Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company.-Choses in Action. with its permission, and by authority of the president of the United States, is a violation of the acts which authorize the chief magistrate of the Union to exercise this authority. lbid. 11. The Cherokee nation is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force; and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by the constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. Ibid. CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO CANAL COM- 2. The thirteenth section of the act of Vir ginia, of January, 1824, incorporating the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, declares, that upon such surrender and acceptance, the charter of the Potomac Company shall be, and the same is hereby vacated and annulled, and all the powers and rights thereby granted to the Potomac Company shall be vested in the company hereby incorporated. By this provision the Potomac Company ceased to exist, and a scire facias on a judgment obtained against the company before it was so determined, cannot be maintained. Mumma v. The Potomac Company, 8 Peters, 281. 3. There is no pretence to say that a scire facias can be maintained, and a judgment had thereon, against a dead corporation, any more than against a dead man. Ibid. states, any more than the death of a private person may be said to impair the obligation of his contracts. The obligation of those contracts survives; and the creditors may enforce their claims against any property belonging to the corporation, which has not passed into the hands of bona fide purchasers, but is still held in trust for the company, or for the stockholders thereof, at the time of its dissolution, in any mode permitted by the local laws. Ibid. CHOSES IN ACTION. 4. The dissolution of the corporation, under the acts of Virginia and Maryland, (even sup1. A bill was filed in the circuit court of the posing the act of confirmation of congress out of District of Columbia, against the Chesapeake and the way,) cannot in any just sense be considered, Ohio Canal Company, claiming, as riparian pro- within the clause of the constitution of the United prietor, from the company, a right to use, for States on this subject, an impairing of the oblimanufacturing purposes, the water of the Po-gation of the contracts of the company, by those tomac, introduced through the land of the appellant, when the quantity of water so introduced should exceed that required for navigation. The bill charged that the land of the appellant was susceptible of being improved, and was intended so to be, for the purpose of manufacturing, by employing the water of the Potomac, prior to 1784, in which year the Potomac Company was chartered. All the chartered rights of that company, and all their obligations, were, in 1825, transferred to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company. By the improvements made by the Potomac Company, much surplus water was introduced and wasted on the land of the appellant. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company had deepened the canal; had made other improvements on the land of the appellant; thus, introducing a large quantity of water for navigation and manufacturing. The appellant claimed, that under the charter of the Potomac Company, held by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, he was entitled to use this surplus water for manufacturing purposes. If the water is insufficient for this purpose, he claimed to be allowed to have the works enlarged to obtain a sufficient supply. The supreme court held, that under the provisions of the charter, the purposes for which lands were to be condemned and taken, were for navigation only; limiting the quantity taken to such as was necessary for public purposes. By the thirteenth section of the charter of the Potomac Canal Company of 1784, the company were authorized, but not compelled to enter into agreements for the use of the surplus water. The owner of the adjacent lands required no such special permission by law: this is a right incident to the ownership of land. The authority, on both sides, was left open to the mutual agreements of the parties; but neither could be compelled to enter into an agreement relative to the surplus water. Binney v. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, 8 Peters, 201. VOL. I.-30 1. A legacy, until it is recovered, is a chose in action, and the marital right of the husband to his wife's legacy does not attach, until it is reduced to possession. He may, indeed, sue for it, and reduce it to possession; but as long as it continues a chose in action, it is the property of the wife. Gallego v. Gallego's Ex'r., 2 Brock. C. C. R. 285. 2. Courts of law, following in this respect the rules of equity, now take notice of assignments of choses in action, and exert themselves to afford them every support and protection, not inconsistent with established principles, and modes of proceeding which govern tribunals, acting according to the course of the common law. They will not, therefore, give effect to a release procured by the defendant, under a covinous combination with the assignor, in fraud of his assignee, nor permit the assignor to interfere injuriously with the conduct of any suit, commenced by his assignee, to enforce the rights which passed under the assignment. Ibid. 3. Where a chose in action is assigned by the owner, he cannot interfere to defeat the rights of the assignee, in the prosecution of a suit brought to enforce those rights. It is immaterial, in this respect, whether the assignment be good at law, or in equity only. The doctrine, however, applies only to cases, where the entire Choses in Action.-Church of England. chose in action has been assigned, and not to a partial assignment. Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; 4 Cond. Rep. 642. 4. In England, any instrument or claim, though not negotiable, may be assigned to the king, who can sue upon it in his own name. No valid objection is perceived against giving the same effect to an assignment to the government of this country. The United States v. Buford, 3 Peters, 30. 5. According to the settled rule in chancery, and that which is recognised by the law of Virginia, the assignee of a bond stands precisely in the same situation as the original party, and subject to all existing equities. Scott et al. v. Shreeve et al., 12 Wheat. 605; 6 Cond. Rep. 662. 6. An assignment, with notice, of a chose in action, founded in illegality, will not protect the parties from the legal consequences attached to the original contract. Fales et al. v. Maybury, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 560. 7. A decree, though not assignable at law, is transferable for valuable consideration in equity; and a court of chancery will support the transfer. Coate's Ex'x. v. Muse's Adm'rs., 1 Brock. C. C. R. 551. 8. If a chose in action, not negotiable, be assigned without any fraud or illegality in its origin, the parties are not precluded from setting up such matters in defence, in the same manner as if there had been no assignment. Fales et al. v. Maybury, 2 Gallis. C. C. R. 560. 9. The surplus rents and profits of land, after the satisfaction of a mortgage, may be assigned as a chose in action; and the assignee may maintain a suit in equity for an account. Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 143. 10. A valid sale may be made of personal goods which are out of possession; and the sale will be of the thing itself, and not of a chose in action. The Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 206. 11. The statute of 1797, ch. 74, giving priority to the debts of the United States in cases of insolvency, applies to equitable as well as to legal assets; but the United States cannot enforce such priority in a suit at law, as the assignee of a judgment of the private creditor of the insolvent debtor, where the suit is brought in the name of the creditor, and not in the name of the United States. Howe v. Sheppard, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 133. 12. Query, Whether the United States may not sue at law, as assignee of a chose in action or debt; as such an assignment would, in England, in the case of the crown, by the common law, vest a legal title? Ibid. 13. Courts of law as well as courts of equity will take notice of the assignment of choses in action, and to every substantial purpose, will protect the assignee. The beneficial interest of the assignee is so far regarded, that the defendant may set off a debt due the assignee, in like manner as if the suit had been brought in his own name. Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 424. 14. The general principle of law is, that choses in action are not at law assignable. But if as signed, and the debtor promises to pay the debt to the assignee, the latter may maintain an action against the debtor as money received to his use. Tiernan v. Jackson, 5 Peters, 580. 15. In Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, 286, it was said by the supreme court, that in cases where an order is drawn for the whole of a particular fund, it amounts to an equitable assignment of that fund, and after notice to the drawee, it binds that fund in his hands. But where the order is drawn either on a general or a particular fund, for a part only, it does not amount to an assignment of that part, or give a lien against the drawee, unless he consents to the appropriation by an acceptance of the draft; or an obligation to accept may be fairly implied from the custom of trade, or the course of business between the parties, as a part of their contract. The court were there speaking in a case where the suit was not brought by the assignee, but in the name of the original assignor for his use, against the debtor; and it was, therefore, unnecessary to consider whether the remedy, if any, for the assignee, was at law or in equity. Ibid. 16. The assignor of a patent-right cannot maintain an action in his own name for a violation of the patent. Tyler et al. v. Tuel, 6 Cranch, 324; 2 Cond. Rep. 388. 17. Under the patent act of February 21, 1793, ch. 156, if the patentee has sold out a moiety of his patent-right, a joint action lies by himself and his patentee for a violation of it. Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 429. 18. The assignee of a bail-bond is not such an assignee as is contemplated by the judiciary act of 1789. Bosbyshell v. Oppenheimer, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 317. See ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION, Ante, 189. CHURCH OF ENGLAND. 1. The religious establishment of England was adopted by the colony of Virginia, together with the common law upon that subject, as far as it was applicable to the circumstances of the colony. Terret et al. v. Taylor et al., 9 Cranch, 43; 3 Cond. Rep. 254. 2. The church was capable of receiving endowments of land, and the minister of the church was, during his incumbency, seised of the freehold, of its inheritable property, as emphatically persona ecclesiæ; and capable, as a sole corporation, of transmitting that inheritance to his successors. Ibid. 3. The church-wardens also were a corporate body, clothed with authority and guardianship over the repairs of the church and its personal property; at common law their capacity was limited to personal estate; the other temporal concerns of the church were submitted to a vestry, composed of persons selected for that purpose. Ibid. 4. By several statutes of Virginia, and the common law, lands purchased under their au Church of England. thority, became vested either directly or beneficially, in the episcopal church; the minister for the time being was seised of the freehold in law or equity, jure ecclesiæ; and during a vacancy the fee remained in abeyance, and the profits of the parsonage were to be taken by the parish for their own use. Ibid. 5. Property thus acquired by the church remained unimpaired, notwithstanding the revolu tion; for the statute of 1776, ch. 2, completely confirmed and established the rights of the church to all its lands and other property. Ibid. 6. At the revolution, the episcopal church no longer retained its character as an exclusive religious establishment; and it was competent for the people and the legislature to deprive it of its superiority over other religious sects, and to withhold from it any support by public taxation. Ibid. 7. The legislature may enact laws more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of religion, by giving them corporate rights for the management of their property, and the regulation of their temporal as well as spiritual concerns. Ibid. 8. Consistently with the constitution of Virginia, the legislature could not create or continue a religious establishment which should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the free exercise of religion is not restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect, to perform their own religious duties; or by establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead; nor did either public or constitutional principles require the abolition of all religious corporations. 1bid. 9. The public property acquired by the episcopal churches under the sanction of the laws, did not at the revolution become the property of the state. The title was indefeasibly vested in the church or their legal agents. The dissolution of the form of government did not involve in it a dissolution of civil rights, or an abolition of the common law. Ibid. 10. Although a conveyance to the churchwardens and their successors cannot operate to convey a fee to the church, because their successors as such could not take; nor to the churchwardens in their natural capacity, because the word heirs is not in the deed: yet, a covenant of general warranty in the deed, binding the grantors and their heirs for ever, and warranting the land to the church-wardens and their successors for ever, may well operate by way of estoppel, to confirm to the church and its privies, the perpetual and beneficial estate in the land. Ibid. 53. 11. As incident to their office as general guardians of the church, the vestrymen may assert the rights and interests of the church. But the minister also, having the freehold estate in law or equity, during his incumbency, in the lands of the church, is entitled to assert his own rights as persona ecclesiæ. No alienation, therefore, of the church lands, can be made either by himself or by the parishioners, or their authorized agents, in cases of a plenarty of the church, without the mutual consent of both, unless such assent be expressly dispensed with by statute. Ibid. 12. A grant of a tract of land in equal shares to sixty-three persons, to be divided amongst them in sixty-eight equal shares, with a specific appropriation of five shares, conveys only a sixtyeighth part to each person: and if one of the shares be declared to be "for a glebe for the church of England as by law established," that share is not holden in trust by the grantees, nor is it a condition annexed to their rights or shares. The Town of Pawlet v. Daniel Clark et al., 9 Cranch, 292; 3 Cond. Rep. 408. 13. The church of England is not a body cor porate, and cannot receive a donation eo nomine. Ibid. 14. A grant to the church of such place is good at common law, and vests the fee in the parson and his successors. If such a grant be made by the crown, it cannot be resumed by the crown at its pleasure. Land at common law may be granted to pious uses, before there is a grantee in existence competent to take it, and in the mean time the fee will be in abeyance. Such a grant cannot be resumed at the pleasure of the crown. Ibid. 15. The common law, so far as it related to the erection of churches of the episcopal persuasion of England, the right to present or collate to such churches, and the corporate capacity of the parsons thereof to take in succession, was recognised and adopted in New Hampshire before the revolution. It belonged exclusively. to the crown to erect the church in each town that should be entitled to take the glebe, and upon such erection to collate, through the governor, a parson to the benefice. Ibid. 16. A voluntary society of episcopalians within a town unauthorized by the crown, could not entitle themselves to the glebe; where no such church was duly erected by the crown, the glebe remained as an hæreditas jacens; and the state which succeeded to the rights of the crown, might, with the assent of the town, alien or encumber it, or might erect an episcopalian church therein, and collate, either directly, or through the vote of the town indirectly, its parson; who would thereby become seised of the glebe jure ecclesiæ, and be a corporation capable of transmitting the inheritance. Ibid. 17. No episcopal church in Vermont can be entitled to a glebe, unless it was duly erected by the crown before the revolution, or by the state since. Ibid. 18. The vestry of the episcopal church of Alexandria, (D. C.) now known by the name of "Christ's Church," is the regular vestry in succession of the parish of Fairfax, and in connection with the minister, has the care and management of all the temporalities of the parish within the scope of their authority. A sale made by Citation on Appeal or Writ of Error.-Citizenship. them under the decree of the court, in Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52, conveys a good title to the purchaser. Mason v. Muncaster, 9 Wheat. 445; 5 Cond. Rep. 644. 19. Although the church-wardens of a parish are not capable of holding lands, and a deed to them and their successors in office for ever, cannot operate by way of grant, yet, where it contains a covenant of general warranty, binding the grantees and their heirs, it may operate by way of estoppel to confirm to the church and its privies, the perpetual and beneficial estate in the land. Ibid. 20. The parishioners have, individually, no right or title to the glebe lands; they are the property of the parish in its aggregate or corporate capacity, to be disposed of for parochial purposes, by the vestry, who are the legal agents and representatives of the parish. Ibid. CITATION ON APPEAL OR WRIT OF 1. The supreme court will not compel the hearing of a cause, unless the citation be served thirty days before the first day of the term. Welch v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch, 321; 2 Cond. Rep. 268. 2. A citation must accompany the writ of error. Lloyd v. Alexander, 1 Cranch, 365; 1 Cond. Rep. 334. 3. The citation had not been served on the defendant in error thirty days; and the court would not take up the cause until the thirty days had expired, unless the defendant in error should appear. Ibid. 4. When an appeal is prayed and granted in the circuit court, during the session of the court, a citation to the appellee is not necessary. Reilly, Appellant, v. Lamar et al., 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 419. See Vol. I., page 151, paragraphs 6, 7. Vol. II., page 438, par. 189, 195; page 442, par. 246, 247; page 447, par. 315; page 735, 736, par. 1, 2, 3. CITIZENSHIP. 1. A certificate by a competent court, that an alien has taken the oath prescribed by the act respecting naturalization, raises a presumption that the court was satisfied as to the moral character of the alien, and of his attachment to the principles of the constitution of the United States, &c. The oath, when taken, confers the rights of a citizen. It is not necessary that there should be an order of court admitting him to become a citizen. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch, 176; 2 Cond. Rep. 342. 2. The children of persons duly naturalized, before the 14th of April, 1802, being under age at the time of the naturalization of their parent, were, if dwelling in the United States on the 14th of April, 1802, to be considered as citizens of the United States. Ibid. 3. The second section of the act of congress, "to establish a uniform system of naturalization," passed in 1802, requires that every person, desirous of being naturalized, shall make report | of himself to the clerk of the district court of the district where he shall arrive, or some other court of record in the United States; which report is to be recorded, and a certificate of the same given to such alien; and "which certifi cate shall be exhibited to the court by every alien who may arrive in the United States after the passing of the act, on his application to be naturalized, as evidence of the time of his arrival within the United States." James Spratt arrived in the United States, after the passing of this act; and was under the obligation to report himself according to its provisions. The law does not require that the report shall have been made five years before the application for natu ralization. The third condition of the first section of the law, which declares that the court, admitting an alien to become a citizen, "shall be satisfied that he has resided five years in the United States," &c., does not prescribe the evidence which shall be satisfactory. The report is required by the law to be exhibited on the application for naturalization, as evidence of the time of arrival in the United States. The law does not say the report shall be the sole evidence; nor does it require that the alien shall report himself within any limited time after arrival. Five years may intervene between the time of arrival and the report, and yet the report be valid. The report is undoubtedly conclusive evidence of the arrival; but it is not made by the law the only evidence of that fact. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Peters, 393. 4. James Spratt was admitted a citizen of the United States by the circuit court for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, and obtained a certificate of the same in the usual form. The act of the court, admitting James Spratt as a citizen, was a judgment of the circuit court; and the supreme court cannot look behind it, and inquire on what testimony it was pronounced. Ibid. 5. The various acts on the subject of naturali zation, submit the decision upon the right of aliens to courts of record. They are to receive testimony, to compare it with the law, and to judge on both law and fact. If their judgment is entered on record, in legal form, it closes all inquiry; and, like any other judgment, is complete evidence of its own validity. Ibid. 6. To deprive an American citizen of the right of suing in the circuit court, on the ground of his not being a citizen of any particular state, there ought to be very strong evidence of his being a mere wanderer without a home. Rabaud et al. v. D'Wolf, 1 Paine's C. C. R. 580. 7. The averment of the citizenship of the parties, to give jurisdiction to a circuit court, is a necessary averment, and must be proved under the general issue. Catlett et al. v. The Pacific Ins. Co., 1 Paine's C. C. R. 594. 8. It is not necessary that a citizen, removing from a territory of the United States, or a state, into another state, should acquire all the rights of a citizen of the state into which he removes, by the laws of such state. It is sufficient if he acquire a domicil there. Yet the declaration must aver that he is a citizen of the state, not Citizenship. sufficient that it should aver that he is a resident. Ibid. 9. If one make such a removal, with the avowed object of acquiring a right to sue in the circuit court, but with the intention of a permanent residence, and not to return, it is not a fraud upon the law. Ibid. 10. To constitute a person a citizen of a state, so as to sue in the courts of the United States, he must have a domicil in such state. If he removes into a state animo manendi, that is sufficient, whatever may be his motive for removal. But a mere temporary change of place, without any intention of permanent residence, constitutes no change of domicil. Case v. Clarke, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 70. 11. An American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to that country, yet, if he performs no other act, changing his condition, is entitled to the protection of his own government; and if, without the violation of any municipal law, he should be oppressed, he would have a right to claim that protection, and the interposition of his government in his favour. Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Cond. Rep. 358. 12. Citizenship, when spoken of in the constitution, in reference to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, means nothing more than residence. If a citizen thinks proper to change his domicil, and to remove with his family, if he has one, to another state, bona fide to leave his state and become an inhabitant of the other, he becomes, immediately on such removal, accompanied by such intention, a resident citizen of that state; and as such may sue in the federal court in the state from which he removes. If the removal is bona fide, it is not material that the change of residence was avowedly to enable him to sue in the federal court. Cooper's Lessee v. Galbraith, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 546. 13. A native of Massachusetts, coming to Philadelphia in 1796, and remaining until 1798, when he went to Maryland, and applied for the benefit of an insolvent act, in his petition styling himself of that state, and receiving his discharge under an act in which it was required that he should appear to be a citizen of the United States and of that state; subsequently, in 1800, returned to Pennsylvania, where he afterwards continued to reside: Held, that in February, 1801, he was a citizen of Pennsylvania, so as to exclude the plaintiffs, also citizens of that state, from suing him in the federal courts. Knox v. Greenleaf, 4 Dall. 360. 14. An American citizen may acquire, in a foreign country, the commercial privileges attached to his domicil; and if by his own act he makes himself a subject of such foreign power, although it may not be sufficient to rescue him from punishment, for any crime committed against the United States, yet it places him out of the protection of the United States while within the territory of the sovereign to whom he has sworn allegiance. Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch, 64; 1 Cond. Rep. 338. 30* 15. The inhabitants of the District of Columbia, by its separation from the states of Virginia and Maryland, ceased to be citizens of those states respectively. Reilly v. Lamar et al., 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 419. 16. A Spanish merchant who came to the United States in a time of peace between Spain and Great Britain, to carry on a trade between this country and the Spanish provinces under a royal Spanish license, and who continues to reside here and carry on that trade after the breaking out of war between Spain and Great Britain, is to be considered an American merchant, although the trade could be lawfully carried on by a Spanish subject only. The national character of a person, for commercial purposes, depends on his domicil by the laws of nations. Livingston et al. v. Maryland Ins. Co., 7 Cranch, 508; 2 Cond. Rep. 589. 17. A naturalized citizen, who, in time of peace, returns to his native country for the purpose of trade, but with the intention of returning again to his adopted country, continuing in the former a year after the war between the two countries for the purpose of winding up his business, engaging in no new commercial transactions with the enemy, and then returning to his adopted country, has gained a domicil in his native country, and his goods are subject to capture and condemnation. The Frances, 8 Cranch, 335; 3 Cond. Rep. 154. 18. It seems, that where a native citizen of the United States emigrated before a declaration of war to a neutral country, there acquired a domicil, and afterwards returned to the United States during the war, and reacquired his native domicil, he became a redintegrated American citizen, and could not afterwards, flagrante bello, acquire a neutral domicil, by again emigrating to his adopted country. The Dos Hermanos, 2 Wheat. 76; 4 Cond. Rep. 39. 19. A citizen of the United States fitting out a vessel in a port of the United States, to cruise against a power in amity with the United States, is not protected by a commission from a bellige rent, from punishment for any offence committed against vessels of the United States. United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. 184; 4 Cond. Rep. 623. 20. One born in the (then) colony of New York, in 1760, of Irish parents, went in 1771 to Ireland, where he was educated and served his apprenticeship, and remained in the British dominions until 1795, when he returned to America, is not a citizen of the United States. Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wallace, 51. 21. A native citizen of the United States cannot throw off his allegiance to that government, without a law authorizing the same. United States v. Gillies, Peters' C. C. R. 159. 22. A citizen of the United States cannot dissolve the compact between him and his country, without the consent or default of the community. United States v. Williams, 4 Hall's Am. Law Jour. 361. 23. Where the alienage of the holder of land in Virginia was fully proved, and the laws of Virginia required the oath of fealty to the common. 2 U |