasers, and thus to fix the amount which the consumer shall pay, eliminating all competition.
Side 141 - It is difficult to find a man of sufficient ability to run one large business, and there are not a great many intellectual giants that have the ability to run ten or more large, businesses. In my judgment one of the dangers to the success of industrials is that parties, without being intellectual giants, are liable to attempt to centralize too much. Taking men as they are, I think that in businesses where high-class ability is required at many places, and where the business is not of such a character...
Side 125 - The testimony of substantially all of the combination men is to the same effect— that unless a combination has either some natural monopoly of the raw material, or is protected by a patent, or possibly has succeeded in developing some very popular style or trade-marks or brands, any attempt to put prices at above competitive rates will result eventually in failure, although it may be temporarily successful.