of trade and travel on water. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; S. C. I Brown, 193.

If a river divides into two channels, Congress may erect works to divert the water from one channel into the other for the purpose of improving the navigation. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4.

Congress has the power to control navigable rivers between States to the extent of improving their navigability. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 4.

If the natural navigation of a river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce, the river is navigable in fact, although its navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as rapids and sand bars. The Montello, 20 Wall. 430.

Each State, in its capacity as sovereign, owns the navigable waters and the soil under them within its limits. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Den v. Jersey Co. 15 How.426; Smith v. State, 18 How. 71.

The territorial limits of a State extend a marine league, or three geographical miles, from the shore. Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass.

268.

In ascertaining the line of the shore, the limit does not follow each narrow inlet or arm of the sea, but when the inlet is so narrow that persons and objects can be discerned across it by the naked eye, the line of territorial jurisdiction stretches across from one headland to another of such inlet. Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. 268.

How far Exclusive.

The power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port, and some as imperatively demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation. Either absolutely to affirm or deny that the nature of this power requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert concerning all of them what is really applicable but to a part. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299; Newport v. Taylor, 16 B. Mon. 699; Port Wardens v. The Martha J. Ward, 14 La. Ann. 289; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562; S. C. 2 Sandf. 681; 26 Barb. 270; Gilman v.

Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713; Stewart v. Harry, 3 Bush, 438; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. 474; License Cases, 5 How. 504; S. C. 13 N. H. 536; Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 500; U. S. v. Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Savannah v. State, 4 Geo. 26; Haldeman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 286; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713; S. C. 1 Hopk. 150; People v. Railroad Co. 15 Wend. 113; The Chusan, 2 Story, 455; Chapman v. Miller, 2 Spears, 769; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; S. C. 45 Mass. 282.

Whenever the subjects over which a power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they are of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232.

If the subject is local and not national, the States may legislate concerning it in the absence of any legislation by Congress. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299; Edwards v. Panama, 1 Oregon, 418.

The transportation of passengers or merchandise through a State, or from one State to another, is of such a nature as to admit of but one regulating power; for if one State can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation every other may, and thus commercial intercouse between States remote from each other may be destroyed. State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232.

The power to regulate the right to land passengers in the United States is national, and belongs exclusively to Congress. Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; State v. Constitution, 42 Cal. 578.

That portion of commerce with foreign countries and between the States which consists in the transportation and exchange of commodities, is of national importance, and admits and requires uniformity of legislation. The very object of investing this power in the general government was to insure this uniformity against discriminating State legislation. Welton v. State, 91 U. S. 275; S. C. 55 Mo. 288.

When Congress makes a law regulating commerce, its authority is paramount and exclusive, and supersedes all State legislation on that subject. People v. Raymond, 34 Cal. 492; West. Union Tel. Co. v. Atlantic & Pac. Tel. Co. 5 Nev. 102.

State Legislation.

⚫ The legislation of a State not directed against commerce or any of its regulations, but relating to the rights, duties, and liabilities of citizens, and only indirectly affecting the operations of commerce, is of obligatory force upon citizens within its territorial jurisdiction, whether on land or water, or engaged in commerce, foreign or interstate, or in any other pursuit. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99.

A State law prohibiting the importation from other States of cattle which are calculated to communicate disease to the native cattle is valid. Yeazel v. Alexander, 58 Ill. 254; Stevens v. Brown, 58 Ill. 289; Somerville v. Marks, 58 Ill. 371; Wilson v. K. C. St. Jo. & C. B. R. R. Co. 60 Mo. 184.

A State law giving an administrator the right to maintain a suit where the death of the deceased is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, is valid, although it applies to marine torts committed within the State. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99.

A State law prohibiting the floating of logs in a navigable river without their being rafted and joined together, and put under the control and pilotage of men specially placed in charge thereof, is valid. Craig v. Kline, 65 Penn. 399.

A State law requiring railroad corporations to fix the rates for the transportation of passengers and freight at a certain time in each year, and make them public and adhere to them, is a police regulation, and not a regulation of commerce. Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560.

Every State has the right to make improvements in the rivers, watercourses, and highways within its limits. Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84; S. C. 29 Miss. 21; Boykin v. Shaffer, 13 La. Ann. 129.

A State legislature may charter a company to navigate the waters in any State, or even the ocean itself. If the company seek the protection and security of a State charter, they are bound by the restrictions and penalties of that charter. Such restrictions are not regulations of commerce, but limitations on the power of the corporation. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Briggs, 22 N. J. 623.

A State may pass a law prohibiting the sale of any article deemed detrimental to the public good, although it may have been introduced from a foreign country or another State. Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328; Wynehamer v. People, 2 Parker Cr. C. 377; S. C. 20 Barb. 567; 13 N. Y. 378; People v. Quant, 2 Parker Cr. C. 410; Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; Metropolitan Board v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Rohrbacker v. Jackson, 51 Miss. 735; contra, People v. Toynbee, 20 Barb. 168; S. C. 13 N. Y. 378.

A statute prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors within certain limits is valid. Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216; Barnes v. State, 49 Ala. 342.

The power of the State to determine the status of persons in its territory may be exercised as well in relation to persons in transitu as in relation to those remaining in the State. Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270; S. C. 20 N. Y. 562; 2 Sandf. 681.

A statute regulating the places in which imported articles may be kept

does not interfere with the power of Congress to regulate trade. City v. Ahrens, 4 Strobh. 241.

A statute conferring exclusive privilege of navigating the interior navigable rivers of the State is void. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150.

The constitutionality of the health laws and quarantine laws of the several States has never been denied. They are considered as flowing from the acknowledged power of a State to provide for the health of its citizens. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I; s. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; Metcalf v. St. Louis, 11 Mo. 102; City v. McCoy, 18 Mo. 238; City v. Boffinger, 19 Mo. 13; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581.

The object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country, to fit them for exportation, or it may be for domestic use. They act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the general government, all of which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I; S. C. 17 Johns. 488; 4 Johns. Ch. 150; Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McC. 495; Stokes v. New York, 14 Wend. 87; Green v. State, R. M. Charlt. 368.

Quantity as well as quality is an object of inspection. Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McC. 495.

A statute requiring the measurement of coals upon sale thereof is valid. Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McC. 495; Stokes v. New York, 14 Wend. 87.

An act regulating the floating of timber on navigable rivers is not a regulation of commerce. Scott v. Willson, 3 N. H. 321.

A statute regulating the speed of steamboats on a navigable river in passing the wharves of a city is valid. It is a police regulation, and does not conflict with any regulation of commerce by the general government. People v. Jenkins, 1 Hill, 469; People v. Roe, 1 Hill, 470.

A State law regulating the charges for the storage of grain in warehouses is valid. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.

Until Congress acts, a State may regulate the rates to be charged by a railroad corporation for the transportation of freight and passengers, although it is engaged in interstate commerce. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. 7. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peck v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. 94 U. S. 164.

A State law regulating the navigation of vessels has no operation on commerce carried on between the State and any place out of the State. Haldeman v. Beckwith, 4 McLean, 286; contra, Fitch v. Livingston, 4 Sandf. 492.

A State law prohibiting any person from having certain game birds in his possession after a certain time, whether killed in the State or brought from another State, is valid, whether the law is regarded as a sanitary measure, or is made for the protection of food. Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 10; S. c. 5 Daly, 235.

A State statute prohibiting colored seamen from coming into the State on board of any vessel, and requiring the master to give bond to transport them out of the State, is void. A State can not thus interfere with navigation, or dictate to the owners of an American vessel the composition of her crew. The Cynosure, 1 Sprague, 88; Elkison v. Deliesseline, 2 Wh. Cr. Cas. 56; The William Jarvis, 1 Sprague, 485; contra, Roberts v. Gates, 16 Law Rep. 49.

No State is under any legal obligation to give to other States the facilities requisite to interstate commerce. The only obligation of a State in this respect is to allow the citizens of other States to use, equally with her own citizens, such roads or highways as in her discretion she may see fit to construct. A State may, therefore, agree not to permit the construction of a rival railroad for a certain period. Rar. & Del. R. R. Co. v. Del. & Rar. Canal Co. 18 N. J. Eq. 546.

A State law regulating commerce can not be made valid because it is contained in the charter of a corporation, for no contract respecting a regulation of commerce can make it constitutional. State v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co. 30 N. J. 473; S. C. 31 N. J. 531.

A State can not accomplish, by indirect methods, what it is forbidden to do directly. People v. Raymond, 34 Cal. 492.

If the real object of an act, as manifested in its provisions, is to direct, regulate or control commerce, although some other purpose may be recited in the preamble or otherwise expressed, the real and not the expressed object must determine the character of the act. Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. 282.

A statute prohibiting the transportation of slaves on a navigable river over which the State has jurisdiction, without the consent of the owner, does not interfere with the rightful power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce, for the act forbidden is in its nature tortious. Church v. Chambers, 3 Dana, 274.

A State law prohibiting any vessel from leaving a port in the State without being inspected, for the purpose of protecting the slave property of citizens of the State is valid. Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139.

A statute prohibiting the entrance of negroes within the limits of a State, is not a regulation of commerce. Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449. Comm. v. Griffin, 3 B. Mon. 208.