Counsel for Parties.

found payable to said plaintiff, and $22.70 for costs and charges about said suit expended, as appears of record, and return this writ into the clerk's office of said court within 60 days so endorsed as to show when and how you have executed the same. "Witness the Honorable Edward F. Bingham, chief justice of said court, the 19th day of February, A. D. 1896.

Seal of the Supreme Court of the Dis

trict of Columbia here imprinted.

By

"JOHN R. YOUNG, Clerk.

- Assistant Clerk." This execution was levied upon lot K in James Crutchett's subdivision of lots in square No. 755, in this city. Advertisement of sale was made in the ordinary form, and on May 9 (the day named for the sale) the principal defendant, plaintiff herein, paid the amount of $89.94 to satisfy the execution and prevent a sale. The value of the lot thus levied upon was $1800.

Thereafter, and on May 8, 1899, this action was commenced in the Supreme Court of the District, the declaration setting forth a copy of the judgment and execution, alleging the levy and the advertisement, averring that the lot was the separate property of the plaintiff, that she was a married woman and that George C. W. Magruder, the surety against whom judgment was also rendered, was her husband. The declaration also alleged that the judgment was rendered for witness fees, but was without law or merit; that both judgment and execution were void because not in terms limited by the rights which belonged to her as a married woman; that efforts were made by her to quash the execution and to appeal from the proceedings had upon such efforts, but that they failed, and that, therefore, she paid the sum of $89.94 to prevent the sale and save her property. As damages the sum of $6000 was claimed. A demurrer to this declaration was sustained, judgment entered for the defendants, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and thereupon this writ of error was sued out.

Mr. Jackson H. Ralston for defendants in error.

Mr. Joseph J. Waters for plaintiff in error submitted on his brief.

VOL. CLXXX-32

Opinion of the Court.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The jurisdiction of this court in ordinary actions in the District of Columbia is limited to cases in which the amount in controversy is over $5000. Act of February 9, 1893, c. 74,

8, 27 Stat. 434, 436. The fact, as disclosed by the declaration, is that plaintiff paid less than $90 to preserve from sale property worth only $1800. Everything which the defendants did was done by virtue of an order or judgment of a court of this District, having full jurisdiction. Whether such judgment was simply irregular or absolutely void, plaintiff cancelled all her liabilities by the payment of a sum less than $90, and the only property of hers endangered by their action she avers was worth $1800. It is true that in the declaration she charges illegality and spite, but such language is mere matter of epithet. We are guided by the facts as they are stated. There was no personal violence, no insult; nothing which sometimes rightfully opens the door to punitive damages. Finding that property of the value of $1800 was, as she thought, endangered, she paid $90 to escape the danger. Obviously her assertion that she was damaged to the amount of $6000 was without legal foundation and only made with the purpose of securing a review in this court. Nothing in the facts justified any such assertion. Jurisdiction cannot be vested in this court by a mere claim of damages, unsupported by facts. We do not care to enter into any discussion of this question, but refer simply to Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, 115 U. S. 611, and cases cited in the opinion. The writ of error will be

Dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

MINNESOTA v. BRUNDAGE.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

No. 159. Argued February 28, 1901.- -Decided March 18, 1901.

The principle reaffirmed that when the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under an alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations, the courts of the United States have frequently interposed by writs of habeas corpus and discharged prisoners who were held in custody under state authority; so, also, when they are in the custody of a state officer, it may be necessary, by use of the writ, to bring them into a court of the United States to testify as witnesses.

But the power of the Federal court upon habeas corpus to discharge one held in custody by state officers or tribunals in violation of the Constitution of the United States ought not to be exercised in every case immediately upon application being made for the writ. Except in cases of emergency, such as are above defined, the applicant should be required to exhaust such remedies as the State gives to test the question of the legality, under the Constitution of the United States, of his detention in custody.

THE case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. W. B. Douglas for appellant.

Mr. William D. Guthrie for appellee. Mr. Albert H. Veeder was on his brief.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellee Brundage was arrested under a warrant issued

Opinion of the Court.

by the Municipal Court of Minneapolis, Minnesota, upon the complaint under oath of the Inspector of the State Dairy and Food Department of that State charging him with having violated a statute of Minnesota approved April 19, 1899, entitled "An act to prevent fraud in the sale of dairy products, their imitations or substitutes, to prohibit and prevent the manufacture or sale of unhealthy or adulterated dairy products, and to preserve the public health." Gen: Laws, Minnesota, 1899, c. 295.

The specific offence charged was that the accused, in the county of Hennepin, Minnesota, "did wilfully, unlawfully and wrongfully offer and expose for sale, and have in his possession with intent to sell, a quantity of a certain compound designed to take the place of butter, and made in part from animal and vegetable oils and fats not produced from milk or cream, said compound being an article commonly known as oleomargarine, and being then and there colored with a coloring matter whereby the said article and compound was made to resemble butter, contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Minnesota."

He was adjudged to be guilty and to pay a fine of twentyfive dollars and costs, or in default thereof to be committed to the workhouse to undergo hard labor for thirty days, unless he sooner paid the fine and costs or was thence discharged by due course of law.

Having been taken into custody in execution of the judgment, Brundage presented his application to the Circuit Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States. That court held the statute to be unconstitutional and discharged the accused from the custody of the state authorities.

The State insists, upon this appeal, that the statute, at least in the particulars applicable to this case, was consistent with the Constitution of the United States.

This question is one of great importance, but we do not deem it necessary now to consider it; for in our opinion the Circuit Court should have denied the application for the writ of habeas corpus, without prejudice to a renewal of the same after the

Opinion of the Court.

accused had availed himself of such remedies as the laws of the State afforded for a review of the judgment in the state court of which he complains.

We have held, upon full consideration, that although under existing statutes a Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction upon habeas corpus to discharge from the custody of state officers or tribunals one restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution of the United States, it is not required in every case to exercise its power to that end immediately upon application being made for the writ. "We cannot suppose," this court has said, Ex parte Royall, "that Congress intended to compel those courts, by such means, to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control of all criminal prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the case summarily, and thereupon 'to dispose of the party as law and justice require,' (R. S. § 761,) does not deprive the court of discretion as to the time and mode in which it will exert the powers conferred upon it. That discretion should be exercised in the light of the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the State, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution. When the petitioner is in custody by state authority for an act done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the United States, or of an order, process or decree of a court or judge thereof; or where, being a subject or citizen of a foreign State, and domiciled therein, he is in custody, under like authority, for an act done or omitted under an alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection or exemption claimed under the commission, or order, or sanction of any foreign State, or under color thereof, the validity and effect whereof depend upon the law of nations; in such and like cases of urgency, involving the authority and operations of the General Government, or the obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign na