ahead by the towing vessel Midwest Cities, piloted, incidentally, by unlicensed personnel). According to the Marine Board convened to investi

gate this casualty, the tank barge was loaded with a cargo of highly volatile crude oil. As the vessels were closing prior to the collision, the upbound M/V Midwest Cities was directing her course at an angle across the river

toward the left descending bank after passing Pointe a la Hache. The downbound African Star was about midriver with the intention of conducting a starboard to starboard meeting situation. The pilot on the African Star, using his portable radiotelephone, attempted to contact the Midwest Cities prior to the collision. There was no response. Why was there no response? Simply because the radiotelephones on the two vessels were not designed to operate on the same frequency. The Midwest Cities used 2738 KHz and the African Star was designed for 156.65 MHz. Consequently, it was impossible for the two pilots to communicate by radio. The tank barge and the freighter collided and a fire and explosion ensued almost immediately on both vessels. Twenty-one persons aboard the African Star lost their lives, and the tank barge burned and sank in the river. Fiercely burning oil spread to the African Star. With many secondary fires in combustible material on board, the African Star backed out of the barge and was purposely beached on the right descending bank. Heroic members of the crew

The Midwest Cities.

successfully contained the fire.

mittee of the American Pilots Association stated, "our pilots will attest to the fact that single channel bridgeto-bridge radio will work indeed under all imaginable conditions of adverse weather and traffic density. It is not unusual to have a traffic situation involving 10 or more vessels in sight of one another at any given time".

Captain Paul Ives, when chairman of the Bridge-to-Bridge Radio Com

AFRICAN STAR

MIDWEST CITIES

COLLISION

(Plotted positions are approximate)

Bohemia

Light

MIDWEST CITIES

Mississippi

River

results were achieved during that period of time when the Delaware River witnessed a large increase in tonnage as well as a greater number of vessels, carrying with it the inevitable potential for a higher collision

Captain Ives' comments were made with reference to the Delaware Bay and River where bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone communications have been in use since 1 November 1960. During the 5 years and 10 months preceding the implementation of bridge-to-bridge radio, there was an average of 1.27 collisions per month. The first few years after the use of bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone, collisions gradually dropped to an average of 0.91 per month. Later, during 1966 and 1967, the number of collisions dropped drastically to the figure of 0.23 per month. Our Philadelphia records show that for 1968 and 1969 not one collision occurred between vessels underway that were equipped and using radiotelephone communication. These outstanding

rate area.

The obvious advantage of bridgeto-bridge radiotelephone is the ability for pilots to communicate, to reach early agreements, and to take the necessary positive actions to insure safety. TOWBOAT LEGISLATION

In September of 1961 the Coast Guard initiated a comprehensive study of towing vessel casualty statistics in an effort to determine whether the inspection of steam towing vessels and the licensing of their operating personnel should be extended to include diesel towing vessels. The study indicated that the inspection of all towing vessels and licensing of their personnel were essential to the

The position has always been that it is inequitable for steam towing vessels to be subject to inspection and licensing whereas diesel vessels of the same type and size were exempt. Statistical analyses of towing vessel

casualties now indicate a deficiency in safety due to the lack of qualified and properly trained towing vessel operators. The statistics have been updated each year, and continue to reveal personnel fault on the part of towing vessel operators as a primary cause of towing vessel accidents. Therefore, we strongly support that aspect of a current House Bill, H.R. 13987, requiring persons in charge of a towing vessel's direction and control to be federally licensed. We feel that such a licensing program would be a significant first step in reversing the casualty trend. We will wait until the program is operational before assessing its impact on maritime safety and the need for supplemental legislation.

Three important lessons were learned from the previously discussed tragedies, which reemphasize the need for unification of the rules of the road, bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone and licensing of personnel operating towing vessels. The African Star and Union Faith were in collision with vessels directed and piloted by unlicensed personnel. There is no licensing requirement for personnel operating towing vessels similar in size and operation such as the Midwest Cities and Warren J. Doucet. In fact, the record of the Marine Board of Investigation revealed that the person in charge of the Midwest Cities at the time of the collision with the African Star had ability to read and write limited to little more than signing his

name.

The recent sinking of a towing vessel in the Gulf of Alaska points out the potential need for inspection of certain categories of towing vessels. The Intrepid, towing an inspected sea-going freight barge, was on a voyage from Seattle, Wash., to Whittier, Alaska. Three persons lost their lives when the vessel sank during a severe storm with seas reported to be 20 feet in height and winds in excess of 50 knots. The Intrepid, built in 1965, was an uninspected, welded steel, single screw, diesel-propelled vessel of 199 gross tons. It was con

structed and operated without any statutory requirements relative to plan-review and periodic inspection. or drydocking. The vessel was not classed, but was in compliance with the 1930 Load Line Convention. There was no requirement for licensed personnel to be on board. Prior to her final voyage the vessel was operated in Alaskan waters and had a history of hull fractures. The adequacy of repairs made to the hull are not known as they were neither approved nor examined by the Coast Guard or a classification society. On the night of 19 February 1970 the Intrepid took an unusual roll to starboard estimated to be 60° at about 2100 hours. The reason for the roll was never fully established; however it was assumed to be the result of heavy weather. At about 2115 an attempt was made to haul in some of the tow wire; but because of the amount of water on the after deck, the crew was unable to reach the winch. Shortly afterward an internal examination of the vessel was made to determine why the stern was riding so low in the water. It was found that the watertight door leading to the lazarette could not be opened because of the water in the lazarette. Pump suction was started on this compartment. Meanwhile weather conditions worsened, and the vessel's heading was brought around into the wind and sea. At approximately 2330 the Intrepid took another heavy roll to starboard. This roll, together with further submersion of the stern, allowed water to enter the engine room resulting in the loss of all power. The vessel started sinking by the stern and was totally immersed in 10 or 15 minutes. We believe that the flooding of the after compartment and the starboard ballast tank was caused by fractures in the underwater body. The sinking of the Intrepid possibly could have been prevented by timely and adequate inspection. CONCLUSIONS

How would the passage of these

pieces of legislation improve maritime safety and decrease vessel collisions? Unification of the rules of the road would remove the confusion that exists on vessels passing from one rules of the road zone to another. The "narrow channel rule" under the Inland Rules and the "points and bends" customs would be compatible. Today a vessel operating in the Gulf of Mexico could easily be faced with the problem of operating under three different sets of rules on the same day. I have shown earlier the dramatic effect bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone has on reducing vessel collisions in the Delaware Bay. What better way is there to lessen the occurrence of vessel collisions than establishing a positive, sure and exact method of deciding how two vessels are to pass in inland waters? Bridge to bridge would not eliminate the requirements for whistle signals, but it would indeed provide an important tool to supplement the whistle and one which is entirely compatible with radar. Towboat Legislation would provide licensing requirements for vessel operating personnel. If we were to construct a graph from our statistical studies of inland towing vessel casualties, it would reveal personnel fault as the major cause of such casualties. With regard to towing vessels operating on the high seas, our studies show vessel construction and maintenance deficiencies to be the major cause of casualties. The Coast Guard has, therefore, taken the position that future legislation requiring inspection of certain categories of towboats may be required.

With each collision, the need for legislation in the areas of bridge-tobridge radiotelephone, unified rules of the road and towing vessels becomes even more urgent. These tragedies should convince us that unless preventive measures in the form of the legislation discussed are enacted, the same types of casualties will occur in greater numbers. The safety of life and property is too important to delay these positive programs.

Captain Morgan L. Howell's recently issued license bears pilotage endorsements covering more routes and more miles than anyone else known to Coast Guard licensing officials.

He has demonstrated his familiar

ity with the 1,300 miles of the St. Lawrence Seaway System and Great

Lakes between Montreal and Chi

cago. His knowledge extends 1,300 miles to the south on the Mississippi

River from St. Louis through New

Orleans Harbor. In New York, he is qualified to pilot 340 miles of the New York State Barge Canal between the Hudson and Niagara Rivers, the Hudson from Yonkers to the sea, including New York Harbor, and the Niagara River where he began his career a half century ago as a $1-aday deckhand on a sidewheeler.

Perhaps the most outstanding demonstration of his professionalism and seamanship was during the period from 1957 to 1962 when he was master of the passenger ship, SS Aquarama, a converted C-4 of 12,773 tons, which sailed daily between the busy harbors of Cleveland, Ohio, and Detroit, Mich. His unequaled proficiency in docking and undocking the light-loaded Aquarama without tug assistance in the congestion of both harbors will remain for years in the minds of the many awe-struck spectators.

Although the Aquarama has been laid up and Captain Howell is free to spend more time at home in Troy, Mich., he still enjoys "ferrying" new ships from Great Lakes shipbuilders to various ports and piloting foreign freighters through the Great Lakes. Ashore, he attends seminars in naval architecture at the University of Michigan. In an age of automation,

Captain Howell's broad ranging experience earns him great credit as a master mariner.

Economy Move Closes

Two Ports of
Merchant Marine
Library Assn.

The American Merchant Marine Library Association has closed its port offices at Norfolk and San Pedro, Calif., in a major economy move.

The organization's 1969 income totaled $126,365 against expenses of $131,974, a loss of $5,609. For the past several years, the Association has been forced to rely on its reserve funds to continue operation.

According to Mrs. George Emlen Roosevelt, AMMLA Chairman, the library system forsees no improvement in the future without substantial financial assistance from contributors.

The closing of the two ports leaves AMMLA with offices at New York, national headquarters; Boston, New Orleans, San Francisco, Seattle, and Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.

AMMLA was established in 1921 as an outgrowth of World War I library service to American merchant ships by the U.S. Shipping Board and the American Library Association. AMMLA, which is due to mark its golden anniversary next May, has distributed more than 16 million books and many more magazines to ships of the American Merchant Marine, the U.S. Coast Guard and other waterborne the operations of Government.

9

COMMANDANT'S ACTION

1

1. The record of the Marine Board of Investigation 1 convened to investigate the subject casualty has been reviewed and the record, including the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Recommendations, is approved subject to the following comments and the final determination of the cause of the casualty by the National Transportation. Safety Board.

2. At 0340 CST; 16 March 1968, the dry cargo vessel SS African Star collided in a meeting situation with the tank barge Intercity No. 11, being towed by pushing ahead of the M/V Midwest Cities in the lower Mississippi River at Mile 46 Above Head of Passes.

3. Approaching Socola Light (Mile 44.8) from New Orleans the axis of the river changes from about 143°T to 113°T at Mile 45 as it rounds Pointe a la Hache.

4. During the early morning hours of 16 March 1968, there was reported some haze and patch fog on the river. At the time of the casualty the weather was clear and the visibility was good. The radar units on the African Star and Midwest Cities were in operation before and at the time of the collision, but were not continuously observed by the watch personnel of either vessel.

5. The African Star was enroute New Orleans to Newcastle, Australia, with 11 passengers, 52 crew members and 5,364 tons of general cargo. Her speed over the bottom with a one (1) knot following current was estimated to be 16 knots. The Bolivar Maru was also down

bound and approximately 10 miles ahead of the African Star proceeding at the same speed. The respective pilots communicated with each other on portable transceivers using the frequency of 156.65 MHZ regarding traffic and weather conditions. The pilot of the Bolivar Maru reported that the African Star could expect to meet two upbound tows about Bohemia Light (Mile 44.9). Approaching Favret Light, Mile 52.5, an upbound vessel, the

Due to space limitations the Coast Guard record of the Marine Board of Investigation is not printed herein.

The small triangular object protruding from the surface of the water in the upper right corner is all that is visible of the Intercity barge. With smoke still billowing from the African Star, she rests safely aground on the bank of the river.

Hellenic Charm was sighted. Agreement was reached by communicating on 156.65 MHZ to a starboard to starboard meeting. The vessels met at Mile 50 with the Hellenic Charm in mid river and the African Star favoring the left descending bank. At 0324, the vessel's speed was slowed to half ahead when approaching Pointe a la Hache ferry crossing. Speed was increased to 21 nozzles, equivalent to about 16 knots at 0331. After clearing the Hellenic Charm, as the African Star widened to midchannel, an upbound tow was sighted above Bohemia Light. Whistle signals for a meeting situation were exchanged for a port to port passing. The tug El Cello Grande and tow favoring the left descending bank met the African Star at Mile 47. When clear of the El Cello Grande the lights of the Midwest Cities came into view. At 0336, while on a heading of 140°T, a green side light and two white lights in a vertical line were first observed off the starboard bow at a range of 1/2 miles. The record indicates that the required amber and colored side lights on the lead barge Intercity No. 14, and the white towing

lights and colored side lights on the Midwest Cities, were burning brightly. The report, however, does not reveal whether the amber light or which of the side lights on the tow or the tug were seen from the African Star. The African Star's rudder was ordered left 15° and then midship to open the range lights and to better show the green light to the Midwest Cities. As the vessels closed the African Star sounded a two blast passing signal. This was not heard on the Midwest Cities. The pilot moved to the radar scope to look at the visual presentation when he was alerted by the Third Mate that a vessel was crossing in front of the African Star. The tug and tow appeared to be crossing sides of the river in front of the African Star. Collision was imminent. The danger signal followed by one blast of the whistle was sounded by the African Star. The rudder was ordered hard right, and at 0338 stop was rung on the engine order telegraph followed by full astern at 0339. The African Star started swinging to the right when at 0340 on a heading of 153°T, the bow struck the after port side of the Intercity No. 11 at an angle of 45°.

6. The Midwest Cities enroute from Shell Terminal, Southwest Pass, La., to Texas City, Tex., via the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway was upbound in the Mississippi River making six (6) statute miles per hour over the bottom stemming a one knot current towing by pushing ahead the unmanned tank barges Intercity No. 11 and Intercity No. 14. Each barge was loaded with 19,050 barrels of crude oil. The length of the tug and barges was 611 feet. Approaching Point Michel, Mile 43.8, another upbound tow, tug El Cello Grande overtook the Midwest Cities at 0320. A passing agreement was reached by using voice radio, 2738 KHZ, whereby the El Cello Grande was to favor the right descending bank of the river. During this period, as the El Cello Grande was overtaking the Midwest Cities, a downbound freighter, the Bolivar Maru met and passed clear with the El Cello Grande starboard to starboard and with the Midwest Cities port to port. At a distance of 11⁄2 miles the range lights and red side lights of the African Star were sighted. The record and report do not reveal the range light aspect as sighted from the Midwest Cities; it did, however, determine that the port side light on the Intercity No. 14 was being displayed unscreened on an oil drum at the time of the collision. When collision was evident, the rudder of the Midwest Cities was put over to the right and the engine was put in reverse. The danger signal was sounded by the Midwest Cities, and at the same time the danger signal was heard from the African Star.

7. The crude oil cargo on the barge ignited seconds. after the collision. Several explosions on the barge caused oil to be sprayed on the African Star. The fiercely burning oil ignited many secondary fires in combustible material on board the vessel. When the fixed CO2 system was discharged to fight the fire in No. 5 hold, a flexible line ruptured between a cylinder valve and the header. This did not prevent the effectiveness of the CO2 or the containment of the fire in the hold. The African Star backed out of the barge shortly after the collision and was purposely beached on the right descending bank at Mile 45.9. The Intercity No. 11 sank in 43 feet of water about