action. It is argued that the civil action for libel is given primarily to reestablish the character of the injured person, not to redress injured feelings, that since every man stands for himself and not by his family's character, no legal injury has been done to surviving relatives. So construed are the words "concerning the plaintiff" when civil action for libel is defined (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., § 460; in addition to principal case see Skrocki v. Stahl (1910) 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 Pac. 957; Sorenson v. Balaban (1896) 11 App. Div. (N. Y.) 164, 42 N. Y. Supp. 654, 4 N. Y. Ann. Cas. 7; Wellman v. Sun Printing Assn. (1892) 66 Hun. (N. Y.) 331, 21 N. Y. Supp. 577). Damages have been given to a husband for libel of his wife resulting in her nervous prostration on the theory of loss of services (Garrison v. Sun Printing Assn. (1912) 207 N. Y. 1, 74 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 622, 100 N. E. 430, 134 N. Y. Supp. 670, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 766; Ann Cas. 1914C 288). Admitting that no right exists in relatives to prevent others from publishing fair statements concerning their dead (Schuyler v. Curtis (1895) 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22, 31 L. R. A. 286, 49 Am. St. Rep. 671), yet a libel on a dead man reflects, most often intentionally, on the surviving relatives. Family reputation shapes any individual's reputation. On the continent the principal case would have been decided for the plaintiff, for in civil law countries following the Roman law (Dig., 47, 10, 11) relatives are given a right to damages for a libel on the dead, if the libel is intended to insult and libel the living; the presumption is that such libel is intended so to insult the dead man's family (cf. Labori, Repertoire due Droit Francaise, Presse Outrage, § 370, French Press Law of July 29, 1881). In Germany an absolute right to sue is given if the libeled person is a parent or grandparent to the plaintiff. Under this statute it is said the late Kaiser wished to sue persons who libelled his great-grandfather, but being outside of the class entitled to the presumption, unsuccessfully attempted to persuade his aunt, the Grand Duchess of Baden, to sue. In our law, when a criminal act injures an individual specially, civil redress is given; only in criminal libel is this right absent. Apparently the right to reputation has an imperfect remedy.

Book Reviews

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS. By Walter C. Tiffany. Third edition by Roger W. Cooley. St. Paul. West Publishing Co., 1921. pp. xiv, 769.

In this, the third edition of a widely used and deservedly popular manual, the editor has made few changes except by incorporating some recent decisions. The law of persons is one with which legislation is constantly busy, but a thorough knowledge of its historical development is of peculiar importance, if for no other reason than that the legislative changes are specific and date from a precise moment, so that rights vested under an earlier situation are seldom affected.

Mr. Cooley announces in his preface that he has made no attempt to present under the chapter on Master and Servant more than a brief reference to the enormous changes caused by the Workmen's Compensation Law.

In a manual that professes no purpose except that of introducing students to a difficult topic, it seems ungrateful to note lacunae. Yet the following matters might well have been added, however elementary the treatise is. Where a special marriage bar exists, such as miscegenation, it would have been more useful to mention. the states that have it, rather than refer to Stimson's Statute Law (p. 31). Again, although Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, is cited three times in capitals, no mention is made of the long and admirable note to this case in 18 Am. St. Rep. 569. This omission, as well as that of Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, was noted by Professor Warren in his review of the 2nd ed., 23 Harvard Law Review 158. Reviews that make constructive suggestions of this sort ought not to be simply ignored.

It might have been well to note that Combs v. Hawes, 2 Cal. Unrep. 555, 8 Pac. 539, was decided under C. C. sec. 35 and not under the general common-law rule about returning consideration on the part of an infant. Indeed this very special provision of the Field Code is not mentioned at all, although reference is made to a similar statute in Oklahoma (p. 510).

The section on Community Property (pp. 150-155) is cursory and unsatisfactory, even for elementary purposes. Some attempt might have been made to classify the theories represented by the California, Texas and Washington courts. (Cf. Evans, The Ownership of Community Property, 35 Harvard Law Review 47.) Max Radin.

INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES. Charles Cheney Hyde. Charles Cheney Hyde. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1922. 2 vols., octavo, lix and 832 pages, and xxvii and 925 pages.

This major and epochal work ranks in scientific value and delight of reading with the similar, though far earlier treatises of Wheaton and Halleck; and in large measure and by reason of official and general associations of the author in the State Department and with the most highly regarded juridical authorities of our day, Hyde's International Law will be accepted as a continuance of Moore's Digest and as an epitome of the best contributions to the American Journal of International Law for the notable period of 1907 to 1921.

Limiting his examination in the main to international law matters wherein the United States has taken action, the author avers that the "authentic American understanding of what the principles of international law really are" is "the only scientific basis" on which the "United States, whether at the Hague or elsewhere, may participate intelligently and worthily in the common effort to render the law of nations closely responsive to the just and changing demands of civilization." The principles and system of treatment of them, however, are the same as with all leading authors since Grotius. Of recent works Hall and Oppenheim have the simple title "International Law," De Louter adds the words

“Public” and “Positive"; Moore's Digest was of international law "as embodied in diplomatic discussions, treaties and other international agreements, international awards, the decisions of municipal courts and the writings of jurists, and especially in documents, published and unpublished, issued by Presidents and Secretaries of State of the United States, the opinions of the Attorneys-General, and the decisions of courts, Federal and State"; on the other hand, Alvarez of Santiago de Chile wrote a general treatise entitled "Le droit international américain." Oppenheim has the continental regard for scholarly dissertations; Hall, thoroughly English, has his court cases mostly under names of British and American ships. The question comes how far personal and national predispositions permit independence in international law writing, and whether, if any writer surmounted them, his deductions would preserve reality and force.

However, our author treats also and in very practical manner of some subjects in which the United States has had only a minor or no determinative part. For example, his admirable discussion of "Navigation of Rivers," after dealing for some pages with rivers of North and South America, goes on with similar accuracy and fullness to explanation of the conventions and usages relating to the Rhine, Danube, Scheldt, Vistula and Po, and to the Congo and Niger. One asks why the great rivers of China, especially the Yangtsze, carrying an enormous trade subject to international arrangements, are not also included.

There is special excellence of treatment of international claims, protection of aliens, extradition, the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to international law, amicable modes of settlement of international controversies, and neutrality. The provisions of treaties. following the World War are analyzed. There is no disposition to set forth the merits of various controversial situations or opposing policies. Indeed, the author's analytic skill and thorough research would justify more positive statement of results.

The author is equally well known as a lawyer of distinguished career at Chicago and before the Supreme Court of the United States, being also occasional and special counsel in the Department of State, and as professor of international law at Northwestern University. He dedicates this work to his distinguished friend and colleague, Professor John H. Wigmore. A more notable group of American authorities on international law could not be found than those to whom Professor Hyde in his preface makes acknowledgment. Their esteem and cordiality toward him is and will be shared by many others who may as yet know him only in his works. The instructors and students of our universities and law schools using Hyde's International Law will long have special pride and satisfaction in this illustrious work.

Frank E. Hinckley.

THE LAW OF THE SEA. By George L. Canfield and George W. Dalzell. D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1921. pp. xvi, 315.

A book of this sort, according to the preface "designed to be an outline of the subject primarily for the student, more especially the student layman who desires to inform himself of the general principles of Admiralty law," is in danger of falling between two stools that of technical accuracy not easily comprehensible to the layman, and that of easy comprehensibility lacking in accuracy. The latter is the more usual failing, and in this direction has the present book somewhat erred. Nevertheless, a teacher could conscientiously recommend it to his class, provided he also took pains here and there to complete the picture and to safeguard the student against errors. If, however, the book is read by a layman without such additional guidance, while he will obtain a flavor of maritime law, and much interesting information on many points, he will not obtain a knowledge upon which it will be safe for him to base inferences or too greatly to rely in his business transactions.

It would serve no purpose to point out more than one or two of the instances where there is inaccuracy. Most of these are on unimportant matters. It might not be amiss, however, to observe that the ancient error connecting Richard Coeur de Lion with the Laws of Oleron is perpetuated (page 20); that the Harter Act does not provide that "if the ship is actually seaworthy in all respects at the commencement of the voyage, there is no liability for losses sustained by faults or errors in her navigation or management," but provides that if due diligence be used to make the ship seaworthy, etc., there shall not be liability for the specific causes mentioned (page 7); that the doctrine of frustration of adventure has been extended to time charter parties contrary to the statement of the text (page 108); and that there is no English statute corresponding to the Harter Act of about the same date, as the learned authors seem to believe (page 119). There are a few other statements which are slightly misleading, as, for example, that the authority of the owner predominates over that of the master, a statement applicable only to their relations ashore and not to their relations where the owner goes to sea with the master (page 30); that there is an implied warranty by the shipper that his goods are not of a character to cause injury to other goods, the rule seeming to be that the shipper makes no such warranty and is liable only if he has knowledge of the dangerous quality of his goods (page 73); and that the purpose of the Harter Act was to benefit the ship-owner rather than the shipper (page 120).

While a studious eye might find other flaws in this book, this should not militate against the fact that it is more than usually readable and probably above rather than below the average of accuracy in other books of the same type.

A. T. Wright.

THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. By Benjamin N. Cardozo. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921, pp. 180. (Storrs Lectures, 1921).

What is the judicial process? Kantorowicz (Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie, p. 5) tells us that according to popular conception in Germany, it consists, or ought to consist, in dropping an appropriate section of a statute into a hopper, turning the crank and pulling out the correct decision at the bottom. Doubtless the current American belief is very similar, except that we are likely to credit the judge with a perverse ingenuity in so turning the crank that a wrong decision comes out. In this admirable little volume, Mr. Justice Cardozo tells us that turning the crank is far from being a purely mechanical process, that it is a matter of minute and delicate adjustments, that in its conscious form it is an application of philosophy, history and sociology, and that subconsciously powerful forces direct and help determine it.

Judge Cardozo is a member of one of the busiest and most influential tribunals on the face of the earth, the Court of Appeals of New York State. That he can find time to subject his thinking and procedure to so close an analysis is a sign of high encouragement. He is quite abreast of the New Learning-new, that is to say, to lawyers trained in the common-law tradition-a learning that consists in treating the profoundly significant work of modern continental jurists not as a mischievous irrelevancy, but as a source of guidance and light. If he quotes mostly from the valuable series on legal philosophy and continental legal history issued by the American Association of Law Schools, that is apparently for the convenience of his readers, since he gives ample indication of being conversant with the original sources. All this is important to note, for the quite extraordinary width and depth of his learning have largely contributed in giving his decisions those qualities which have earned for them an almost general commendation. man can completely describe the nature of the judicial process, it will be a man like the Storrs lecturer of 1921.

If any

Judge Cardozo somewhat over-dignifies the method which he calls that of philosophy. Properly it is rather the method of the formal syllogism. It is a way of dealing with facts that can never become obsolete. Drawing correct inferences from premises is a discipline that must always be valuable, but its limitations are obvious and over-emphasis of it has done real harm. For a syllogism can tell us nothing that was not already implicit in the major premise. Progress is impossible in a theory that recognizes no other method except by the surreptitious devices of fictions and verbal quibbles. It is a judicial method that too closely for comfort. resembles the turning of the handle, and it deserves some of the odium into which it has recently fallen.

The historical, sociological, and psychological methods which the author sets forth are really different in kind. They assist the judge in performing his really judicial task-of selecting his major pre