General Principles. amount, in two distinct items, first, for the notes, and, secondly, for the balance in cash, this is a mere provisional payment; and if the notes be not paid, he may recur to his original claim; unless, by his subsequent conduct, he converts the provisional into an absolute payment. Ibid. 568. 38. If a bill of exchange be taken in payment, as a discharge of a pre-existent debt, or in such manner as imports an intention of the creditor to take the risk of the bill on himself, the original debt is thereby discharged. Brown v. Jackson, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 24. 39. If a bill of exchange is remitted, with a special endorsement, in payment of a previous debt which it was meant to discharge, the special endorsement does not restrain the rights of the endorsee on the drawer, or on any previous endorser; whatever may be the effect of such endorsement between the creditor and his endorser. Ibid. 40. The holder of a bill of exchange, protested for non-payment, is not obliged to sue any one of the parties to the bill, in order to strengthen | his claim on other parties. He may sue or not, as he chooses. Ibid. 41. In an action by the endorser of a bill of exchange against the drawer, it is sufficient to account for the non-production of the bill, that it was lodged with the commissioners of bankruptcy, under a commission issued against the drawer, and still remains with them. The Assignees of Palmer v. The Assignees of Blight, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 96. 42. It is not necessary that a receipt for the money paid by the endorser to the endorsee, shall be entered on the bill. Ibid. 43. A bill of exchange is not, in general, to be considered as a satisfaction of a pre-existing debt, unless it be paid or accepted as such; nor if remitted conditionally, unless the debtor sus tain injury by the laches of the creditor who received it. Gallagher's Ex'rs. v. Roberts et al., 2 Wash. C. C. R. 191. 44. The defendants having ordered the plaintiff to purchase salt for them, and to draw on them for the amount, and he having so purchased and drawn, they are bound to accept and pay his bills; and if they do not, he may recover from them the amount of the bills, and damages and costs of protests, (if he has paid the same,) upon a count for money paid, laid out and expended; and the bills of exchange may be given in evidence on that count. Riggs v. Lindsay, 7 Cranch, 500; 2 Cond. Rep. 585. 45. An action of debt will lie by the payee or endorsee of a bill of exchange, against the acceptor, where it is expressed to be for value received. Roborg et al. v. Peyton, 2 Wheat. 385; 4 Cond. Rep. 173. 46. Debt will lie by the payee against the maker of a bill, when the note is expressed to be for value received. Ibid. of that board,) with the money of the United States, and was afterwards endorsed by T. T. T., treasurer of the United States, to W. and S., and by them presented to the drawees for acceptance, and protested for non-acceptance and nonpayment, and sent back by W. and S. to the se cretary of the treasury: Held, That the endorse ment to T. T. T. passed such an interest to the United States as enabled them to maintain an action on the bill against the first endorser. Dugan's Ex'rs. v. The U. S., 3 Wheat. 172; 4 Cond. Rep. 223. 48. Query, Whether, when a bill is endorsed to an agent, for the use of his principal, an action on the bill can be maintained by the principal in his own name. Ibid. 49. However this may be between private parties, the United States ought to be permitted to sue either in their own name, whenever it appears, not only on the face of the instrument, but from all evidence, that they alone are interested in the subject matter of controversy. Ibid. 50. Held, That the United States might recover in the present action, without producing from W. and S. a receipt or re-endorsement of the bill; that W. and S. were to be presumed to have acted as the agents or bankers of the United States; and that all the interest which W. and S. ever had in the bill was divested by the act of returning it to the party from whom it was received. Ibid. 51. If a person who endorses a bill to another, whether for value or for the purpose of collec tion, comes again to the possession thereof, he is to be regarded, unless the contrary appears in evidence, as the bona fide holder and proprietor of such bill; and he is entitled to recover thereon, notwithstanding there may be on it one or more endorsements in full, subsequent to the endorsement to him; without producing any receipt or endorsement back to him from either of such endorsers, whose names he may strike from the bill or not, as he thinks proper. Ibid. 52. The endorser of a promissory note, who has been charged by due notice of the default of the maker, is not entitled to the protection of a court of equity as a surety; the holder may proceed against either party at his pleasure, and does not discharge the endorser by not issuing, or by countermanding an execution against the maker. Lenox v. Prout, 3 Wheat. 520; 4 Cond. Rep. 311. 53. By the statute of Maryland of 1763, ch. 23, sec. 8, which is perhaps only declaratory of the common law, an endorser has a right to pay the amount of the note or bill to the holder, and to be subrogated to all his rights, by obtaining an assignment of the holder's judgment against the maker. Ibid. 54. Bills of exchange, and negotiable promis sory notes, are distinguishable from all other 47. Where a bill of exchange was endorsed to parol contracts, by the circumstance that they T. T. T., treasurer of the United States, who re-are prima facie evidence of valuable consideraceived it in that capacity, and for account of the United States, and the bill had been purchased by the secretary of the treasury, (as one of the commissioners of the sinking fund, and as agent tion, both between the original parties and against third persons. Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; 4 Cond. Rep. 642. 55. A bill of exchange is an assignment to the General Principles. payee of the debt due from the drawee to the drawer. Ibid. 56. But this doctrine only applies to cases where the entire chose in action has been as signed, and not a partial assignment. Ibid. 57. A bill drawn upon a partnership, but not accepted until after a dissolution of the partnership, publicly announced, binds only the partner who accepts it, and not the other partners who have not consented thereto. Tombecbee Bank v. Durnell, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 56. 58. Assuming that a foreign bill of exchange, payable after sight, ought to be presented within a reasonable time, that time must be judged of with reference to the usage among merchants as to delays in the negotiation and transmission of such bills. Wallace v. Agry, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 118. 59. No protest of a promissory note, or inland bill of exchange, is necessary. Young v. Byran, 6 Wheat. 146; 5 Cond. Rep. 44. 60. A protest of an inland bill, or promissory note, is not necessary, nor is it evidence of the facts stated in it. The Union Bank v. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572; 5 Cond. Rep. 189. 61. A bill or note is prima facie evidence, under a count for money had and received, against the drawer or endorser. Page's Adm'rs. v. The Bank of Alexandria, 7 Wheat. 35; 5 Cond. Rep. 222. 62. The presumption that the contents of the bill or note have been received by the party sued, and for the use of the plaintiff, may be rebutted by circumstances; and a recovery cannot be had in such a case, where it is proved that the money was actually received by another party. Ibid. 63. The negotiability of a promissory note, payable to order, is not restrained by the circumstance of its being given for the purchase of real property in Louisiana, and the notary, before whom the contract of sale is executed, writing upon it the words "ne varietur," according to the laws and usages of that state, and other countries governed by the civil law. Fleckner v. The Bank of the U.S., 8 Wheat. 338; 5 Cond. Rep. 457. 64. In a declaration upon a promissory note or bill, the omission of the place where it is payable is fatal. Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 558; 5 Cond. Rep. 677. | necessary. Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333; 6 Cond. Rep. 120. 68. Where the bill or note is made payable at a particular bank, and the bank itself is the holder, such an averment and proof may be dispensed with; and all that is necessary is, for the bank to examine the account of the maker with them, in order to ascertain whether he has any funds in their hands. lbid. 69. By the general law, demand of payment of a bill or note must be made on the third day of grace; but where a note is made for the purpose of being negotiated at a bank, whose custom is to demand payment and give notice on the fourth day, that custom forms a part of the law of the contract, and it is not necessary that a personal knowledge of the usage should be brought home to the endorser for that purpose. Mills v. Bank of U. S., 11 Wheat. 431; 6 Cond. Rep. 373. 70. If a draft not negotiable, be accepted by the drawer with an agreement to pay the amount to any person to whom it is assigned, the assignee, after notice, may maintain an action for money had and received to his use against the acceptor. Weston v. Penniman, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 306. 71. A foreign bill of exchange protested, does not bind the heir of the drawer. Alston, Executor of Munford, &c., v. Munford et al., 1 Brock. C. C. R. 266. 72. A fortiori, this applies where the money has been drawn for by a bill in favour of a third person, which has been accepted before the failure. Taber v. Perot, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 565. 73. A bill drawn payable at five days after sight, and accepted on the first day of a month, is payable on the ninth of the same month, the day of the acceptance being excluded, and the three days of grace allowed; a demand on the eighth, and protest for non-payment on that day, is too early, and therefore void. Mitchell v. Degrand, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 176. 74. In an action on the case to recover the amount of an accepted bill of exchange brought by the payees, who were endorsers on this bill, the damages and costs of the snit, which had been recovered from them, cannot be recovered against the endorsee, there being no money count in the declaration. King et al. v. Phillips, Peters' C. C. R. 350. 75. A bill payable at five days after sight, is presented for acceptance on the 30th of September, but not in fact accepted till the 1st of October; the acceptance takes effect only from that day, and does not relate back to the time of presentment on the preceding day. Mitchell Degrand, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 176. 65. By the custom of the banks in the District of Columbia, payment of a promissory note or bill is to be demanded on the fourth day after the time limited for the payment thereof, in order to charge the endorser, contrary to the general law merchant, which requires a demand on the third day. Renner v. The Bank of Co-v. lumbia, 9 Wheat. 581; 5 Cond. Rep. 691. 66. It seems that, as against the maker of a promissory note, or against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, payable at a particular place, no averment in the declaration, or proof at the trial, of a demand of payment at the place designated, is necessary. Bank of the U. S. v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171; 6 Cond. Rep. 257. 67. But as against the endorser of a bill or note, such an averment and proof is, in general, 76. A bill payable at so many days after sight, means so many days after legal sight, that is, so many days after the acceptance: for that is the sight to which the bill refers. Ibid. 77. Exchange is to be settled at the rate prevailing at the time of the verdict. Cropper v. Nelson, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 125. 78. A bill of exchange drawn at New Orleans upon a person residing in Philadelphia, and payable in the latter city, had a view to the laws of General Principles. Pennsylvania, and the claims of the holder of | after sight, was drawn in Havana upon London. such a bill will be subject to those laws. Golden | Held, that it need not be sent from Cuba direct v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 313. 79. If a debtor remits a bill to his creditor, in payment of the debt, and he receives it as such, and credits the debtor, it is a payment, and he can only sue the debtor as an endorser; and if he neglect to present it in time for acceptance and payment, and to give notice of its dishonour, he makes the debt his own, whether the drawer has funds in the hands of the drawee or not. Dermiston et al. v. Imbrie, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 396. 80. In an action, where the declaration stated that E. Brown was attached to answer, and proceeded to allege the drawing of a bill of exchange by Elisha Brown, evidence of a bill of exchange, signed by Elijah Brown, cannot be given. Craig v. Brown, Peters' C. C. R. 139. to London, but might be sent indirectly in any manner justified by the course of trade, and be sent for sale to the United States. Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 336. 89. No absolute rule can be laid down, as to the time within which such a bill must be presented for acceptance. The only rule is, that it must be presented within a reasonable time; and what is a reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Ibid. 90. Taking a bill of exchange is, at most, only prima facie evidence of a satisfaction and extinguishment of an antecedent debt. Query, How far even this is to be relied on, as a general presumption in foreign states? A copy of the protest for non-acceptance need not accompany the notice of dishonour. It is sufficient to produce it at the time. Ibid. 91. By the general custom of merchants in the United States, bills of exchange drawn in one state are, if dishonoured, protested by a notary, and the protest is the customary and sufficient proof of the dishonour, without any auxiliary evidence. Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 81. If one partner, in a voyage on joint account, be authorized by the others to take up money on the credit of the whole concern, and draw bills therefor on a house at Amsterdam, and the partner take up money and draw a bill for the same, directing it to be charged to the account of all the partners, but it is signed by himself only, it seems such bill is binding on all the partners; at least equity will enforce pay-Peters, 178. ment thereof against all the partners in favour of the payor of the bill, who has trusted the money on the faith of the joint credit. Van Riemsdyk v. Kane et al., 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 630. 82. In equity, such a bill, drawn under such circumstances, would be deemed to have been guarantied as to acceptance and payment, by all the partners. The statute of frauds does not apply to such a case, for the guarantee is not for the payment of the debt of another, but of the debt of the guarantors. Ibid. 83. If no original authority to draw was given, but subsequently the whole transaction was ratified by all the partners, such ratification would be equipollent with an original authority. Ibid. 84. A bill of exchange, expressed to be collateral to a ransom bill, is a contract upon which an action may be sustained at common law, the plaintiff and payee being an alien friend. Maisonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 325. 85. In an action upon such bill or exchange, the capture must be taken to be justifiable, and the ransom regular. Ibid. 86. If an agent to collect and receive payment of bills, transmits them to his own private agent, to receive the money, and place the amount, when received, to his private credit, payment to such agent is payment to the original agent; and if there be a failure, it is the loss of the latter, and not of his principal. Taber v. Perot, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 565. 87. If a bill of exchange be drawn by A., with airections to charge the amount thereof to B., and it is accepted generally, and paid, the drawer is not liable to the drawee; unless it appear that B. was the agent of A., and the direction to charge the bill to him, was only to point out the fund from which the bill was to be paid. Bell v. Davidson, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 328. 88, A bill of exchange, payable at sixty days 92. A bill of exchange, accepted and endorsed by citizens of Kentucky, and there negotiated, payable at New Orleans, was not, by force of the statute of Kentucky of 1798, subject to the pay. ment of ten per cent. damages. The Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 12 Peters, 32. 93. A bill of exchange drawn in one state of the United States, on a person in another state, and payable there, is a foreign bill. Ibid. 94. Where a bill was drawn in Kentucky on a person in Kentucky, and accepted, payable in New Orleans, the acceptor is liable to the contract to the same extent as he would have been, if he had accepted the bill in Louisiana. As a foreign bill, the holders were entitled to re-exchange, by commercial usage, when the protest for non-payment was made. Ibid. 95. Giving a note for a pre-existing debt, does not discharge the original cause of action; unless it is agreed that the note shall be taken in payment. Ibid. 96. A party to a note entitled to notice, may waive the notice by a promise to see it paid, or an acknowledgment that it must be paid; or a promise that he will set the matter to rights;" or by a qualified promise, having knowledge of the laches of the holder. Reynolds et al. v. Douglass et al., 12 Peters, 497. 97. A person who takes a bill, which on the face of it was dishonoured, cannot be allowed to claim the privileges which belong to a bona fide holder without notice. If he chooses to receive it under such circumstances, he takes with it all the infirmities belonging to it; and is in no better condition than the person from whom he received it. There can be no distinction in principle between a bill transferred after it is dishonoured for non-acceptance, and one transferred after it has been dishonoured for non-payment. Andrews v. Pond et al., 13 Peters, 65. 98. The plaintiffs in an action on the second General Principles. Bet of a foreign bill of exchange, which was, the exclusion of those drawn by them jointly protested for non-acceptance, with the protests with Horton and Terry; and, as these bills exthereto attached, can recover, without producing the first of the same set, or accounting for its non-production. Downes v. Church, 13 Peters, 205. ceeded the proceeds of the cotton, they brought an action on a bill drawn June 4th, 1835, by P. and Company, and Horton and Terry, amounting to three thousand dollars. The circuit court instructed the jury, that if they believed from the evidence that, at the maturity of the bill, B. and M'K. had sufficient funds of P. and Company to pay the bill, and Horton and Terry to be accommodation drawers, and securities only, then, in the absence of any instructions from P. and Company, in regard to the application of the funds, B. and M K. were bound to apply them to pay the bill, and could not hold them to pay a bill drawn on them by P. and Company only. which had been accepted by them, and was not then due. Held, That the instructions of the circuit court were correct. Brander & M'Kenna v. Phillips & Co., 16 Peters, 121. 99. Action in the circuit court of New York on a bill of exchange accepted in New York, instituted by the holder, a citizen of the state of Maine. The acceptance and endorsement of the bill were admitted, and the defence was rested on allegations that the bill had been received in payment of a pre-existent debt, and that the acceptance had been given for lands which the acceptor had purchased from the drawer of the bill, to which lands the drawer had no title, and that the quality of the lands had been misrepresented, and the purchaser imposed upon by the fraud of the drawer, and those who were co-owners of the land, and cooperators in the sale. The bill accepted had 102. When a factor makes advances, or inbeen received bona fide, and before it was due. curs liability on a consignment of goods, if By the court: There is no doubt that a bona fide there be no special agreement, he may sell the holder of a negotiable instrument for a valuable property in the exercise of a sound discretion, consideration, without any notice of the facts according to general usage, and reimburse himwhich implicate its validity as between the self out of the proceeds of the sale, and the conantecedent parties, if he takes it under an en-signor has no right to interfere. The lien of the dorsement made before the same becomes due, holds the title unaffected by those facts; and may recover thereon, although, as between the antecedent parties, the transaction may be without any legal validity. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1. 100. The holder of negotiable paper, before it is due, is not bound to prove that he is a bona fide holder for a valuable consideration, without notice; for the law will presume that, in the absence of all rebutting proof; and therefore it is incumbent on a defendant to establish by way of defence satisfactory proofs of the contrary, and thus to overcome the prima facie title of the plaintiff. Ibid. 101. B. and M'K., merchants at New Orleans, were the factors of P. and Company, of Huntsville, Alabama, and made advances on cotton shipped to them. In August, 1834, P. and Company were indebted to B. and M'K. one thousand three hundred and fifteen dollars; and Williams, the agent of B. and M'K., agreed with P. and Company, that B. and MK. would advance eight thousand dollars on bills to be drawn between the 20th of April, and the 31st July, 1835, by P. and Company, and any two of six persons named, among whom were Horton and Terry, two of the defendants in this suit. Before July 31st, 1835, several shipments of cotton were made to B. and M'K. by P. and Company, and several bills were drawn by them jointly with Horton and Terry, and by others without them; all of which were accepted by B. and M'K. These bills, with the advances before made, amounted to twenty-nine thouand seven hundred and ninety-five dollars, and the proceeds of the shipments were twenty-two thousand four hundred and sixty dollars. B. and M K. applied these proceeds to the liquidation of the bills drawn by P. and Company, to factor for advances and liabilities incurred, extends not only to the property consigned, but, when sold, to the proceeds in the hands of the vendee, and the securities therefor in the hands of the factor. Ibid. 103. By the law merchant, no protest is required to be made upon the dishonour of any promissory note; it is exclusively confined to foreign bills of exchange. Burke v. M'Kay, 2 Howard, 66. 104. Nor is it a necessary part of the official duty of a notary to give notice to an endorser of the dishonour of a promissory note. Ibid. 105. A state law or general usage may overrule the general law merchant in these respects. Ibid. 106. Where a protest is necessary, it is not absolutely necessary that it should be made by a person who is in fact a notary. Ibid. 107. Where the endorser has discharged the maker of a note from liability by a release and settlement, a notice of non-payment would be of no use to him, and therefore he is not entitled to it. Ibid. 108. In the state of Mississippi it is allowed by statute, that a suit be brought against the maker and payer, jointly, of a promissory note by the endorsee. Dromgoole v. The Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Mississippi, 2 Howard, 241. 109. An action of this kind cannot be maintained in the courts of the United States, although the plaintiff resides in another state, provided the maker and payer of the note both reside in Mississippi. Ibid. 110. If notes are deposited for collection by way of collateral security for an existing debt, the case does not fall within the strict rules of commercial law applicable to negotiable paper. It falls under the general law of agency; and Liability and Discharge of the Drawer of Bills of Exchange. the agents are only bound to use due diligence | payee to recover of the drawer. Baker v. Galto collect the debts. Lawrence v. M'Callmont, lagher, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 461. 2 Howard, 427. 111. If the drawer of a bill has no right to expect the payment of it by the acceptor; where, for instance, the drawer has withdrawn or intercepted funds which were destined to meet the bill, or its payment was dependent upon conditions which he must have known he had not performed, such drawer cannot be entitled to notice of the non-payment of the bill. Rhett v. Poe, 2 Howard, 457. 112. Whenever the facts are ascertained, it is a question of law whether due diligence has been used; and therefore there is no error in the direction of a court to the jury that they should infer due diligence from certain facts, where those facts, if found by the jury, amounted in the opinion of the court to due diligence. Ibid. 113. If the drawer and acceptor are either general partners or special partners in the adventure of which the bill constitutes a part, notice of the dishonour of the bill need not be given to the drawer. Ibid. 114. On a bill of exchange, payable at a particular place, it would seem, that the difference of exchange may be recovered, if the declaration contains the proper averments. Weed & Co. v. Miller, 1 M'Lean, 423. 115. But this seems not to be the rule where the action is on a note, and there is no count or allegation in the declaration to cover the rate of exchange. Ibid. 116. In a bill of exchange, or other negotiable instrument, the words "value received" are not necessary. Benjamin v. Tillman, 2 M'Lean, 213. 117. A letter written a reasonable time before or after the date of a bill of exchange, describing it, and promising to accept it, is a virtual acceptance. Bayard v. Lathy, 2 M'Lean, 462. 118. An authority to draw several bills of exchange, payable at specified periods, with an assurance that the bills should be paid, is an acceptance to the person who takes the bill on the credit of such an authority. Ibid. 119. By the English law, a promise to accept a non-existing bill of exchange, even though it be taken by the holder upon the faith of that promise, does not amount to an acceptance of the bill, when drawn in favour of the holder. Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story, 22. 123. An agreement to accept bills renders it unnecessary that the drawee shall have funds in his hands belonging to the drawer. De Tastet & Co. v. Crousillat, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 132. 124. A drawer of a bill of exchange having no funds in the hands of the acceptor, or having withdrawn them without giving notice of the bill, and intercepting all other funds before they reach the acceptor, is not entitled to strict notice of non-payment. He has no right to expect the bill to be paid. Valk v. Simmons, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 113. 125. Where a bill of exchange is drawn by the master of a ship, by authority of the owners, in his own name, for a cargo supplied for the owners, the latter are liable, and are entitled to the same defence against the bill, in case of dishonour, that they would be as drawers. Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 336. 126. The failure of a bank holding a bill payable after date for collection, to give notice to the drawer that the drawee was not found at home when called upon to accept the bill, is not such negligence as discharges the drawer from his liability. Bank of Washington v. Triplett et al., 1 Peters, 35. 127. A bill of exchange was drawn against shipments made to the drawee, but no letter of advice was written by the shipper to the consignees of the property, and drawees of the bill, ordering the proceeds of the shipment to be applied to the discharge of the bill; but directions were given to charge the bill, generally, to the account of the shipper. Held, That the drawees were not bound to accept the bill, in consequence of the proceeds of the shipment being received by them. Schimmelpennich v. Bayard et al., 1 Peters, 286. 128. It is well settled, that if a bill of exchange be drawn by one partner in the name of the firm, or if a bill drawn on the firm by their usual name and style, be accepted by one of the partners, all the partnership are bound. It results necessarily from the nature of the association, and the objects for which it is constituted, that each partner should possess the power to bind the whole, when acting in the name by which the partnership is known; although the consent of the other partners to the particular contract should not be obtained, or should be withheld. Le Roy v. 120. It has been otherwise held by the su-Johnson, 2 Peters, 197. preme court of the United States. Yet if the bill be payable after sight, and not after date, such a promise has never been held in either country to be an acceptance of a non-existing bill. Ibid. 121. It is not necessary that the various parties to a negotiable instrument should be different persons, in order to render it a bill of exchange. Ibid. 2. Liability and Discharge of the Drawer of Bills of Exchange. 122. When the drawer of a bill of exchange has no funds in the hands of the drawee, neither protest nor notice of non-acceptance or non-payment to the drawer are necessary to enable the 129. Where a bill of exchange was drawn by A., after the dissolution of his partnership with B., and the proceeds of the bill went to pay, and did pay, the partnership debts of A. & B., which A., on the dissolution of the firm, had assumed to pay, the holder of the bill, after its dishonour, can have no claim on B. in consequence of the particular appropriation of the proceeds of the bill. Ibid. 199. 130. A suit may be brought against the draw and endorser of a bill of exchange, on its nonacceptance. The undertaking of the drawer and endorser is, that the drawee will accept and pay; and the liability of the drawer only attaches when the drawee refuses to accept, or having |