appears, that the ground of Mr. Just. Blackstone's opinion
was, "that implicit credit ought to be given to any judg-
ment in a court of record, which has competent jurisdiction
of the subject-matter, and that the jurisdiction of the court
of Exchequer was in such a case not only competent, but
sole and exclusive." The opinions of C. J. De Grey and
the other Judges are not reported. They agreed in think-
ing the judgment of condemnation in the court of Exche-
quer conclusive evidence of the right of seizure, but it does
not appear, whether they thought it conclusive on the
ground of its being a judgment of a court of record. Nor
is this reason stated as the ground of determination in any
of the authorities referred to by Mr. Just. Blackstone. A
different principle was certainly established in the case of
the Duchess of Kingston (3), where De Grey, C. J. in an
elaborate judgment delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Judges; and it is observable, that he pronounced this
judgment within a year after the determination of the court
in *the case of Scott and Shearman. The principle there
established is not confined to the judgments of courts of
record, some of which are of a very inferior description,
but extends equally to every court of competent or exclu-
sive jurisdiction; and the examples cited by C. J. De Grey,
in illustration of this principle, are all drawn from the pro-
ceedings in ecclesiastical courts, none of which are classed
among courts of record. It seems therefore correct to infer,
from the rule established in the Duchess of Kingston's
case, as well as from analogy to several cases mentioned
in the course of the present chapter, that a sentence of con-
demnation by commissioners of excise will be conclusive,
on the right of seizure coming incidentally into question in
any
other court, in all cases where by act of parliament
they have a sole or exclusive jurisdiction.

In support of this position, the following authorities may be cited. First, in an action of trover against commissioners of excise (1), for levying the plaintiff's goods by

(3) See ante, p. 242.

(1) Terry v. Huntington and others, Hard. 480., cited by Holt, C.

J. in Dr. Groenvelt v. Dr. Burwell,
1 Ld. Raym. 471.

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their warrant under statute 12 C. 2. c. 23., the point was, whether, after they had adjudged low wines to be strong wines perfectly made, their judgment could be drawn in question again, so as to make the officers chargeable. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff, on the ground, that the defendants had exceeded their jurisdiction. Rainsford, B. said, that the defendants might well enough have justified by virtue of an authority from the commissioners of excise, who are judges of the fact, and whose authority is not traversable by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff here must have taken his remedy by appeal and no otherwise. But if the commissioners exceed their authority, and that appear to the court, then their proceedings are coram non judice, and an action of trespass lies. But if that does not appear, it must be otherwise. Hale, C. B., and the other judges present, argued to the same effect.

*In another case, which was an action of trespass against commissioners of excise (1) for taking the plaintiff's money, the defendants pleaded not guilty, and gave in evidence their warrant and a judgment against the plaintiff, on an information against him for an offence against an excise law. It was objected on behalf of the plaintiff that this judgment was not peremptory, and that the plaintiff in this action was at liberty to disprove the truth of the matter of fact, upon which the defendants grounded their judgment. But this was denied by the court, and a distinction was taken, namely, that if the commissioners had intermeddled with a thing which was not within their jurisdiction, then all is coram non judice, and that may be given in evidence upon this action; but it is otherwise, if they are only mistaken in their judgment in a matter within their cognizance, for that is not inquirable, otherwise than upon an appeal.

A third case may be cited to the same effect. In an

(1) Fuller v. Fotch, cor. Holt, C. J., Carth. 346. Rep. temp. Holt, 287., S. C.

action of trover for a quantity of tea (2), it appeared in evidence that the plaintiff sent the tea for one Lloyd with a permit, but the porter in his way called at the house of one R., and set it down there, where the defendant, an excise officer, seized it as forfeited, for being brought to R.'s house for R.'s use, without a permit to that place according to the statute 10 G. 1. c. 10. s. 16. Upon not guilty pleaded, the defendant, to show that the property was out of the plaintiff, produced a condemnation by the commissioners of excise upon an information against R. for receiving this tea without a permit, which sentence, it was insisted, was conclusive evidence of that fact, being a judgment before a proper jurisdiction. On the other side it was insisted, that the plaintiff was no party to the suit; that R. had nothing to do with the tea; and that, if he made a feigned defence, or, as the case was, made default, yet the plaintiff ought not to be affected by that, but might *show, that this was a case not subject to forfeiture. But Lee, C. J. said, “The judgment of forfeiture is a judgment on the thing itself. How the tea came to R.'s house was a matter proper for the consideration of the commissioners; and, if the plaintiff was willing to have defended the suit, he might have come in pro interesse suo, which as he has not done, his property is bound. There is no more in this than the common case, namely, that courts of law pay such deference to the judgment of each other in matters within their jurisdiction, that the first determination by a proper authority ought to prevail; so that, the tea being forfeited. the property could not be in the plaintiff." And upon this the plaintiff was nonsuited.

An acquittal in the Exchequer was considered by Lord Kenyon, in the case of Cook v. Sholl (1), to be conclusive evidence of the illegality of the seizure. That was an action of trover for several pipes of wine seized by the defendant for want of a permit. At the trial of the cause,

(2) Roberts v. Fortune, cor. Lee, C. J., sittings after Easter term 1742, 1 Hargr. Law Tracts, p. 468. n. from Ford's MS.

(1) 5 T. R. 255., and see a case in 12 Vin. Ab. (A. b. 22.) pl. 1. cor. Price, B. acc.

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the plaintiff gave in evidence a record of acquittal in the court of Exchequer. The defendant then insisted, that, under the circumstances of this case, the permit had expired before the seizure was made; and Mr. Just. Heath, who tried the cause, was of that opinion; but, on its being suggested, that there had been a different determination in the court of Exchequer, he reserved the point for the opinion of the court of King's Bench, with liberty to enter a verdict for the defendant, if it should be adjudged for him. When the case came before the court, Lord Kenyon thought the record of acquittal precluded all reasoning on the construction of the permit: but as the question respecting the judgment of acquittal was not upon the record, and the only question was on the construction of the permit, a verdict was entered for the defendant. This case, therefore, has not determined, that an acquittal in the *Exchequer would be conclusive evidence of the illegality of a seizure, although certainly that appears to have been the opinion of Lord Kenyon. It may be observed, that an acquittal does not, like a conviction, ascertain any precise fact. The sentence might have proceeded on the ground, that sufficient evidence was not produced, on the part of the crown to warrant the seizure; and, though the sentence may be conclusive as against the crown, it seems reasonable, that it should not have such a conclusive operation, in an action for seizing the property, against a third person, who was not a party with the crown in the original proceedings, and had no notice or opportunity for supporting the condemnation (a.)

(a) In an action of trespass against the collector and surveyor of the customs of the port of New-York, for the illegal seizure of a vessel, it was held on a bill of exceptions, taken at the trial, that the sentence of restitution of the vessel, in the district court of the United States, was conclusive evidence of the illegality of the seizure. Hoyt. v Gelston & Schenck, 13 Johns. Rep. 141. The judgment of the Supreme Court was affirmed in the court of

SECT. IV.

Of Sentences by Members of a College, Convictions before
Magistrates, &c.

THE principle, which has been before laid down as ap plicable to the sentences of courts of justice, seems to aps ply equally to the judicial proceedings of other tribunals, which are invested with an exclusive or peculiar jurisdiction.

a college.

A sentence of deprivation or expulsion of one of the Sentence of members of a college, by the master and fellows, or by the expulsion by visitor on an appeal, upon a subject within their jurisdiction, is conclusive in courts of law. And the justice of their decision cannot be questioned even in the King's Bench, though it belongs to that court to control them,if they exceed the bounds of their jurisdiction. On this principle, a mandamus, to restore the fellow of a college, has been frequently refused (1). In the case of Philips v. Bury, it was decided, on an appeal to the House of Lords, that a sentence of deprivation, by the visitor of a college, *was conclusive evidence in an action of ejectment for one of the college estates; and the judgment of the court of King's Bench, which had been given on the opinions of three judges against the opinion of Lord Holt, was reversed (1). And in the last case on this subject, which was a prosecution for an assault in turning out of a college one who had been expelled, the Court of King's Bench determined, that evidence, to impeach the sen

(1) Dr. Widrington's case, 1 Lev. 23. Dr. Patrick's case, 1 Lev. 65. Case of New College, 2 Lev. 14.

(1) Philips v. Bury, Skin. 447. 1 Ld. Raym. 5. S. C.

errors during their sitting in 1816; but I have understood that the defendants have since brought a writ of error into the Supreme Court of the United States.

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