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of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. United States v. Wonson, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 5.

214. In debt for a penalty, tried in the district court, no appeal lies. Ibid.

215. If in a prize court the claimant appeals and deserts his appeal, the circuit court may affirm the decree of the district court, with costs. The Montgomery, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 416.

216. The circuit court has no jurisdiction in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, except over the final decrees of the district court. If such final decree be unappealed from, no appeal lies upon any subsequent proceedings, upon the summary judgment rendered on the bond for the appraised value, or upon an admiralty stipulation, taken in the cause to enforce the decree. The proceedings in such cases, and the awarding of execution, are incidents exclusively belonging to the court in possession of the principal cause. The Hollen, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 431. 217. An appeal from a decree of the district court must be taken in open court before the adjournment sine die, unless a different period be prescribed by the court. Norton v. Rich, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 443.

218. Appeals made ten days after the decree, before a notary, as is the practice in admiralty courts in other countries, have never been used in America. Ibid.

219. Since the act of 1803, ch. 93, in admiralty, as well as in equity cases carried up to the supreme court by appeal, all the evidence goes with the cause, and it must be in writing. The Schooner Boston, 1 Sumner's C. C. R. 328.

220. No appeal lies by any party from the district court, unless on the part of the appellant, the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars. Shirley v. Titus, 1 Sumner's C.

C. R. 447.

221. On appeal in salvage cases, the court of appeal does not alter the amount of salvage upon slight grounds, or inconsiderable differences of opinion. The Schooner Boston, 1 Sumner's C.

C. R. 328.

222. An appeal by any of the parties interested in the distribution of salvage as to their shares, brings up incidentally a review of the whole decree, so far as the distribution is concerned. The Ship Henry Ewbank, 1 Sumner's C. C. R. 400.

223. After a sentence of condemnation upon a seizure by the collector, for a violation of the revenue laws of the United States, and the proceeds being brought into court, a petition to the court by the informer, to be paid the proportion of the forfeiture allowed to him by law, is an original suit in the admiralty; and from the decree of the district court therein, an appeal lies to the circuit court. Wescot v. Bradford, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 492.

234. If part of the fund in court be the produce of the coasting license bond, the petition of the informer for his proportion of the penalty so recovered, is a proceeding at common law; and from the sentence on the petition no appeal

lies. Ibid.

225. The appellate court may sustain the appeal in part and dismiss it in part, on the ground,

that as to such part, the case could not be brought up by appeal. Ibid.

226. An appeal lies from a decree of the district court of the United States, in a proceeding in the admiralty, refusing an order for the sale of a vessel, on application by one of two part owners, who have an equal interest. Davis v. The Seneca, Gilpin's D. C. R. 36.

227. Where an appeal to the supreme court was taken by the owners of goods from the cir cuit court, on the ground that a too great amount of salvage had been allowed, but the libellant, who had proceeded for salvage, did not appeal either from the district court in which the libel was originally filed, or from the circuit court, it was held that the decree of the district court was conclusive as to the amount of the salvage. In the appellate court, the libellant cannot claim any thing beyond the amount allowed in the district court, unless he has appealed. Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Peters, 4.

228. The interest of each individual owner of property proceeded against for salvage, must be of a sufficient amount to allow an appeal, according to the provisions of the laws of the United States. Each owner of goods proceeded against for salvage, has a separate interest; and an appeal will not be allowed where the individual interest of an owner in the amount of the salvage on his goods saved, is less than the sum for which appeals are allowed, although the whole sum allowed as salvage to the salvors, is sufficient to authorize an appeal. The district courts of the United States, as courts of original jurisdiction, have general jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime causes, without reference to the sum or value of the matter in controversy. But the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court and of circuit courts, depends upon the sum or matter in dispute between the parties having independent interests. Ibid.

229. After an appeal, a vessel which was the subject of a decree in the district court, passes into the custody of the circuit court, and is no longer under the control of the former tribunal. Davis v. The Seneca, Gilpin's D. C. R. 37.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THE ADMIRALTY.

230. Congress have power to provide for the punishment of offences committed by persons serving on board a ship of war of the United States, wherever that ship may lie. But congress have not exercised that power in the case of a ship lying in the waters of the United States. The words "within any fort, arsenal, dock-yard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," in the third section of the act of 1790, ch. 9, not extending to a ship of war, but only to objects, in their nature fixed and territorial. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; 4 Cond. Rep. 275.

231. The courts of the United States have no jurisdiction under the act of April 30, 1790, ch. 36, of the crime of manslaughter, committed by the master upon one of the seamen on board of a merchant vessel of the United States, lying

Criminal Jurisdiction of the Admiralty.

in the river Tigris, (in the empire of China,) | drowning him, or by shooting him when on the thirty-five miles above its mouth, off Whampoa, sea, though he was not thrown overboard. Ibid. about one hundred yards from the shore, in four 241. Admitting that the third article of the and a half fathoms water, and below low-water constitution of the United States, which declares mark. U.S. v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76; 4 Cond. that the "judicial power shall extend to all cases Rep. 593. of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," vests in the United States exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases; and that a murder committed in the waters of a state where the tide ebbs and flows, is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; congress have not, in the eighth section of the act of 1790, ch. 9, for the punishment of "certain offences against the United States," so exercised this power, as to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over such murder. The U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; 4 Cond. Rep. 275.

232. Though penal laws are to be construed strictly, yet the intention of the legislature must govern in the construction of penal as well as other statutes, and they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. Ibid.

233. In the act of April 30, 1790, ch. 36, the description of places contained in the eighth section, within which the offences therein enumerated must be committed, in order to give the courts of the Union jurisdiction over them, cannot be transferred to the twelfth section, so as to give those courts jurisdiction over a manslaughter committed in the river of a foreign country, and not on the high seas. Ibid.

234. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a murder committed on the high seas, from a vessel belonging to the United States, by a foreigner being on board of such a vessel, upon another foreigner being on board of a foreign vessel. It is not necessary to produce documentary evidence in order to prove the national character of a vessel, on an indictment for piracy. The United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; 4 Cond. Rep. 623.

235. The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of a murder committed by one foreigner on another foreigner, both being on board of a foreign vessel. Ibid.

236. It is competent in an indictment for piracy for the jury to find, that a vessel within a marine league of the shore, at anchor, in an open roadstead, where vessels only ride under shelter of the land, at a season when the course of the winds is invariable, is upon the high

seas. Ibid.

237. The words "out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," in the act of the 30th of April, 1790, ch. 36, sec. 8, must be construed to mean, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the Union. Ibid.

238. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under the act of 30th April, 1790, ch. 36, of murder or robbery committed on the high seas, although not committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States; as if she had no national character, but was held by pirates or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. The United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412; 4 Cond. Rep. 708.

239. In the same case and under the same act, if the offence be committed on board of a foreign vessel by a citizen of the United States, or on board a vessel of the United States by a foreigner, or by a citizen or foreigner on board of a piratical vessel, the offence is equally cognisable by the courts of the United States. Ibid.

240. It makes no difference, in such a case and under the same act, whether the offence was committed on board a vessel, or on the sea, as by throwing the deceased overboard, and

242. Quere. Whether courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty, over murder committed in bays, &c., which are enclosed parts of the sea? Ibid.

243. Congress having, in the eighth section of the act of 1790, ch. 9, provided for the punishment of murder, &c., "committed upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state," it is not the offence committed, but the bay, &c., in which it is committed, that must be out of the jurisdiction of the state. Ibid.

244. The grant to the United States, in the constitution, of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which those cases may arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same. Congress may pass all laws which are necessary for giving the most complete effect to the exercise of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, granted to the government of the Union; but the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion of the territory not yet given away; and the residuary powers of legislation still remain in

the state. Ibid.

245. Although the crimes act of 1790, ch. 36, sec. 13, does not define the offence of endeavouring to make a revolt, it is competent for the court to give a judicial definition of it. U. S. v. Kelly, 11 Wheat. 417; 6 Cond. Rep. 370.

246. A vessel lying on the sea, outside of a harbour of the United States, within three miles of the shore, is on the high seas. The U. S. v. Smith, 1 Mason, 147.

247. The waters of havens, where the tide ebbs and flows, are not properly the high seas, unless without low-water mark. U. S. v. Hamilton, 1 Mason, 152.

248. On an indictment for an endeavour to make a revolt in a ship, founded on the 12th sec. of the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 36, it is not necessary to prove it was committed on the high seas. Ibid. 443.

249. To constitute the crime of murder under the laws of the United States, cognisable in the circuit court of the United States, not only the stroke, but the death, must happen on the high seas. U. S. v. Magill, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 463.

250. The state courts have jurisdiction of offences committed on arms of the sea, creeks, havens basins, and bays, within the ebb and

Administration of Assets.

flow of the tide, where those places are within | the laws of Maryland, all debts are of equal the body of a county; and in such cases the dignity in administration; and by the laws of circuit courts of the United States have no juris- Virginia, where R. was domiciliated, debts on diction under the crimes act of 1825, ch. 276. bond are preferred. The assets in the hands of U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 290. the administrator were insufficient to discharge the bond and simple contract debts. Held, that the effects of the intestate, in the hands of the administrator, are to be distributed among his creditors according to the laws of Maryland, and not according to the laws of Virginia. Smith, Administrator, v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 5 Peters, 518.

251. Where an arm of the sea, or creek, haven, basin, or bay, is so narrow, that a person standing on one shore can reasonably discern, and distinctly see, by the naked eye, what is doing on the opposite shore, the waters are within the body of a county. Ibid.

252. In such waters, the admiralty and common law have, it seems, concurrent jurisdiction. Ibid.

253. Separate and distinct trespasses cannot be joined in the same libel against defendants who are not jointly liable. Thomas v. Lane,

2 Sumner's C. C. R. 1.

3. Á tract of land in the state of Georgia, was purchased by A. M'Learn, on which he established a rice plantation, put slaves upon it, paid part of the purchase money, gave a judgment for the balance, and died, leaving a son, James H. M'Learn, his devisee, who, to obtain posses254. In a libel for a maritime trespass, assault sion of the estate, mortgaged the land and slaves and battery, against two respondents, if there is for the balance of the judgment. A judgment, a joint decree for damages, either of the re- under the laws of Georgia, binds personal as spondents may appeal without joining the other, well as real property. The son died, part of the where the respondents have severed in their debt being unsatisfied, leaving as his nearest of pleadings or answers, or jointly pleaded a nega-kin, aliens, and also more remote kindred, who tive plea in the nature of the general issue. were citizens of the United States. The real But it seems otherwise if they had pleaded aestate was sold to satisfy, and did satisfy the joint justification. Ibid.

255. The admiralty jurisdiction as to torts depends upon locality, and is limited to torts committed on the high seas, or, at farthest, to torts committed on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. Ibid.

256. It seems that torts committed on tidewaters within foreign ports, are within the admiralty jurisdiction. Ibid.

257. The statutes 13th and 15th Richard II., respecting the admiralty, do not affect its jurisdiction in foreign ports. Ibid.

258. No words of provocation will justify an assault, although they may constitute a ground for the reduction of damages. Cushman v. Ryan, 1 Story's C. C. R. 91.

259. Punishment inflicted by a master upon a seaman must be moderate in degree, both proportioned to the nature of the offence and the exigency of the occasion, and administered in a proper manner. Ibid.

ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS.

mortgagee. The personal estate was sold by the executor. The aliens, who were nearest of kin, claimed the proceeds of the personal estate. The kindred of the deceased who were more remote, but who were citizens of the United States, claimed that the personal estate should have been appropriated to pay the mortgage; and that not having been so appropriated, they were entitled to the money arising from its sale, to reimburse them for the value of the real estate taken by the mortgagor; the aliens nearest of kin not being entitled, by the law of Georgia, to take real estate by descent. The court held, that as both the real and personal estate had been charged with the mortgage debt, both funds must be applied, in proportion to their respective amounts, to its payment. Any debt, not covered by the mortgage, to be paid out of the personal estate. The nearest of kin to take the residue of the proceeds of the personal estate; and the remoter kin, citizens of the United States, to take the residue of the proceeds of the real estate, and the real estate unsold. M'Learn v. M'Lellan, 10 Peters, 625.

4. Where an estate is insolvent, and distribution of the assets is decreed, under the laws of 1. The executor or administrator cannot dis- Rhode Island, and afterwards new assets come charge his own debt in preference to others of into the hands of the administrator, more than superior dignity, though he may give the pre-sufficient to pay all the debts, a suit will lie ference to his own over others of equal degree. In some of the states this rule would not apply, as there is no difference made in the payment of debts, between a bond and simple contract debt. Page v. Patton et al., 5 Peters, 304.

2. Robertson was domiciliated at Norfolk, in Virginia, and there contracted a debt on bond to T. He was also indebted to the Union Bank of Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, on simple contract. He died intestate in Bedford, in Pennsylvania, leaving personal estate in the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, of which administration was there granted. By

against the administrator for payment in behalf of the creditors, notwithstanding the statute of limitations precludes an original suit against his administrator; for the new assets are a trust fund for the creditors, and the heirs can claim distribution only after all the debts are paid. Dexter v. Arnold, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 284.

5. An administrator, who is also mortgagee of the real estate of his intestate, in his own right, is not liable to account, as administrator for the money which he receives upon the sale of such estate as mortgagee, although he sells it with a general warranty. Ibid.

Advancement.—Adversary Possession of Lands.

ADVANCEMENT.

6. Many judgments, quando assets, were ren- | property for some time after their removal. G. K. dered against administrators, and assets to a died in 1820, insolvent; his debts amounted to large amount subsequently came into the hands $36,000, and his whole estate, both real and perof the administrator de bonis non. Held, that sonal, when sold, did not pay thirty-nine per these judgments retained the same rank which cent. of his debts. The property claimed by would belong to the particular instruments on J. T. and his wife, in this case, was sold for 1600 which they were founded. The only effect of dollars by a trustee, under a decree in chancery, such judgment is, to give priority to other debts obtained by the creditors of G. K., but the sale of the same dignity, on which, either no judg- has not been ratified. From the occupancy of ments, or subsequent judgments were rendered. the property, and the amount of money expended Lidderdale v. Robinson, 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 160. | in improving it, it was certain that there was an understanding between G. K. and J. T. that the property, in some manner, should be possessed and enjoyed by J.T. and his wife. The evidence, however, showed that G. K. did not intend to vest it absolutely in J. T., but that the value of it, before the improvements, should, in some form, be secured to the wife of J.T. Whatever uncertainty may have existed as to the terms of the contract, J. T. acted under it in taking possession of the property, and expending a large sum of money on it. J. T. and his wife filed a bill against the heirs of G. K., and the trustee of the creditors of G. K., claiming a conveyance of the property, and for general relief. By the court. In no point of view could such a contract as that in this case be considered voluntary. There was not only a good consideration, that of natural affection, but a valuable one. To constitute a valuable consideration, it is not necessary that money should be paid; but if, as in this case, it be expended on the faith of the contract, it constitutes a valuable consideration. King's Heirs v. Thompson and Wife, 9 Peters, 204.

1. A reasonable advancement to a daughter on her marriage, made by a parent, though indebted, is not within the statute of frauds, though the donor subsequently becomes insolvent. Hopkirk v. Randolph et al., 2 Brockenb. C. C. R. 132. 2. A deed from a parent to a child, for the consideration of love and affection, is not absolutely void as against creditors; it may be so under certain circumstances: but the mere fact of being in debt to a small amount, will not make the deed fraudulent, if it could be shown that the grantor was in prosperous circumstances, and unembarrassed, and that the gift to the child was a reasonable provision according to his state and condition in life, and leaving enough for the payment of the debts of the grantor. Hinde's Lessee v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199; 6 Cond. Rep. 270.

3. The want of a valuable consideration may be a badge of fraud, but it is only presumptive, and not conclusive evidence of it, and may be met and rebutted by evidence on the other side: and where the deed to the child is expressed to be for the consideration of love and affection, evidence to show that the father was indebted to the child at the time, to an amount equal to the value of the property conveyed, is competent to go to the jury to repel the presumption of

fraud. Ibid.

4. A few days after the marriage of J. Thompson with the daughter of George King, in 1812, the latter residing in Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, and having a large active capital, and a large real estate there, proposed to grant to J. T. a house and lot in Georgetown, then much out of repair, and untenantable, provided he would repair the same so as to make it a comfortable residence, and saying that he intended the property for his daughter. This proposition was accepted by J. T., who repaired the property, expending upwards of 4000 dollars on the same, and he, with his wife, resided on it about four years. Before his removal from it, a correspondence on the subject of the conveyance of the property to J. T., or to J. T. and his wife, took place, which ended in propositions to convey the property on certain terms, beneficial to J. T. and his wife, in pursuance of, and intended to be in execution of the original offer of G. K. to J. T., made him immediately after the marriage. No conveyance was made. J. T. and his wife removed from Georgetown, and G. K. collected and paid to J. T. the rents of the

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ADVERSARY POSSESSION OF LANDS.

1. An adversary possession of fifty years, though with knowledge of a better title, constitutes a good defence against that title. Alexander et al. v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch, 462; 3 Cond. Rep. 216.

2. A purchaser, without notice, has a right to join his adversary possession to the ostensible adversary possession of his vendor, so as to give him the benefit of the statute of limitations. Ibid.

3. Under the act of assembly of Kentucky, entitled "an act concerning champerty and maintenance," a deed will pass the title to lands, notwithstanding an adverse possession. Walden v. Gratz, 1 Wheat. 292; 3 Cond. Rep. 570.

4. An adverse possession under a survey previous to the patent, may be connected with the possession after the patent, so as to come within the statute of limitations of Kentucky. Ibid.

5. One tenant in common may oust his cotenant, and hold in severalty; but a silent pos

Adversary Possession of Lands.

session, accompanied with no act which can amount to an ouster, or give notice to his cotenant that his possession is adverse, ought not to be construed into an adverse possession. M-Clung v. Ross, 5 Wheat. 116; 4 Cond. Rep.

603.

6. In ejectment, possession accompanied with a claim of ownership in fee, is prima facie evidence of such an estate. In such a case, it is not the possession alone, but that it is accompanied with the claim of the fee, which gives this effect, by construction of law, to the acts of the parties. Jackson v. Porter, 1 Paine, C. C. R. 457. 7. But such effect is limited to the claim actually made, and a claim cannot be afterwards set up for the purpose of aiding the first. Ibid. 8. The entry of one heir will enure to the benefit of all; and if the entry is made as heir, and without claim of exclusive title, it will be deemed an entry, not adverse to, but in consonance with the rights of the other heirs. But one heir may disseise his co-heirs, and hold an adverse possession against them as well as a stranger. Ricard v. Williams et al. 7 Wheat. 59; 5 Cond. Rep.

237.

9. Against his co-heirs and his creditors, an heir, also a party, may afterwards, by disseisin of his co-heirs, acquire an exclusive possession upon which the statute will run. But it is a general rule that a disseisor cannot qualify his own wrong, but must be considered a disseisor in fee. Ibid.

10. Where the defendant in ejectment for lands in North Carolina has been in possession under title in himself, and those under whom he claims, for a period of seven years and upwards, such possession is, by the statute of limitations of that state, a conclusive legal bar against the action by an adverse claimant, unless such claimant bring himself, by positive proof, within some of the disabilities provided for by that statute. In the absence of such proof, the title shown by the party in possession is so complete as to prove, in an action upon a covenant against incumbrancers, that a recovery obtained by the adverse claimant was not by a paramount legal title. Somerville's Ex'rs. v. Hamilton, 4 Wheat. 230; 4 Cond. Rep. 436.

11. Under the statute of limitations of Tennessee, the running of the statute can be stopped only by an actual suit, if the party claiming under it has had peaceable possession for seven years. But this cannot occur, if the party having the better title takes actual possession in pursuance of his right. M'Clung v. Ross, 5 Wheat. 116; 4 Cond. Rep. 603.

12. Under the statute of limitations of Tennessee, of 1797, a possession of seven years is a bar only under a grant or a deed founded on a grant. Doe ex demise of Walker v. Turner, 9 Wheat. 541; 5 Cond. Rep. 668.

13. In Tennessee, a possession of seven years under a sheriff's deed, which is void for want of jurisdiction in the court under whose judgment the sale took place, will be protected by the statute of limitations. Ibid.

14. Kentucky.-Where an adverse possession has continued for twenty years, it constitutes a

complete bar in equity, wherever the same pos session would operate at law to bar an ejectment. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152; 6 Cond. Rep. 47.

15. Under the statute of limitations of Pennsylvania, of March, 1785, if, at the time the law passed, a person was disseised, he was bound to bring his ejectment within fifteen years; if the disseisin occurred afterwards, the statute would not be a bar in less than twenty-one years. Penn's Lessee v. Ingraham, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 487. 16. Pennsylvania.-The possession of a disseisor, to bar the plaintiff, cannot extend beyond the limits of the particular spot occupied by him, and the legal possession of the right owner continues unaffected as to the residue, by such par tial tortious possession. Lessee of Potts v. Gilbert, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 475.

17. Pennsylvania.-To confer a title upon the defendant, under the statute of limitations, his possession must continue the same in point of locality during the period prescribed by the sta tute. A possession of part of the tract, for a period short of that, cannot be tacked to a possession of another part, so as to make out the time. Nor can the possessions of different intruders in succession upon the same part of the tract be added together, to create a title in the last intruder. Ibid.

18. In Tennessee, a naked possession by a mere trespasser for the term of seven years, will not, under the acts of 1715 and 1797, bar a recovery by the original legal owner. Patton's Lessee v. Hynes, 1 Cooke, 356.

19. Tennessee. To constitute a colour of title, there need not be a regular chain of conveyances. If the possession had been taken in such a way as to authorize a belief that the possessor imagined he was occupying his own property, that will be considered colour of title. Ibid.

20. Tennessee.-If a person has no title, but is in possession by the consent of another person, his possession may be connected with the title of such other. M'Iver v. Reagan, 1 Cooke, 366.

21. Possession alone, unexplained by collateral circumstances, which show the quality and extent of the interest claimed, evidences no more than the mere fact of present occupation by right. Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59; 5 Cond. Rep. 237.

22. Where a party enters into possession under a recorded deed claiming title to the entirety, and exercises acts of ownership, it is a disseisin of all persons who claim title to the same land, to the extent of the boundaries in the deed. Prescott v. Nevers, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 326.

23. Mere possession of land, or offering to sell it, or even partial sales actually made, are not alone sufficient to authorize a presumption of ownership; for these may be tortious acts of a possessor, or of an agent. Lessee of Delancey v. M'Keen, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 354.

24. New York.-The circumstance that one took possession of unoccupied land as contractor, to transport for the government to and from a fort on the frontiers, and that his claim compre hended the fort itself, as well as the land around it, and that his improvements were necessary in

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