present parliament, the petitioners; the right hon. John Thynne esq. commonly called lord John Thynne, and Charles Palmer, esq. were candidates; and that the notice of the said election was not in pursuance to the sheriff's precept, and that Joseph Phillott, the then mayor and returning officer, acted with gross partiality, and refused to admit the petitioners as candidates, though duly qualified by law to be so, and legally proposed at the said election; and that the said Joseph Phillott, the returning officer, with 21 others, self-appointed, claiming to be freemen, were exclusively proceeding to elect two members of parliament in the Guildhall, the doors of which were closed on the freemen and citizens of the said city, at the hour appointed for the election to commence, being also guarded by above 30 ruffians called bludgeon-men, who were protected in all their gross outrages and violence on the freemen and citizens of the said city, contrary to the freedom of election, the express law of the land, and the privileges of the House, and so continued till the Guildhall was thrown open with some violence from without; and that the Durham Act was not read, though repeatedly required; and that on trivial pretences, and without any justifiable reason, a large military force was introduced into the said city, during the election, to disperse a portion of the freemen legally assembled, and to prevent the exercise of their elective franchise contrary to their rights and the privileges of the House; and that the said Joseph Phillott, as returning officer, refused to admit a majority of the freemen of the said city to vote for the petitioners, and admitted to vote at the said election only 22 persons, styling themselves the mayor, aldermen, common council and freemen of the city of Bath, most of whom have been illegally admitted to the freedom of the said city, and most of whom are also honorary freemen not qualified to vote, thereby giving to 22 self-appointed individuals the exclusive right of choosing two representatives for a city containing a population of 35,000 persons, and excluding the whole body of the freemen who have legally and constitutionally obtained the right of freedom in the said city, and who have voted in the election of members to represent the city of Bath in parliament from time immemorial, till they were illegally deprived of the same by the admission of a new order of persons styl

ing themselves freemen, who purchase the same at 2501. each, and which sum is never accounted for to the legal freemen, though they are entitled to partake of the receipts of the estates belonging to the freemen of the said city, and that the right of electing two members to represent the city of Bath has been usurped by 30 individuals, many of whom do not ever reside in the said city, and others hold sinecure places and pensions to a great amount in the court of Exchequer, Lottery Office, Stamp Office, and other situations under government, and that the said Joseph Phillott, as mayor and returning officer, refused to admit a majority of legal votes who desired to vote. for the petitioners, and received others who had not been duly admitted to their freedom to vote for the sitting members, whereby a colourable majority was obtained for lord John Thynne and Charles Palmer esq., who were not duly qualified to represent the said city as the law directs; and praying such relief as to the House shall appear meet."

Ordered to be taken into consideration upon the 11th of February next.


VOTE OF THANKS TO THE MARQUIS OF WELLINGTON VICTORY OF SALA MANCA.] Lord Castlereagh rose, pursuant to the notice he had given on a former day, to call the attention of the House to the services rendered to their country by that gallant officer, general.the marquis of Wellington, and the brave army under his command during the last campaign in Spain, and particularly to those by which they had signalised themselves in the glorious and ever-memorable battle of Salamanca. He was sure he should forget his duty to the House, the country, and to that illustrious officer and his army, if on this occasion he were to introduce into the discussion any matter that might cause a controversial feeling respecting the policy of the war in the peninsula, and more especially if he were to offer any thing respecting the conduct of his Majes ty's ministers in connection with the subject of the motion he was about to submit to the House. Any charges that might be preferred against them for the mode in which that war had been conducted, they would be happy to meet on a future day. On this, they hoped it would not be necessary, as it was their wish to bring forward nothing that might divide the feelings of the House and the public, and abstract them from that subject, on which all de

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lighted to dwell with admiration and gratitude. At the same time, however, while he wished to guard against the introduction of any matter on which a difference of opinion might exist; he thought it would not be just to the army, and more particularly, he thought, it would not be just to the marquis of Wellington, if he were to confine himself to the feelings excited by that great transaction, considered as an insulated affair, brilliant as it was in itself, and great and glorious as it was, and a more glorious action had never adorned the annals of this or any other great military power: for he was proud to say, this country had become a great military power, though formerly looked to principally as a naval one by the other nations of Europe. But still he contended, it would be to let down and to undervalue the victory of Salamanca, if it were to be brought before the House unconnected with other considerations, and not as it stood, connected on the grand scale of the military operations of which it formed so pre-eminent a part. This was not a victory which had been thrown in the way of lord Wellington, which he had been able to accomplish, and gloriously accomplish, on the instant; but it was a transaction which wound up a military object, the result of long preparation and of foresight, in which the application of just principles was so interwoven with various circumstances, that he should fail in his duty to the army, and to the marquis of Wellington, if he were not shortly and generally to describe the causes which had led to the Victory of Salamanca, and its consequent advantages. The House would recollect, that at the close of the former, and at the commencement of the present campaign, lord Wellington, after dispossessing Massena of Portugal, had made himself master of Almeida, but Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were still in the hands of the enemy. Both armies had retired into winter quarters, and remained for some time in inactivity on account of the season; but such vigorous preparations for renewing hostilities were made by the marquis of Wellington so early as January, (a period at which, even in that clime, armies have seldom been occupied in preparing to take the field) that in that month he was enabled to lay siege to Ciudad Rodrigo. Nothing higher to the praise of the marquis of Wellington could be said, than that he had completed his preparations for this operation with such activity and secrecy,

that he was enabled to reduce this fortress (which was one of a most respectable decription) before marshal Marmont was able to call his troops from their winter cantonments, and advance further than Salamanca. Lord Wellington having got possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, meditated an advance on Badajoz, and his arrangements consequent on this design were made with so much expedition and secrecy, that marshal Marmont believed the English army to be still at Ciudad Rodrigo, when seven of eight divisions had arrived at Badajoz. He attacked this fortress, which was stronger and of more importance than that. of Ciudad Rodrigo, early in the month of March, and carried on the works with such vigour and alacrity, that the French armies of the north and of Portugal, under Soult and Marmont, were unable to relieve it, and it was even confessed by Soult, an officer of great ability, in explaining to the war minister of France the causes of the loss of Badajoz-it was admitted in his dispatches to Berthier, which were intercepted, that lord Wellington had taken Badajoz in the face of two armies, each of which in strength was equal to his own. It was stated by Soult that the army under lord Wellington was not superior to that under his command, nor to that commanded by Marmont; but he stated the difficulty of assembling troops to be so great, and the rapidity of lord Wellington's movements to be so extraordinary (an admission most honourable to the gallant marquis, more particularly as it came from an enemy), his operations carried on with such celerity, the siege pressed with such vigour, and the assault made with such gallantry, as to exceed all his calculations: so that he had only reached Albuera with his army, on his way to relieve the fortress, when he received intelligence that it had fallen. These services then, it would be seen, lord Wellington had accomplished under circumstances of great difficulty. He had taken two important fortresses, in the presence of two armies, respectively equal in numbers to his own, and in such a way as to extort from the French commanders an acknowledgment, that all their preparations were rendered useless, and all their efforts foiled. Lord Wellington having done these services, which of themselves would have appeared most splendid in the career of an individual less illustrious than himself, and completed that task which had been the glorious ob

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ject of a former campaign, and expelled the enemy from the country of an ally always wound up in the interest and affections of England-Portugal. After this he had still a great object before him; it was for him to direct his force so as to effect what he might be capable of doing for the interest of Spain, with a view to repel the invading army. Lord Wellington had now to compare his army with that of the enemy, and to deliberate on what would be the probable result of the campaign. Though the army under him was certainly both respectable and important, yet when he compared it with the means of the enemy, a very grave prospect appeared before him, and he certainly could not flatter himself with a result like that which had crowned his measures. The French armies were so strong, though the successes of lord Wellington had caused their strength to be frequently under-rated in this country, and indeed by the world at large; that the gallant marquis did not expect to be enabled with his means to drive them out of Spain, (as many sanguine persons did), but he felt that he might force them to abandon the military hold they had at that time; that grasp of the country, on which alone the French must ground their hopes of ultimate success. These, unless they could now retain, he would venture to say they were farther off the consummation of their hopes, than at any period of the four years during which the war had been continued in the peninsula. He would repeat it, unless the moral subjugation of the people could be effected, which the military possession of the country could alone secure, the French were further from the end they had in view than at any period of the last four years. The noble lord did not look at that time to the complete expulsion of the enemy from Spain, and this he distinctly stated in his communications with his government; he (lord Castlereagh) did not speak of what he might have written to individuals; but to those under whom he served, the language of lord Wellington was this: "If I can reduce the two fortresses (Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz), and place Portugal under their protection, my next operation shall

into Andalusia, this will be my object." When lord Wellington had reduced Badajos, in consequence, certainly, of a circumstance for which he was not responsible, the delay on the part of the Spaniards to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo, he was obliged to march to protect that fortress, and secure that interesting frontier of Portugal. The noble lord afterwards stated, that he did not altogether regret that circumstances had caused him to direct an operation in the north instead of the south, as he had intended; and he hoped, as he found himself at the head of an army to which he could look with confidence for success in an action with Marmont, he might in that quarter, more particularly if Castile were thrown open, able to do that which would deliver Andalusia more completely than if, as he had first intended after the capture of Badajoz, he had advanced against the French in that province itself. The climate also he found more favourable to his soldiers, and he advanced with a perfect confidence in the moral qualities and physical force of his army. He (lord C.) begged the House to bear this in mind. Lord Wellington did make an irruption into Castile. He drove the French from Salamanca, and advanced upon the line of the Douro. Though at the commencement of these operations, his army was such that he could court a general action with Marmont, when he arrived upon the line of the Douro, this was no longer the case. The French, as was their practice, sacrificed all the hold they had of the country, by withdrawing their troops from the several fortresses they had previously occupied, to make head against lord Welling. ton. Before the battle of Salamanca, Marmont was reinforced from Leon and Estremadura, from the army of Caffarelli, and from the army of Madrid. From that moment lord Wellington said, "I am not prepared to risk a general battle, unless I find that upon military grounds I engage you with a prospect of success." This lord Wellington laid down as the principle on which he would act-a principle in every respect correct, and consistent with his genius. It was not for us to court general engagements in the ab.

be directed to the south of Spain, to de-stract. The French might wish to do so; prive the enemy of the resources they but lord Wellington felt, that while he repossess in Seville; or if I oblige them to mained in Spain with such an army, the collect an army to defend them, I shall country never could be conquered; and it then compel them to raise the siege of was his object to make the French abanCadiz. If from Badajoz I can advance don all but the ground on which they

stood, till he found them in such a situa-
tion as would enable him to turn it to
their discomfiture and defeat. Upon these
principles he acted up to the battle of
lamanca, and when the French crossed the
Douro, (an opportunity of which lord
Wellington could not deprive them from
being in possession of the fords and
bridges, so that was impossible for him,
with an inferior army, to make the Douro
a military position,) he then retreated; but
his retreat was made on this principle.
"If you give me an advantage, I will at-
tack you, but otherwise I will not put to
the risk of a single battle the cause of the
peninsula, which may ultimately triumph
without such a sacrifice." And what was
the result of this determination? It led to
that great action, which not only filled
the nation with gratitude, but inspirited
other countries to oppose the aggressions
of France-an action, of which it was
justly said, on a former evening, that, in
the history of all the battles which the
campaign in Spain, or in any other coun-
try, presented, there was none which could
be less imputed to chance than the battle
of Salamanca. It was not one, the armies
engaged in which met but the hour before
they engaged, and decided the struggle
by force of arms unaided by policy; but
it was a battle fought between two great
armies (for they both were great) nearly
equal in numbers, though a superiority
was certainly on the side of the enemy,
after looking at each other, and not only
looking at each other, but watching, ma-
noeuvring in each others presence for an
advantageous opportunity of attack, from
the 16th of July to the 22d of that month,
the day on which the glorious and ever-
memorable battle of Salamanca was fought.
~Without going into the detail, which he
thought unnecessary, as every English-
man must be familiar with it, from having
read the Gazette with the highest interest
and delight over and over again; he
would repeat that this was a victory
achieved after manœuvres the most com-
plicated, where two armies were long in
sight of each other, each observing what
the other did, and trying, by every effort
of military skill, to take advantage of any
errors that might occur. The greatness
of his mind was the admiration of all
Europe. In him was seen a general not
tenacious of what might be said by his
enemies, not putting to risk his army to
maintain a particular position, but saying
to himself and to his government, "I will

even do that which must at all times be painful to a commander, I will retreat before the enemy. I will even retreat to Sa-Ciudad Rodrigo, rather than give any advantage to the enemy; but if, in the course of my retreat, I can take any opportunity of attacking him with a prospect of success;-if his weakness, or my ad, dress, should enable me to take any advantage of him, without committing my own army, without committing my country, and above all without commiiting that great interest entrusted to my care, then will I revenge the crimes by which France has disgraced herself; and attacking the enemy with that spirit and firmness which belongs to my nature, make him feel what my countrymen are capable of effecting in such a cause.". Such had been the object, and such was the language of our illustrious commander; and the proud and ever-memorable victory of Salamanca grew out of this resolution. He asked the House, whether he had not faithfully performed the promised object, by a battle, than which there was never one fought more nobly, or with more advantage to the common cause? Twenty thousand men had been put hors de combat; and the advantage would have been still greater, had not night, and the force of nature, interfered to prevent all those results which were aspired after. The loss of the French army in the fight, and through the consequences which naturally resulted from it, could not be estimated at less than the above number. He contended, that the plan of campaign, as originally conceived by lord Wellington, (which did not aspire to effect the total expulsion of the enemy, whose expulsion, on military principles, was not to be expected, even from a victory glorious as that of Salamanca) had been perfectly realized. The object of lord Wellington's operations in the north was to force the enemy to quit his hold of the country in the south, and to do that which the French officers were instructed by their government never to do, if it could by possibility be avoided, namely, to raise the siege of Cadiz. The French government was afraid of the moral effects of their raising the siege of Cadiz, and hence these orders; as they believed that while they appeared in strength before Cadiz, the world would give them credit for being strong in Spain. He put it to the House, then, if the operations of lord Wellington had not compelled the enemy to abandon the siege of Cadiz,

the whole of Andalusia, and left them with-
out any force to the westward of Alicant.
What was the situation of Spain at present?
Lord Wellington had said, that but for
one unfortunate circumstance the success
of the campaign would have been certain.
Success would have been certain, had not
the French collected the whole of their
disposable force, amounting to not less than
70 or 80,000 men, upon the Tormes, and
compelled lord Wellington prudentially to
make a retreat, a retreat which was more
like the prelude to a victory than a proof
of disaster. The enemy had only been
enabled to compel him to retreat by an
abdication of every military principle
which had regulated their conduct before.
If Madrid had been a position of military
importance, which it was not, the case
would have been materially different from
what it at present appeared. Lord Wel-
lington had not taken possession of it as a
military position, nor had he advanced
upon it for the vain glory of taking the
enemy's capital, he did nothing for mere
parade-he went there on this principle;
he knew that unless by advancing he
threw a large force on the flank of Soult,
he could not make that general do what
was really the object of his operations
raise the siege of Cadiz, while Andalusia
and the southern provinces of Spain were
delivered from the enemy. What, too,
was the result of these operations? The
French, in consequence, did abandoning
Cadiz; they had since abandoned Madrid,
and thus had lost the moral conquest of
Spain. They were obliged to evacuate
the capital in their turns as well as us, and
were now only in possession of the ground
on which they stood, and as far as ever
from effecting the military or moral sub-
jugation of the country. And, he should
be glad to know a position in which a
French army could be placed, less useful
to themselves or less prejudicial to the in-
terests of Europe? But if they were to
measure the influence of the victory of
Salamanca only by what it had produced
in Spain, he would say, their estimate of
its value would be most unfair, most un-
wise, most untrue, in the circumstances in
which Europe was at present placed. Did
the House imagine that that spirit of re-
sistance which grew out of that House, or
rather out of that people they represented
in that House, (for he should like to know
what ministers could have retained their
situations in this country, who at such a
period had not obeyed the universal im-


pulse and turned their backs on the exertions of Spain) did they think that that spirit had nothing to do with that which had recently manifested itself in another part of the world? Even the retreat of lord Wellington to Torres Vedras had been of service to that power which now, awakened to a sense of its own strength, had resisted and chastised the power of France, and from which so much might be augured for Europe. But with Russia, the hopes excited by the Spanish resistance did not end: beginning at the extremity, it was to be hoped its influence would extend further into Europe-to those powers which now, indeed, appeared to form a part of the strength of France, but which, in fact, were only unnaturally connected with her, he meant the whole power of Germany. Such were the effects resulting from this battle; and which the House might justly trace to itself, as well as to its brave army, and its distinguished general. Did the House know that the cha>\ racter of the great battle of Borodino, for it was a great battle, was partly caused by lord Wellington; a battle greater than that of Eylau, greater than that of Aspern, and that in which the power of France had received one of the severest checks it had ever received. In that great battle, in which 70 or 80,000 men laid down their lives, it was consoling to know that prince Kutusoff had it in his power, on the morn

of that day, to animate his troops by telling them of the glory gained by the English on the plains of Salamanca.-Did not the House feel that it must be most animating to the Russian army to know that the marquis of Wellington had at Salamanca completely routed the French army? To be told, that if they stood to the enemy like Englishmen, they would achieve as great a triumph, and as great a triumph they did achieve? For, though from various circumstances it was found impossible to follow up that victory, still it was a victory, than which a prouder triumph never was obtained by the forces of any country. In that action, that dis tinguished general prince Bagration, whose loss we had since to deplore, with 30,000 men, repelled the whole military power of France directed to one point. But it was not at Borodino only that lord Wellington had served the cause of Russia by the influence of his actions, and where the moral effects of his victory were foundthey pervaded the whole Russian empire. Russia had been assisted by his military

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