agreed statement was done, and the former order herein ist accordingly set aside. The appeal is from this order.

Upon examination of the above statement and order of court, it will be observed that the appellants demand that they shall be paid at the rates paid by the United States government for similar work at the date of the passage of the printing act, and not at the lower rates at present paid by the government for such work. That the auditor refuses to audit the appellants' account at such rates, but only proposes to allow the present rates of compensation paid by the government for such work, and that the court has ordered the respondent to audit the demands of appellants at the rates allowed under the laws of the United States and the rules prescribed by the treasury department at the time the contract was made, instead of at the rates existing when the work was done, and the former order to be set aside.

It is contended by the appellants that this case is parallel to that of Hedges v. Board of Commissioners, 4 Mont. 280. On examination this will be found not to be the case. The statute of January 12, 1872, provided for the fees of the district clerk. The statute of 1873 provided that the fees of probate judges should be the same as the fees of the district clerk for similar services. The act of 1872 was necessarily referred to, and became a part of the act of 1873, to all intents and purposes, as if the act of 1873 had contained a schedule of the fees which the probate judge should receive.

Therefore, any subsequent changes in the law in relation to the clerk's fees did not change those of the probate judge so long as the act of 1873 remained in force. The fees of probate judges thus became definitely and certainly fixed. The act of 1873 authorized them to charge fees, and the act of 1872 fixed the rates, which could not be changed except by changing the act of 1873. But in the case at bar the appellants contract for periods of only two years, under a statute which provides that they shall receive for printing, the rates paid by the government of the

United States, and the rates prescribed by the treasury department. They made a contract under a statute which did not prescribe any fixed rates. The treasury department had the right at any time to change the rates, and the printing contracts were limited by the statute of the territory to periods of two years, so that the contracts at the end of such periods might be made to conform to the rates prescribed at the dates of their execution. The statute authorized a change in the rates by the treasury department without additional legislation, while in the case of the probate judge his fees were fixed by the legislature by the acts of 1872 and 1873, and could not be altered or changed except by the same authority in modifying or changing said acts, which, as to him, it did not attempt to do. The intention of the legislature in enacting the statute providing for the public printing was to require the person contracting under the act at stated intervals to renew his contract, and make it conform to the rates then authorized to be paid. This was as much for his benefit as it was for the . benefit of the government. During the interval the rates might have been diminished or increased, and the period of two years was fixed when the rates prescribed and the rates named in the contract should be made to correspond.

Contracts are always made with reference to the law as it exists at the time of the making thereof. They cannot be entered into otherwise. The law in this case is the rate prescribed at the time the contract is made. The rates may be changed at any time, and the changed or modified rate becomes the law. Therefore, the person contracting thereunder must contract with reference to the rates existing when the contract is made. After the contract is made the rates cannot be changed during its continuance, which is limited to two years. The object of this limitation was that the government or the contractor might have the benefit at frequent periods of the increased or diminished rates. It would be strange if the public printer for congress, under the law authorizing the treasury department, from time

to time, to prescribe rates for the public printing, could disregard in his contracts the rates prescribed and in force at the date of his contract, and demand and receive some other and different compensation, and it would be equally strange if the public printing for this territory, under the same rules and regulations, is not subject to the rates prescribed at the time the contract is made.

POWER ET AL., appellants, v. GUм, respondent.

PRACTICE — Judgment on pleadings — Overruling motion — Error not waived by trial.- Error in overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not waived by afterwards proceeding to trial. Under section 280 of the Revised Statutes, the overruling of such motion is deemed to have been excepted to without formal objection.

OBJECTION TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE VERIFICATION of a complaint, if not made in the lower court, cannot be raised on appeal. PLEADINGS Verification - General and specific denials.— Under the Code of Civil Procedure, when a complaint is verified, the denials of the answer must be specific; a general denial raises no issue.

SAME Insufficient denial of value.- In an action for goods sold and delivered, where the complaint alleges the same to be of a certain value, an allegation in the answer that the defendant paid a less sum, which was the full price of the goods, is not a sufficient denial of the allegation of value.

DENIAL OF INDEBTEDNESS IS A DENIAL OF A MERE LEGAL CONCLUSION, and raises no issue.

Appeal from First District, Gallatin County. ·

THE opinion states the facts.

LUCE & ARMSTRONG, for the appellants.

VIVION & SHELTON, for the respondent.

GALBRAITH, J. This action was commenced in the probate court of Gallatin county. After a trial and judgment in that court an appeal was taken to the district court. The

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complaint, after the usual allegations as to partnership, is in substance as follows: "That the defendant is indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of three hundred and forty dollars and fifty cents, for the balance of an account for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and for freighting done by plaintiffs for the defendant, and for money paid by plaintiffs for defendant's use, the whole of which was furnished, done and performed by the plaintiffs at the request of the defendant, between the 17th day of July, 1880, and the 10th day of December, 1880; that the full amount of the items is five hundred and fifteen dollars and fifty cents, of which no part has been paid, except the sum of one hundred and seventy-five dollars."

Then follows the usual averment that the balance remains due and unpaid, being in amount the above sum of $340.50.

The bill of items annexed to the complaint stated them to be: "One harvester and binder, three hundred dollars; one box binding wire, twenty-five dollars and fifty cents, and a freight bill amounting to one hundred and eightyseven dollars and fifty-five cents." The bill of items, also, showed a credit of $175.

The answer denied each and every material allegation in said complaint contained, except those hereinafter specially admitted. It admits that on the date mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint, to wit, on or about the 18th of July, 1880, the defendant entered into a verbal contract with the plaintiffs, whereby he agreed to purchase from the plaintiffs, for the sum of $300 to be paid to them, a new reaping machine or harvester of a certain kind and make, viz., Wood's harvester and wire self-binder, complete; that the plaintiffs then and there agreed to sell and did sell to the defendant, for the prices last aforesaid, the kind and make of a harvester as above described, and then and there agreed to deliver said machine to the said defendant; but that the plaintiffs then and there failed and

neglected, and ever since have, and still fail, neglect and refuse, to deliver said machine to the defendant, or to any one for him. It also admits that he received from the plaintiffs, as set forth in their complaint, binding-wire, other goods, and work and labor in the way of freighting, of the value of and to the amount of $175, and no more. That afterwards, to wit, on the 9th day of December, 1880, he, the said defendant, paid to the said plaintiffs the said sum of $175, the full price of the goods, wares and merchandise mentioned in said complaint. Defendant therefore denies that he is indebted to the said plaintiffs in the sum of $340.50 or in any sum whatever for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered as set forth in their complaint, or for any other business transaction whatever. The answer also sets up a counter-claim for damages caused by failure of the plaintiffs to deliver the above harvester, which is not material to this inquiry. To this answer a demurrer was interposed upon the ground, among others, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint, which was overruled by the court as to the answer and sustained as to the counter-claim.

The plaintiffs then moved the court for judgment on the pleadings for the reasons;

1. That the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiffs' complaint.

2. It shows upon its face that it is sham and irrelevant, and raises no issue.

This motion was overruled and the cause went to trial, and judgment, from which judgment this appeal is taken.

The overruling of the motion for judgment on the pleadings is the only action of the court of which the appellants complain.

It is claimed by the respondent that the appellants should have stood upon their motion, and cannot take advantage of this alleged error; cannot now complain of this action of the court after a trial. But we think that the overruling of such a motion is one of those matters which the law pro