other ships, including a tug that I think was sunk. And tugboats kept the loss of life to the level that it was through their bravery. But the New York Fire Department was on board the Alva Cape, which was fully involved with vapors of gasoline.

We were on board within 3 hours. We had the salvage people on within about 6 hours. And at that point in time we were just fighting the fire in close quarters, which took us maybe another 12 hours. Now, we were able to do that for two reasons. First of all, we had the capacity. We had responding at that time five fireboats. And you cannot approach a tanker on fire to that extent, Mr. Chairman, with a fireboat. The risks are too great, and the levels of heat are too high. You have to go in with three fireboats.

We did that in that case, with one backing up the other. And finally we could work our way on board. And we reduced the consequences of that particular incident. We reduced the consequences in the sense that there were no further explosions, there were no further loss of life, and we did not have any timebomb in the harbor at a very critical point over in the Kill Van Kull.

Now, I do not want to sound provincial, but there is no other city, no other U.S. port city, that has been able to afford that kind of capacity, nor have they been able to develop that kind of experience, because they were never funded to develop that capability.

A similar fire on the Gulf Stag in the Gulf of Mexico was allowed to burn out for 10 days. Another east coast city-I do not think it pays to mention it had another similar fire, and that was allowed to burn out, because they just did not have the capacity.

Now, whether you want to take that risk, or you want to block the harbor, and you want to have pollution problems, and you want to run the risk of an explosion, that is a decision that has to be made by the local authorities, because they have other commitments to make with their resources.

Mr. BIAGGI. May I ask, on that point, Commissioner, I can see the advisability sometimes of permitting a vessel to burn out, as long as it is out of the harbor, and so normal traffic is cleared. But how about this consequence, where you have some hazardous material, some LNG, and other comparable hazardous cargoes that have the potential of spreading beyond the immediate vessel, and jeopardizing onshore facilities, residences, and oil terminals?

Could there not well be a triggering incident?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. Well, this is what we felt was the advantage of the risks we took with the Alva Cape. You know, we prevented that because we do, in addition to protecting what we have in New York City, have probably one of the largest concentrations of oil refineries and oil storage facilities over in New Jersey, and we do a large amount of our work over there, and we have had occasions where in one refinery, on at least two occasions-and I think with the same refinery-they had fire involvement with a tanker at their dockside. And they did not want their dockside threatened, so they just cut the tanker loose and let it drift, and gave the problem to us.

Now, our capacity to deal with that, as the Deputy Mayor pointed out, has been severely limited. In the Sea Witch there is another passage in the Coast Guard's record of the hearing on the Sea Witch, Mr. Chairman, that was provided by the crew of the Sea Witch.

That is to say, they were trapped on the fantail of the ship, and completely surrounded by flame. They testified they had no idea of how they were to get off. The only way that we were able to save them is that we had a fully manned ship ready to take off immediately with a 20,000 gallon per minute capacity. You know, a 5,000 or 6,000 gallon ship could never have cut through the wall of fire, and cut a path. And the survivors tell you that a path came through that fire. They did not know where it came from. All they knew was that it was salvation. And that was some 36 people.

Now, we spend about $1 million and a quarter for every one of those fireboats that are manned that way-and we only have one manned that way now-but 36 lives, that was worth it.

Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you on some of these points. I know the answers, but on some of these I am asking for the record.

You testified you go over in New Jersey, and you fight fires in Jersey, on the Jersey shore, where they have terminals.

Now, was the city of New York compensated in any way for this service?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. No, they are not, Congressman. And one of your colleagues, from the good State of New Jersey, when she voted against the bill to help New York City, and when she said that New York City was more or less not her responsibility, well, I always think of her when I get requests from New Jersey for our fireboats. Mr. BIAGGI. I wish I had known that fact in advance.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. But unfortunately, you know, we have serviced New Jersey so long that the mayor and I both feel it would be unconscionable to neglect them when they do have a need.

Mr. BIAGGI. I am not saying that you should not. I may agree with your point of view, but there is something inequitable in that. Commissioner O'HAGEN. Right.

Mr. BIAGGI. But it also points out a need.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BIAGGI. Now, you said something about pumping 20,000 gallons per minute. What is the Coast Guard's capacity to pump; do you

know?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I am not certain, but I think it would be in the hundreds of gallons per minute.

Mr. BIAGGI. I will ask them that.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I think we have a good working relationship with the Coast Guard, and

Mr. BIAGGI. I am not questioning that. I am talking about capacity now. The Coast Guard has been neglected over the years.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I would hate to speak for them, but from conversations with them, I think they would acknowledge they are really not equipped to handle this type of-well, they do not have the pumping equipment to do it.

Mr. BIAGGI. When the Coast Guard testifies, I wish they would respond to that question. I am liable to forget it.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. Well, we will show you this picture a little later here.

The problem of fire protection in the Port of New York is a rather sophisticated one. Marine firefighting is a very difficult and hazardous type of operation; it is highly specialized. And while they do not occur

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frequently, but when they do occur, it is like having a standing army, if you do not have the resources, it is too late to go out and get them

now.

And if you would look at our harbors, and you look in the narrows, at any point in time there is half a dozen to a dozen tankers laying at anchor waiting to deliver their energy that we need so badly. You have passenger ships every week, in and out. We still have the marine terminals that you have talked about, and we have the specter of barging and tanker transportation of LNG in the harbor.

As you are well aware, your previous comments indicate that you know that we do not know as much about LNG as we should know. We were receiving very strong support from the National Aeronautic and Space Agency, in sharing with us their expertise in the handling of cryogenic materials. Unfortunately, I think that there were pressures brought to bear, because I think their efforts were misunderstood, and the work by NASA has been suspended. And it would be helpful if your committee could use your good offices to possibly get their interest redirected back toward this, because they have a lot to offer. And I think that some commercial interests misunderstood their interests, misunderstood NASA's interests to be to develop national standards, you know, for the storage and transportation. That was not their interest. They were sharing their technology with us.

And unfortunately, that has been suspended. So you might be able to help us there.

I would also say that we have had continuing contacts with fire officials from various parts of the country, as far Northwest as Seattle, and as far South as Houston. Houston is now considering making us an offer for one of our surplus fireboats, to help improve their protection in the ship channel, which Chief Pareny of Houston feels should be strengthened.

We are in the process of probably selling one of our boats at a severe discount, you know, to the District of Columbia.

Chief Johnson has asked us for that. So you are correct in ascertaining this as a national problem.

And I am active in the National Fire Service, and I can tell you it is a matter of concern to every chief responsible for a port facility. Mr. BIAGGI. Let me ask you this: From the fireman's point of view, how do they see their relationship with the Coast Guard?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I think the relationship between the fire department and the Coast Guard has improved every year, and I think we look on it as a very favorable one. They are supportive of us. And we do look to them for the type of assistance that they have to offer in terms of influence that they can exert on the owners of the ships.

I would have to point out that at the time of the Alva Cape, the salvage capacity, the ability of the private sector to deal with a major collision like this was very limited, and surprisingly so.

One of the major salvage companies, an internationally known salvage company, showed very little background in dealing with the tankers, although we had them involved right from the beginning. Subsequently, we had a second explosion during the salvage operation, because they would not follow our instructions. That case lingered in the courts for 11 years. And the salvage company and the

owners of the vessel tried to put some of the blame on the city of New York. We were fortunately absolved in the courts after 11 years.

The Coast Guard has been very helpful since then in working jointly with us to attempt to prevent that from happening, but Ì suspect that even now the salvage capabilities in the private sector are weak. But I would say that the relationship with the Coast Guard is excellent.

Mr. BIAGGI. Let me give you my assessment, and you tell me if I am right or wrong. And if I am right, tell me to what degree, and if I am wrong, to what degree.

I think traditionally the Coast Guard sees itself as an adjunct to firefighting, a remote adjunct. Whereas, at least in New York Harbor, traditionally that is a responsibility that has been the fire department's. On a nationwide basis, how does that assessment fit?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I really cannot tell you what it is nationwide. I would say, as far as New York Harbor, that would be my perception, too. On a nationwide basis, I know that in comparison to New York, Mr. Chairman, the local public facilities are very limited to deal with marine incidents, as far as number and capacity of fireboats.

Mr. BIAGGI. If you had your druthers, would you prefer Federal assistance in replenishing your fleet, or would you rather the Coast Guard improved their capacity?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. I think I would go for the first option. And I credit a little of that, you know, to personal pride, and professionalism. But I think that in marine firefighting, that because of the commitment we have given to it in the past, that because of the large amounts of traffic that we have in New York, and the experience we have gained, that we do have an experience that would be unfortunate to just disregard, just discard.

So I think that for the best interests of all, Mr. Chairman, it would be best if some support could be forthcoming for our fireboat fleet, and let us continue to assume the responsibility.

Mr. BIAGGI. You testified that you would permit vessels to burn out, away from dockside, if I recall correctly?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. Well, we have never done that. What we did do with the Alva Cape, is that after the second explosion, we told them that if they did not suspend the salvage operations and remove the ship from the harbor, that we would pull all of our firefighting equipment away. So the resolution of that problem was the towing of the Alva Cape out to sea, where the Coast Guard sunk it.

We, as you know, we attempt to board and fight every fire. In the case of the Sea Witch, that was not possible. We attempted to board her, but she was not stable. As we went aboard her, she started to list. And, of course, you know, that brings up another problem. When you have a fully involved containership-particularly out in the harbor, away from a port-and the mechanisms for moving the containers are all, you know, affected by heat, and distorted, you cannot move them. The heat is such you cannot get to them. It is very difficult to tell, therefore, you know, what is in each container, and it involves a whole new set of firefighting problems.

And in that instance we did have to just stand back and wait and cool it. And eventually all the fire was out. In that particular case we did not board and control it.

I do not think, as a general policy, that I would be in favor of letting vessels-that is, unless they are out at sea, or out of the harborburn out indefinitely.

Mr. BIAGGI. I have to conclude then that if fire is at a terminal, or a pier, that you would fight it?

Commissioner O'HAGEN. That has always been our policy.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Chief O'Hagen, your reputation is known nationally. In California you are very highly thought of. I am sure you are called upon for your advice in other areas frequently.

I would like to ask sort of a continuum or a functional question. In other words, I have a little bit of a problem understanding the role of the city fire department and that of the Coast Guard.

I was in the Coast Guard myself, many years ago, and I know its search-and-rescue operation-and I will be asking them this question, too, but certainly safety, in terms of navigating and movement in and out of harbors, in terms of apparatus to fight fires aboard a ship, in terms of lifesaving, support devices, and things that you might put in the category of "fire prevention" seem to fall into the Coast Guard's function. And I do not know to what extent that falls in your department, and you might elaborate on that, if any.

And then, on the other end of it, if you have not been able to, at these different points, you know, put things in, like bridge-tobridge radio communication, and all the things that have occurredput them in to prevent fires-then if fire in fact occurs in port, at least in New York City, then your local fire department fights the fires.

And I would like to ask if this is true across other ports across the country. And I will probably have the same question of the Coast Guard, in terms of what their role might be in fire suppression.

And as you describe in your testimony yourself, it is not the everyday fire, but usually a big, disastrous type of thing, that calls, I think in your own words, for an Army or a Coast Guard maybe. I do not know.

I just ask that question in the sense that it seems to me that there might be some mutual cooperation, there might be a joint plan, a development of something where you fall in under a disaster plan, and work together.

I know I have probably asked a lot of questions, but that is my feeling.

Commissioner O'HAGEN. When I talked about the standing Army, when we had 10 fireboats, or even 4 now, it is costing us in excess of $5 million. And we may go a whole year without the type of incident, or the magnitude of incidents, such as the Sea Witch and the Alva Cape. So the fireboat fleet is not there to perform an everyday service. It is a disaster resource.

But when the disaster occurs, there is no other alternative to it. Now, when a disaster occurs, we go out with our fireboats, and our large capacity to extinguish the fire. The Coast Guard is there with large tugs to help us, say when they can, come and nudge alongside of a boat, and maybe hold it steady.

In this instance here it was to keep it away from the Verrazano Bridge. And they have access to information regarding the status of