agement of domestic industries, to promote internal improvements, to control railways, to maintain hospitals and educational institutions, the signal service, lighthouse and life-saving service, the bureau of education, the bureau of labor statistics, and a department for the encouragement of agriculture.

Assumed Powers.

Some of the powers named have been decided by the courts to be implied in one or another of the powers expressly granted. Of some which have never been contested it is not easy to say in what clause of the Constitution they are implied. Such is the authority to collect seeds and distribute them among farmers, and in various ways to aid improvements in agriculture, as has been done from the beginning. A federal power is not likely to be contested unless it interferes with some cherished right or tends to limit the power of the states. By avoiding these occasions of jealousy, the federal government may exercise a number of powers which are simply assumed.

Elastic Clauses. The clauses which have been most relied upon as the source of implied powers are those granting the power to tax, to borrow, to regulate commerce, and to establish post-offices and post-roads. Out of the power to regulate commerce, as is now held, may be derived unlimited authority over railways as agents of interstate commerce. Out of the power to establish post-offices is derived the power to take full control of the telegraphic business. Some writers on the Constitution have held that the Preamble is a part of the fundamental law, and that from it Congress has power to make laws to promote the general welfare. According to this theory, any power now exercised by the

states may be assumed by Congress, so soon as a majority of the members believe that the general welfare would be thus promoted. But the courts have uniformly ruled that the states have powers not by the favor of Congress, but by the terms of the Constitution.

CHAPTER XLI.

CENTRALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION.

The Federal Principle. Perfection in our form of government will have been reached, when Congress shall have discovered and wisely exercised all the powers which the interests of good government require shall be in the hands of the general government, and when the states shall have become conscious of the limits of their powers, and shall have wisely met the responsibilities placed upon them. The Constitution readily yields itself to the search for the best distribution of powers. If it is found best not to exercise a power expressly conferred, our courts hold that such an unused power is still as fully in the hands of the states as if not conferred. If it is found best to exercise a power not expressly granted, the terms of the grant admit an interpretation including the needed powers.

The plan of giving to the general government control of matters of general interest and making the states responsible for local concerns is known as the federal system of government. The federal principle does not end with the states. The counties, besides serving as agencies of the central power of the state, may have a

measure of governmental responsibility. Cities and incorporated towns exercise much authority, while many important powers may be intrusted to townships and school districts. Just what powers would better be intrusted to each governmental area, can be determined only by experience. A state government may itself vote and collect a school tax; it may appoint a committee and maintain a school in every school district of the state. Yet a state which accomplishes the same ends by giving to the district power to do these things, is much more secure in its possession of public schools. A temporary change of sentiment might change the policy of the state government, and the schools might be stopped, and the entire system be threatened. But if the system is fixed in the habits of the districts, it would be in less danger of serious injury from temporary change of sentiment. Many things which may for a limited time be more effectively done by the central government, will yet, if committed to the local governments, in the end be better done. By giving to the small local areas a large measure of powers, better government may in the end be secured, and, in addition, the people be educated in political wisdom. If destruction or anarchy come to the central governments, the self-governing parts will prevent universal anarchy. Or, if the destructive force originates in one of the parts, the conservative strength of the others will aid the central government in its high function of securing general order.

An English paper misapprehended the situation when it remarked, in view of the admission at one time of four new states, that it remained to be seen whether

the federal government would bear such a strain. The federal government had for years borne the strain of immediate responsibility for their government as territories. When they became states, federal responsibility for local affairs ceased. The federal government bears the strain of the direct government of Utah. Special laws are passed for its government, and administered by federal officers. When the people of Utah become capable of ruling their territory in such a manner as not to endanger good government in other places, a state will be formed, and the strain upon the federal government will be removed. In a strongly centralized government every increase in population or territory tends to make government more difficult. But under the federal system there may be indefinite extension without increasing the difficulties.

CHAPTER XLII.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

Parties in a Monarchy. - A monarchy is the simplest form of government. Where one man is the source of law, authority, and order, there is no necessity for political parties. The monarch and those selected by him. decide all questions, and the people have no pains or trouble in the case. People who take an interest in the government may organize and maintain a half-dozen political parties or societies for the purpose of influencing action. If they are not to decide what shall be done, there is no necessity for majorities. But if the

people are required to decide questions, there is need

of majorities.

Parties in Local Government.

If the voters of a

school district have to locate a schoolhouse, there may be a real difficulty to overcome. There may be twentyfive voters, divided into groups of five each; and each group may prefer to have the house in a different place. If every voter should hold to his own view, and refuse to give up his preference, popular selection would be impossible. The friends of each location form a party, and try to induce at least eight other voters to unite with them. The need is felt of coming to an agreement. Some must give up their preferences that a majority may be obtained, and the house located by popular vote. In almost any county there are three or four places where groups of voters would prefer to locate the county seat. Popular government is not possible unless multitudes sacrifice their first choices and unite with one or another of the groups which are competing for a majority.

Parties in the State and the Nation. In these local governments it is possible for the voters to divide upon questions as they arise, and to decide them by vote. Here parties can form and disband with little trouble. But it is not easy to form parties for the purpose of deciding questions in a great state or a great nation. It is not ordinarily possible to call into existence national parties upon a single issue; and when national parties are organized, it is not easy to disband them. Our Constitution furnishes no method for deciding ordinary national questions by a direct vote of the people. As a matter of fact, voters simply exercise a choice between two