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seven thousand and thirty-one men, that of the militia seventy-eight thousand eight hundred and thirty-one men. In January, 1804, the former was 136,480, the latter 85,519, and our present strength, 25th December, 1811, according to the statement in the note, is, regulars 218,949, militia, 77,159.--As the population of Great Britain has increased more than 1,600,000 during the last eleven years, and of that number, 861,256, are males, can it be doubted for a moment, that we are competent to raise a much larger armed force, and to raise them as *effective men, liable to serve in all parts, not merely the resemblance of soldiers, who, in the hour of danger, have no experience to guide them, and can only be depended upon as to courage and fidelity.
The arıny and navy of Great Britain have, together, increased 169,902, since 1801, and the male population, as above mentioned, has augmented 851,256. It cannot be asserted, notwithstanding the numerous inclosures, that a greater number of men are required for tillage and manufactures thau were in 1801, when the improvements in machinery of all kinds are considered, by which the labour of at least twelve men is now performed by one. Here there is a surplus of 681,354 male children, and consequently, at least, as great an additional number of men capable of bearing arms. Who can, therefore, be surprised at the rapid increase of † paupers throughout the country, or at the necessities of mechanics, of those out of employment, and at the want of labour. The average of casualties in the army is about 23,300 annually ; and I therefore with confidence assert, that an additional force of 50,000 men might be raised for service, and kept up during the war, without injury either to the agriculture or manufacturing interest of the country. I admit that the support of such a force will require no inconsiderable sum (about 150,000l.) It must, at the same time, be admitted, that the distressed state of the lower orders throughout Great Britain and Ireland will oblige the couutry to take some step for their support : and would it not be more adviseable to make their services useful in opposing the measures of our enemy, than by continuing them as paupers, and burthensome to the state.
St. PHILIP, May 10, 1812.
*“ Effective and well-disciplined forces are the best (they will ultimately be found the cheapest for every state), and that, without the agency of these, Great Britain can pever be secured at home, command dominion abroad, and, far less, effect that revolution in the political world which may restore Europe to any degree of equilibrium."
General Reform of the British Land Forces, &c. + Statement of the numbe of poor persons relieved by the Liverpool Committee, from the 3d to the 24th January, 1812.
15,350 An increasc from 8,988 to 15,350, or 7,062 during the month, independent of thuse persons supported from the parish rates in this commercial town; and thus it may be seen, that, from the want of employment, the number of paupers bas kept pace with the population.
IT is, however, true, that those obstacles do not occur to Russian soldiers on a march. The recruits in general receive either from their parents or from their parish sufficient money to indulge their inclination while on the road; and notwithstanding the paucity of inns, they always meet them before their supply of spirits is totally expended ; and as they march in parties, escorted by old soldiers, who know the roads, and set them an example of drunkenness, they are scarcely ever found sober, or without a certain portion of liquor in reserve; especially as the unhappy recruits, seeking to drown the misery of reflection, have ever recourse to brandy; for among an hundred, there is seldom to be found a single one who does not regard bis future life with horror and dread. To obviate this evil, and conquer their inclination to strong liquors, the recruits, ou joining their corps, are deprived of the money remaining with them.The precaution is, however, taken too late, and perhaps it would be more prudent to leave the remainder of their money to their own disposal ; for the evil is already rooted, and in their own mind they lament the privation of an enjoyment they had been habituated to during several weeks, and by the service itself.
The military profession, at the commencement, is more painful to the Russian recruit than it is to that of any other country ; without mentioning the bodily constraint while at exercise, his tongue is submitted to a drill no less rigorous and fatiguing; it is exercised before either his hands or his feet, as the most indispensable, inasmuch as of an bundred words that the noviciate will want, he knows not ove; now this drill must of course add to the difficulty and to the unpleasantness of a soldier's life,
The Russian soldier must speak with the greatest correctness ; the long titles due to every rauk of officers, from the ensign up to the general, as well as many others, regarding their birth and civil rank. Until the peasant enters the service, all these words are unknown to him ; for the common appellation given to superiors is little father, little mother, or simply Sir and Madam.
The difficulty of retaining new words at a certain age is proverbial ; but this must angment very considerably, when it becomes requisite to remember and distinguish between many words of similar import, especially if they are, like the Russian titles, of great length and harsh enunciation.
During their apprenticeship (for so it surely may be called), the recruits are as often encamped as they would be during active warfare ; for every regiment is under canvas from the month of May to that of August; where, no straw being allowed, the soldier sleeps on the naked,
and often damp earth. If he mounts guard, he commonly remaivs there fifteen successive days; but should illness befall him, the government is as careful of him as his piother would be. No expence has been spared to make the hospitals good and comfortable: large structures have been built in most of the priucipal towns, and a number of medical men have been attached to them. Every requisite article of medicine, food, and drink, is ordered to be supplied the sick, without regard to the expence. Notwithstanding which, the soldier has a great repugnance to enter an hospital ; and if driven into it, he hastens to get out as soon as possible. This, of itself, is surely a bad sign; but the worst of it is, that the officers employed in these hospitals are regarded as fortunate ; and when once placed there, would willingly pass the remainder of their days in them; though, according to the strict rules of the service, they should be but a year in those stations, which arrangement was no doubt intended by the government to prevent abuses in the administration of those necessary and humane establishments. Perhaps, however, these situations are regarded as a means of enabling every officer in his tarn to participate in the emoluments attached to them, which, from the avidity with which they are solicited, one would be tempted to imagine was the case. From this desire of the soldiers to quit the hospitals, and of the officers to enter them, no unjust idea may be formed of the manner in which they are conducted. But what has been said above regards enly those hospitals of battalions in garrison.
(To be continued.)
ON THE USE OF SABRES.
SIR,-AS it is not my wish to take up the place of more valuable works in your book, I wish you would hint how much the use of sabres would benefit the army, and on service I would recommend a waist belt, as it is much handier and cleaner. I do not know if it is known, that the late Major Sir George Richardson, of the 64th, lost his life at the capture of St. Lucia in 1803, by having a regulatiou sword on, as a reguJar fight took place between him and a French officer, who, after wounding and overpowering Sir George, was himself wounded by a light company man of the 64th. He however recovered, but Sir George died a short time after at Barbadoes, universally lamented, being an excellent officer, and an amiable private character. Your well wisher,
TRUTH. This letter would have been inserted sooner, but was mislaid by some accident. I did not know Sir G. R. himself, but as I have the pleasure of being intimate with his family, it gives me a more than ordinary satisfaction is publishing this tribute of acknowledgment from a brother Officer.
EDITOR.-H. Jersey, 1812.
Elements of the Art of War.
ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF WAR.
ART OF WAR.-PART FOURTA.
CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT OF AN ARMY THROUGH ALL. THE OPERI
TIONS OF A CAMPAIGN, BY GENERAL COUNT TURPIN.
Of Detachments for forming a Chair of green Forage. THOSE operations, whose object is the subsistence of the troops, require the exactest precaution ; for famiue, as Vegetius says, proves often times more destructire to armies than battles, hanger being more fatal than the sword. A general cam defend bimself agajast an enemy, bowever superior; but when forage and protisous are wanting, there can be no hope remaining.
It is very difficult to provide a large army with forage; and a general often er. poses it to inevitable danger, if he is not thoroughly experienced in this operation, or if he is destitute of that knowledge which at once presents all the wants of an amy, and the means of supplying them, to bis view.
Foraging parties, like convoys, are atteoded with a greater or lesser degree of dan, ger, according as the country is more or less accessible, and the furage at « distance, or near at hand. The disposition for a chaiu in an open country is different from what it must be in a mountainous one ; when forage is within reach of the camp, and the enemy at a distance, fewer troops and attendants are required, because, in in case of an attack, there is assistance near at haud; but in proportion as the fonge is further from the camp and scarer to the enemy, the precautions should be increased, and more troops sbould be allotted to the chain, which should also sounctimes be furnished with canuon.
A general should never forget that maxim which says, The enemy must always be opposed by troops of the same nature as those with which he makes the attack; if the forage, therefore, is in an open country, the chain, as it is certain the enemy will be more numerous in cavalry than infantry, should consist chiefly of cavalry, and only have infantry sufficient to occupy such posts as are necessary to be guarded; in a mountainous country the dispositions will be quite different; because, as it is impossible for caralry to move easily, the chain should be strongest in infantry. In short, the number and quality of the troops for the cbain should be regulated in the same manner as in regard to the convoys ; in proportion to the nearness or distance of the enemy; by the extent of ground to be foraged; and by the nature of the country; and, as Marshal Puysegur observes, before the ground to be foraged is examined, there should be a calculation made of the number of horses to be fed, and of the fertility of the ground that is to be foraged; for if it is a plentiful spot, a less extent will be sufficient; if it is not plentiful, a larger must be taken ; but in either case the chain must be always proportionable.
Before a forage is undertaken, the ground on whieh it is to be perfornted should be always thoroughly known, in order for which the General should send out in the evening, or the day before, the officer who is to commend it, with a detach
Elements of the Art of War.
ment to survey the situation of the country; the places where' he must post his troops of cavalry and dragoons; the posts which the infantry must occupy; the ground necessary for the foragers; that where the corps of reserve must be posted; and what part in the front of tlie chain it will be necessary for the hussars to scour. After baviug examined all these particulars, the officer makes his report to the General, who, from the account given him, will order the troups necessary to secure the forage, and render the execution of it easy. The chain of forage should be in proportion to the number of troops that are to forage, as well as to the quantity of sown fields and the thickness of the grain. Besides the horse, dragoons, and infantry, there should be bussars to scour the country in the front of the chain: the number of them is undetermined, as it will be sufficient for them to cover and protect the front, and give the commanding officer immediate notice of every thing that makes its appearance.
If the forage is to be made at a distance from the camp, the troops destined for the chain should set out at day-break, or the evening of the foregoing night, as was done by Marshal de Coigoy in the campaign of 1735. This General, being desirous of foraging under the cannon of Mentz, the troops taken from the army to form the chain, one body under the command of the Count de Belleisle, pow a Marshal of France, and the other under the command of the Marquis de Dreax, set out after retreat-beating, and at break of day the chain found itself properly placed. When the distance is not so great, it is sufficieut that the troops set out at day-break, and the General will have time enough to establish his chain ; especially as the ground, and the posts necessary to be occupied, have been surveyed two days before. The commanding officer must take care to establish the chain before the foragers arrive, and also that the hussars have scoured the country; first, because the foragers shonld not, by waiting, fatigue the borses, and secondly, that no trooper or servant shall pass; which will unduubtedly be the case, if there is any vacancy where troops are not placed.
The whole of the troops should be disposed after such a manner, as to be able to see one another; and the vedets also that are placed between the troops, to prevent the foragers from passing, should be within hearing. The infantry should be posted in hollows and villages, and behind hedges, with horse or dragoons to sustain it, and support the flanks; and the disposition of the chain will be still better, if these troops can be mixed with it, provided the infantry can be sheltered by any hotlows, hedges, or bushes.
Grenadiers sustained by horse and cannon, if there are any, should be posted on those sides which, either from the situation of the country, or the nearness of the enemy, are most liable to be attacked; but in reiuforcing these posts, the commanding officer must be careful not to weaken the chain too much in arty particular part. When an enemy attacks a foraging party, he generally attempts to penetrate at different parts; but if he forms only one attack, the disposision of the chain becomes useless, as all the troops must be brought to that part where the attack is made. But as it is naturally to be supposed the enemy will form many attacks, particularly if his general acts like a man understanding his business, he must be strong in every part; the reserve, which is in the centre, will, with expedition and speed, send assistance to the parts which are attacked.
Before the commanding officer fixes the chain, he should detach some hussars te survey and scoar, with great exactness, the woods, villages, bollows, and all such places, for at least three quarters of a league or' a league in front, as may be capable of containing ambuscades : and during the time of this surveying, the troops destined for the chain will remain in order of battle, in the front of the ground that is to be foraged, in order to cover it and protect the liussars, in case they should be attacked.