HumeMacmillan, 1879 - 208 sider |
Inni boken
Resultat 1-5 av 38
Side 50
... consciousness , as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues , and tissues into cells . The one traces the development of complex organs from simple rudiments ; the other follows the building of complex conceptions out of simpler ...
... consciousness , as the anatomist resolves limbs into tissues , and tissues into cells . The one traces the development of complex organs from simple rudiments ; the other follows the building of complex conceptions out of simpler ...
Side 55
... consciousness we call a present thought or feeling ; that is safe , even if all other kinds of certainty are merely more or less probable inferences . Berkeley and Locke , each in his way , ap- plied philosophical criticism in other ...
... consciousness we call a present thought or feeling ; that is safe , even if all other kinds of certainty are merely more or less probable inferences . Berkeley and Locke , each in his way , ap- plied philosophical criticism in other ...
Side 61
... consciousness , however , are by no means the first crude conceptions suggested by common sense , but rather a legacy , and , in many respects , a sufficiently damnosa hæreditas , of ancient philosophy , more or less leavened by ...
... consciousness , however , are by no means the first crude conceptions suggested by common sense , but rather a legacy , and , in many respects , a sufficiently damnosa hæreditas , of ancient philosophy , more or less leavened by ...
Side 62
... consciousness , 1 Descartes gave the name of " thoughts , " 2 while Locke 1 " Consciousnesses " would be a better name , but it is awkward . I have elsewhere proposed psychoses as a substantive name for mental phenomena . 2 As this has ...
... consciousness , 1 Descartes gave the name of " thoughts , " 2 while Locke 1 " Consciousnesses " would be a better name , but it is awkward . I have elsewhere proposed psychoses as a substantive name for mental phenomena . 2 As this has ...
Side 63
... consciousness . Thus , whatever other signification we may see reason to attach to the word " mind , " it is certain that it is a name which is employed to denote a series of perceptions ; just as the word " tune , " whatever else it ...
... consciousness . Thus , whatever other signification we may see reason to attach to the word " mind , " it is certain that it is a name which is employed to denote a series of perceptions ; just as the word " tune , " whatever else it ...
Andre utgaver - Vis alle
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
absolute monarchy acquainted actions admit affirm animal appear argument arise ascribe associated attributes battle of Verneuil body causation cause and effect centaur complex idea conceive concerning conclusion connexion consciousness contrary David Hume Deity Descartes doctrine doubt edition endeavour essay event evidence evil existence experience fact faculty feeling give happiness Henry Home human Hume says Hume's identity imagination impossible impressions inference innate innate ideas Inquiry instinct intelligent invisible agent John Hill Burton JOHN MORLEY Joseph Hume justice kind knowledge mankind manner matter means memory mental mind miracle moral motion necessary truth necessity never noumenon object observation operations opinion pain particular passions perceptions person phenomena philo philosophers pleasure polytheism possess present principles proposition prove question reason regard relation relations of ideas religion seems sensation sense sophism soul Spinoza substance succession suppose theism theology things thought tion Treatise universe volition words
Populære avsnitt
Side 139 - So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.
Side 116 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Side 165 - when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Side 51 - Tis evident that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even mathematics, natural philosophy, and natural religion are in some measure dependent on the science of man, since they lie under the cognizance of men and are judged of by their powers and faculties.
Side 8 - Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It fell dead-born from the press* without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots.
Side 32 - I was assailed by one cry of reproach, disapprobation, and even detestation; English, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory, churchman and sectary, freethinker and religionist, patriot and courtier, united in their rage against the man who had presumed to shed a generous tear for the fate of Charles I. and the earl of Strafford...
Side 115 - That the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.
Side 119 - ... twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle.
Side 116 - Again, the mathematical postulate that things which are equal to the same are equal to one another, is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.
Side 166 - The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance ; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.