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Opinion of the Court.

461, it was said that "this being a writ of error to a state court, we cannot take jurisdiction under the allegation that a contract has been impaired by a decision of that court, when it appears that the state court has done nothing more than construe its own constitution and statutes existing at the time when the bonds were issued, there being no subsequent legislation touching the subject." In this case, too, the plaintiff in error sought to take advantage of a change of judicial construction by the Supreme Court of the State, which had held that the bonds were void, because the acts under which they were issued were not valid laws, not having been passed in the manner directed by the constitution.

The case of the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, is much relied upon by the plaintiff in error, and is claimed to be full authority for the maintenance of the writ in this case. This was a bill by the plaintiff in error in the case under consideration to enjoin a collection of taxes upon its property. "The illegality complained of was that the tax was in violation of the company's charter, by which it was insisted the property of the company incident to its railroad operations was exempted from taxation; and it was averred that the charter, as respects the exemption claimed, was a contract irrevocable, and protected by the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States; that the unwarranted application of the general laws subsequently passed, as well as the application of the general laws in force at the time, is equivalent to a direct repeal of the charter exemption; that it is an effectual abrogation of its privilege of exemption by means of authority exercised under the State." Not only does it appear from the opinion that the taxes in question were assessed under an act passed in 1888, subsequent to the charter, but on reference to the original bill, which we have consulted for that purpose, we find that this act of April 3, 1888, was specially set up and pleaded in the bill, and was charged to be a violation of the charter contract, which exempted the orator's road from taxation, and that such application of said act was the same as a repeal or revocation of the granted exemption, and therefore in violation of the Constitution of the United States

Opinion of the Court.

forbidding such violation. In other words, the bill in that case not only pointed out the exemptions contained in the plaintiff's charter, but also set up the subsequent statute, which it was contended impaired the obligation of that contract. The bill thus contained the allegation which is wanting in this case, and put it in the power of this court to say whether the contract set up in the bill had been properly construed by the state court. This was also the case in Columbia Water Power Co. v. Columbia Electric Street Railway Co., 172 U. S. 475, and McCulloch v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102.

If jurisdiction in this case be sustained, it results that whenever a state court gives a certain construction to a contract, it is our duty to search the subsequent statutes and to find out whether there be one which, under a different construction of the contract, may be held to impair it. We must decline the obligation. As was said by the Chief Justice in Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433, 440: "If it appear from the record by clear and necessary intendment that the Federal question must have been directly involved, so that the state court could not have given judgment without deciding it, that will be sufficient; but resort cannot be had to the expedient of importing into the record the legislation of the State as judicially known to its courts, and holding the validity of such legislation to have been drawn in question, and a decision necessarily rendered thereon in arriving at conclusions upon the matters actually presented and considered." See also Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Louisville, 166 U. S. 709, 715.

It is true that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court certifies that upon the argument of this case the validity of legisla tion of the State of Mississippi subsequent to the statute of February 17, 1882, was drawn in question by the company upon the ground of its repugnacy to the Constitution of the United States; but we have repeatedly held that such certificate is insufficient to give us jurisdiction where it does not appear in the record, and that its office is to make more certain and specific what is too general and indefinite in the record. Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149; Gross v. United States Mort gage Co., 108 U. S. 477. It is said in Lawler's case that "the

Statement of the Case.

statutes complained of in this case should have been stated. Without that the court cannot apply them to the subject-matter of litigation to determine whether or not they have violated the Constitution or laws of the United States." See also Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177; Parmelee v. Lawrence, 11 Wall. 36; Powell v. Brunswick County, 150 U. S. 433, and cases cited.

The writ of error is therefore

Dismissed.

QUEEN OF THE PACIFIC.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 130. Argued and submitted December 14, 1900.-Decided January 7, 1901.

A stipulation in a bill of lading that all claims against a steamship company, or any of the stockholders of the company, for damage to merchandise, must be presented-to the company within thirty days from the date of the bill of lading, applies, though the suit be in rem, against the steamship carrying the property covered by the bill of lading.

In the view of the facts that the loss occurred the day after the bill of lading was signed, and the shippers were notified of such loss within three days thereafter, the stipulation was a reasonable one, and a failure to present the claim within the time limited was held a bar to recovery against the company in personam or against the ship in rem.

The reasonableness of such notice depends upon the length of the voyage, the time at which the loss occurred, and all the other circumstances of the case.

THIS was a joint libel by the Bancroft-Whitney Company, a California corporation, and the firm of Hellman, Haas & Com ́pany against the steamship, Queen of the Pacific, owned by the Pacific Coast Steamship Company, to recover damages to certain miscellaneous merchandise shipped April 29, 1888, at San Francisco, to consignees at San Pedro in the State of California.

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Statement of the Case.

The contracts of affreightment were evidenced by bills of lading in the usual form and with the usual exception of perils of the sea, and amongst others with the following stipulation:

"It is expressly agreed that all claims against the P. C. S. S. Co., or any of the stockholders of said company, for damage to or loss of any of the within merchandise, must be presented to the company within thirty days from date hereof; and that after thirty days from date hereof, no action, suit or proceeding, in any court of justice, shall be brought against said P. C. S. S. Co., or any of the stockholders thereof, for any damage to or loss of said merchandise; and the lapse of said thirty days shall be deemed a conclusive bar and release of all right to recover against said company, or any of the stockholders thereof, for any such damage or loss.”

The steamship left San Francisco about two o'clock in the afternoon of April 29, 1888, bound for the port of San Diego and intermediate ports, having on board a cargo of general merchandise and upwards of two hundred persons. A little more than twelve hours after she sailed, and about half past two o'clock in the morning of the 30th, the steamer was seen to have sprung a leak and to be taking in water through a watertight compartment known as the starboard alleyway. At this time she had a list of from five to eight degrees to starboard, which, when she reached Port Harford, four or five hours afterwards, had increased to an angle of thirty degrees. When about two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards from the wharf, where she usually made her landing, she took the bottom in about twenty-three feet of water, and in about twenty minutes thereafter filled, sank and lay in a helpless condition for three or four days. A diver, procured for that purpose, after repeated efforts, found the leak and stopped it, whereupon the water was pumped out of the vessel, and she was towed to San Francisco, where she arrived the next day. Her cargo was all discharged upon the wharf, and delivery thereof tendered and accepted by the several owners, who gave the usual average bonds. On May 19, that portion of the cargo belonging to Hellman, Hass & Company was sold by them at public auction. No claim for damage to the merchandise was made

Opinion of the Court.

upon the owners of the Queen prior to the sale, nor were they invited to such sale. In short, nothing further appears to have been done for nearly four years, though the steamer was constantly running to and from San Francisco, when on April 28, 1892, this libel was filed. Exceptions to the libel were interposed and overruled, (61 Fed. Rep. 213,) and the case subsequently went to a hearing upon libel, answers and testimony, and resulted in a decree for the libellants for the full amount of their claim, (78 Fed. Rep. 155,) which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 94 Fed. Rep. 180. Whereupon this writ of certiorari was granted.

Mr. Thomas B. Reed for the Pacific Coast Steamship Company.

Mr. Milton Andros for the Bancroft-Whitney Company and others.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The Court of Appeals in its opinion dwelt upon several propositions arising upon the pleadings and evidence, but in the view we have taken of the case we shall find it necessary to discuss but one, which is, in substance, that the libellants did not, as required by the bill of lading, present to the company their claims for damage to the merchandise within thirty days from the date of the bills of lading, April 27 and 28, 1888. There is no pretence of a compliance with this condition. Two answers are made to this defence: First, that the limitation applies only to claims against the steamship company or any of the stockholders of said company, and not to claims against the vessel; second, that the limitation is unreasonable.

1. The first objection is quite too technical. It virtually assumes that there were two contracts, one with the company and one with the ship, the vehicle of transportation owned and employed by the company; and that while the company as to all its other property is protected by the contract, as to this

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