auctioneers claimed from the defendant a different sum for commission in respect of the same sale of the same house. Held, that the two claims were not opposing or competing, and could not be made the subject of an interpleader order.-Greatorex v. Shackle, Q.B.D., 47. 7. Jurisdiction-High bailiff-Neglect to levy Action for negligence-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), 8. 49.-Section 49 of the County Courts Act, 1888, provides a remedy in the case of the neglect of the high bailiff to levy execution, but the section does not prevent the high bailiff being liable in such a case to an action for damages for failure to perform his statutory duty in the same manner as the sheriff of a county is liable.-Watson v. White, Q.B.D., 525. 8. Jurisdiction - Proceeding under Charitable Trusts Act, 1853-Title-Rent-charge issuing out of lands-Annual value-Charitable Trusts Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 139), s. 41-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 60.-An action by trustees of a charity to recover arrears of a rentcharge is not a "proceeding" within section 41 of the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853. The plaintiffs sought to recover in the county court arrears of a rent-charge of £10 a year issuing out of lands of an annual value of more than £50. Held, there was no dispute as to the title of the lands, but only as to the rent-charge, and that the jurisdiction of the county court was not ousted.— Bassano v. Bradley, Q.B.D., 576. 9. Practice-Action against a county court bailiff— Statutory defence-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), 8. 54-Special defence, notice of-County Court Rules, 1889, ord. 10, rr. 10, 18a.-The defence afforded to county court bailiffs by section 54 of the County Courts Act, 1888, being a statutory defence, notice must be given as provided by the County Court Rules, 1889, ord. 10, rr. 10, 18a, if a county court bailiff intends to rely on the section as a defence to an action against him.—Denny v. Bennett, Q.B.D., 333. 10. Practice PartiesJoinder of plaintiffsAction under Employers' Liability Act-County Court Rules, 1889, ord. 3, r. 1; ord. 44, rr. 18, 19.-The plaintiffs in an action brought in the county court under the Employers' Liability Act were the personal representatives of fifty deceased miners who were drowned in consequence of the flooding of a mine. Held, on the authority of Smurthwaite v. Hannay, 43 W. R. 113, [1894] A. C. 494, that, notwithstanding ord. 3, r. 1, and ord. 44, rr. 18, 19, of the County Court Rules, 1889, the plaintiffs, having separate causes of action, could not properly be joined in one action.-Carter v. Rigby, C.A., 566. 11. Remitting action to county court-Lodging writ and order with registrar-County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 66.-Where an order is made under section 66 of the County Courts Act, 1888, remitting an action to the county court, the action does not leave the High Court until the plaintiff has lodged the original writ and the order with the registrar of the county court.—D'Errico v. Samuel, C.A., 356 See also ADMIRALTY, 2; BANKRUPTCY, 5; PRACTICE, 42. COVENANT.-See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 7, 8, 9, 13; RESTRAINT OF TRADE; SCHOOL; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2, 8. Criminal Law. 48 CRIMINAL LAW: 1. Act of gross indecency with a male person— Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 69), 8. 11.-Where two male persons are charged in separate counts of the same indictment with the commission of an act of gross indecency the one with the other, the acquittal of the one is not a bar to the conviction of the other. It is an offence under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, for one male person to procure the commission by another male person of an act of gross indecency with himself, the first of such male persons.-Reg. v. Jones, C.C.R., 110. 2. Charge on property to defraud creditors-Bill of sale executed by defendant in pending action-Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), 8. 13.-The plaintiff in an action to recover unliquidated damages is not a creditor of the defendant within section 13, subsection (2), of the Debtors Act, 1869, until he has signed judgment. Therefore the defendant in such an action who before judgment has granted a bill of sale over his property with intent to defeat any judgment which the plaintiff may obtain cannot be convicted under that sub-section of having made a charge on his property with intent to defraud the plaintiff.-Reg. v. Hopkins, C.C.R., 585. 3. Common assault-Jurisdiction of justices to commit for trial-Proceedings not authorized by party aggrieved Jurisdiction of grand jury to find true bill-24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 46.-An indictment for a common assault may be preferred by a person other than the person aggrieved or someone on his behalf. Where proceedings had been instituted before justices in respect of a common assault without the authority of the person assaulted, and the justices committed the defendant in such proceedings for trial under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 46, and a true bill was found by the grand jury: Held, that the grand jury had acted within its jurisdiction in finding a true bill, and that the defendant had been rightly put upon his trial pursuant to such finding.-Reg. v. Gaunt, C.C.R. 4. Cruelty to animals-Domestic animal, what is -Tame Seagull-Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 92), ss. 2, 29-Cruelty to Animals Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 60), s. 3.-A seagull had been the property of one A. S. for three years, and was tame. It was kept in a field, with one wing pinioned so that it could not fly, but it could escape by means of a river running through the field. It would come to its owner when called and feed from her hand, and was used by her in her business of a photographer. The respondents were charged on an information with cruelly illtreating the seagull, and were proved to have been guilty of gross cruelty to the bird. Held, that the seagull was not a "domestic animal within the meaning of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 29, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3, and that the respondents therefore could not be convicted on the information.-Yates v. Higgins, Q.B.D., 336. 5. Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 11— Public examination of bankrupt-Admissions-Parol evidence-Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), 8. 17.-At the public examination of a bankrupt under section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, a shorthand writer took down the evidence given by him, and made a transcript of it; the transcript was not read over to or by or signed by the bankrupt, and and the public examination was adjourned sine die. The bankrupt was afterwards tried upon an indictment charging him with misdemeanours under section 11 of the Debtors Act, 1869, and at the trial the shorthand writer gave parol evidence of admissions made by the bankrupt at the public examination tending to establish the misdemeanours with which he was charged. Held, that the evidence was rightly admitted.Reg. v. Erdheim, c.C.R., 607. 6. Larceny-Delivery of chattel under common mistake-Subsequent fraudulent appropriation by recipient.--The prosecutor, intending to discharge a debt of £2 due by him to the prisoner, handed the prisoner two bank-notes (Irish), both of which were then, alike by the prosecutor and the prisoner, thought to be £1 notes. One of the notes was in fact a £10 note. The prisoner afterwards discovered its true value, and fraudulently appropriated it to his own use. Held, that the prisoner could not be convicted of larceny. Reg. v. Ashwell, 34 W. R. 297, 16 Q. B. D. 190, considered. Reg. v. Hekir, C.C.R. (Ir.). 7. Larceny-Verdict-Absence of finding as to felonious intent-Conviction.-At the trial of prisoner on an indictment for larceny no evidence (except as to character) was called for the defence. In reply to a question from the presiding judge, the jury said they were not agreed on their verdict. He then asked them if they believed the evidence for the prosecution, and they replied that they did. The judge directed that this statement by the jury amounted to a verdict of guilty, and it was so recorded. Held, that the effect of the judge's ruling was to supply a finding that the prisoner had a felonious intent; that he had exceeded his functions in so doing; and that the conviction was bad.-Reg. v. Farnborough, C.C.R., 48. 8. Obtaining money by forged instrument-Forged telegram-Forgery Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 98), 8. 38. The prisoner was indicted under section 38 of the Forgery Act, 1861, for obtaining money by means of a certain forged instrument-to wit, a forged telegram." It appeared that the prisoner, who was a clerk in a post-office, sent to a bookmaker a telegram, by which he offered to bet a sum of money that a certain horse would win a certain race. The telegram purported to have been handed in for transmission before the race was run, and the bookmaker accepted the bet on that footing, and ultimately paid the money. The telegram was in fact sent by the prisoner after the race had been run, and after he had learnt that the horse in question had won. Held (by Hawkins, Mathew, and Wills, JJ.; Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., and Vaughan Williams, J., doubting), that the telegram was a forged instrument within the meaning of section 38 of the Forgery Act, 1861, and that the indictment was good.-Reg. v. Riley, C.C.R., 318. 9. Rape and indecent assault-Evidence-Particulars of complaint made by prosecutrix-Admissibility. -Upon the trial of a prisoner on a charge of rape or indecent assault or kindred offences against women the particulars of a complaint made by the prosecutrix as soon as possible after the acts complained of may be given in evidence as part of the case of the prosecution for the purpose of enabling the jury to judge whether the conduct of the prosecutrix was consistent with her sworn testimony that the acts complained of were done against her will.—Reg. v. Lillyman, c.C.R., 654. 10. Wounding-Aiding and abetting-Indictment for felonious wounding-Conviction for misdemeanour only-Prevention of Offences Act, 1851 (14 & 15 Vict. c. 19), s. 5—Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 94), s. 8.-Where a prisoner is indicted for felonious wounding, and is convicted only of the misdemeanour of unlawful wounding, a person who is indicted with him for aiding and abetting the felony may be convicted of aiding and abetting the misdemeanour.-Reg. v. Waudby, C.C.R., 64. See also EXTRADITION, 1. CROWN: 1. Military service-Engagement made with military officer by the Crown-Petition of right.-No engagement made by the Crown with any of its military or naval officers in respect of services either present, past, or future, can be enforced in any court of law. -Mitchell v. Regina, C.A. vant 2. Prerogative-Servant of the Crown-Civil ser· Contract for personal service-Appointment held during pleasure.—The prerogative of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure applies to all public servants under the Crown, whether military or civil, unless there be some statutory provision for a higher tenure. Where an authority representing the Crown appoints a person as a servant of the Crown in terms for a certain number of years, there must be taken to be imported into such appointment the right of the Crown to dismiss at pleasure, and no petition of right lies against the Crown in respect of such dismissal. If any authority representing the Crown were to exclude such right by express stipulation, it would be a violation of public policy, and could not derogate from the power of the Crown.-Dunn v. Regina, C.A., 243. DAMAGES: 1. Measure of - Contract· Company-Shares Option to take-Breach of contract to allot-Sale of assets of company-Purchase-money-Value of shares at date of breach.-Where a company, having agreed to give to certain persons an option or call upon certain of its shares at a specified price per share, extending to a particular date, subsequently and before the expiration of the stipulated period entered into a contract with another company for the sale and transfer of its assets to that company, thereby causing a breach of the contract creating the option, it was Held (reversing Vaughan Williams, J.) that, in estimating the damages, if any, sustained by the option-holders by reason of such breach of contract, the price paid for the assets by the purchasing company ought alone to be taken into account, and not the assets comprised in the contract with that company. Per Vaughan Williams, J.: The contract creating the option to call upon shares in the company was not illegal or ultra vires either of the company or of the directors.-South African Trust Co., Re, Hirsch, Ex parte, C.A. 2. Measure of-Contract-Sale of goods to be delivered at future time - Repudiation by buyer — Acceptance of repudiation by bringing action-Subsequent re-sale by seller.-By a contract, made on the 24th May 1895, the defendants purchased from the plaintiffs a cargo of maize, to be shipped from a port in the Argentine Republic about the 15th July. The market was then falling, and on the 28th May the buyers repudiated the contract, and on the 24th July the plaintiffs brought this action for damages for non-acceptance of the goods. The prices at that time were falling continuously, and there was no prospect of their recovery. If the plaintiffs had re-sold about the 24th July, when they brought this action, the loss on the contract price of the cargo would have been £1,557, but they did not resell until the vessel and cargo arrived at her port of call on the 5th Sept., when the loss was £3,807. Held, that the measure of damages was the sum of £1,557, being the difference between the contract price and the market price on the 24th July, when the plaintiffs accepted the defendants' repudiation by bringing this action, as, having regard to the falling prices, the plaintiffs ought to have re-sold at that time, and ought not to have waited until the arrival of the cargo on the 5th Sept.-Roth v. Taysen, Q.B.D. 3. Measure of-Master and servant—Sum paid by master to servant for injury-Defect in plant-Warranty-Remoteness.-The plaintiffs, who were stevedores, undertook to unload the defendant's ship. The defendant supplied the necessary chains and other plant. One of the chains was unsound and broke, thereby injuring a workman in the plaintiffs' employ. The workman sued the plaintiffs under the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and the plaintiffs settled the action for an admittedly reasonable sum. In an action by the plaintiffs to recover that sum from the defendant, it was admitted that the defendant had warranted the chain to be fit for the purpose for which it was to be used, and that there had been a breach of that warranty. It was also admitted that the plaintiffs might, by the exercise of reasonable care, have discovered the defect in the chain. Held (affirming the judgment of Charles, J., 43 W. R. 528), that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, as damages for the defendant's breach of warranty, the sum paid by them in settlement of their workman's claim.-Mowbray v. Merryweather, C.A., 49 4. Measure of damages-Trespass-Injury to land -Deposit of spoil on land.-The defendants, who were colliery owners, had committed a trespass on the plaintiffs' land by depositing spoil thereon from their colliery for a number of years. Further tipping having been restrained by injunction, and an inquiry as to damages having been directed, Held, that the true measure of damages was the value of the land to the trespasser for the purposes for which he had used it. The principle of the wayleave cases-Jegon v. Vivian, 19 W. R. 365, L. R. 6 Ch. 742; Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., 28 W. R. 357, 5 App. Cas. 25; and Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 6 Ch. 770, 20 W. R. Dig. 121-applied. Decision of Chitty, J. (ante, p. 459), affirmed.-Whitwham v. Westminster Brymbo Coke and Coal Co., C.A., 698. See also LANDLORD AND TENANT, 13; NEGLIGENCE, 3. DEBTOR'S ACT.-See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, DETINUE: 5. Trover-Finding of goods-Title of finder-Rings found in pool-Title of owner of pool as against finder.-Where an owner of land has a de facto possession of the land and an actual control over the same, a chattel found upon or beneath such land is presumed to be in the possession of the owner of the land, who can claim possession of the chattel from the finder.-South Staffordshire Waterworks Co. v. Sharman, Q.B.D., 653. DIVORCE: 1. Adultery-Conduct conducing to adulteryVerdict of jury-Discretion-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 31.-On a petition by a husband for the dissolution of his marriage, adultery by the wife was admitted, but the jury found that the petitioner had been guilty of "wilful neglect or misconduct conducing to the adultery" within the meaning of section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857. It appeared that the parties were domestic servants. The respondent had had an illegitimate child by the petitioner before the marriage. During their married life, between 1883 and 1894, the petitioner was abroad for long periods with his master; and the respondent meanwhile kept a lodging-house, the petitioner remitting to her regularly an adequate weekly allowance. The parties lived unhappily owing to the enforced separation. In 1894 a child was born, the result, as the respondent admitted, of the adultery imputed to her in the petition. The court, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, pronounced a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage, but directed that it should not be made absolute until the petitioner had secured to the respondent, by a proper deed, the annual sum of £20, payable in equal monthly instalments, commencing from the date of the decree nisi, during their joint lives, dum sola et casta vixerit.-Parry v. Parry, P.D. & AD.D. 2. Alimony-Increase-Husband relieved of obligation to support children.-If the husband is relieved of the obligation of supporting his children by reason of the custody of the children being given to the wife, his faculties are thereby increased, and the court can increase the permanent alimony already given the wife.-Halligan v. Halligan, C.A. (Ir.). 3. Alimony, Permanent-Dissolution of marriage— Practice Injunction-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 32.—Where, a wife having obtained a decree nisi for the dissolution of her marriage, an order had been made pursuant to section 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, that the husband should secure a sum for her maintenance, and that, for that purpose, it should be referred to one of the conveyancing counsel of the Chancery Division to draw a deed, the court granted an injunction restraining the husband, his servants and agents, from dealing with certain of his property until the execution of the deed.— Newton v. Newton, P.D. & AD.D. 4. Cruelty-Husband charged by wife with committing an unnatural offence-Charge persisted in after verdict of jury acquitting husband-Restitution of conjugal rights―Judicial separation—Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 68) s. 5.—Per Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ.-To constitute legal cruelty there must be danger to life, limb, or health bodily or mental, or a reasonable apprehension of it. Per Rigby, L.J.-There may be exceptional cases in which, without bodily injury or threat of it, the injury to mental feelings may be legal cruelty. Where a wife persisted in charging her husband with having committed an unnatural offence of which he had been acquitted by the verdict of a jury, Held (Rigby, L.J., dissenting), that such conduct on the part of the wife did not amount to legal cruelty, and formed no ground for granting the husband a decree of judicial separation; but Held also (by Lindley, Lopes, and Rigby, L.JJ.), that the wife's conduct disentitled her to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, inasmuch as, since the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884, the court, by necessary implication, had power to refuse a decree for restitution wherever the result will be to compel the court to treat one of the spouses as deserting the other without reasonable cause, contrary to the real truth of the case.-Russell v. Russell, C.A., 213. 5. Desertion-Restitution of conjugal rights-Conduct of petitioner-Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884 (c. 68), s. 5.-In a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, brought by a second wife, it appeared that differences had arisen between her and her husband, due to her inability to agree with her step-children, his daughters by the former marriage, and that she had in consequence left her home, and her husband had refused to receive her back. Held, on consideration of the evidence, that the wife had done nothing to disentitle her to maintain a suit for desertion without reasonable cause, within the meaning of section 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1884, as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Russell v. Russell (ante, p. 213, [1895] P. 315), and that she was therefore entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.-Oldroyd v. Oldroyd, P.D. & AD.D. 6. Judicial separation-Alimony pendente liteApplication for injunction.-Where in a suit for judicial separation the wife obtained an order for alimony pendente lite, the court refused to grant an injunction restraining the husband from parting with his property.-Carter v. Carter, P.D. & AD.D., 400. 7. Judicial separation-Desertion-Limitation of time for proceedings-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), s. 4-11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11.-For the purpose of proceedings under section 4 of the Sumuiary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, the desertion of a married woman by her husband is a continuing act; an application by the wife for an order under that section need not, therefore, be made within six months of the commencement of the desertion.Heard v. Heard, P.D. & AD.D. 8. Judicial separation-Justices -Jurisdiction Aggravated assault.-Where a separation order containing only a provision for the custody of children has been made by justices, there is no jurisdiction to make a subsequent order for maintenance.— Woodhead v. Woodhead, P.D. & AD.D. 9. Judicial separation-Justices-Maintenance— Neglect to provide-Evidence of means-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), 8. 4-Appeal-Costs of wife when unsuccessful respondent.-Upon the hearing by a court of summary jurisdiction of a summons taken out by a married woman under section 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, charging her husband with wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for her, the court, before making an order, must be satisfied that the husband either is in receipt of actual earnings, or has the capability of earning a livelihood; evidence of means cannot be entirely dispensed with. Where a married woman is an unsuccessful respondent in an appeal to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, the court, without laying down any binding rule of practice, will in ordinary cases follow the practice in matrimonial causes, and order her costs of the appeal to be paid 11. Judicial Separation Justices Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895-Appeal— Findings of fact and of law-Notes in court belowCosts of notes of evidence and of grounds of decision.Upon appeals under the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, the Divisional Court will not reverse a finding of fact, unless it be shown that the court of summary jurisdiction was clearly wrong in the conclusion at which it arrived. In administering the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 1895, courts of summary jurisdiction should be careful not to interfere too much in matrimonial life. Magistrates' clerks should take notes of the evidence and of the grounds upon which decisions are based, and the costs of such notes will be allowed in the costs of appeals under the Act.Harling v. Harling, P.D. & AD.D. Alienability Matrimonial 12. Maintenance Causes Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 32), s. 1.Maintenance granted to a divorced wife under section 1 of 29 & 30 Vict. c. 32, cannot be prospectively released or assigned.-Watkins v. Watkins, C.A., 677. 13. Nullity-Duress.—On the trial of a petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, on the ground of duress, the following facts appeared. The petitioner, a girl of seventeen, went through the ceremony of marriage with the respondent in a church on the 5th of June, 1889. He was a friend of her brother's. She had met him only a few times, and he had never spoken to her of marriage, or professed affection for her. She stated that on the day in question her mother told her that they were going for a drive, and that they drove to the church, where they found the respondent; that she thought she was being betrothed to him, and would not have submitted even to that if she had not been so much under her mother's influence, that she did what she was told; that, on leaving the church, she threw away the ring; that she had never seen the respondent since; and that none of her family then knew what had happened except her mother, who died in 1890. A few days before, the respondent had obtained a marriage licence, falsely stating in his affidavit that the petitioner's father consented to the marriage. On the 5th of June he sailed for South Africa with the petitioner's brother, and on their arrival told him of the marriage. Her brother returned in 1889, but did not mention the matter to any member of his family except his mother, who told him to say nothing about it. In 1893 the petitioner went through the ceremony of marriage with another man. In the same year the respondent wrote to her father from South Africa, claiming her as his wife. The court, upon consideration of the evidence, found that the petitioner had never consented to marry the respondent, but had gone through the ceremony as one of betrothal, and in doing so had been to such an extent under the influence of her mother and the respondent that she was not a free agent, and granted a decree nisi of nullity.—Ford v. Stier, P.D. & AD.D. 14. Nullity-Fraud and duress.-Petitioner was induced by her mother, acting in concert with respondent, to go through the marriage ceremony with respondent; the petitioner being persuaded by her mother that it was only a betrothal ceremony: Held, entitled to a decree of nullity.-Clarke v. Clarke, P.D. & AD.D. 15. Practice-Co-respondent-Necessity for making a person co-respondent-Inability to prove adulteryMatrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), 88. 28, 33.-Where the relief sought by the petitioner is on the ground of adultery alleged to have been committed with a man, who is alive, and whose name and identity are known, the petitioner must make that person a co-respondent; and the court ought not to excuse him from so doing merely because he finds that he cannot obtain evidence which will prove his case as against that corespondent.-Jones v. Jones, P.D. & AD.D. 16. Practice-Co-respondent-Substituted service-Necessity of affidavit by petitioner-Rules of 1865, rr. 10, 11, 12, 13.-On an application to allow substituted service of a petition on a co-respondent, there should be an affidavit by the petitioner.— Williams v. Williams, P.D. & AD.D. 17. Practice-Costs-Agreement for settlement of action-Costs of preparation and execution of separation deed. In an action for judicial separation the parties mutually agreed to a separation by deed and to the settlement of the action, the respondent paying the petitioner's costs of suit, and the terms of the agreement being made a rule of court. Held, that the costs of settling the deed were not costs of suit, but might have been provided for in the agreement; as they were, however, not provided for, the court had no jurisdiction over them.-Lancaster v. Lancaster, C.A., 440. 18. Practice-Costs-Solicitor-Pauper-Petition by husband suing in formâ pauperis-Divorce Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 51.-Section 51 of the Divorce Act, 1857, gives the court a discretion as to costs. The best exercise of such discretion, except under special circumstances, is to follow the rule laid down in Carson v. Pickersgill & Sons, 33 W. R. 589, 14 Q. B. D. 859, and to allow a husband suing in forma pauperis, or his solicitor, only out-ofpocket expenses, including a reasonable sum for office expenses, against the co-respondent. The adoption of such rule is intended to introduce a new uniform rule into all the divisions of the High Court.-Richardson v. Richardson, C.A., 102. 19. Practice-Evidence-Decree in previous suit.On a petition by a wife for dissolution of her marriage on the ground of adultery coupled with desertion, the decree in a previous suit in which her husband had been co-respondent was produced. This decree stated that the jury found that the respondent had been guilty of adultery with the co-respondent, and that he had been condemned in costs, but contained no finding by the jury that the co-respondent had been guilty of adultery with the respondent: Held, that the decree was not by itself sufficient evidence of adultery against the husband.-Ruck v. Ruck, P.D. & AD.D. Deceased witness.-A certified copy of the judge's notes of the evidence of a witness called by the petitioner at the hearing of a petition for divorce a mensâ et thoro cannot, in case of the death of the witness, be received as proof of the matters deposed to by him upon the second reading of a bill for divorce presented by the petitioner. - Griffin's Divorce Bill, Re, H.L. 22. Practice-Evidence-Motion to dispense with co-respondent-Confirmation.-On a motion to dispense with co-respondents, the affidavit of the petitioner alone is not sufficient; such affidavit must be confirmed by further evidence.-Barber v. Barber, P.D. & AD.D. 23. Practice-Sequestration-Right of sequestrators -Money held by third person, not party to the action -Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), 8. 52.—The right of sequestrators to attach moneys, alleged to be held by third persons for the judgment debtor, but denied by them to be so held, cannot be determined upon a motion in a suit to which the third persons are not parties, unless they appear and submit to the jurisdiction of the court. A co-respondent in a divorce suit not having paid the damages assessed against him by the jury, a writ of sequestration was issued against his property, in pursuance of which the sequestrators applied by a motion in the suit for an order calling upon the trustees of his marriage settlement to pay into court any moneys in their hands belonging to him. The trustees disputed their liability to the co-respondent, and the jurisdiction of the court to make the order: Held, that, as the trustees were not parties to the suit, and disputed their liability to the co-respondent, and the jurisdiction of the court, the court had no power to make the order on motion in the suit.-Craig v. Craig, P.D. & AD.D. 24. Queen's Proctor-Intervention-Unreasonable delay in presenting petition-Questions for jury— Divorce Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 31.—In a suit by a husband for a dissolation of marriage, if the Queen's Proctor intervenes on the ground of unreasonable delay in presenting the petition, Held, that the proper questions to be put to the jury are— -(1) When did the petitioner first know or have reason to believe that his wife had committed adultery? (2) when did the petitioner first take action to obtain a divorce?.-Brougham v. Brougham, P.D. & AD.D. 25. Variation of settlements-Acceleration of infant's interest by divorce of parents-Powers of petitioner.-Upon a petition to vary two post-nuptial settlements after decree absolute for divorce, it appeared that the whole property was in land, and that, if the respondent's interests were extinguished, the petitioner would, by virtue of a clause in one of the settlements, have power to call upon the trustees to raise forthwith a sum which, at the present time, would exceed the sale value of the whole of the settled property, and which would, therefore, if exercised by the petitioner, absolutely blot out all interests of the infant child of the parties under the settlements. The registrar, notwithstanding this, recommended that the respondent's interests should be extinguished as if he were dead. Held, that, inasmuch as the child's interest was accelerated by the extinguishment of the respondent's interests, the child was thereby obtaining a certain gain against an uncertain loss if the petitioner should now exercise the power conferred upon her by the settlement |