Contempt of Court.-Contempt of Congress.

court; the liberty to affirm being strictly con- CONTEMPT OF THE HOUSE OF REPREfined to Quakers, by the law and practice of Massachusetts. The United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gallis, C. C. R. 364.

Contingent Remainder.

ters, 1.

issue such a warrant, reciting the said resolution | riage, desire the same by her last will and testaand order, and commanding the serjeant-at- ment," &c. &c. The marriage took effect ; chilarms to take the plaintiff into custody, &c., and dren were born, all before the attainder of their delivered the said warrant to the defendant, the parents in 1779. Mary Morris survived her hus serjeant-at-arms. By virtue of which warrant band; and died in 1825, leaving her children the defendant arrested the plaintiff, and con- surviving her. By the supreme court:-This is veyed him to the bar of the house, where he a clear remainder in fee to the children of Roger was heard in his defence, touching the matter Morris and wife; which ceased to be contingent of the said charge; and the examination being on the birth of the first child; and opened to let adjourned from day to day, and the house hav-in after born children. Carver v. Astor, 4 Peing ordered the plaintiff into custody, he was accordingly detained by the defendant, until he was finally adjudged to be guilty, and convicted of the charge aforesaid, and ordered to be forthwith brought to the bar and reprimanded by the speaker, and then discharged from custody; and after being thus reprimanded, was actually discharged from the arrest and custody aforesaid. Held, by the supreme court, that the matters set 3. The general rule of law founded on public forth in the plea amounted to a legal justifica-policy is, that limitations of this nature shall be tion. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204; 5 Coud. Rep. 66.

2. The house of representatives has authority to punish for contempt, persons not members of the body. This power is necessarily implied, and extends to the imprisonment of the party. The imprisonment must at all events terminate with the adjournment, or periodical dissolution of the house. Ibid.

3. The process issued by the house of representatives, in such a case, may be executed any where within the United States. Ibid.

CONTINGENT REMAINDER.

1. The uses declared in a deed of marriage settlement were, to and for the use of "Johanna Philipse and Beverly Robinson (the releasees), and their heirs, until the solemnization of the said intended marriage; and from and immediately after the solemnization of the said intended marriage, then to the use and behoof of the said Mary Philipse and Roger Morris, and the survivor of them, for and during the time of their natural lives, without impeachment of waste; and from and after the determination of that estate, then to the use and behoof of such child or children, as shall or may be procreated between them, and to his, her, or their heirs and assigns for ever. But in case the said Roger Morris and Mary Philipse shall have no child or children begotten between them, or that such child or children shall happen to die during the lifetime of the said Roger and Mary, and the said Mary should survive the said Roger without issue, then to the use and behoof of her, the said Mary Philipse, and her heirs and assigns for ever. And in case the said Roger should survive the said Mary Philipse, without any issue by her, or that such issue is then dead, without leaving issue; then, after the decease of the said Roger Morris, to the only use and behoof of such person or persons, and in such manner and form as the said Mary Philipse shall, at any time during the said intended mar

2. It is perfectly consistent with this limitation, that the estate in fee might be defeasable and determinable upon a subsequent contin gency; and upon the happening of such contingency, might pass by way of shifting executory use to other persons in fee; thus making a fee upon a fee. Ibid.

construed to be vested, when, and as soon as they may vest. The present limitation, in its terms, purports to be contingent only until the birth of a child, and may then vest. The estate of the children was contingent only until their birth; and when the confiscation act of New York passed, they being all born, it was a vested remainder in them and their heirs, and not liable to be defeated by any transfer or destruction of the life estate. Ibid.

4. The testator devised his land to his wife for life, and after her decease to his two daught ers, A and B, to them, their heirs and assigns; but in case they should die without issue, that the same should go to and vest in their two sisters, C and D. Held, that the devise to A and B, was a fee tail, and not a fee simple, the contingency upon which the limitation was to take effect, not being limited to a life in being, but being upon an indefinite failure of issue; and that the estate to C and D was a vested remainder, to take effect upon the death of both A and B, without issue. That cross remainders in tail were to be implied between A and B. That at common law A and B would take joint estates for life, with several remainders in tail to their issue; but by the statute of Rhode Island, it would be turned into a tenancy in common, and several estates tail in possession vested in them. Lillibridge v. Adie, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 224.

5. A devise to the testator's wife, until his son P. should attain the age of twenty-one years, and after P. should attain that age, that he should enter into possession, &c. &c., to him, his heirs and assigns for ever. But if the said P. should die before he attained the age of twenty-one, or without lawful issue, then the premises to descend to the testator's heir male in fee simple. P. attained the age of twenty-one; but died without ever having had lawful issue. Held, that P. took an immediate vested estate in fee simple, liable to be defeated by his death before twenty-one; but having attained that age, it became an indefeasible estate. Arnold v. Buffum, 2 Mason's C. C. R. 208.

6. Where the estate of a tenant in fee tail male was confiscated to the commonwealth

Continuance of a Cause.

under the statute of Massachusetts, of April, | of his cause on an affidavit of the absence of 1779, for confiscating the estates of absentees: material witness, who lived more than one hunHeld, that the estate of the remainder-man was dred miles off, who had been sick some time not thereby divested; but that the common- ago, but had promised to attend on the trial. wealth took only, by virtue of the confiscation, The circuit court said: It is not a sufficient rea such an estate as the absentee had in the pre-son for forcing the cause on for trial, that the act mises. Also held, that the tenant in possession of congress authorized the deposition to be taken. of the premises under a defective title from the Courts of justice are always desirous to attain commonwealth, after the expiration of this estate, viva voce evidence, when practicable. The teswas entitled to the value of his improvements. timony may be of such a nature, as not to admit Borland v. Dean, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 174. of all its force being reduced to the form of a 7. Contingent remainders and executory de- deposition. The court cannot lay down a genevises, are transmissible to the heirs of the party ral rule for the continuance of causes; but it to whom they are limited, if he chance to die must take care, under the circumstances of each before the contingency happen. Barnitz's Les- case, that injustice is not done, either by presee v. Casey, 7 Cranch, 456; 2 Cond. Rep. 561. cipitate trials, or wanton delays. In this case 8. In such case, however, the executory de-there appears a fair ground for a postponement. vise does not vest absolutely in the first heir, so as, upon his death, to carry it to his heir at law of the first devisee; but it devolves from heir to heir, and vests absolutely in him only, who can make himself heir to the first devisee at the time when the contingency happens, and the executory devise falls into possession. Ibid.

9. This rule is adopted in analogy to that rule of descent, which requires that a person who claims a fee simple, by descent, from one who was first purchaser of the reversion, or remainder expectant, on a freehold estate; should make himself heir of such purchaser at the time when that reversion or remainder falls into possession. Ibid.

10. Nor does it vary the legal result, that the person to whom the preceding estate is devised, happens to be the heir of the executory devisee: for, although, on the death of the latter, the executory devise devolves upon him, yet it is not merged in the preceding estate, but expects the regular happening of the contingency, and then vests absolutely in the then heir of the executory devisee. Ibid.

CONTINUANCE OF A CAUSE.

1. After the supreme court has decided on the question of value, or sum in controversy, on a question whether the court had jurisdiction of the case on that ground; a continuance will not be granted, to afford the party affected by the decision an opportunity to procure further evidence of value. The United States v. The Brig Union, 4 Cranch, 216; 2 Cond Rep. 91.

2. The supreme court will not compel a cause to be heard, unless the citation be served thirty days before the first day of the term. Welsh v. Mandeville, 5 Crauch, 321; 2 Cond. Rep. 268.

3. In a case depending between the states of Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the senior counsel appointed to argue the cause for the state of Rhode Island, by the legislature, was prevented, by unexpected and severe illness, from attending the court: the supreme court, on the application of the attorney-general of the state of Rhode Island, ordered a continuance for the term. The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 11 Peters, 226.

The defendant moved to postpone the trial

Symmes' Lessee v. Irvine, C. C. of Pennsylvania, 2 Dall. 384.

5. In all applications for the postponement of the trial of a cause, the court will be governed by a sound discretion, in order to prevent, on the one hand, an unnecessary procrastination, and, on the other, to avoid an injurious precipitation of the trial. Where the counsel engaged to argue the cause had died, the court, under the circumstances of the case, ordered a continuance. Hunter v. Fairfax's Devisee, 3 Dall. 305, 306.

5. The continuance of a cause, by consent, or by order of the court, while it is under a rule for trial or non pros., does not discharge the rule; and such a rule continues until it is expressly discharged. The King of Spain v. Oliver, Peters? C. C. R. 217.

7. If a cause be continued from time to time, by consent, it is the duty of the parties to be ready for trial at any subsequent time; and notice of an intention to try the cause is not necessary from either party. Ibid.

8. When a party knows that his witness is about to leave the country, he may, and such is his duty, take his deposition; if he has failed so to do, and he knows to what place the witness has gone, he ought to obtain a commission without loss of time, and endeavour to have it executed. If he has been negligent, he has no right to ask for a continuance. Ibid.

9. Where a defendant, in a suit at common law, has filed a bill in equity against the plaintiff, calling for a discovery and account, in rela tion to the matters in controversy, and the plaintiff having refused to answer, an attachment had issued against him; the court allowed a continuance of the cause at common law, and declared they should be disposed to hear favourably every future application to postpone a trial, until the plaintiff should file a satisfactory answer to the bill in equity. Hurst v. Hurst, 3 Ďall. 512.

10. The court continued the cause on the application of the defendant, a witness being absent in New Jersey, on the ground that a state magistrate cannot issue process for the defendant's witness into another state. The United States v Little, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 159.

11. The court continued the cause, upon application of the defendant, he being an adminis trator, and having, a few days before, discovered, among the papers, material testimony. Hour

Contraband.

quibee v. Girard, Administrator, 2 Wash. C. C. R. | deprive him of his right to a continuance, though

16. Where a motion is made for the continuance of a cause, on an affidavit stating the absence of a material witness, counter affidavits may be received; they should not, however, deny the materiality of the evidence, but may state any circumstances that render it improba-emption. Ibid. ble or impossible that testimony can be procured within a reasonable time. Anonymous, 3 Day, 308.

17. Where a witness, in a public prosecution, having been duly summoned and his fees tendered, refuses to attend, the prosecutor cannot have the trial postponed to afford time for an attachment, unless he will make affidavit that he thinks he cannot safely try the cause without the attendance of the witness. The United States v. Frink, 4 Day, 471.

4. By the modern law of nations, provisions 18. Although the party has been dilatory in are not, in general, deemed contraband; but they taking out his commission, yet if any objection may become so, although the property of a neuon that score has been waived, and the execu- tral, on account of the particular situation of the tion and return of the commission has been pre-war, or on account of their particular destination. vented by the acts or omissions of the other party, or his commissioner, the trial may be postponed. The United States v. Duane, Wallace,

Construction of Contracts.

is destined. Maissonnaire v. Keating, 2 Gallis. C. | purge away the guilt of the fraudulent conduct of the neutral. Ibid.

C. R. 325.

6. The ship insured, when seized, had not unloaded all her outward cargo, but was still in the progress of the outward voyage originally designated by the owners; she sailed on that voyage from Providence, R. I., with contraband articles on board, belonging, with the other parts of the cargo, to the owners of the ship, with a false destination and false papers, which yet accompanied the vessel; the contraband articles had been landed before the policy, which was a policy on time, designating no particular voyage, had attached; the underwriters, though taking no risks within the exception, were not ignorant of the nature and objects of the voyage; and the alleged cause of the seizure and detention was the trade in articles contraband of war, by the landing of the powder and muskets, which formed a part of the outward cargo. By the principles of the law of nations, there existed, under these circumstances, a right to seize and detain the ship and her remaining cargo, and to subject them to adjudication for a supposed forfeiture, notwithstanding the prior deposit of the contraband goods; there was a legal and justifiable cause of seizure. Carrington v. Merchant's Ins. Comp., 8 Peters, 495.

7. According to the modern law of nations, for there has been some relaxation in practice from the strictness of the ancient rules, the carriage of contraband goods to the enemy subjects them, if captured in delicto, to the penalty of confiscation; but the vessel and the remaining cargo, if they do not belong to the owner of the contraband goods, are not subject to the same penalty. The penalty is applied to the latter only, when there has been some actual co-operation on their part, in a meditated fraud upon the belligerents, by covering up the voyage under false papers and with a false destination. This is the general doctrine when the capture is made in transitu, while the contraband goods are yet on board. But when the contraband goods have been deposited at the port of destination, and the subsequent voyage has thus been disconnected with the noxious articles, it has not been usual to apply the penalty to the ship or cargo upon the return voyage, although the latter may be the proceeds of the contraband. And the same rule would seem, by analogy, to apply to cases where the contraband articles have been deposited at an intermediate port on the outward voyage, and before it had terminated, although there is not any authority directly in point. But in the highest prize courts of England, while the distinction between the outward and homeward voyage is admitted to govern, yet it is established that it exists only in favour of neutrals who conduct themselves with fairness and good faith in the arrangement of the voyage. If, with a view to practise a fraud upon the belligerent, and to escape from his acknowledged right of capture and detention, the voyage is disguised, and the vessel sails under false papers and with a false destination, the mere deposit of the contraband in the course of the voyage is not allowed to VOL. I.-37

8. When there has been a bona fide seizure and detention for and on account of illicit or contraband trade, and by a clause in the policy of insurance it was agreed that "the assurers should not be liable for any charge, damage or loss, which may arise in consequence of seizure or detention for or on account of illicit trade, or trade in articles contraband of war;" a sentence of condemnation or acquittal, or other regular proceeding to adjudication, is not necessary to discharge the underwriters. If the seizure or detention be lawfully made for or on account of illicit or contraband trade, all charges, damages and losses consequent thereon, are within the scope of the exception. They are properly attributable to such seizure and detention as the primary cause, and relate back thereto. If the underwriters be discharged from the primary hostile act, they are discharged from the consequences of it. Ibid.

CONTRACTS.

1. It is a principle recognised and acted upo as a cardinal rule by all courts of justice, in th construction of contracts, that the intention o' the parties is to be inquired into, and, if not fo bidden by law, is to be effectuated. Bradley v. The Washington, Alexandria and Georgetown Steam Packet Company, 13 Peters, 97.

2. The general principle in relation to contracts made at one place, to be executed at another, is well settled. They are to be governed by the laws of the place of performance; and if the interest allowed by the laws of the place of performance be greater than that permitted at the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for the higher interest, without incurring the penalties of usury. Andrews v. Pond et al., 13 Peters, 65.

3. Where a contract has been made without reference to the laws of the state where it was made, or to the laws of the place of performance, and a rate of interest was reserved, forbid den by the laws of the place where the contract was made, which was concealed under the name of exchange, in order to evade the law against usury; the question is not, which is to govern in executing the contract: unquestionably, it must be the law of the state where the agreement was entered into, and the instrument taken to secure its performance. A contract of this kind cannot stand on the same principles with a bona fide agreement made in one place to be executed in another. In the last-mentioned cases, the agreements were permitted by the lex loci contractus; and will even be enforced there, if the party is found within its jurisdiction. But the same rule cannot be applied to cases forbidden by its laws, and designed to evade them. In such cases, the legal consequences of such an an agreement must be decided by the laws of

3 E