an excess flow valve whenever technically feasible or whenever natural gas service lines are first installed or repaired.

I introduced a bill to require gas companies that don't already take this action to do so to better protect the lives and the property of their customers across the country.

In trying to come up with the figures to substantiate the need for these devices, we've experienced some difficulty. And part of that difficulty is because natural gas accidents have been poorly catalogued by the Federal Government in the past. Only one out of every seven incidents have been reported to Federal authorities.

However, there was a laborious process that took place back from January 1989 until July 1990. Examination of newspaper accounts and other data throughout the country showed that there were 185 incidents involving homes, apartments, schools and businesses that were either destroyed or damaged by natural gas explosions. The number of injuries in those cases were about 170–169 to be exact. There were 24 deaths and the total property damage was in excess of $125 million.

Now I'm not saying that the excess flow valve could have prevented all of those incidents, because that's just not true.

However, I think it is fair to say that a number of those incidents could have been controlled if we had had excess flow valves on the gas lines coming into the properties.

As a matter of fact, the device is rather simple. It works day and night. I'm not advocating any special device. I believe there are a number of manufacturers. I brought along a couple of them, and I'm sure you're familiar with the technology. But there are a number of companies that do manufacture these relatively simple and relatively inexpensive devices.

Whenever the device detects an unnatural surge in gas, the device shuts down the gas line and prevents the possibility of an explosion occurring inside the property. The excess flow valve has worked well in its installations.

As a matter of fact, the technology has been used for over 20 years. Some of the first models of the valves were installed improperly or needed further design work. And since the initial installation and design, those problems have been corrected.

Over the last 15 years, the gas industry on a company-by-company basis, has installed over one million of these valves and continues to install them, and based on all of the information available that we've looked at, they work just like they were designed to work, and are a vital addition to public safety.

I want to make a point here. I'm not here to beat up on the gas industry. I think they have an enviable record of safety and working for the safety of their customers, and I applaud that. They go to great lengths to protect their customers and their reputations. But in this case I think we can do more.

Certainly we can do more by looking at new installations and repair. I am not advocating retrofitting. I am advocating this device in new installations where it is in fact feasible.

Many companies are already installing these devices around the country and they are doing it at a cost of approximately $20 each. They have proven to be reliable and also save lives.

Now the key question becomes, if some of the companies are installing these, why aren't more companies doing the same thing?

I can't answer that. You're going to have some witnesses today that will perhaps be able to answer the question for you as to why some companies are installing them and others aren't.

The only point that I would make is that they are not being installed just where they are mandated by legislation locally, such as in Massachusetts-I believe in Boston, specifically. But in other parts of the country they are being installed voluntarily by the gas companies.

So I would hope that as your committee continues with its deliberations, sir, and that you would ask the representatives of the industry why some companies are voluntarily installing these devices and yet others are not. And is there some reason, perhaps, that is not evident to us in the Congress.

I think it makes sense.

I applaud you once again for your leadership. I think we have a responsibility to prevent these kinds of incidents where possible. I think this will be a step that will go a long way to reducing loss of life and property in this country. I don't think we should delay the issue any longer.

And I just want to thank you and the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today and I look forward to working with you on this and other legislation to minimize the possibility of loss of life and property from fires and explosions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weldon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Chairman for the opportunity to testify today and commend him and the Subcommittee for their continued diligence and commitment to public safety by acting expeditiously on this bill. The Subcommittee has included a vital and notable provision in its draft dealing with excess flow valves which would add further safeguards for the public. As the Chairman of the Congressional Fire Services Caucus, I have introduced Excess Flow Valve legislation to promote public safety. The Chairman and his staff are to be especially recognized for their devotion to public safety and an awareness of the risks faced by natural gas delivery systems.

Is $20 too much to save a life? Is 20 years long enough to wait for the Federal Government to make the American public aware of a simple state-of-the-art safety device which can prevent death, injury, and the loss of property due to natural gas explosions and to mandate their use? The time is long overdue to address this issue. I have introduced a bill, H.R. 977, which would direct the Secretary of Transportation_to_issue regulations to require the installation of safety devices, known as excess flow valves [EFV's], in all new or renewed single family residential natural gas distribution systems in the United States, and does not require the excessively expensive retrofit of all existing service lines. These excess flow valves will provide the highest level of safety for natural gas consumers. This section of the bill is consistent with nearly twenty years of recommendations on the use of excess flow valves by the National Transportation Safety Board.

These excess flow valves operate on the same principal as an electric circuit breaker-which are required by all local, state, and federal building codes. When an electrical circuit is overloaded, the circuit trips and the current is shut off, likewise, when a gas line experiences excess flow, the valve trips and the gas is shut off. In both cases, the safety device provides a margin of safety for the homeowner.

Since 1971 the National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB] has advocated the use of excess flow valves to eliminate or minimize damage, injuries, and fatalities associated with natural gas explosions. The EFV is designed to sense a greater than normal flow of gas when a line is broken or sufficient leakage flow occurs and shuts off the gas.

The NTSB has determined, as the result of its extensive investigations of gas accidents, that a substantial number of gas explosions could have been prevented by the installation of an EFV. The device costs about the same as a good home smoke detector ($15 to $20). Like electrical fuses or circuit breakers, they are considered by the NTSB to be essential safety devices.

Despite this clear message from NTSB, EFV's have largely been ignored by_government and industry. A few gas utilities have recognized the advantages of improved safety for their customers and for themselves and have installed EFV's, but this trend has not spread throughout the industry. Nor has the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety in the Department of Transportation yet responded to NTSB's initiatives by issuing regulations requiring EFV's. It is interesting to note that utilities using EFV's have had extremely positive and consistent results with this state-ofthe-art technology. None have failed in an emergency.

In its most recent look at the EFV issue in March 1990, the NTSB again strongly recommended the use of excess flow valves after a series of fatal explosions in Kansas and Missouri which claimed 4 lives in 1988 and 1989. The NTSB is so impressed with the EFV's capability to enhance natural gas safety that it has gone a step further and put the device on a newly created "Most Wanted" list of safety improvements, which it intends to pursue through the federal rulemaking process. But my colleagues, we cannot wait for this cumbersome process to play itself out. As I have noted, I have introduced a bill, H.R. 977, which to a considerable degree is reflected in the bill under discussion today, because America needs this technology now. My objective is not only to educate the public regarding the EFV issue, but also to work with industry, the NTSB, and the Department of Transportation to provide natural gas consumers with the highest level of safety and to expedite the proc

ess.

Until now, natural gas safety has never been publicly questioned because natural gas accidents have been poorly catalogued by the Federal Government. Because of technicalities in the system, only 1 out of every 7 incidents have been reported to the Federal authorities. Through a laborious process of reviewing newspaper accounts and other data throughout the country, a public safety group has discovered that during the period between January 1989 and July 1990 alone, 185 homes, apartments, schools and businesses were destroyed or damaged by natural gas explosions. The number of reported injuries was 169, including 24 deaths. The total cost in property damage alone: $125 million. Only a small fraction of these accidents have been reported to, or investigated by, the Federal Government. Both the NTSB and I believe that excess flow valves could have prevented or minimized some of these tragedies.

The costs associated with natural gas explosions are also grossly underestimated, as are the actual number of deaths. Cost estimates are generally made by an official at the scene based on his first observations and deaths that occur instantly are the only ones reported. Generally not included in official reports are the expenses associated with: Insurance to pay any liability claims; firemen and equipment at the scene; police and equipment at the scene; evacuating people from the area; the loss of business sales; the loss of personal goods; gas lost in fire or to the atmosphere; and the utility for the repair of the line.

Information is available to gas utilities and to the public from NTSB and DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety which concluded after several studies that excess flow valves will improve safety. Actual tests of over 40,000 EFV's over a 13 year period have proved that the devices are reliable and have operated as designed to stop the flow of gas to damaged service lines. In one year alone, the valves prevented 34 potentially hazardous situations from causing harm to people or property in a small test area. There have been no reports of valves having failed to operate within the design parameters or to have otherwise caused any problems to the utility.

The NTSB thinks that excess flow valves are important enough to be placed on its "Most Wanted" list of safety enhancements. I believe that they are important enough for the U.S. Congress to require that EFV's be made available to all natural gas consumers for new and renewed residential service so that they can be afforded the maximum level of protection consistent with NTSB recommendations. What is a life worth? It must certainly be worth the $20 average cost of an excess flow valve. NTSB, DOT's Office of Pipeline Safety, and progressive gas utilities have determined EFV's to be effective. This new technology will save lives and money across America.

all

After 20 years of delay I would encourage expeditious consideration of this legislation, so that this essential safety system is made available to the public before more lives and property are lost.

Mr. SHARP. Thank you very much, Mr. Weldon. I certainly appreciate your longstanding leadership and your thoughtful advocacy on this and other issues. We drew very heavily on your work and your legislation in the development of our draft so far, of H.R. 1489, and we certainly appreciate that, and look forward to working with you as it is marked up-and applaud many of the things that you were saying in your statement.

Let me recognize my colleague, a cosponsor, who has always been very effective and worked very hard on this issue.

Mr. MOORHEAD. I want to commend you for your work in this area. I think this is an important area. And I know the recent problems they had in the Santa Monica Bay out in California pointed out that some kind of legislation is necessary and property damage isn't the only concern that we have. We have to be concerned about the effects on overall environment also.

Mr. WELDON. Yes.

Mr. MOORHEAD. We certainly want to work with you. I'm pleased to be the cosponsor of a bill that our chairman has introduced and we'll try to incorporate the legislation together to make the best possible results we can get.

Mr. WELDON. I want to thank you both. I might just add one further request. If you could have the staff look at one aspect of the legislation, which I believe currently requires these devices on residential properties only. You may want to look at whether or not instead of classifying the line by the type of end use, the occupancy-you may want to look at requiring it by the size of the gas line because there are some commercial properties that have the same size gas line coming in as a residential property. So perhaps the size of the gas line would be more of a logical way to do this as opposed to the type of end use in terms of occupancy.

But that's something your committee can shortly review.

Mr. SHARP. We will certainly look at that. Thank you very much. Mr. WELDON. Thank you.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I have two markups going on this morning. It's a busy morning. I would like to have my opening statement put in the record.

Mr. SHARP. Without objection, we'll make it a part of the record. We appreciate the gentleman's attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moorhead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS J. MOORHEAD

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding today's hearing. Pipelines are generally safer than other methods of transporting natural gas or hazardous liquids. Yet between 1971 and 1986, pipeline failures resulted in approximately 165 deaths and 720 injuries. In addition, the failures cost over $370 million in property damage, product loss, and cleanup costs.

Congressman Sharp and I have introduced H.R. 1489 to further mitigate these failures and their effects on lives and property. H.R. 1489 also does something different. It authorizes the Department of Transportation to design rules that ensure that the environment is protected, too. The recent pipeline failure in the Santa Monica Bay highlights the fact that pipeline safety should mean something broader than just property damage; it should include the impact such failures have on the envi

ronment.

Our legislation, however, is not without controversy. Interested parties are at odds over whether existing pipelines operating in high density or environmentally sensitive areas should be required to accommodate the use of "smart pigs," devices which run through a pipeline to determine the extent of corrosion.

There is also a fair amount of controversy over the issue of excess flow valves. While our legislation requires the Department of Transportation to issue regulations on when such valves must be installed, Congressman Weldon's bill statutorily mandates the use of excess flow valves.

This hearing will afford the subcommittee an opportunity to hear the competing claims surrounding each of these issues. I emphasize that the subcommittee is only at the beginning of the legislative process. By the end of the process, I am sure that we can craft a workable solution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHARP. We now welcome our second panel of witnesses. We have Mr. Travis Dungan, the Administrator for Research and Special Programs with the Department of Transportation, accompanied by Mr. Tenley and Ms. Kaleta. We have Mr. George Reagle, Director of the Board's Office of Surface Transportation Safety with the National Transportation Safety Board, accompanied by Mr. Batten. We have Mr. Bruce Ellsworth, the Commissioner for the State of New Hampshire, on behalf of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.

Ladies and gentlemen, I think you're familiar with our processes. We'll make your written testimony and any documents you wish to make a part of our published record a part of that record, and we'd be delighted to hear your oral summary at this point. Mr. Dungan, we'll begin with you.

STATEMENTS OF TRAVIS P. DUNGAN, ADMINISTRATOR, RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE W. TENLEY, JR., ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR PIPELINE SAFETY; GEORGE REAGLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SURFACE

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; AND BRUCE B. ELLSWORTH, COMMISSIONER, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS

Mr. DUNGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One question, more than any other, should dominate this hearing today, and that question is: Why should the Congress give RSPA the discretion we seek in the reauthorization of the pipeline safety program. We're going to answer that question.

I believe that you need to look at several aspects of our record before you come to conclusion.

Before going any further, let me introduce my Assistant Administrator for Pipeline Safety, George Tenley, and my Chief Counsel, Judy Kaleta.

Two years ago I took the helm as RSPA Administrator. Given the resources available to the agency, I was struck by the very farreaching responsibilities we have in pipeline safety and the overload of rulemaking studies and accident investigations.

I determined that improvements to the pipeline safety program were my No. 1 priority.

Since then, we have changed management, both at the top of the organization and throughout the program. We've taken a more aggressive approach to inspection and enforcement. We've set new regulatory direction and we've added additional resources to the staff and the budget.