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ment, that the only claim upon them was for an explanation of the general principles of policy by which their future actions were to be regulated, and that there appeared no ground for censure, no cause for complaint, and no source for apprehension or discouragement. It was indeed evident that the prospects of the country were improved, for if this had not been broadly founded in fact, he would this night have had made upon him, demands of a very different nature from those which had been made. The right hon. gentleman had with perfect propriety divided the consideration of the subject before the House into two parts, connected with the external and internal situation of the country, and had applied himself generally to the former. This in itself was another source of gratification to him, and must, he was sure, be equally satisfactory to the House, when they considered the state in which they were placed about the period of the end of the last session of parliament. When they reflected on the condition of some of the counties at that time, they would be inclined to think that his Majesty's ministers had a very difficult task to perform, and would agree in what had been so ably stated by the noble mover and honourable seconder of the Address, that there was great cause for congratulation in the termination of those difficulties, by the means which parliament had provided-means devised in the spirit of conciliation, although calculated to repress the system of insubordination that then unhappily existed. In the administration of those laws with which they were armed, it was pleasing to him and to his colleagues to observe, that there was no insinuation of an abuse of power; and it was equally gratifying to him to have to state, that the people themselves by their own good sense and allegiance had retraced their mistaken steps, and that their regeneration had grown more out of their own disposition than out of the efficacy or enforcement of the legislative provisions which had been resorted to. In looking to the larger branch of the question to which the right honourable gentleman had directed his attentionlarger as it affected the security and destinies of the world, he must trespass at somewhat greater length upon the tience of the House, in order, not to discuss fully the several important propositions started, but to record what might be the grounds on which ministers would meet

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these various enquiries, and, if necessary, defend themselves from attack, should they be made matter of accusation. His task in this would have been infinitely narrower if the right hon. gentleman had not built much of the reason for his reserve in cordially agreeing with the Address that had just been moved, on assumptions entirely inapplicable to ministers, and without foundation in point of fact. This the right hon. gentleman had done in the absence of that information which it was impossible for any person not in the administration of the government to possess, but which he would, in so far as was consistent with his public duty, and what he owed to his own and to other countries, endeavour to produce. In looking to our external relations, the right hon. gentleman had first brought before them the most important state of affairs in the north of Europe; he had, secondly, directed their regards to the war on the peninsula, in which we were interested in common with other powers; and, in the third and last place, had alluded to that contest in which we were engaged alone, and which might therefore be considered as more peculiarly within our own province, namely, the war with America-a war which he would ever continue to think most unfortunate and afflicting, however unavoidable and necessary. In endeavouring to follow the right hon. gentleman over these grounds, he would beg leave to vary a little the order in which he had considered the several topics. He would take the war on the peninsula in the first instance, and this he might the more naturally do, because the right hon. gentleman had spoken of it as the point on which they ought, by the ordinary course of policy, to make their effort as a diversion in favour of Russia, since it could not be expected of this country, that it was able at one and the same time, to make a proper exertion in that quarter, and nerve the arm of Russia in the north, by furnishing her with men or money. He begged to assure the right hon. gentleman and the House, that ministers would not be inclined to rebut any censure that might be applied to them, on the ground of relaxation in their efforts to carry on most vigorously the war in Spain; there had been no relaxation on their parts; neither had they neglected any means by which it was possible for them, by previous provisions, to obtain possession of a greater disposeable force. They would not therefore

found their justification on any grounds of the most consummate generalship, that postponement, or inclination to delay exe- victory, unparalleled in the history of the cuting that which was in their power. He war, and as glorious as ever adorned the also rejected in their name the defence British name; when that victory made that might be set up for not calling earlier the enemy feel its effects to the utmost on parliament to furnish them with more extremities of his force, and dislocated extended means. The ministers of the his armies; because our illustrious and Prince Regent were prepared to defend excellent commander had accomplished themselves on the exercise of the means this, had they any reason whatever to they actually did possess, or could pos- suppose that the entire French power on sess, and their having employed the re- the peninsula would be at once extinsources entrusted to them to the utmost, guished, and the allies enabled to march without draining the country beyond that to the Pyrennees? The public mind was pitch which no nation could sustain or sup- apt to run into a course too sanguine, and port. Whatever might be the right hon. to believe any statement which might gentleman's opinion on this head, mi- pretend that the effect of a defeat like this nisters certainly could not have been ex- would be the total extinction of the enemy pected to make these unnatural attempts in Spain. But when the House reflected (now suggested as necessary and de- that at the commencement of the camfended as politic) by gentlemen on the paign, the French force on the peninsula other side; by those who had ever incul- amounted to 200,000 men, which was cated upon their minds the necessity there perhaps reduced by detachments sent to was for husbanding our resources, and, the north to 150,000, at the period of the even on the peninsula, keeping our exer- battle of Salamanca, they would be intions within bounds of the strictest mode-clined to take a different and more correct ration. It was not his intention to throw out any invidious reflection on those who had maintained these opinions, and all he wished to do at this time was, to lay in his claim to the grounds on which he should be prepared hereafter to combat any attachment of blame to his Royal Highness's advisers on this subject. Indeed, it was obviously impossible for ministers to enter on an ample elucidation of the measures respecting which doubts might be thrown out, on a night like the present, when all the numerous points of policy connected with the country were thrown open for partial discussion, and their attention was not confined to a single object, though many of those alluded to were sufficiently intricate and important to require of themselves the utmost diligence and powers of enquiry possessed by parliament. He begged leave to caution the House against being, as it was apt to be, led to expect too much from successes, or to despair at reverses, even though they might be such as placed the allied forces in the lines at Torres Vedras. It was neither one disaster, or one victory, that could decide the fate of the peninsula, and it was a dangerous feeling to indulge, which would be elevated beyond correct views even by such a victory as would shortly call for the thanks of the House; or to be depressed beyond occasion by every failure of complete success that might attend our exertions. When by (VOL. XXIV.)

view of the subject. They would observe that such a force, when spread over the face of Spain, might maintain the possession of the country, by keeping down the spirit of its population, which they were now unable to do when collected into two great masses. After the memorable battle of Salamanca, they were rendered too feeble to keep possession of Spain, and instead of driving the British into the sea, as they had often vainly threatened, they were driven by the British. But when they gave up the provinces and became a concentrated army, any man looking with a soldier's eye, might be able to see, that even after the battle of Salamanca, the marquis of Wellington had a heavy task to perform to drive the French from Spain. They might worship the spirit of the people of this country, whose exultation on the triumphs of their gallant countrymen in Spain was so great as to induce a sanguine feeling, not warranted by the actual state of the case. But whatever expectations the people built upon, as far as lord Wellington with his knowledge and information went, his prospects had been largely and liberally accomplished. He could assure them, that lord Wellington had received supplies and reinforcements to a greater extent than ever. In the course of last year, 20,000 men had been sent to join him, and he (Lord C.) should be able to contend, that though

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large reinforcements had not arrived since the battle of Salamanca, this arose from the impossibility of sending men sooner than had been done. The exertions of the government, and in a peculiar manner, of his royal highness the Commander in Chief, to bring regiments to such a state of efficiency as to render them fit for foreign service, had been incessant and strenuous. And he had to apprize the right hon. gentleman, that on the wisest principles the grants from the militia had not been available as a regular force, earlier than the month of May, and that neither the internal state of the country, nor of Ireland, would, at a former period, admit of those forces being spared which might now be united to their gallant comrades in the glorious task of delivering the peninsula. He again repeated, that the greatest possible efforts had been made for an active campaign; and he trusted what he had said on this point would be received as a fair and candid solution of the doubts thrown out by the right hon. gentleman. Thus far he had rather opened the matters at issue between the right hon. gentleman and himself. He perfectly agreed with him, that the aid to Russia ought to be given in Spain; and he was also ready to admit, that as the north opened prospects of greater success, insomuch ought they to make more strenuous efforts on the peninsula. With respect to the war in the north, the right hon. gentleman had laid what was necessary for him to advert to, into a narrower compass, as he had not made any charge in so far as Russia was concerned. He and all the world must feel, and none felt it more than the illustrious person at the head of that vast empire, who was so likely to ameliorate the destinies of the world, that it was not to be expected from this country to make larger sacrifices, or in other quarters, than those in which she was engaged. That great monarch did not call on us for pecuniary support. He said, "you are fighting my cause and the cause of the world in Spain, and there it is that your efforts will be most available and efficacious." His imperial majesty felt this to be the common policy in the common cause, and instead of looking to us for aid in the north, he had looked to a far surer and nobler source-he had looked to the patriotism, the liberality, the unbounded liberality, the spirit, and the loyalty of his people, to uphold him in the great struggle for independence, in

which he is engaged, and to us he had looked for the effectual carrying on of the contest in Spain. Of Sweden, to which the right hon. gentleman had alluded, it was more difficult to speak. Without divulging any of those secrets which belong to the cabinet of this or of other countries, he might however state that Sweden as well as Russia had received injury from France, and both had felt it, Russia had taken the field to resist the aggressions of her adversary, and therefore there could be no impropriety in speaking openly of her measures; but as Sweden had not yet taken a step so decided, he hoped the House would be of opinion that he had a duty to perform, which rendered it very difficult for him to make any very open or explicit statement on this point. Yet without exceeding discretion, he might say, that if the exertions of Sweden, necessarily smaller than those of Russia, had required the pecuniary aid of this country, to cause a diversion in the rear of the French armies, ministers would have been ready to have assisted her operations to that extent. He declined entering further into this matter at present. France had committed an unqualified aggression on the Swedish monarchy, which had as yet been only met by a somewhat qualified resistance. What were the motives for collecting the force upon her coasts, it would not be expected for him to explain; but it would be seen with a feeling of hope and exultation, that between these great northern powers, for they were both great, out of their late contention, which had led to the dismemberment of the province of Finland from Sweden :-out of that contention a system had arisen, which happily had not prevented their being linked together in the bonds of the closest friendship and alliance. This fact appeared to be obvious from the very commencement of the campaign, when it was easy to perceive that a perfect understanding existed between the countries. It was evident that Russia reposed confidence in Sweden from the withdrawal of the mass of her troops from their cantonments in Finland. But those who were not satisfied with this demonstration of friendship, must have every apprehension relieved by the event of the personal interview at Abo, after which 18,000 men from the port of Swinburgh were dispatched to Riga, where they arrived in time to join general Wittgenstein at the critical period which enabled him to turn

the scale of the war in that quarter, and defeat the object of the enemy's right wing. He might also be permitted to say, that if there had not been any actual military exertion on the part of Sweden, yet that much benefit had been reaped from the posture which she assumed. He called upon parliament to take sober views of these questions. However much we might wish other powers to enter into resistance against the enemy with as great energy as ourselves, when we considered, that not possessing the advantages of our insular situation, they were not so safe and remote from danger as we were, we ought to look with forbearance to their measures, and not run them down, or impute want of virtuous feeling to them, because they might not embark in hostilities with the avidity we desired. The position assumed by Sweden had the effect of detaining two corps of the French army from active operations, and which were left in the confines of Denmark. These corps amounted to 60,000 men. The most advanced, that of Victor, the enemy had not ventured to use till after the battle of Borodino; and in fact it had not advanced till September, when it proceeded by detachments to join the main army. The other corps, that of Augereau, was still more retired in Germany, and completely withdrawn from hostile operations. Having observed this much, he was satisfied he had said enough, without disclosing the councils of the state, to shew that Russia had a well-founded confidence in the amity of Sweden, and that the demonstration made by the latter power, had paralysed 60,000 of the enemy's force. On these grounds ministers would prepared to meet any future discussion that might be thought necessary. With respect to the third subject on which the right hon. gentleman had animadverted, America; on this branch, he had an additional task of explanation imposed upon him, from the right hon. gentleman's assuming too much in point of fact, which he was compelled to deny. He agreed with him that in negociation too much forbearance had been shewn towards America and had this not been so, he could not believe ministers would stand so well with the House and the country as they would do if they had not shewn (whatever America did), that they were most unwilling to depart from old principles and feelings. But he denied that the war, after it had been commenced, was carried on

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with greater forbearance than was indispensably adopted from a consideration of the other contests in which the nation was unhappily engaged. They would justly have drawn down the vengeance of many, and of no one more than of the right hon. gentleman, had they withdrawn a force from the peninsula for the purpose of originating belligerent measures against America. He maintained and would at any time be prepared to shew that they had done all they could. The right hon. gentleman expressed himself at a loss to conceive how ministers could expect any thing pacific from America, after the promulgation of her Declaration to which he referred. He was ready to consider that document in the same point of view with the right hon. gentleman, as containing in it demands which, if insisted on by America, would preclude for ever any prospect of peace. But the Speech, in its allusion to this topic, referred to the state of America at the period when this declaration was issued. Ministers had never assured the House, nor the country, whatever had been done by others, that the concessions required to be made to America would lead to peace; on the contrary, when the repeal of the Orders in Council was discussed, they said, in answer to those who contended that if these were surrendered peace would be the consequence, that the claims relative to blockade and impressment would disappoint their expectations. It was not till after the war broke out that the American government alleged other grounds of war than the Orders in Council, and the system of blockade. The matter of impressment was previously only urged as an angry point of discussion. With respect to the course taken by ministers when they acquired a knowledge of the actual commencement of the war, they had done that which was tantamount to complete hostility, and it was not from forbearance, but from considerations of other circumstances of the country, that they had refrained from the immediate issue of letters of marque and reprisal, and from publishing to the world their case against the United States. But although letters of marque and reprisal were not issued, war was as effectually waged in another mode; and this was done from a desire to keep the councils of the government ready to meet any disposition that might arise on the part of America towards peace. Had they not acted in this manner, they would

have justly had to experience the censure of gentlemen opposite, if America had, on the receipt of the intelligence from this country, withdrawn her declaration, and restored the British property that had been seized, and they had been unable to meet this pacific disposition with correspondent restitution, without coming to parliament to vote that sum which had found its way into the coffers of the captors of American ships. With respect to time, the moment the declaration of war was ascertained, and that the Americans had proceeded to the condemnation of the British property seized and refused to ra tify the armistice concluded between them and the governor of Upper Canada, with admiral Sawyer, that moment the letters of marque and reprisal were issued. The right hon. gentleman had truly said it was an extraordinary thing that no answer had been published to that Declaration which could be so readily refuted, and that the onus was thrown on the government, to shew that grave and weighty reasons existed for not taking that official step. But neither the House nor the right hon. gentleman were to learn, that though we were actually at war with America, yet negociations had not absolutely terminated. A mission had been entrusted to admiral Warren, and a proposition submitted by him to the American govern ment, to which no answer had been received up to this day. This proposition was intended to have been made through Mr. Foster; but as he had left the country before the dispatch arrived, the business had of necessity devolved upon the admiral on the station. Under these circumstances, waiting for the reply of the American government (though he did not mean by this to lead the House to any sanguine expectation as to the result), he was sure the House would feel that ministers would have more consulted their feelings than their judgments, had they hastily put forth the answer they felt themselves so competent to give to the assertions and claims of America. He hoped, therefore, that on this subject also he had laid sufficient general grounds for meeting any inculpatory observations to which it might give rise hereafter. The right hon. gentleman had touched on one or two other points which required little notice. It was true, as he stated, that the British government had never endeavoured to force through neutrals their manufactures into France. With regard to the mission

of Henry, he did not think it necessary that ministers should publish any disavowal of it now. They had disavowed it in their places in parliament, as the right hon. gentleman had done to-night, and like him declared they never knew of it until published by the American government. That the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Whitbread) had not pursued his charge upon it with greater eagerness, was a pretty strong proof that no blame could be thrown on ministers on that account; and besides all this, he had to assure the right hon. gentleman, that government had disavowed it to the American cabinet, to satisfy whom they had sent over all the papers with which they were acquainted on the subject. He was not aware that he had occasion to trouble the House at any further length, though he would be happy to give every information in his power. It was with extreme pleasure he found, that instead of the usual opposition on such opportunities as the present, the object of all seemed rather to be to join in gratulations on the prosperous state of affairs, and the general improving aspect of Europe. (Here some disapprobation was evinced on the Opposition bench). He challenged the House to say when a Speech was delivered on the opening of parliament, which contained so bright a catalogue of success, or displayed a more marked prospect of amendment or advantage to the country. (Hear!) If they could not say that the enemy was altogether discomfited, and finally and effectually repressed, yet they never before could say that they saw him so dangerously involved in two great wars in the opposite extremities of Europe. These were wars in which he was not merely committed against the governments of countries, but in which the nations were arrayed against him. They were not, as heretofore, wars productive of means to recruit his resources, augment his forces, and from his conquests reap the sinews of extended conquests. Though he could drag his tributary states into the field, and amass a powerful force from those whom he had already overcome, yet in the great scale on which he was engaged, he met with no aids to enable him to carry on the war vigorously; he only met with national resistance, and was obliged to bring his supplies with him, and exhaust his resources from the people over whom he exercises his rigorous sway, for he could not find them in the country he invaded.

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