the Russian fleet, he had given a proof of his implicit faith in England.-The new treaty with the Sicilians was very favourable, their troops being thereby made more efficient to the general cause. Thus was the aspect of European affairs highly favourable. Not long since they had seen the whole continent of Europe arrayed under the despotic dominion of Buonaparté; but they now saw efforts making to throw off that odious dominion, that gave the fairest and most flattering promise. They already saw the difficulties by which Buonaparté was surrounded. He not only met with obstructions to his efforts to recruit his army, but appeared actually unable to supply the army which was already opposed to Russia. It might be hence fairly concluded, that the military despotism of our foe had received a deadly shock, if it were not now trembling to its very base. All these advantages were to be traced to the conduct of this country, to its undaunted efforts in the peninsula; and from what had passed, their lordships might fairly place a confidence in the future. Europe had now an opportunity of arousing from her lethargy, and there was reason to hope that the opportunity would not be lost.-As to the war with America, that event was much to be lamented; and it being the belief in this country, that it could not continue, was the cause of our not having more vigorously prosecuted it hitherto. In Canada, however, honourable and glorious proofs had been given of the fidelity and loyalty of that portion of his Majesty's subjects. As to the triumphs of the Americans at sea, and triumphs, no doubt, they called them, they owed them to the very general belief amongst us, that the war could not continue. The war might be injurious to us, but he confidently hoped, that its continuance would not be for any very extended period.-The East India question was one of great interest, and would deservedly have the serious attention of parliament. The appearance of domestic affairs, as set forth in the Speech, was highly gratifying, and it could not fail to make a pleasing impression on their lordships to ascertain, that order had been restored in those districts that had been somewhat disturbed. The noble earl then concluded with moving, that an Address be presented to his royal highness the Prince Regent, which, as usual, was an cho of the Speech. Lord Rolle rose to second the motion, and observed, that with regard to the first paragraph of the Speech from the throne, which related to the continuance of his Majesty's lamented indisposition, no one could possibly feel more real concern than himself. It was not his intention, nor did he feel it necessary, after the able exposition their lordships had heard, to enter into any detailed view of the important topics in question. The spirited and judicious conduct of his Majesty's government, under circumstances the most trying and arduous, had his warmest approbation, and called for that of the country; nor should, he thought, the prudent, affectionate, and kind manner in which his Royal Highness acted on a trying and important occasion, go without its merited applause. The system adopted by his Majesty's government was productive of consequences which, he agreed with the noble earl in thinking, would lead to the deliverance of Europe from the tyranny and oppression under which it groaned. But, in this view, he could not avoid noticing the effectual resistance which the emperor of Russia, so greatly to his own honour, had offered to the destructive progress of the enemy. Nor were his subjects less entitled to praise for their patriotic efforts in defence of their lawful sovereign and national independence. He trusted that the conduct of his Majesty's government, with respect to the United States of America, would have its due effect, and that the maritime rights of the country, upon which so much depended, would be asserted and upheld.-These were the prominent points to which the noble lord directed the attention of the House, and concluded by expressing his cordial approbation of the Address. Marquis Wellesley said, he could not have approved either of the Speech, or of the Address proposed, had they, with respect to the great contest in the peninsula, or the cause in which the emperor of Russia was now engaged with all the efforts of his people, assumed in any degree a lower tone than that which pervaded them. Nothing less was demanded by the great interests of the country, by a proper zeal for our honour or our welfare, or by a true regard to the interests of our allies embarked in the same mighty cause with ourselves. In all those points he not only applauded the spirit of the Speech which their lordships had just heard delivered, but he almost entirely approved of the general spirit of the Ad vitally interwoven with the best interests of the British nation. We had, indeed, done much in Spain: he was most willing to admit it; but, he would ask, what still remained to be done? And that question naturally led him to a review of the events which had taken place there since no very distant period: he would limit himself to the time when lord Wellington was before Badajoz. It had always appeared to him, from the very commencement of the struggle in the peninsula, that the only solid ground of success, the only reason dress consequent upon it, moved and seconded by his noble friends.-Of all the parts of the Speech, however, none struck him more forcibly, none made a stronger impression upon his mind, than that which anticipated the same wisdom in parliament, the same firmness, and the same prudence, on the present trying occasion, when the eyes of all Europe, nay, of the whole world, were fixed upon us. There was nothing novel, he admitted, either in the subjects, or in the expressions:-the novelty was rather in the application of them. Yes! he had, no doubt, the parable hope of ultimate victory, the only liament would exercise the same wisdom, it would evince the same perseverance, it would display the same firmness, especially on the great question of the war in the peninsula, as it had hitherto shewn. It was to that country in particular he wished for a few moments to direct their lordships' attention: its situation was to be considered in various respects; but in no respect would any man venture to say, that the triumphs which had been achieved there, were of such a description as to be totally unqualified; admit of unbounded triumph; or cause unmixed congratulation; no man could say that victory had so predominated, that its career was unchecked by a single reverse. But, as it was certainly the highest part of the character of wisdom to persevere with reasonable grounds of hope, in the face of danger, difficulty and discomfiture, so it was the highest character of firmness to meet the tide of success without intoxication, to look it steadily in the face, to analyze the grounds upon which it stood, and from that analysis, carefully and cautiously pursued, to deduce one general and consistent ground of public action. Even if our success had been broad, general, splendid and unqualified, he would say to those who represented a wise and enlightened nation, to those who were prepared and anxious to do their dutybe not led away by this success-be not intoxicated with it-let not its lustre so dazzle your faculties that you perceive neither whence it originated, how it may be rendered permanent, nor to what ultimate objects it may be applied. And this he would say, not for the purpose of disparaging that success, nor to raise any spirit of discontent, but for the sole purpose of producing a due tone of reflection, from which might spring one consistent, one general line of public conduct en a measure of policy so important and practical system of resistance which could be adopted, was to awaken in the people of Spain, a spirit of hostility to France, and to succour and aid that hostility upon a broad and extensive scale of operations. With our force and resources properly directed in that way great advantages might be expected, and final triumph be safely calculated upon. It was, indeed, perfectly clear, that the measureless ambition of the leader of France never would desist from its object, till some strong and energetic force should check its progress on the one side or other. If the Spanish nation could once bring themselves to feel that there was no evil, no human evil, scarcely indeed an evil beyond the verge of humanity, to be put in competition for a moment with that of submission to the government of France; that loss of property, loss of relations, loss of all that was dear to them, loss of life itself, was small and insignificant, compared to that tremendous and overwhelming calamitysubmission to France; if they could be brought to this pitch of patriotism and resistance, every thing might then be hoped from the contest. It was true, indeed, that the perseverance he had described was a species of which philosophy afforded no definition, nor history any record; but it was by that spirit alone that any thing great could be achieved in the struggle between Spain and France. Our assistance co-operating with this general feeling, might have been productive of the utmost benefits. The great person who now ruled over the destinies of France (for great he could not hesitate to call him) would, it might be presumed, were such a system pursued, find himself, by the success of our arms, reduced to the necessity of abandoning the cause, or, his ambition, leading to the exertion of all his means and energies in this one quarter, would open the way for other enemies in other parts of Europe, who would be eager to seize the opportunity of his reverses in Spain, to shake off the yoke of his subjugation; he would be compelled to divide his forces, and thus present a prospect of more easy success to our combined efforts in the peninsula. Such was the view he had always taken of the contest in Spain; and with regard to the spirit of universal hostility in the people, which he deemed so essential, he would assert, without fear of contradiction, that it had been produced in its fullest extent in the course of last year. He was not speaking of any thing which it might be thought he had no liberty to express: he was not alluding to any thing which had come to his knowledge merely through an official channel: he asserted only what every one might know, who had directed his attention to what had occurred in the peninsula during that period. He also knew it as a fact which no one would venture to deny, that the success of the British arms in Spain had been felt and considered in Russia, as the salvation of that country, and if it had not been for our triumphs there, the leader of France would have been able to direct a military force against Russia, so vast and overwhelming as to preclude the hope of that power's resisting it with any prospect of success. But, was not all this foreseen, and was not this the very basis on which the system to be pursued in our present situation should be founded: What then followed from the fact? The moment it was known that such effects were taking place; the moment it was known that the desired action was commencing on the one side, ought we not to have pushed every effort on the other side, ought we not to have strained all the resources of the country, he would say to their very utmost: and, if we were honest in our exertions in behalf of the cause, ought we not to have seized this momentous crisis as it occurred, to strike one grand and decisive blow? In these preliminary views of the question, which he had ventured to offer to their lordships, his great purpose was to inquire, and to instigate their lordships to inquire, whether the system which had hitherto been pursued was founded upon just and extended principles, whether an able and efficient exertion of our resources had been made; whether such means as the country possessed had been fully employed; and whether, upon the whole, the result had been such as the nation had a right to expect, from the possession of those means, and the right application of them. He could wish also that it were possible to fix in the minds of their lordships something like a definite and precise object as to the issue of the contest in the peninsula. His own idea as to the only true and legitimate object of that contest was, that it involved the expulsion of the French armies from Spain: this he considered as the plain and practical object: it was intelligible to all, and he would detain their lordships only a few moments, while he inquired what had been done in the course of the present year, towards its accomplishment, compared to what might have been done if our resources had been properly, wisely, and efficiently employed. His own opinion decidedly was, that the war in the peninsula had been carried on in a way totally inadequate to the production of that result which he had stated as the only true and practical one of the contest. He would carry his inquiries back (and with as much brevity as possible) to the period a little before the reduction of Badajoz, somewhere about the beginning of April last. At that time the great general who commanded our armies in Spain having reduced that important fortress, his next step, it was natural to suppose, especially at that season of the year, would be to expel the French from the south of Spain. But why did he not do so? Because his means were deficient; because he was under the necessity of abandoning his object, that of marching against Soult, and raising the siege of Cadiz, from inadequate resources; and he was under the necessity of marching northward with his army, because in the North of Spain he had no force which he could leave sufficient to check and resist the progress of Marmont. To the north he accordingly did proceed, and there he was, from an operation of the same causes, compelled to remain on the frontiers of Spain till the 13th of June, and by that time Marmont's army was in such a state from the accession of reinforcements that it became doubtful whether the British commander could advance or not. why did he remain so long? Because his means of advancing were insufficient; because he wanted money and supplies of every sort; because he had not the common means of transport to convey his artillery. These were stubborn facts which he defied any one to contradict. At last, But however, lord Wellington advanced with- | finances? Forty thousand dollars had out a battering train, not because he been sent to Cadiz, for the use of the Spathought it unnecessary for the success of niards: these he was forced to intercept, his military operations, but because he and apply to the exigencies of the British literally had not the means of transport- army. Upon a fair comparison of his ing it. But then, after lord Wellington force with that of Marmont, and taking did advance, what state was he in? He into calculation the reinforcement of found Marmont's army much stronger Joseph's army by the detachment from than he expected: and he also discovered Suchet, which detachment he would have another circumstance-his object in ad- been unable to spare, if the Sicilian expevancing (and here he begged leave dis- dition had arrived in due time on the easttinctly to assert that he spoke from no ern coast of Spain, as it would have fully other knowledge of lord Wellington's occupied his whole army, lord Wellington plans than what any person might acquire deemed it most prudent to retreat, and he who had attentively watched the whole accordingly did so. Here he would re course of the proceedings in Spain-for quest their lordships to pause for a monot one syllable concerning them did he ment. Here was a proof of lord Wellingderive from any communication with that ton's inadequacy of means. He retreated; great general on the subject)-his object and in ascribing that retreat to a want of in advancing was, he maintained, in ex- resources, he was borrowing nothing from pectation of a powerful co-operation on his imagination. The cause and effect the other side of the peninsula, and which were plain before them; and he might co-operation had been concerted with him reason upon the subject, either from the even at the time he was before Badajoz. cause to the effect, or from the effect to He, therefore, must have expected the as- the cause. He might shew that his means sistance of this force at the time of his were inadequate, and therefore he was advance into Spain; for, had he not so compelled to retreat, or he might argue expected it, he would venture to say that from the fact of the retreat, that he want his advance into that country would have ed the power to pursue his operations: been unjustifiable, even though success and this deficiency of power arose chiefly, had ultimately attended his progress. It if not entirely, from the tardy and ineffi was certain, however, that he remained a cient co-operation of the Sicilian expeconsiderable time on the frontier, waiting dition. for intelligence of the looked for arrival of The next step in tracing the progress of this co-operating force, but waiting in lord Wellington, brought him to a period vain; he then proceeded forward, still full of glory and renown; he meant the confident in his hope that it would arrive battle of Salamanca. But from what cir sufficiently early to make a strong diversion cumstances did that battle arise? Did it in his favour, and found, as their lordships arise out of his efficiency, or out of his were already informed, the army of Mar- necessity? It arose from the magnificence, mont much greater than he expected. the splendour, the greatness of his talents. Nor was that all he found: he found that He struck the enemy with his spear the Suchet had detached a corps to unite with moment he saw an opening. But were Joseph's army, and which made his force we to hope for that again-was that a efficient to co-operate with Marmont's ground to build upon? His talents, indeed, army. What was the consequence? On were a firm and secure rock on which any the 17th of July, five days before the bat- hopes, any expectations, however great, tle of Salamanca, lord Wellington com- however exalted, might be founded; but it menced, not a feigned, but a real retreat, ill became statesmen to calculate upon and this retreat he continued during the chances and occasions presenting them18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and till late in the selves, for success in operations upon the day of the 22d. But why did he retreat? prosperous issue of which so much deWhy did this great general retreat? Be-pended. Did the ministry mean to say cause, again, his means were inadequate. He had no money: he was so low in money that he had not 20,000 dollars in his military chest. The richest brigade in the army did not possess more than 3,000 dollars: and what were the only means left to this deserted general to recruit his that their system was raised solely upon the resplendent abilities of a consummate general, and upon the errors of the enemy? Did they mean to affirm that all their plans amounted only to that? The battle of Salamanca was certainly productive of great events; the evacuation of the South of Spain; the raising of the siege of Cadiz, force, especially in cavalry, the most and the occupation of Madrid by our dreadful of all species of superiority in troops. But did it secure those advan- that country. He (marquis Wellesley) tages? Did they remain permanent? Was had a right therefore to assume, that on lord Wellington able to pursue Marmont? the 25th of October, that army which No. He was not able to do that, which so lord Wellington had conquered on the obviously he ought to have done, because plains of Salamanca, that army which Joseph's army, reinforced by the corps he had driven before him on that memorfrom Suchet, was hanging on his flank, able day, with a grandeur of military and afterwards on his rear. It was neces achievement which the language of history sary to disperse that army. He did so, or poetry could never equal, which imaand entered Madrid. Could he then gination herself could not decorate with a march southward to pursue the career of splendor beyond the colouring of truth, his conquests? No. He found that the and which ranked him among the most corps which he had so lately defeated, the renowned generals of this or any other army over which he had so recently tri- age, he had a right to infer that that army umphed, was strong again, and he was had received strong and efficient reinforcecompelled to direct his course to the north ments since the battle of Salamanca. Now, once more, to meet them. Then followed where was lord Wellington's reinforcethe siege of Burgos, and all he should say ments during the same period? Scattered upon that subject was, that so far from every where: some in port at home, some considering as a disappointment the failure on the ocean, and some landed at too of lord Wellington in his attempt to re- great a distance to be of any use. Fifteen duce that fortress-it was madness to sup- hundred men reached him on the 24th, pose that a fortress of such a description four days after he had begun his retreat. could be reduced by a few guns. He Where were the others? One regiment could not conceive, indeed, how any cal- advanced as far as Benevento, and were culations founded upon success could be forced to retreat again to the frontiers. entertained, when lord Wellington's means Two regiments were landed at Corunna, were confessedly inadequate according to and were re-embarked for Lisbon, where all the established rules of war. they arrived just in time, probably, to reach lord Wellington at the commencement of the next campaign, certainly not much sooner. Again, when it was understood, so far back as the month of June last, that lord Wellington was advancing into Spain, was it possible not to see that France, being Such was the state of the war in the engaged in a war with Russia, must neces peninsula-such the manner in which it sarily detach a great part of her force to had been conducted-and he would ask that quarter of Europe, and that then was their lordships whether, if the same exerthe moment, not only in reference to that tions had been used by the ministers in event, but also to the temper of the Spa- this country as were employed by the nish nation, to send out sufficient rein- enemy, might not lord Wellington have forcements to enable lord Wellington to been able to prosecute to their full extent proceed upon a large and effective scale his operations against Burgos? He would of operations? Without such reinforce- now, however, call their attention for a ments it was manifestly imprudent to ad- few moments to the Sicilian expedition, vance into Spain. He (marquis Wellesley) as it had been denominated. He had at that period holding the seals of office, stated that the plan of that expedition had had repeatedly urged in his dispatches been concerted with lord Wellington that it would be highly dangerous to ad- when he was before Badajoz. In consevance into Spain without such a command-quence of the improved fortune of our ing force, and such co-operation as would almost secure success; under any other circumstances it was not only disadvantageous to the cause, but it was perilous to the parties. Now, how was lord Wellington reinforced? On the 21st of October he thought it necessary to retire from Burgos on the 25th he saw the French army, and we knew from his dispatches that they were greatly superior to his own affairs in Italy, it was thought that a part of our force might be spared to co-operate with our armies in Spain: and, if it had arrived at the proper season on the southeast coast of that country, at the time when lord Wellington fully expected it, Suchet would have been utterly unable to detach a corps to reinforce Joseph's army: Joseph must rather have hastened to assist Suchet. Such a timely arrival would |