Convictions by magistrates. * 261 tence of expulsion, had been properly rejected at the trial (2). A conviction by a justice of the peace, who has competent jurisdiction, is, till reversed or quashed, conclusive evidence in favour of the justice, in an action against him for false imprisonment (a). Thus in the case of Strickland against Ward (3), tried before Mr. Just. Yates, (which was an action of trespass and false imprisonment against the defendant, a justice of the peace,) the defendant produced in evidence, under the general issue (4), a warrant signed by him, reciting a conviction of the plaintiff for unlawfully returning to a parish, whence he had been removed, and requiring the keeper of a house of correction to keep the plaintiff to hard labour; he also produced the conviction, referred to in the warrant, regularly drawn up: Mr. Just. Aston, upon this, gave his opinion, "that the conviction could not be controverted in evidence, but that, as the justice had a competent jurisdiction of the matter, his judgment was conclusive, till reversed or quashed; and that it could not be set aside at nisi prius." The plaintiff was accordingly nonsuited (b). But where the magistrate has committed to prison, not having any jurisdiction, he will be liable to an action for false imprisonment, though the conviction has not been reversed or quashed (5); as, where the plaintiff was convicted and *committed to prison for destroying game, though, as it was proved, he had effects which might have been distrained, sufficient to answer the penalty, (the statute of 5 & 6 Ann. c. 14. enacting that the penalty is to be levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods, and, for want (2) R. v. Grundon, Cowp. 315. (4) St. 7 Jac. 1. c. 5. (5) Hill v. Bateman, 2 Str. 710. Crepps v. Durden, Cowp. 640. Morgan v. Hughes, 2 T. R. 225. (a) Vide Mather v. Hood, 8 Johns. Rep. 44. (b) So, if a justice commit for a contempt, the warrant of commitment is conclusive evidence of the contempt, in favour of the justice. Luing v. Bentham, 2 Bay 1. of distress, the offender to be committed to the house of correction) (1); or, where the justice has committed to prison, on mere suspicion, without any information laid before him (2). It is reported to have been held (3), that, where actions for false imprisonment are brought against justices of peace, they are obliged to show the regularity of their convictions; and that the informations laid before them, upon which their convictions are founded, must be produced and proved in court. But it appears from later authorities (4), that, in such collateral proceedings, the informality of the warrant of commitment, or of the conviction, cannot be taken advantage of by the plaintiff; and that, if the magistrate was warranted in taking cognizance of the charge, and did in fact convict, this will be sufficient to protect him, however irregularly the conviction may have been drawn up (5). It may also be collected from the late case of Gray v. Cookson (6), that, if the magistrate had a general jurisdiction over the subject-matter, evidence of facts not stated in the conviction is not admissible, to prove that the conclusion drawn by the magistrate was er roneous. It is a general rule, with respect to special and limited jurisdictions, that where a person acts as judge, (that is, where he has over the subject-matter a general jurisdiction, which he has not exceeded,) he will not be liable to have his judgment examined in an action brought against *him (1). When therefore in pursuance of such judicial authority he has convicted a party, the facts, upon which the conviction is grounded, cannot be traversed (2). So (1) 2 Str. 710. (3) Hill v. Bateman, cor. Raymond, C. J., 2 Str. 710. (4) Massey v. Johnson, 12 East 67. And see Gray v. Cookson and Clayton, 16 East 13. (5) Where a conviction has been quashed, the magistrate is protected in certain cases, by st. 43 G. 3. c. (6) 16 East 21. 23. See also 7 (1) Marshalsea case, 10 Rep. 76.. * 262 where a statute provides, that the judgment of commissioners, appointed by the act, shall be final, their decision is conclusive, and cannot be questioned in any collateral proceeding. It has therefore been held, that a certificate from commissioners for settling the debts of the army, stating that so much was due from the defendant (an armyagent) to the plaintiff (an officer), was conclusive in an action brought to recover the money; and that no evidence could be received to show, that the commissioners had formed a wrong judgment (3). (3) Moody v. Thurston, 1 Str. 481. ruled by Pratt, C. J.; and a new trial afterwards refused by the whole court. See also Lane v. Hegberg, Bull. N. P. 19; Earl of Radnor v. Reeve, 2 Bos. & Pull. 391, Decree. 263 CHAP. IV. Of certain other judicial Proceedings. WE proceed now to treat of the admissibility of certain other judicial proceedings; and in the present chapter it is proposed to consider the admissibility of proceedings in Chancery, of depositions, inquisitions, examinations taken under acts of parliament, judgments of inferior courts, and, lastly, of awards. SECT. I. Of Proceedings in Chancery. A DECREE in the Court of Chancery may be given in evidence on the same footing, and under the same limita*tions, as the verdict or judgment of a court of common law (1) (a). (1) See ante, p. 223. (a) A decree finding a fact immaterial to the issue in Chancery, is not admissible in a subsequent suit at law between the same parties, to prove such fact. Hotchkiss v. Nichols, 3 Day 138. The common opinion used to be, that a bill in Chancery, Bill. which had been followed up by other proceedings, was admissible in evidence, as an admission of facts, against the complainant (2). "The allegations in the bill, it was said, must be supposed to be true: nor is it to be presumed, that the bill was preferred by a counsel or solicitor, without the privity of the party himself (2)." However, it is notorious that many of the facts stated in the bill are the mere suggestions of counsel, made for the purpose of extorting an answer from the defendant. The general rule therefore is, that a bill in Chancery will not be evidence, except to show that such a bill did exist, and that certain facts were in issue between the parties, in order to introduce the answer or the depositions of witnesses (3); it is not to be admitted as evidence, in courts of law, to prove any facts either alleged or denied in the bill (4). Lord Kenyon, indeed, is reported to have admitted a bill in Chancery, filed by an ancestor, to be evidence of a pedigree there stated, as a declaration in the family (5). But it was resolved by the judges in the Banbury peerage case, on a question put to them by the House of Lords, that a bill in equity, or depositions, cannot be received in evidence in the courts below, on the trial of an action of ejectment, against a party not claiming or deriving in any manner under the plaintiff or defendant in the Chancery suit, either as evidence of the facts therein deposed to, or as declarations respecting pedigree (6). And even if the bill or depositions could be received, some extrinsic proof must be given of the relationship between the complainant and the party whose pedigree *is disputed. It would not be sufficient, that the bill purports to have been filed by a relation. In the Banbury peerage case before mention (2) Snow v. Philips, 1 Sid. 221; Gilb. Ev. 42. Woollett v. Roberts, 1 Chan. Cas. 64. contra. (3) Lord Ferrers v. Shirley, Fitzgib. 196. Bull. N. P. 235. Bowerman v. Sybourn, 7 T. R. 3. 1 Wightw. 325. (4) Banbury Peerage case, report- (6) MS. case, in 2 Selw. N. P. * 264 Answer. *265 ed, where C. D.'s legitimacy was in question, the claimant offered in evidence a bill filed in C. D.'s name by E. F. his uncle and next friend, stating his legitimacy, but there was no proof that E. F. was his uncle: the judges, being referred to for their opinion, were unanimous, that extrinsic proof of the relationship was essential, and the bill, which was above 150 years old, was accordingly rejected (1). Answers in Chancery are confessions on oath, and therefore strong evidence against the party that makes them. But when an answer is read, all the parts must be taken together, connected, and entire. If only a part is read in evidence, the other party is entitled to have the whole read (2) (a); and if, on exceptions being taken, a second answer is put in, the defendant may insist upon having that also read, to explain what he swore in his first an swer (3). This is the general rule, when an answer of either party to the suit is given in evidence against him, to prove a point in issue. But if an answer is produced, merely for the purpose of showing the incompetency of a witness, who has in his answer admitted himself interested in the event of the cause, that part only is to be read which states the ground of interest (4); for if the witness is incompetent, his evidence ought not to be received in any form on the other hand, if he is competent, he ought to be examined viva voce in open court. When you read the answer of a party, says Ch. B. Gilbert, the confession must be all taken together: you shall not take only what makes against him, and leave out what *makes for him; for the answer is read as the sense of the party (1). But, although the defendant may regularly in (1) MS. case in 2 Selw. N. P. 685; Feb. 1809. See also Berkeley Peerage case, supra, p. 178. (2) Per Holt, C. J. Lynche v. Clarke, 3 Salk. 153. Earl of Bath v. Battersea, 5 Mod. 9. (a) 11 Johns. Rep. 260. (3) R. v. Carr, 1 Sid. 418. Bull. N. P. 237. See ante, p. 79. (4) Sparin v. Drax, trial at bar, Bull. N. P. 238. (1) Gilb. Ev. 44. See ante, p. 79. |