course of time annual sessions will disappear. Experience, it is said, has proven in many states, that the legislatures, having naught to do with higher politics, can very well, in ordinary times, attend in one session to all real wants in the way of legislation for two years, and extraordinary circumstances are sufficiently cared for by the fact that the governor can call special sessions of the legisla ture. The experience of the states which have annual legislative sessions has also shown that the legislatures, when they do not find enough to do, always know how to make something to do. Once assembled, they seem to feel in duty bound to sit for a certain time and to pass a certain number of laws. The legislative statistics of the states which have tried both plans show that with annual sessions just as many laws are passed each year as with biennial sessions are passed every second year. In the former case it is evident that many laws which were at least unnecessary have been enacted; and unnecessary laws, simply because they are unnecessary, always do harm. The stability of relations so essential to the welfare of the state and of society is thus quite uselessly destroyed and a highly dangerous craving for experiment fostered. That there is much truth in this argument cannot be disputed by any one who examines the facts without prejudice. The opinion that it might be wise to bridle the legislative zeal for law-making is too old a one, in the United States, to be suppressed by declaring it to be a heresy affecting the fundamental principles of democracy. Several constitutions limit the length of the session. Indeed, they measure out the time in quite a niggardly way-forty and forty-five (but also sixty and ninety) days. Of course, the established time can be exceeded, but it needs so large a majority to do this that it cannot be done easily or on any but really valid grounds. The

constitution of Nebraska (adopted 1867) tried an odd remedy. It did not limit the duration of the sessions, but while, like the constitutions of all the other states, it adopted the principle of paying the members of the legislature a per diem, it provided that they should not be paid this for more than forty days. As far as the desired effect can be expected from this sort of pressure, it could also be brought about by paying a proper annual salary instead of a per diem. This has also been tried (in Wisconsin, by an amendment adopted by the people in 1867), but except in the case of these states public opinion has either not yet been warmed up to these experiments, or has busied itself only with the question whether changes in this direction are desirable.

The question of the powers of the legislatures is essentially different in constitutional law from the question of the powers of congress. Congress has only the powers granted it by the federal constitution. The legislative power of the state legislatures, on the contrary, is unlimited, as far as no limits are set to it by the federal or the state constitution. This does not mean, however, that these restrictions must always be expressed in explicit words. As it is generally admitted that the factors of the federal government have certain "implied powers," so it has never been disputed that the state legislatures are subject to "implied restrictions," that is, restrictions. which must be deduced from certain provisions of the federal or state constitution, or that arise from the polit

166 The rule of construction of state constitutions is that they are not special grants of power to legislative bodies, like the constitution of the United States, but general grants of all the usually recognized powers of legislation not actually prohibited or expressly excepted. The exception must be construed strictly as against those who stand upon it, and liberally in favor of the government." Southern Pacific R. R. Co. vs. Orton, 6 Sawyer, 157; Hammond, I., 20, § 28.

course of time annual sessions will disappear. Experience, it is said, has proven in many states, that the legislatures, having naught to do with higher politics, can very well, in ordinary times, attend in one session to all real wants in the way of legislation for two years, and extraordinary circumstances are sufficiently cared for by the fact. that the governor can call special sessions of the legisla ture. The experience of the states which have annual legislative sessions has also shown that the legislatures, when they do not find enough to do, always know how to make something to do. Once assembled, they seem to feel in duty bound to sit for a certain time and to pass a certain number of laws. The legislative statistics of the states which have tried both plans show that with annual sessions just as many laws are passed each year as with biennial sessions are passed every second year. In the former case it is evident that many laws which were at least unnecessary have been enacted; and unnecessary laws, simply because they are unnecessary, always do harm. The stability of relations so essential to the welfare of the state and of society is thus quite uselessly destroyed and a highly dangerous craving for experiment fostered. That there is much truth in this argument cannot be disputed by any one who examines the facts without prejudice. The opinion that it might be wise to bridle the legislative zeal for law-making is too old a one, in the United States, to be suppressed by declaring it to be a heresy affecting the fundamental principles of democracy. Several constitutions limit the length of the session. Indeed, they measure out the time in quite a niggardly way-forty and forty-five (but also sixty and ninety) days. Of course, the established time can be exceeded, but it needs so large a majority to do this that it cannot be done easily or on any but really valid grounds. The

constitution of Nebraska (adopted 1867) tried an odd remedy. It did not limit the duration of the sessions, but while, like the constitutions of all the other states, it adopted the principle of paying the members of the legis lature a per diem, it provided that they should not be paid this for more than forty days. As far as the desired effect can be expected from this sort of pressure, it could also be brought about by paying a proper annual salary instead of a per diem. This has also been tried (in Wisconsin, by an amendment adopted by the people in 1867), but except in the case of these states public opinion has either not yet been warmed up to these experiments, or has busied itself only with the question whether changes in this direction are desirable.

The question of the powers of the legislatures is essentially different in constitutional law from the question of the powers of congress. Congress has only the powers granted it by the federal constitution. The legislative power of the state legislatures, on the contrary, is unlimited, as far as no limits are set to it by the federal or the state constitution. This does not mean, however, that these restrictions must always be expressed in explicit words. As it is generally admitted that the factors of the federal government have certain "implied powers," so it has never been disputed that the state legislatures are subject to "implied restrictions," that is, restrictions which must be deduced from certain provisions of the federal or state constitution, or that arise from the polit

1 "The rule of construction of state constitutions is that they are not special grants of power to legislative bodies, like the constitution of the United States, but general grants of all the usually recognized powers of legislation not actually prohibited or expressly excepted. The exception must be construed strictly as against those who stand upon it, and liberally in favor of the government." Southern Pacific R. R. Co. vs. Orton, 6 Sawyer, 157; Hammond, I., 20, § 28.

ical nature of the Union, from the genius of American public institutions, etc. But in a discussion of the authority of the state legislatures, the question always is, not what can they do, but what cannot they do? Then comes the further question: how must they do what they are authorized to do? On both questions, I can here present only a few especially significant or especially characteristic results of the doctrines already developed.

The legislative initiative belongs exclusively to the legis latures and to both chambers in exactly the same way. It is true that here and there an assembly has been granted the privilege of originating all "money bills," but the idea has steadily become of more general acceptance that there is even less reason for a legislature's than for congress's taking the English constitution as a pattern in this particular. For the senates of the state legislatures are just as much popular bodies (i. e., representatives of the people) as the assemblies. There is therefore no analogy of relations. This freedom of initiative does not, however, involve complete freedom in matters of form. A large number of state constitutions provide expressly that every law shall contain but one subject,- a provision that might well be brought into the federal constitution, because wrong is often done in federal legislation by the so-called "riders." The "appropriation bills," especially, have been used to carry through measures which, if proposed independently, would either not have received a majority of votes in congress or else not have been approved by the president. As long as it has not been expressly declared unconstitutional, in so many words, to couple together in one law subjects foreign to each other, and, moreover, as long as the president (or, in a state, the governor) can only approve or return appropriation bills 1 See my Constitutional History, III.