Opinion of the Court. dated in Illinois, but signed in this State. He [the hus band] sent the paper, as soon as it was completed, not to the bank, but to another of the principals. If he represented any one but himself, it was his copartners. The delivery of the paper by his wife to him, therefore, after her signature had been attached, was not a delivery to the bank, but simply purported to give him authority as her agent to make or procure such a delivery at some subsequent time. Engagements which coverture prevents a woman from making herself. she cannot make through the interposition of an agent whom she assumes to constitute as such in the State of her domicil. If this were not so the law could always be evaded by her appointment of an attorney to act for her in the execution of contracts. No principle of comity can require a State to lend the aid of its courts to enforce a security which rests on a transgression of its own law by one of its own citizens, committed within its own territory. Such was, in effect, the act by which Mrs. Mitchell undertook to do, what she had no legal capacity to do, by making her husband the agent to deliver the guaranty to the bank. He had no more power to make it operative by delivery in Chicago to one of his creditors in Illinois than he would have had to make it operative here had it been drawn in favor of one of his creditors in Connecticut. It is not the place of delivery that controls, but the power of delivery. The Superior Court is advised to disallow all and every part of the claim of the First National Bank." Freeman's Appeal, 68 Connecticut, 533, 542. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut was rendered February 23, 1897; and on March 2, 1897, the Superior Court in conformity with the advice of the former court entered judgment disallowing the claims of the bank against the estate of Mrs. Mitchell. After this judgment the bank proceeded with the case commenced by it in the Circuit Court of the United States on the 30th day of December, 1895, just as if nothing had occurred in the state courts affecting its claim. Mrs. Mitchell on May 22, 1897, filed in that court a substitute plea in abatement, asking judgment in her favor, "because she signed said writing, Ex Opinion of the Court. hibit A,' [the writing of February 20, 1891], at her domicil in Bristol, in the State of Connecticut, and was, at the time of signing the same, a married woman, the wife of said George H. Mitchell, to whom she was married in 1857, at said Bristol, where she has ever since resided." She also filed on May 26, 1897, an answer, alleging that she signed said guaranty at her domicil in Connecticut and not elsewhere, she being then a married woman, and stating that said copartnership at the time the alleged guaranty was signed, and prior thereto, "was indebted to the plaintiff in a large sum, viz., $25,000 and more, and the plaintiff did not thereafter give said copartnership additional credit, but such indebtedness was largely reduced." Subsequently, June 8, 1897, the parties having previously stipulated in writing to waive a jury, filed in the Circuit Court an agreed statement of facts, which did not materially differ from the one filed in the Superior Court at Hartford. The Circuit Court of the United States gave judgment for the defendant. It referred to the above decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, and said among other things: "The capacity of citizens of a State, so long as they actually remain within the borders of the State, would seem to be a matter of local law, to be controlled by the laws of the State, and not to be evaded by the simple device of sending or mailing a letter to some other State. Suppose that the laws of some State should provide that infants might attain their majority and become capable of contracting at the age of eighteen years, could it be held that a minor eighteen years old in Connecticut could, by mailing a contract to that State, subject his property in Connecticut to execution against the will of his guardian and against the determination of the legislature and courts of Connecticut? . . In the present case, the law by which the invalidity of a contract is established is the common law, and the decisions that a married woman has capacity to make such contracts are founded upon local statutes. In these circumstances I think it is the duty of this court to follow the decision of the Connecticut court of last resert." 84 Fed. Kep. 90. The case was carried by the bank to the Circuit Court of Appeals, in which court the judgment was reversed with in Opinion of the Court. structions to the Circuit Court to render a judgment in favor of the bank for the amount due by the terms of the guaranty of February 20, 1891. That court, one of its members dissenting, held that the guaranty in question became effective and was to be deemed to have been made when delivered in Illinois, and that its validity as a contract was determinable by the law of that State and not by the laws of Connecticut. The court said: "We are extremely reluctant to differ with the Supreme Court of Connecticut in a case involving the same facts, between substantially the same parties, not only because the opinion of that learned tribunal is always entitled to great consideration, but also because it is, in a sense, unseemly that there should be diverse judgments under such circumstances between a Federal court sitting in that State and the highest court of the State. But the case is one which concerns the rights of a citizen of Illinois, acquired before the decision of the state court; and its decision depends, not upon the construction of local laws, but upon the application of the principles of general jurisprudence. In such cases the Federal courts are in duty bound to exercise their own independent judgment. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, we should be glad to certify the question which we have thus considered to the Supreme Court for its instructions, but we do not feel authorized to do so, especially as that tribunal, under the power to issue a certiorari, can review our judgment if it sees fit." 92 Fed. Rep. 565. In the view we take of this case it is not necessary to inquire whether the liability of Mrs. Mitchell under the writing of February 20, 1891, was determinable by the laws of Connecticut or by the laws of Illinois. If, as the bank contends, that writing became a contract when delivered to the bank in Illinois, and not before, and if, as is also contended, Mrs. Mitchell was liable thereon by the laws of that State, although she was a married woman at the time of signing the writing in Connecticut where she resided, the question remains whether the parties were not concluded by the final judgment of the Hartford County Superior Court based upon the judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. There can be no doubt that the identical question now presented-namely, as to the lia Opinion of the Court. bility of Mrs. Mitchell on the writing in suit notwithstanding her coverture arose in the Superior Court upon appeal from the allowance of the bank's claim by the Probate Court; and, as we have seen, the parties united in the request that the case be reserved for the advice of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, and the latter court upon full consideration advised the disallowance of all and every part of the bank's claim. To that advice the Superior Court, as it was compelled to do by the laws of Connecticut, conformed in its final adjudication of the bank's claim. The bank then turned to the Federal court, as if nothing had been adjudicated in the courts of Connecticut, and sought a judgment in support of the same claim that had been rejected by the state court in the case between it and the trustee of the estate of Mrs. Mitchell. We are of opinion that the bank was concluded by the judg ment in the state court. In the recent case of Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 48, we said, after an extended examination of the adjudged cases, that "a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified. This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of persons and property, if, as between parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in issue and actually deter mined by them." The authorities cited in the margin illustrate the rule.1 1 Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, 113; Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 198, 216; Opinion of the Court. It is said that the question here presented was one of general jurisprudence involving the rights of citizens of different States, and that the Circuit Court was not bound to accept the views of the state court but was at liberty, indeed under a duty, to follow its own independent judgment as to the legal rights of the parties. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20. If it were true that the question was in whole or in part one of general law, the thing adjudged by the state court when properly brought to the attention of the Circuit Court would still be conclusive between the same parties or their privies. Whatever may be the nature of a question presented for judicial determinationwhether depending on Federal, general or local law-if it be embraced by the issues made, its determination by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter binds the parties and their privies so long as the judgment remains unmodified or unreversed. It is also said that after this suit was brought in the Federal court the defendant made a voluntary assignment in insolvency under the statutes of Connecticut; that a master was appointed who took possession of all of the property assigned for the benefit of creditors; that commissioners were appointed to receive and adjust claims on her estate; and that it was necessary for the bank to present its claims to the commissioners or be forever barred from sharing in the assets of such estate. Therefore it is contended that the bank's appearance in the State court was compulsory, and that such appearance, although followed by an adverse final judgment in the state court, did not operate as a surrender of its right to thereafter proceed to final judgment in the Federal court in respect of the same matter. These suggestions are without force. We do not suppose that the bank acquired any lien upon the property of Mrs. Mitchell Thompson v. Roberts, 24 How. 233, 240; Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333, 340, 341, 343; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606, 608; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261; Lumber Co. v. Buchtel, 101 U. S. 638; Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225, 230; Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 252; Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U. S. 683, 691; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506, 518; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, 396. VOL. CLXXX- -31 |