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ulties, Conception the second, and Imagination the highest. Imagination is often confounded with Ideality, but is quite distinct from it. Each faculty conceives Form conceives forms, and may

in its own way. imagine them exquisitely beautiful; Tune conceives music; and so on. Curious effects result when these faculties are morbidly active. The whole mystery of spectral illusions is thus made plain.

DREAMING, to account for which so many volumes have been written in vain, is at once explained by the excitability of the organs from internal causes; and as some organs may be awake while others are asleep, the disjointed images of our dreaming moments are, to the phrenologist, a thing which was to have been expected. The kind of dreams most frequent with us could be predicted by the phrenologist from the size of the predominating organs.

MEMORY, too, is not a faculty, but a mode of action. It necessarily follows that there can be no such thing as the general memory of the metaphysicians, but every faculty must have its own memory. Memory belongs, however, only to the intellectual faculties. It differs from Conception and Imagination in this, that it recollects real objects or events which it has actually perceived, and adds the consciousness of time elapsed since they were perceived. The other named modes of action do not require realities or time.

JUDGMENT, in its proper sense, is the perception of adaptation, fitness and necessary consequence; and is a mode of action of the reflecting powers. In a certain sense, the knowing faculties may each be said to possess judgment; as Coloring judges of colors, Form

of forms, Tune of music. When, however, we use the word judgment, we mean right reasoning, sound deciding. To this a proper balance of the affective faculties is essential. There is no sound judgment, even with great reflecting powers, if any of the feelings are excessive. Hence the difficulty of convincing each other, experienced by heated controversialists. What is called a person of good sense, is one who has not only clear and strong reflecting powers, but wellbalanced feelings, thus allowing the reflecting powers to have undisturbed action.

CONSCIOUSNESS is the knowledge which the mind has of its own existence and operations, whether these last are affective or intellectual; but as it does not reveal the existence or nature of the powers themselves which think and feel, it was an error in the metaphysicians to attempt to discover these powers by reflecting on their own consciousness. As they could have, by this means, no access to the consciousness of others, they fell into the error of supposing all men constituted alike.

ATTENTION is not a faculty, but the stretch, application, or tension, of any or all of the intellectual faculties.

ASSOCIATION is that succession of ideas in the mind, each seeming to call up that which succeeds; so that, in our waking hours, the mind is never without an idea passing through it. This is a state or condition of the faculties, not a faculty. The metaphysicians have endeavoured to discover laws by which, in every mind, this succession is regulated. This attempt is utterly vain—as vain as to subject the succession of

the fleeting clouds or fitful breezes to regular laws. The uniform associating powers, according to the old notions, are resemblance, contiguity in time and place, and contrast; yet any one who thinks on the subject, cannot fail to be sensible that there are many connecting links of thought which cannot be reduced to any of these three. The phrenological view is, that the predominant faculties in each mind create the associations. It is in the philosophy of Stewart that Association is made to play a part most disproportioned to its actual nature. He even holds that Association produces new principles of action, and names Avarice (which phrenology proves to be the abuse of a primitive faculty called Acquisitiveness) as one of them. Association is a very important principle in mental science. There is a mutual influence of the organs, which produces associations; a natural association between certain external objects and certain faculties; and artificial associations may be formed between objects and faculties. For example, long exercise of a particular organ or organs in performing certain acts, renders those acts easy, by the rapid association of the ideas necessary to their performance. Professional skill, in all its varieties, is thus accounted for. Mutual action of the faculties arises from the beautiful arrangement of grouping which we have already described. The organ of Language associates signs with ideas, with well known rapidity. Artificial Memory, or Mnemonics, as it is called, avails itself of our most easy and natural associations, which will always be regulated by our organization. One person will connect his ideas with forms, another with colors, and many do so

with places. Prejudices are associations of false ideas with the feelings. In short, to arrive at anything like laws of association, we must not look to the ideas themselves, but to the faculties which form them.

PASSION is any faculty in excess. Thus, there are as many passions as faculties. Love is the passion of Amativeness in union with Veneration; avarice of Acquisitiveness; rage of Destructiveness.

PLEASURE and PAIN also belong to each faculty, according as it is agreeably or disagreeably affected.

PATIENCE and IMPATIENCE are respectively the results of certain combinations of faculties. Thus, Benevolence, Veneration, Hope, Conscientiousness and Firmness, with moderate Self-Esteem, produce a quiet, meek, resigned and patient spirit. Apathy is quite different, although often confounded with Patience; it arises from lymphatic temperament, or deficient brain. On the other hand, Self-Esteem, Combativeness and Destructiveness, when larger than Benevolence, Conscientiousness and Veneration, will be impatient of contradiction. Large Time and Tune give impatience of bad music.

Joy and GRIEF arise from agreeable and disagreeable affections of the faculties by causes of considerable power. Wealth, power and praise give joy to Acquisitiveness, Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation; while, on the other hand, the death of a beloved relative affects Adhesiveness with grief.

SYMPATHY, as its name, from the Greek, signifies, is feeling with another, or partaking of his emotions. The laws which regulate the activity of the faculties show the nature of this affection and the circumstances

in which it occurs. Two individuals of similar constitution of mind naturally feel alike. This is the sympathy felt in the theatre, listening to eloquence, or witnessing distress and suffering. But there is another kind of sympathy, namely, that which is called up by the activity of a particular feeling in another's mind, manifested by the natural language of the active faculty; thus, the haughty air of Self-Esteem instantly calls up a defensive Self-Esteem in those who witness it, if the faculty be powerful in them. On the other hand, Benevolence, with its kind natural language, excites the same feeling in another. Wonder, too, spreads rapidly; and so on. We sympathize with the animal feelings of Combativeness and Destructiveness only when they are awakened and guided by Conscientiousness and Benevolence. But we sympathize with Benevolence directly, provided we do not detect a mixture of a selfish feeling in the actions it produces, such as vanity or love of gain. The doctrine of sympathy leads to valuable practical consequences in life. In education, for example, it explains the greater power of Benevolence than of Self-Esteem and Destructiveness in the treatment of the young—of kindness than of harsh and imperious commands and punishments.

HABIT may be defined as the power of doing anything well, by frequently doing it. But before it can be done at all, there must be the faculty to do it, however awkwardly. Habit, then, is the acquired strength of the faculty by its repeated exercise. The act of performing skilfully on a musical instrument is the best illustration. Stewart erred when he held that "a genius for poetry, painting, music or mathe

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