A.D. 1550. BOOK V. Monaim Khan, Shah Bidágh and Tulik Khan Kochín are particularly named. When the rout was seen to be irreparable, the leaders dispersed, taking different roads. Mírza Suleimán returned to Badakhshan. Hindal, attended by Monaim Khan, found his way to Kunduz. Many of the Emperor's Amírs and officers, among whom was Shah Bidágh, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Atálík and other Uzbeks, who had been made prisoners at Eibek, having been allowed to return to Bálkh, made so favourable a report of the handsome treatment which they had met with, that Pír Muhammed, to show his sense of this conduct, sent back all his prisoners to Kábul, in the most humane manner; a striking instance, when contrasted with the consequences of the recent cruelties exercised at Kábul, how in war generosity produces generosity, while retaliation of injury generates the darkest passions that disgrace human nature. Humayun winters in of Kámrán. Humayun, on reaching Kábul, found everything safe, Kábul. and that Kámrán had never in reality attempted to cross the mountains. He passed the winter in the Proceeding Bála Hissár of Kábul. Kámrán, meanwhile, whose failure to join his brother had been the real cause of the late discomfiture, resolved to take advantage of the Emperor's misfortunes, to increase his own power. We have seen that he was but little satisfied with the allotment of Kuláb, which had been made to him when he was reconciled to his brother; that he had very soon become embroiled with Chaker Ali Beg, the Minister assigned him by Humáyun, and had expelled him from his province. He, nevertheless, made every profession of allegiance to the Emperor, who, confiding in his promises, had marched to Bálkh, when Kámrán's breach of promise led to the most disastrous consequences. No sooner had Humáyun recrossed the mountains, than Kámrán, who is said, for some time before, to have been carrying on a secret correspondence with several SECT. III. of his brother's chief Ministers, hastened to improve CHAP. III. the opportunity for his own advantage. Leaving Askeri Mírza, therefore, in Kuláb, he marched to seize the dominions of Suleimán Mírza.* on Badakh Suleimán, unable to oppose him, retired from Talikán His attempt without fighting, and fell back upon Kila-Zefer. Kám- shán, rán entered Talikán, which he gave to Bápus Beg, and advanced to Kila-Zefer. Suleimán, placing Ishak Sultan in that fortress, the principal one of Badakhshán, withdrew to the highlands and narrow valleys of the upper country, and waited at the village of Jurm, in an inaccessible position, to see what turn affairs would take in the country below. Kunduz. Kámrán, finding that nothing could be effected by and on any operations against Suleimán in Badakhshán, marched down to Kunduz. He there attempted to work upon Hindal Mírza by professions of friendship, and by representing their interests as being the same, to enter into an alliance with him, and to desert Humáyun. Hindal, however, did not listen to his proposals, but remained faithful to his allegiance. Upon this, Kámrán laid siege to the place, and pushed on his operations with vigour, while Hindal omitted no exertion in its defence. Kámrán, seeing himself baffled in all his attempts, at last asked assistance from the Usbeks, with whom he entered into a treaty; and a large auxiliary force was soon sent to assist him in the siege. Hindal, being hard pushed by this new and active enemy, had recourse to a stratagem, which seems to be a standing one in Eastern wars. He caused a letter to be written in Kámrán's name, addressed to himself, proceeding on the supposition that the two Mírzas had made up their differences, and entering into details as to the best plan for overreaching the Uzbeks. The letter was entrusted to a kásid, or messenger, who, it Akberuáma, ff. 78, 79.; Tab. Akb. ff. 163, 164.; Tar. Niz. ff. 200, 201.; Jouher, c. 24.; Ferishta, vol. ii. pp. 165, 166.; Khol : ul To- was contrived, fell into the hands of the Uzbeks. He A. D. 1550. was searched, and the letter discovered. The Uzbeks, concluding that the brothers had made a reconciliation to which they were to be sacrificed, alarmed and disgusted, abandoned the siege, and returned home. In consequence of this defection, the operations made little Returns to Is defeated beks. progress. It was about this time that news reached Kámrán, that Chaker Ali Beg had descended from the mountainous country into which he had been driven, and was plundering and laying waste the territory of Kuláb. Askeri, who had marched out to chastise him, was defeated, and compelled to take shelter in the town. By Kámrán's orders, Askeri marched out against him a second time, and was a second time routed. This compelled Kámrán to raise the siege of Kunduz; the rather as he learned that Suleimán Mírza had descended from his mountain retreat, and had formed a junction with Ishak Sultan at Kila-Zefer, of which he had taken possession. Kámrán, detaching a body of troops to check the advance of Suleimán, himself hastened to Kuláb. On his approach, Chaker Beg hurriedly raised the siege, and Askeri marched out and joined his brother. Kámrán, taking Askeri along with him, now marched by the Uz- back to meet Mírza Suleimán. He had reached Rostak*, near which he was encamped, when a large body of Uzbeks under Said, who had gone out on a foray, observing a camp at a distance, fell upon it, without inquiring whose it was, and completely plundered it. Kámrán, Askeri and Mírza Abdalla Moghul, with a few of their men, escaped to Talikán. Saíd, on learning the real state of matters, sent back the prisoners and plunder that had fallen into his hands, excusing himself to the Mirza for having, by mistake, carried off his baggage. But the mischief done was irreparable. Kámrán's army was broken and dispersed. Suleimán * Rostak lies on the Kokcha branch of the Amu. SECT. III. and Hindal, taking advantage of the mischance, ad- CHAP. III. vanced in conjunction against him; while he, seeing that his strength was broken, and that all hope of effecting any thing on the Amu had vanished, made the best of his way to Khost, intending to proceed from thence, over the hills, by the route of Zohák and Bámián, as that on which there was least snow, so as to reach the Hazára country, where he could learn the true state of Kábul; and either try his fate there once more, or retire to Bheker, as circumstances might dictate.* It is asserted that, all this time, there was a party in Humayun's court favourable to Kámrán. It was headed by Kerácha Khan, Mosáhib Beg, Kásim Husein Sultan Uzbek and other Amírs of the very first rank, and was in general composed of those who had already rebelled, who had joined Kámrán, and had finally surrendered along with him at Talikán. Though they had been pardoned, and had accompanied Humayun in his Bálkh expedition, and now attended him in his court, they had never been restored to favour, and were still in disgrace. They are said to have carried on a private correspondence with Kámrán, inviting him to advance, and assuring him that, from the general disaffection towards Humayun which now prevailed, they would undertake to restore him to his throne. Of the truth of these assertions, and indeed of the real causes and nature of the intrigues and discontents that produced the many revolutions at Kábul at this era, very little is, with certainty, known. The events of the times have been recorded chiefly by the servants of Humayun and his son, who are disposed to represent every thing in * Akbernáma, ff. 79, 80.; Tab. f. 163, 164.; Tar. Niz. ff. 201, 202.; Ferishta, vol. ii. pp. 166, 167.; Ferishta says that Humayun wrote to Ali Shír Khan, one of Kámran's officers, making him great promises, to seize his master, and Excites a revolt in b Kábul. BOOK V. the most favourable light for that prince, who, with A. D. 1550. many high and agreeable qualities, was evidently very thoughtless and very impolitic. We may sometimes, from the course of events, infer that suspicions of treachery are alleged to save the credit of the prince. At the same time, that treachery was common, and left little imputation on the character of the traitor, is no less evident from the whole history of the times. When Kámrán, after his disaster on the Amu, was crossing the mountains, he received communications from the discontented Amírs, urging him to march at once upon Kábul, where they would join him. To lull the suspicions of Humáyun, the Mírza sent him envoys to announce his coming, the object of which he pretended was to ask forgiveness for his late offences, and to submit himself in every respect to the Emperor's orders, relying solely on his never-failing clemency. Humayun is said to have listened with favour to these pretences, till reminded by his counsellors how little faith could be placed in his brother's representations; and that any new indulgence which the Emperor might grant him, might be ascribed rather to weakness than Humayun generosity. Humáyun, therefore, made preparations for intercepting the Mírza, and leaving Kábul to the nominal charge of Akber, under the direction of Muhammed Kásim Khan Birlás, he marched for the hills by Kárábágh and Charikárán, and halted for a time at Ab-Bárán.* A. H. 957, prepares to Divides his forces. Here Kerácha and the Emperor's other advisers,-for Kerácha seems still to have had influence, - recommended that the different passes in the mountainous country should be occupied, so as to prevent the Mirza's escape. Abulfazl asserts that this advice was given for the purpose of weakening the Emperor's force. But, if Kámrán was suspected of attempting, with his broken Abulfazl says he left Kábul in the middle of 957. |