and observed, that with regard to the first paragraph of the Speech from the throne, which related to the continuance of his Majesty's lamented indisposition, no one could possibly feel more real concern than himself. It was not his intention, nor did he feel it necessary, after the able exposition their lordships had heard, to enter into any detailed view of the important topics in question. The spirited and judicions conduct of his Majesty's governpro-ment, under circumstances the most trying and arduous, had his warmest approbation, and called for that of the country; nor should, he thought, the prudent, affectionate, and kind manner in which his Royal Highness acted on a trying and im portant occasion, go without its merited applause. The system adopted by his Majesty's government was productive of consequences which, he agreed with the noble earl in thinking, would lead to the deliverance of Europe from the tyranny and oppression under which it groaned. But, in this view, he could not avoid noticing the effectual resistance which the em peror of Russia, so greatly to his own honour, had offered to the destructive progress of the enemy. Nor were his subjects less entitled to praise for their pa triotic efforts in defence of their lawful sovereign and national independence. He trusted that the conduct of his Majesty's government, with respect to the United States of America, would have its due effect, and that the maritime rights of the country, upon which so much depended, would be asserted and upheld.-These were the prominent points to which the noble lord directed the attention of the House, and concluded by expressing his cordial approbation of the Address.

Marquis Wellesley said, he could not have approved either of the Speech, or of the Address proposed, had they, with respect to the great contest in the peninsula, or the cause in which the emperor of Russia was now engaged with all the efforts of his people, assumed in any degree a lower tone than that which pervaded them. Nothing less was demanded by the great interests of the country, by a proper zeal for our honour or our wel fare, or by a true regard to the interests of our allies embarked in the same mighty cause with ourselves. In all those points he not only applauded the spirit of the Speech which their lordships had just heard delivered, but he almost entirely approved of the general spirit of the Ad

the Russian fleet, he had given a proof of
his implicit faith in England.-The new
treaty with the Sicilians was very favour-
able, their troops being thereby made
more efficient to the general cause. Thus
was the aspect of European affairs highly
favourable. Not long since they had seen
the whole continent of Europe arrayed
under the despotic dominion of Buona-
parté; but they now saw efforts making
to throw off that odious dominion, that
gave the fairest and most flattering
mise. They already saw the difficulties
by which Buonaparté was surrounded.
He not only met with obstructions to his
efforts to recruit his army, but appeared
actually unable to supply the army which
was already opposed to Russia. It might
be hence fairly concluded, that the mili-
tary despotism of our foe had received a
deadly shock, if it were not now trem-
bling to its very base. All these advan-
tages were to be traced to the conduct of
this country, to its undaunted efforts in
the peninsula; and from what had passed,
their lordships might fairly place a confi-
dence in the future. Europe had now an
opportunity of arousing from her lethar
gy, and there was reason to hope that the
opportunity would not be lost.-As to the
war with America, that event was much
to be lamented; and it being the belief in
this country, that it could not continue,
was the cause of our not having more vi-
gorously prosecuted it hitherto. In Ca-
nada, however, honourable and glorious
proofs had been given of the fidelity and
loyalty of that portion of his Majesty's
subjects. As to the triumphs of the Ame-
ricans at sea, and triumphs, no doubt, they
called them, they owed them to the very
general belief amongst us, that the war
could not continue. The war might be
injurious to us, but he confidently hoped,
that its continuance would not be for any
very extended period.-The East India
question was one of great interest, and
would deservedly have the serious attention
of parliament. The appearance of do-
mestic affairs, as set forth in the Speech,
was highly gratifying, and it could not
fail to make a pleasing impression on their
lordships to ascertain, that order had been
restored in those districts that had been
somewhat disturbed. The noble earl then
concluded with moving, that an Address
be presented to his royal highness the
Prince Regent, which, as usual, was an
cho of the Speech.

Lord Rolle rose to second the motion,

dress consequent upon it, moved and seconded by his noble friends.-Of all the parts of the Speech, however, none struck him more forcibly, none made a stronger impression upon his mind, than that which anticipated the same wisdom in parliament, the same firmness, and the same prudence, on the present trying occasion, when the eyes of all Europe, nay, of the whole world, were fixed upon us. There was nothing novel, he admitted, either in the subjects, or in the expressions:-the novelty was rather in the application of them. Yes! he had, no doubt, the parliament would exercise the same wisdom, it would evince the same perseverance, it would display the same firmness, especially on the great question of the war in the peninsula, as it had hitherto shewn. It was to that country in particular he wished for a few moments to direct their lordships' attention: its situation was to be considered in various respects; but in no respect would any man venture to say, that the triumphs which had been achieved there, were of such a description as to be totally unqualified; admit of unbounded triumph; or cause unmixed congratulation; no man could say that victory had so predominated, that its career was unchecked by a single reverse. But, as it was certainly the highest part of the character of wisdom to persevere with reasonable grounds of hope, in the face of danger, difficulty and discomfiture, so it was the highest character of firmness to meet the tide of success without intoxication, to look it steadily in the face, to analyze the grounds upon which it stood, and from that analysis, carefully and cautiously pursued, to deduce one general and consistent ground of public action. Even if our success had been broad, general, splendid and unqualified, he would say to those who represented a wise and enlightened nation, to those who were prepared and anxious to do their dutybe not led away by this success-be not intoxicated with it-let not its lustre so dazzle your faculties that you perceive neither whence it originated, how it may be rendered permanent, nor to what ultimate objects it may be applied. And this he would say, not for the purpose of disparaging that success, nor to raise any spirit of discontent, but for the sole purpose of producing a due tone of reflection, from which might spring one consistent, one general line of public conduct en a measure of policy so important and

vitally interwoven with the best interests of the British nation. We had, indeed, done much in Spain: he was most willing to admit it; but, he would ask, what still remained to be done? And that question naturally led him to a review of the events which had taken place there since no very distant period: he would limit himself to the time when lord Wellington was before Badajoz. It had always appeared to him, from the very commencement of the struggle in the peninsula, that the only solid ground of success, the only reasonable hope of ultimate victory, the only practical system of resistance which could be adopted, was to awaken in the people of Spain, a spirit of hostility to France, and to succour and aid that hostility upon a broad and extensive scale of operations. With our force and resources properly directed in that way great advantages might be expected, and final triumph be safely calculated upon. It was, indeed, perfectly clear, that the measureless ambition of the leader of France never would desist from its object, till some strong and energetic force should check its progress on the one side or other. If the Spanish nation could once bring themselves to feel that there was no evil, no human evil, scarcely indeed an evil beyond the verge of humanity, to be put in competition for a moment with that of submission to the government of France; that loss of property, loss of relations, loss of all that was dear to them, loss of life itself, was small and insignificant, compared to that tremendous and overwhelming calamitysubmission to France; if they could be brought to this pitch of patriotism and resistance, every thing might then be hoped from the contest. It was true, indeed, that the perseverance he had described was a species of which philosophy afforded no definition, nor history any record; but it was by that spirit alone that any thing great could be achieved in the struggle between Spain and France. Our assistance co-operating with this general feeling, might have been productive of the utmost benefits. The great person who now ruled over the destinies of France (for great he could not hesitate to call him) would, it might be presumed, were such a system pursued, find himself, by the success of our arms, reduced to the necessity of abandoning the cause, or, his ambition, leading to the exertion of all his means and energies in this one quarter, would open the way for other enemies in

other parts of Europe, who would be eager to seize the opportunity of his reverses in Spain, to shake off the yoke of his subjugation; he would be compelled to divide his forces, and thus present a prospect of more easy success to our combined efforts in the peninsula.

Such was the view he had always taken of the contest in Spain; and with regard to the spirit of universal hostility in the people, which he deemed so essential, he would assert, without fear of contradiction, that it had been produced in its fullest extent in the course of last year. He was not speaking of any thing which it might be thought he had no liberty to express: he was not alluding to any thing which had come to his knowledge merely through an official channel: he asserted only what every one might know, who had directed his attention to what had occurred in the peninsula during that period. He also knew it as a fact which no one would ven、 ture to deny, that the success of the British arms in Spain had been felt and considered in Russia, as the salvation of that country, and if it had not been for our triumphs there, the leader of France would have been able to direct a military force against Russia, so vast and overwhelming as to preclude the hope of that power's resisting it with any prospect of success.

But, was not all this foreseen, and was not this the very basis on which the system to be pursued in our present situation should be founded: What then followed from the fact? The moment it was known that such effects were taking place; the moment it was known that the desired action was commencing on the one side, ought we not to have pushed every effort on the other side, ought we not to have strained all the resources of the country, he would say to their very utmost: and, if we were honest in our exertions in behalf of the cause, ought we not to have seized this momentous crisis as it occurred, to strike one grand and decisive blow?

In these preliminary views of the question, which he had ventured to offer to their lordships, his great purpose was to inquire, and to instigate their lordships to inquire, whether the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles, whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed; and whether, upon the whole, the result had been such as the nation had

a right to expect, from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He could wish also that it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like a definite and precise object as to the issue of the contest in the peninsula. His own idea as to the only true and legitimate object of that contest was, that it involved the expulsion of the French armies from Spain: this he considered as the plain and practical object: it was intelligible to all, and he would detain their lordships only a few moments, while he inquired what had been done in the course of the present year, towards its accomplishment, compared to what might have been done if our resources had been properly, wisely, and efficiently employed.

His own opinion decidedly was, that the war in the peninsula had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result which he had stated as the only true and practical one of the contest. He would carry his inquiries back (and with as much brevity as possible) to the period a little before the reduction of Badajoz, somewhere about the beginning of April last. At that time the great general who commanded our armies in Spain having reduced that important fortress, his next step, it was natural to suppose, especially at that season of the year, would be to expel the French from the south of Spain. But why did he not do so? Because his means were deficient; because he was under the necessity of abandoning his object, that of marching against Soult, and raising the siege of Cadiz, from inadequate resources; and he was under the necessity of marching northward with his army, because in the North of Spain he had no force which he could leave sufficient to check and resist the progress of Marmont. To the north he accordingly did proceed, and there he was,, from an operation of the same causes, compelled to remain on the frontiers of Spain till the 13th of June, and by that time Marmont's army was in such a state from the accession of reinforcements that it became doubtful whether the British commander could advance or not. But why did he remain so long? Because his means of advancing were insufficient; because he wanted money and supplies of every sort; because he had not the common means of transport to convey his artillery. These were stubborn facts which he defied any one to contradict. At last,

finances? Forty thousand dollars had been sent to Cadiz, for the use of the Spaniards: these he was forced to intercept, and apply to the exigencies of the British army. Upon a fair comparison of his force with that of Marmont, and taking into calculation the reinforcement of Joseph's army by the detachment from Suchet, which detachment he would have been unable to spare, if the Sicilian expedition had arrived in due time on the eastern coast of Spain, as it would have fully occupied his whole army, lord Wellington deemed it most prudent to retreat, and he accordingly did so. Here he would re quest their lordships to pause for a mo ment. Here was a proof of lord Wellington's inadequacy of means. He retreated; and in ascribing that retreat to a want of

however, lord Wellington advanced without a battering train, not because he thought it unnecessary for the success of his military operations, but because he literally had not the means of transporting it. But then, after lord Wellington did advance, what state was he in? He found Marmont's army much stronger than he expected: and he also discovered another circumstance-his object in advancing (and here he begged leave distinctly to assert that he spoke from no other knowledge of lord Wellington's plans than what any person might acquire who had attentively watched the whole course of the proceedings in Spain-for not one syllable concerning them did he derive from any communication with that great general on the subject)-his object in advancing was, he maintained, in ex-resources, he was borrowing nothing from pectation of a powerful co-operation on his imagination. The cause and effect the other side of the peninsula, and which were plain before them; and he might co-operation had been concerted with him reason upon the subject, either from the even at the time he was before Badajoz. cause to the effect, or from the effect to He, therefore, must have expected the as- the cause. He might shew that his means sistance of this force at the time of his were inadequate, and therefore he was advance into Spain; for, had he not so compelled to retreat, or he might argue expected it, he would venture to say that from the fact of the retreat, that he want. his advance into that country would have ed the power to pursue his operations: been unjustifiable, even though success and this deficiency of power arose chiefly, had ultimately attended his progress. It if not entirely, from the tardy and ineffi was certain, however, that he remained a cient co-operation of the Sicilian expeconsiderable time on the frontier, waiting dition. for intelligence of the looked for arrival of this co-operating force, but waiting in vain; he then proceeded forward, still confident in his hope that it would arrive sufficiently early to make a strong diversion in his favour, and found, as their lordships were already informed, the army of Marmont much greater than he expected. Nor was that all he found: he found that Suchet had detached a corps to unite with Joseph's army, and which made his force efficient to co-operate with Marmont's army. What was the consequence? On the 17th of July, five days before the battle of Salamanca, lord Wellington commenced, not a feigned, but a real retreat, and this retreat he continued during the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and till late in the day of the 22d. But why did he retreat? Why did this great general retreat? cause, again, his means were inadequate. He had no money: he was so low in money that he had not 20,000 dollars in his military chest. The richest brigade in the army did not possess more than 3,000 dollars: and what were the only means left to this deserted general to recruit his

The next step in tracing the progress of lord Wellington, brought him to a period full of glory and renown; he meant the battle of Salamanca. But from what cir cumstances did that battle arise? Did it arise out of his efficiency, or out of his necessity? It arose from the magnificence, the splendour, the greatness of his talents. He struck the enemy with his spear the moment he saw an opening. But were we to hope for that again-was that a ground to build upon? His talents, indeed, were a firm and secure rock on which any hopes, any expectations, however great, however exalted, might be founded; but it ill became statesmen to calculate upon chances and occasions presenting themselves, for success in operations upon the prosperous issue of which so much deBe-pended. Did the ministry mean to say that their system was raised solely upon the resplendent abilities of a consummate general, and upon the errors of the enemy? Did they mean to affirm that all their plans amounted only to that? The battle of Salamanca was certainly productive of great events; the evacuation of the South of

Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, and the occupation of Madrid by our troops. But did it secure those advantages? Did they remain permanent? Was lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont? No. He was not able to do that, which so obviously he ought to have done, because Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps from Suchet, was hanging on his flank, and afterwards on his rear. It was neces sary to disperse that army. He did so, and entered Madrid. Could he then march southward to pursue the career of his conquests? No. He found that the corps which he had so lately defeated, the army over which he had so recently triumphed, was strong again, and he was compelled to direct his course to the north once more, to meet them. Then followed the siege of Burgos, and all he should say upon that subject was, that so far from considering as a disappointment the failure of lord Wellington in his attempt to reduce that fortress-it was madness to suppose that a fortress of such a description could be reduced by a few guns. He could not conceive, indeed, how any calculations founded upon success could be entertained, when lord Wellington's means were confessedly inadequate according to all the established rules of war.

force, especially in cavalry, the most dreadful of all species of superiority in that country. He (marquis Wellesley) had a right therefore to assume, that on the 25th of October, that army which lord Wellington had conquered on the plains of Salamanca, that army which he had driven before him on that memorable day, with a grandeur of military achievement which the language of history or poetry could never equal, which imagination herself could not decorate with a splendor beyond the colouring of truth, and which ranked him among the most renowned generals of this or any other age, he had a right to infer that that army had received strong and efficient reinforcements since the battle of Salamanca. Now, where was lord Wellington's reinforcements during the same period? Scattered every where: some in port at home, some on the ocean, and some landed at too great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen hundred men reached him on the 24th, four days after he had begun his retreat. Where were the others? One regiment advanced as far as Benevento, and were forced to retreat again to the frontiers. Two regiments were landed at Corunna, and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where they arrived just in time, probably, to reach lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign, certainly not much sooner.

Again, when it was understood, so far back as the month of June last, that lord Wellington was advancing into Spain, was it possible not to see that France, being engaged in a war with Russia, must necessarily detach a great part of her force to that quarter of Europe, and that then was the moment, not only in reference to that event, but also to the temper of the Spanish nation, to send out sufficient reinforcements to enable lord Wellington to proceed upon a large and effective scale of operations? Without such reinforcements it was manifestly imprudent to advance into Spain. He (marquis Wellesley) at that period holding the seals of office, had repeatedly urged in his dispatches that it would be highly dangerous to advance into Spain without such a command-quence of the improved fortune of our ing force, and such co-operation as would affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part almost secure success; under any other of our force might be spared to co-operate circumstances it was not only disadvanta- with our armies in Spain: and, if it had geous to the cause, but it was perilous to arrived at the proper season on the souththe parties. Now, how was lord Welling- east coast of that country, at the time ton reinforced? On the 21st of October when lord Wellington fully expected it, he thought it necessary to retire from Suchet would have been utterly unable to Burgos on the 25th he saw the French detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: army, and we knew from his dispatches Joseph must rather have hastened to asthat they were greatly superior to his own sist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would

Such was the state of the war in the peninsula-such the manuer in which it had been conducted-and he would ask their lordships whether, if the same exertions had been used by the ministers in this country as were employed by the enemy, might not lord Wellington have been able to prosecute to their full extent his operations against Burgos? He would now, however, call their attention for a few moments to the Sicilian expedition, as it had been denominated. He had stated that the plan of that expedition had been concerted with lord Wellington when he was before Badajoz. In conse

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