(TSPP) which will be held 6-17 February 1978. In preparation for the conference, no less than three, week-long preparatory sessions have been held during May, June, and July, with a final two week preparatory meeting starting on 10 October. Having been privileged to be an industry delegate to these meetings, I can comment on progress at least as I see it to date: 1. Many nations of the world have responded very rapidly and responsibly to this U.S. initiative, and I believe can be expected to take decision at the February conference on the basis of thorough technical review of every detailed proposal. 2. While certain of the ship construction and equipment proposals made by the U.S. government, on which I will comment further in a minute, are running into varying degrees of opposition, much of this is on the basis of thorough technical study of the proposals, and the actual tanker record. Additional technical studies on these measures can be expected by the October meeting. 3. Very substantial progress with near unanimous support is being made on a tightening and strengthening of ship inspection and certification measures. This work fits in directly with the President's proposal for "a Coast Guard program to board and examine all foreign flag oil tankers entering U.S. ports." The President's message called for "U.S. ratification of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973." This proposal also parallels one of the key points of the API analysis already presented. API sincerely hopes that by the time of the February IMCO Conference, the U.S. delegation will be in position to advise positively on this matter. Another major feature of the President's program covered improvements internationally in the area of crew standards and training. Here again, emphasis on the subject of personnel parallels the API analysis, but because of the importance of it, I feel it worth including a brief abstract from the President's proposal on this subject. "These actions are particularly crucial because human error is involved in 80-85 percent of all tanker accidents. The United States imposes relatively strict standards for the U.S. Merchant Marine, but stringent international requirements for crew qualifications do not exist. However, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization is developing a major draft convention on the subject for negotiation next year. The President views this effort as a major international opportunity to upgrade crew qualifications." The President further recommended bringing forward the date for the IMCO/ ILO Conference, and this has been done with it now being scheduled for three weeks starting June 14, 1978. I should mention at this stage that API was pleased to see that the matter of personnel qualifications and training has also been addressed in the draft bills, though perhaps not so widely as design and equipment features. In this regard, until very recently I have had the personal impression that many proposals originating in the U.S. have shown a pre-occupation with technological or design approaches to what are fundamentally personnel problems. I think this is a view shared as well by many traditional maritime nations holding the belief that it is primarily through personnel standards and enforcement measures that further progress is to be found rather than continual change in design and equipment standards. The President's program included as well a number of important proposals having to do with compensation and liability, response capability and so forth, which are not being considered in these hearings. III. SHIP CONSTRUCTION AND EQUIPMENT STANDARDS I would now like to review briefly the API's current position on the basic design and equipment proposals put forward in President's Carter's program, many of which are the subject to the two bills which you are considering, and all of which have been the subject of previous IMCO and industry review. Before addressing the specific issues, however, I should emphasize that API definitely supports the Administration's proposal that any new rules should allow the adoption of technological improvements and alternatives which can be shown to accomplish equivalent pollution prevention, and their recommendation that any new standards be the subject of regulatory action rather than necessarily new legislative initiatives. API's current positions on the specific design and equipment proposals by the Administration follow. Issue. Segregated ballast on all new and existing tankers (over 20 MDWT in a period of five years).1 1 Limitations in parenthesis taken from U.S.C.G. 16 May proposals. Position.-API's position in regard to the segregated ballast concept is to: Continue to support the requirement for segregated ballast applied to newbuilding tankers over 70 MDWT as provided for in 1973 IMCO MARPOL; Oppose retrofitting of segregated ballast to tankers of any size; Support crude oil washing together with load on top (LOT), reception facilities and other measures for tankers over 20 MÓWT as preferable alternatives to retrofitting segregated ballast. Background. The segregated ballast concept was accepted at the 1973 conference as a logical improvement and adjunct to the LOT process in that it could in some instances reduce or eliminate the ballast shifting and dirty ballast decanting processes. It was, also recognized at that time, however, and thoroughly documented by industry studies that properly conducted, the LOT process could achieve results consistent with the discharge standards of the 1969 amendments and the 1973 convention. It was for this purpose that the 1973 convention by Regulation 15, specified the conduct and monitoring of LOT under the name "retention on board". In regard to crude tanker operation these factors are still valid. In addition, however, in the years since 1973, the practice of crude oil washing has been developed to the extent that it is now believed to represent a preferable alternative to the segregated ballast concept and a logical extension of the LOT concept. Accordingly, API believes it should be considered by governments as the recommended alternative to the proposed segregated ballast requirement, together with the continued acceptance of monitored LOT as in 1973 MARPOL. Two very recent papers submitted to IMCO2 are appended to this statement. They both show the distinct potential for reducing operational discharges from tankers by upwards of 90 percent by measures other than segregated ballast. Furthermore the OCIMF paper3 gives an analysis of the economic factors which would cause a very high financial burden with retrofitting segregated ballast. Furthermore, proponents of retrofitting segregated ballast often incorrectly characterize it as a total solution to operational marine pollution. Insufficient recognition has been given to the fact that vessels equipped with_segregated ballast would have inherent problems, are still sensitive to personnel factors, and marine pollution from their operation would still occur because: Cargo tanks would have to be routinely cleaned at least in rotation to prevent sludge build-up. During periods of particularly heavy weather, some cargo tanks would have to be ballasted to assure the seaworthiness of the vessel. The same problems would prevail in the case of segregated ballast vessels not equipped for crude oil washing as with a conventional vessel in cleaning and mucking cargo tanks prior to entering shipyard and handling accumulated oil and sludge. In event the hull is pierced, a segregated ballast tanker, with its greater freeboard, would lose more oil before pressure equalization occurs and cause more pollution than would a conventional vessel. The increase in the number of tankers operating as a result of retrofitting segregated ballast would increase marine traffic congestion and potentially lead to vessel casualties and marine pollution which would not otherwise have occurred. For the U.S. waters this could mean as much as 15 to 20 percent greater tanker traffic. Issue.-Double bottoms on all new tankers (over 20 MDWT ordered after 12/31/79 and/or delivered after 12/31/81). Position.-API is opposed to mandated double bottoms for tankers of all sizes. API is prepared to support the concept of defensive location of segregated ballast developed by the U.S. for application to newbuilding tankers of over 70 MDWT which will have segregated ballast as required by 1973 MARPOL and would consider it logical also to adopt this concept for smaller new building tankers if segregated ballast is required for operating reasons. This position is predicated upon the belief that a reasonable amount of accident protection/ mitigation might be achieved by application of the formula adopted by the U.S. Coast Guard, and that a date for mandatory application of this concept should be selected as soon as reasonably practicable following international acceptance of the value of this concept. MEPC VII/5, "A study of the Comparative Effectiveness of Some Alternatives for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships" submitted by OCIMF to MEPC VII. MEPC VII/5/2, note by the United Kingdom (which also covers cost and effectiveness of LOT, SET, and COW). Further background on these matters is given in the following two documents which are appended to this statement: March 1976 Acapulco symposium paper, "Segregated Ballast Tanker Arrangements for Pollution Abatement Due to Accidents", by Messrs. W. O. Gray, R. K. Kiss, and Cdr. R. A. Sutherland (SYMP IV/1). AIMS booklet, "Tanker Double Bottoms-Yes or No?" Issue.-Inert gas system on all tankers (over 20 MDWT over a five year period except for those carrying high flash point products only). Position.-API continues to support the IMCO decision for inert gas on all newbuilding tankers over 100 MDWT and believes this could logically be extended to retrofitting to crude tankers of these larger sizes. Despite the fact that accident trend analysis indicates no clear need for further mandatory requirements for inert gas, API would be prepared to support an internationally agreed requirement for inert gas on both new buildings and existing crude tankers down to 20 MDWT implemented over a period of up to five years after agreement. It is noted however, that extension of this requirement to product tankers poses possible problems of product contamination. Industry is opposed to any requirement to fit inert gas systems to product tankers of any size. Issue.-Back-up radar system with collision avoidance equipment on all tankers (on all vessels over 10,000 GRT). Position.—API fully supports and has already advocated the requirement for two radars on ships of all types over 5,000 grt, and believes this should be made mandatory in a period as short as one year. API supports a requirement for collision avoidance equipment for ships of all types (not only tankers) over 5,000 GRT to be fitted over a reasonable time period, such as three years, to be selected on the basis of equipment availability. Support is dependent upon development of a reasonable performance specification for collision avoidance equipment being agreed internationally. In this regard, such a specification should be sufficiently flexible to permit logical development and to encourage simple and reliable equipment capable of achieving broad acceptance rather than highly restrictive and sophisticated requirements. Industry support for this concept presupposes that the requirement and specifications would clearly permit the continued use of any present or ordered collision avoidance equipment. It is also essential to point out that a requirement for collision avoidance equipment should carry with it the commitment to adequate training in the use of such equipment for ships' deck officers, and appropriate certification thereto. Issued.-Improved emergency steering standards for all tankers (over 20 MDWT). Position.-API supports the general concept of maximum reliability for steering control systems on larger ships of all types (not only tankers) which could perhaps be placed at the above 1,600 grt range. In regard to U.S. Coast Guard proposals of 16 May, and to IMCO in July it would appear reasonable to have international requirements for a steering failure alarm and for dual control systems, but it is essential for such requirements to be agreed internationally for ships of all types. In this regard, the findings of the ESSO BRUSSELS/SEA WITCH disaster of June 1973 showed that the catastrophe was the result of steering gear control system failure in a smaller non-tanker. It should also be recognized that IMCO had already moved to enact stricter standards in this area in 1974 and 1975. Issue. Electronic navigation position fixing (Loran-C for all vessels over 1600 grt) Position.-API supports requirements for advanced electronic position fixing capability aboard vessels of all types suited to the expected areas of each vessel's trade. API does not support specific international requirements for particular national systems of limited utility for world trading (i.e., Decca, Loran-C, etc.). API recommends requirements be so drafted as to permit logical future development of systems with truly global potential to fill all requirements (i.e., possibly navigational satellite position finding). We also recommend that such navigation equipment requirements should not be analyzed in isolation, but should be reviewed in the overall context of bridge equipment, and training and certification of deck officers along lines already being studied at IMCO's Subcommittees on Safety of Navigation and Standards of Training and Watchkeeping. IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY H.R. 3796 AND S. 682 I have gone into this rather comprehensive review of current international activity because I believe it supports the fundamental API viewpoint that there is probably no need for new legislative initiatives to achieve the results which the Congress and the industry desire. In this regard, I should add, however, that even in the event that international decisions over the next nine months are deemed inadequate by the U.S. government, it still appears to API that the Ports & Waterways Safety Act of 1972 has already placed adequate authority in the hands of the Transportation Department to enact such further regulations as may be needed. This route retains an important flexibility to change regulations as future events indicate to be desirable whereas the legislative approach does not. I would like to conclude the statement with comment on certain specific concepts in the two bills before you. H.R. 3796 would create a 200 mile "maritime safety zone" for preventing discharges and providing navigational safety. This would contravene existing and proposed international agreements. Further, it would be costly for the U.S. to implement and would result in little if any improvements. It could also invite unwanted retaliatory actions by other nations, API strongly recommends deletion of all references to such zone as was done in S. 682. Both S. 682, and more particularly H.R. 3796, address the concept of central national control of pilotage in a way which has the full support of API. Because of possible conflict with state requirements, this may, in fact, be a matter on which a new legislative initiative would eventually be desirable. API is also in support of the basic approach in regard to vessel and cargo documents taken in H.R. 3796. We feel it is essential to have direct and open knowledge of both vessel and cargo owner if progress is to be made towards the identification of substandard ships which are really at the root of most tanker safety and pollution problems. Again, to the extent that greater authority for requiring such documentation may not already exist, API would support new legislation to require such documentation. Also, on the positive side, API believes that the inspection and enforcement concepts advocated by the bills address an essential part of protecting our waters. As previously stated, however, we feel this is an area in which substantial progress is being made already, both internationally and nationally, and would accordingly urge restraint before taking new legislative initiatives. In this regard, API would be very concerned with the proposal in H.R. 3796 which would authorize the Secretary of Transportation to authorize any person to serve as a marine safety officer with broad powers. We feel the basic philosophy should continue to be that all safety officers would be under the direct authority of the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and that they must be suitably trained and qualified, which in most cases would mean commissioned Coast Guard officers. API would be very concerned with the proposed vessel traffic control provisions in H.R. 3796 which direct (as opposed to authorize) the installation of VTS in ports and harbors as well as requiring installation and use of electronic devices, all without reference to the need for these being suitably determined as a function of the specific areas, or equipment. Further, the requirement for computerized tracking for all ports handling over 100 MB/D of hazardous materials is clearly not necessary. This is the equivalent of one 12 MDWT ship per day which hardly needs computer tracking. More fundamentally API believes that the necessary authority for traffic control systems has already been put into the Ports & Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and notes that the U.S. has recently started operation of a number of successful vessel traffic systems. We expect that with growing experience of these systems in the U.S. a distinct improvement in harbor safety will be found as has been the case after many years of experience in Holland, France, U.K., etc. An important new subject raised by S. 682 would be the promulgation by Coast Guard of regulations for lightering operations. API does not believe that the need for such regulations has been established, nor has the subject of lightering been thoroughly reviewed to our knowledge in the U.S. as it has in numerous other areas. Ship-to-ship lightering to remove cargo from large vessels offshore is a standard operation with which the industry has a great deal of recent and successful experience on the high seas over the past 7-8 years. Detailed operational gudelines exist based on a great deal of practical experience, and the safety and environmental protection record has been outstanding. In all cases to our knowledge, including those off U.S. waters more recently, the ship operators have almost always kept local authorities fully informed as to their intentions, plans and procedures. Accordingly API does not feel this matter should be the subject of specific national regulations. H.R. 3796 would require a number of specific technical features not otherwise mentioned, and in some cases rather poorly defined, for which we would question the need. Certainly it is felt that one reliable gyro compass would be a more sensible requirement than two. API also feels that the provision of position transponders may cause more problems than it solves. Principally the difficulty would result from ability to intelligently use or act upon the information ashore. Petroleum Hydrocarbons Introduced into the Oceans (Source "Petroleum in the Marine Environment") 1973 |