3 new and Indeed, we believe the potential for preventing or minimizing the consequences of accidents is so great with EFVS that the Safety Board last fall placed its recommendation calling for their installation on renewed service lines on its "Most Wanted" list of transportation safety improvements. Our most recent recommendations for EFVs came out of our investigation of a series of pipeline accidents suffered by the KPL Company in the Kansas City area that killed three people and seriously injured three more. Of the five accidents that occurred over a seven month period in 1988 and 1989, two - and perhaps three of them could have been prevented or the effects mitigated had EFVs been in place. Yet, the myths about EFVs persist. These myths suggest: 0 better "one-call" systems negate the need for Excess that Excess Flow Valves primarily protect against the use of plastic pipe and outside meters make the need for EFVS unnecessary; and o EFVs are simply not effective or reliable. Gas operators that installed some types of EFVS 15 to 20 years ago did experience difficulties some from design and other problems from their own poor installation and operating practices. But that was then. Today we have newer designs and improved installations. We learned a lot from those first experiences, and hindsight has helped make EFVs more effective and reliable. Today there are approximately one million EFVs installed in gas service lines throughout the United States. About 45 gas companies now make some use of EFVs, and some routinely install these valves on new and renewed gas service lines. The experience of those gas systems that are now using EFVs has been positive, according to their submissions to the Office of Pipeline Safety's rulemaking proposal on excess flow valves. The majority of the submissions to OPS were from gas companies that had never used EFVs; yet they objected to the use of these valves based primarily on hearsay. It has been claimed there was no documentation to prove their reliability or longevity. The Gas Research Institute, however, performed numerous tests of EFVs and issued its results in 1985. These tests showed that today's valves function as designed by their manufacturers, that they are not subject to being fouled by debris normally found in gas systems, and that they are not subject to false closure under normal conditions. These findings have been confirmed by the experience of two northeastern gas companies. One acknowledged that it has approximately 40,000 valves on its systems and that there has never been a failure in the 15 years since the first ones were installed. The other company has used EFVS for 11 years and also has never experienced a failure with any of the 30,000 valves on its system. The gas distribution industry, in a further effort to discourage the use of EFVs, now has created another myth. This newest myth is that the gas company incurs a new liability by installing EFVs. This is the weakest argument against EFVs. It is an argument that has been used for every safety device ever invented, whether it was the smoke detector, the seat belt or any one of the many devices that now make our lives safer. The airbag, for instance, was an innovative idea first resisted and then embraced by Detroit. It now has become a selling point with American consumers. In fact, one auto manufacturer told us they believed that they might be liable if they did not utilize available safety devices such as air bags. Just as the liability argument was not valid against the air bag or the seat belt or the smoke detector, it is not valid in the case of the excess flow valve. If it were, we would never make any progress in transportation safety. 5 Like the air bag, the technology for EFVs is here and has been proven to be effective for preventing many serious injuries and deaths. As Americans learn of these valves, they are making their interest known to Congress, which is also showing growing interest. The Board supports the provision for EFV's in both H.R. 977 and Section 5 of H.R. 1489. They are consistent with the recommendations on EFVS we have made to the RSPA over the past 10 years. In its latest recommendation, P-9012, the Board calls for installation of EFVs without delay on new and renewed single-family, residential high-pressure service lines. We do not believe that RSPA needs to conduct further study to require the installation of EFVs for the conditions specified in that recommendation. Also, without much additional study, the RSPA could identify other gas customers, such as small commercial establishments, that have operating characteristics similar to residences and require EFVs for them. In these instances, we believe the date by which the RSPA must issue regulations requiring EFVs should be much earlier than now proposed in these bills. We recognize that the RSPA will need additional time to determine additional conditions for EFV use. Because the RSPA has already received comments on its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on EFVs, we believe that 12 to 18 months would be reasonable for this purpose. Let me reiterate, it is time to act, not to study. The Safety Board also supports the provision in H.R. 1489 that requires consideration be given to potential environmental damage in the regulatory development process. We too have become more aware of the fact that the existing pipeline safety regulations do not adequately address environmental issues. It is an almost daily occurrence for the media or the National Response Team reports on spills to address hazardous liquid releases from pipelines. The Safety Board has investigated releases of liquids from pipelines that threatened navigable waters or that contaminated community water 6 supplies, but we have not specifically addressed the broader environmental issues related to liquid pipeline failures. Although the RSPA, like the Safety Board, has become more sensitive to the environmental affects of liquid spills from pipelines, we believe that an explicit mandate to consider environmental issues when establishing pipeline safety requirements will serve to keep present activities on the right track. The Safety Board also supports the provision in H.R. 1489 on the use of internal inspection equipment, particularly for pipelines in densely populated areas that transport gases and hazardous liquids. In a 1987 accident report on pipeline ruptures in Beaumont and Lancaster, Kentucky, the Safety Board recommended that the RSPA require pipeline operators, when repairing or modifying existing systems, to install facilities to allow the use of internal inspection devices (P-87-6) and to require that all new pipelines be constructed to facilitate the use of internal inspection devices (P-87-7). The corrosion damages that caused these two accidents could have been detected by then available internal inspection equipment. Both could have been prevented by making proper use of internal inspection results. Had that been done, the five fatalities, six injuries, and the almost $4 million in property damages might not have occurred. The two safety recommendations on internal inspection equipment were reiterated to the RSPA in the Board's report on a rail and a pipeline accident at San Bernardino, California. This report noted that the RSPA had advised the Board on April 29, 1987, that it had addressed these two recommendations in an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and on June 8, 1990, the RSPA had advised the Board that it was undertaking a study on the use of internal inspection devices as required by Public Law 100-561. Because of the delays already encountered on this issue, the Board agrees with H.R. 1489 that a time must be established by which pipeline operators must provide for and begin using internal inspection equipment. The Safety Board also supports the provision in H.R. 1489 that would require the testing of pipeline employee qualifications. We believe this is essential to determine that they possess the experience and knowledge needed 7 for them to correctly perform assigned operation and maintenance responsibilities. In the majority of its accident reports, the Board has addressed improvements that pipeline operators should make in their employee qualification and training programs, including the need to annually test and requalify employees who are responsible for complying with Federal safety requirements. In our investigations, we have reviewed many pipeline employee programs and have identified deficiencies in most. Common deficiencies include the reluctance of pipeline operators to establish qualification requirements and a means to test employee knowledge of the actions appropriate to the correct performance of their assigned responsibilities. We have found that some pipeline operators have excellent employee qualification and training programs, including tests to determine if additional training needs exist. Recently, a Columbia Gas Transmission employee reported that even though no Federal requirement exists, it had developed a comprehensive qualification and training program for its gas controllers. It reported further that the improvements brought about through this program were significant and that it planned to maintain the program even if the RSPA did not establish such requirements. In the report on the accidents at Beaumont and Lancaster, the Board issued Safety Recommendation P-87-2. This recommendation called on the RSPA to require pipeline operators to develop and conduct employee selection, training, and testing programs and to annually qualify their employees for correctly performing each assigned responsibility required by Federal regulations. This appears to us to be a fundamental requirement not only in pipeline safety but in all transportation modes. The Board further supported the implementation of improved employee qualification and testing programs in its May 14, 1987, response to the RSPA'S ANPRM on pipeline operator qualifications. It identified five provisions that operators should be required to include in their employee qualification and training programs. Although the RSPA informed the Board |