I want to congratulate the chairman on the introduction of H.R. 1489. And, as you know, I have introduced H.R. 2201, legislation which would require the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations to ensure the safety of underwater hazardous liquid pipelines and to strengthen inspection, monitoring and enforcement activities. Mr. Chairman, I'm not alone in calling for the use of remotely controlled emergency flow restricting devices. The Department of Transportation also recognizes their effectiveness in certain circumstances. Both a January 1989 report entitled "Department of Transportation's Safety Review Task Force Report on the Research and Special Programs Administration's Pipeline Safety Program” and a more recent analysis entitled "Emergency Flow Restricting Device Study" recommend the selective use of these devices as an effective means to reduce damage caused by spills. We had a very disastrous happening in my home State of New Jersey on January 1, 1990 when approximately half a million gallons of No. 2 heating oil spilled into the Arthur Kill, a waterway which separates my New Jersey district from Staten Island. This spill closed one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and threatening one of the most unique wildlife habitats on the east coast. This spill occurred because of a leak in a 12-inch pipeline that runs from a refinery in Linden, N.J. under the Arthur Kill to the northwestern tip of Staten Island and then under the Kill van Kull to a terminal in Bayonne, N.J., a distance of 6.7 miles. It is widely believed that this spill could have been kept to a minimum had a pipeline monitoring and control system functioned properly. The leak detection system, however, had been emitting false and erratic signals for approximately 12 years prior to the accident. As a result, the leak-one of the worst ever in the New York-New Jersey area-continued unabated for 6 hours. There have been other incidents, Mr. Chairman-three I describe in my statement. They indicate that properly functioning remotely controlled emergency flow restricting devices are needed to reduce the damage caused by the hazardous liquid pipelines spills. I would urge the committee when they consider H.R. 1489 to include in that bill provisions regarding these devices. Also, these incidents point out that any regulations, whether for remotely controlled or automatic devices, should require an annual inspection of the system and a certification at that time that everything is in operating order. For the record, I would like to submit a copy of the Coast Guard's report on the Arthur Kill spill for your consideration. Again I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to be here and I would urge and wish the committee well, and God speed in the adoption of H.R. 1489. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Testimony resumes on p. 65.] [The prepared statement of Mr. Dwyer and the Coast Guard report follow:] Testimony of THE HONORABLE BERNARD J. DWYER Mr. Chairman, I thank you and your subcommittee for the opportunity to take part in today's hearing on the reauthorization of the pipeline safety act. I will confine my remarks to one aspect of the issue before you -- underwater hazardous liquid pipelines. As you know, I have introduced H.R. 2201, legislation which would require the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations to ensure the safety of underwater hazardous liquid pipelines and to strengthen inspection, monitoring and enforcement activities. I will spare you a detailed examination of my bill. Instead, I would like to use my time to make the case for requiring remotely controlled emergency flow restricting devices on hazardous liquid pipelines. Mr. Chairman, I am not alone in calling for the use of such devices. The Department of Transportation also recognizes their effectiveness. Both a January 1989 report entitled "Department of Transportation's Safety Review Task Force Report on the Research and Special Programs Administration's Pipeline Safety Program" and a more recent analysis entitled "Emergency Flow Restricting Device Study" recommend the use of these devices as an effective means to reduce damage caused by spills. Importantly, these expert recommendations are supported by experience. On January 1, 1990, an estimated 567,000 gallons of No. 2 heating oil spilled into the Arthur Kill, a waterway which separates my New Jersey district from Staten Island, closing one of the world's busiest shipping lanes and threatening one of the most unique wildlife habitats on the East Coast. This spill occurred because of a leak in a 12-inch pipeline that runs from a refinery in Linden, N.J. under the Arthur Kill to the northwestern tip of Staten Island and then under the Kill van Kull to a terminal in Bayonne, N.J., a distance of 6.7 miles. It is widely believed that this spill could have been minimized had a pipeline monitoring and control system functioned properly. The leak-detection system, however, had been emitting false and erratic signals for approximately twelve years prior to the accident. As a result, the leak -- one of the worst ever in the New York-New Jersey area -- continued unabated for six hours. Again, in February 1991, in Tacoma, Washington. This time, a three foot section of a hazardous liquid pipeline failed, spilling 210,000 gallons of oil into a wetlands area in 20 minutes. Yet again, on March 5, 1991. This time in Grand Rapids, Minnesota, a 34-inch pipeline failed, discharging 650,000 gallons of oil into a tributary of the Mississippi River. Mr. Chairman, three different incidents, one common lesson: properly functioning remotely controlled emergency flow restricting devices are needed to reduce the damage caused by hazardous liquid pipeline spills. It is true that, in the Arthur Kill case, an automatic flow restricting device was in use. However, the failure to maintain and operate the system properly, combined with inadequate operator training, resulted in the spill. This incident points out that any regulations, whether for remotely controlled or automatic devices, must require the annual inspection and certification of such devices and the review of any operational procedures and training guidelines associated with the use of such devices. I also would like to say a word about the spacing of such valves. As you know, the spacing will determine how quickly an accident site can be isolated and the flow discontinued. It is my belief that spacing standards should take into account, at a minimum, population density and the proximity of the pipeline facility to environmentally sensitive areas or significant commercial water routes. In conclusion, I believe that the use of remotely controlled emergency flow restricting devices is warranted and I would ask that you consider incorporating appropriate language into your reauthorization bill. For the record, I would like to submit a copy of the Coast Guard's report on the Arthur Kill spill for your consideration. Again, thank you. I look forward to working with you on this matter in the coming months. (617) 223-8444 (m) 16732 JUN 11 1990 From: Vie: Subj: Commander, First Coast Guard Distriot CWO2 Charles A. Howard, 224-80-7723, USCO, Investigating Office INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE MAJOR POLLUTION INCIDENT INTO 1. Subject investigation is approved with the following comments: 2. Recommendations at paragraph 18, 19 and 20 is outside Coast Guard jurisdiction for action but is concurred with. Distribution of report as per recommendation at paragraph 21 will be accomplished by CCGDONE(m) with additionel distribution to Commandant (G-MPS), New York City Fire Department and Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration. R. I. RYBACKI 16732/NYC/90 10 MAY 1990 FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Investigation Ltr. 16732/NYC/90, 10 MAY 1990 From: Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection Office, New York, N.Y. SUBJ: INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE MAJOR POLLUTION INCIDENT INTO 1. Forwarded, approved. Manal SANIAL Us.Department Commanding Officer Marine Inspection Office FROM: CWO2 Charles A. Howard, 224-80-7723, USCG TO: SUBJ: 1. MAILING ADDRESS: Battery Park Bldg. New York, NY 10004 (212) 668-7850 16732/NYC/90 10 MAY 1990 Officer In Charge, Marine Inspection, New York, N.Y. INVESTIGATION CONCERNING THE MAJOR POLLUTION INCIDENT INTO This investigation was convened under the authority of a letter from the Commander, First Coast Guard District, dated 12 January 1990 which required an investigation of the oil spill which occurred on or about 02 January 1990 in the Arthur Kill waterway between Staten Island, NY and the State of New Jersey. This investigation was to center on two main points: the first to be the cause of the rupture c the pipeline and the failure of the automatic leak detection system t stop the flow of oil into the water and the second to determine whether the spill was reported to the U.S. Coast Guard in a timely manner as required by law. The convening order required the report t be completed within 60 days. Two 30 day extensions to this deadline were granted by CGD1(61) on 02 March 1990 and 05 April 1990. These extensions were granted to allow the physical testing of the ruptured pipeline to be completed. 2. The U.S. Coast Guard has no regulatory authority over the construction, installation or operation of petroleum pipelines or any regulations providing for the investigations of pipeline failures, therefore this report relies on information freely given by the parties involved." This flow of information has been hampered by the fact that this accident is also the subject of grand jury investigations by both the Federal Government and the State of New Jersey. As such the information received from the involved parties i knowingly incomplete. 3. SUMMARY The number 1 pipeline of the Inter-Refinery Pipe Line (IRPL) serving the Exxon facilities of Exxon Bayway, Linden, New Jersey and Exxon Bayonne, Bayonne, New Jersey failed on or about 2200, 01 Januar 1990, and spilled approximately 567,000 gallons of #2 heating oil int the Arthur Kill waterway. Cause of the failure has been determined t be from a high stress, low cycle fatigue crack, which occurred in an area of physical damage to the pipe sustained at an undetermined time estimated to be considerably prior to the actual failure. The |